























Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 

















Victor Serge: Political, Social & Literary Critic of 
the USSR, 1919-1947; The Reflections and 
Activities of a Belgo-Russian Revolutionary 
Caught In the Orbit of Soviet Political History
Susan Claudia Weissman
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, at the 
Institute of Soviet and East European Studies of the 
University of Glasgow, March 1991
Copyright © Susan C. Weissman, 1991
ProQuest Number: 10983769
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10983769
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Acknowledgement s
I am grateful to many people for the kind and generous 
support shown me during the years it took to write this 
dissertation. I would like to thank Hillel Ticktin, my thesis 
supervisor, friend and teacher, Vlady Kibalchich for sharing his 
archive, personal reminiscences and enlightening discussions, to 
both Vlady and his wife Isabel Diaz for opening their home to me 
on several occasions, and for Isabel's recollections of Serge. 
Thanks to Jeanine Kibalchich, Serge's daughter, who shared her 
childhood memories of her father and photos from the family 
album, and took me to Laurette Sejourne, Serge's third wife who 
generously consented to answering my questions. Thanks to 
Richard Greeman who shared his personal Serge archive, 
unpublished writings and several years of lively discussions, 
John Eden for commenting on drafts and sending me copies of 
taped interviews and material collected for his projected film 
on Serge; to Hryhory Kostiuk for his personal correspondence 
with Serge, Richard Kuper for sending me the unpublished Trotsky- 
Serge correspondence left by Peter Sedgwick, David Cotterill, 
Bill Marshall, and Alan Wald for sharing Serge documents in 
their possession, to Sergei Zavarotnyi of Komsomolskaya Pravda 
for his considerable help in Moscow and for leading me and Vlady 
to Irina Gogua, Serge's niece who spent 21 years in Vorkuta and 
Ukhta. I am grateful to Irina Gogua for allowing me to tape and 
photograph her first reunion with Vlady in 57 years, to Sieva 
Volkov, Trotsky's grandson, for all his help and encouragement, 
and Manuel Alvarado, Left Oppositionist and friend of Serge's 
who recounted political discussions he had with Serge in Mexico, 
Pierre Broue who answered my many questions and sent me obscure 
letters of Serge's from Precigne, the French concentration camp: 
to Paco Ignacio Taibo II for sharing his material on Serge's 
anarchist days in Spain, and to Alejandro Galvez Cancino for his 
copies of Mundo. the obscure journal of Serge's political group 
in Mexico.
I am grateful to Columbia University Library's Serge 
Archive, Yale University Library for the Dwight and Nancy 
Macdonald Papers, Harvard University's Houghton Library for the 
Trotsky Archive, and a special thanks for the warm and 
cooperative assistance of archivists Elena Danielson, Dale Reed 
and Carole Leadenham of the Hoover Institution on War, 
Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, for consistently 
sending me Serge material from the Boris Nicolaevsky Collection 
of the Hoover archive, and for giving me first preview of the 
Serge-Sedov correspondence found in this archive. A very 
special thanks to Alex Buchman, (one of Trotsky's guards at 
Coyoacan) whose continued moral, material and intellectual 
support made many of my research trips possible.
I am very grateful to Robert E. Wahl, Michel Bolsey, Greg 
Jacks and Jon Amsden for their considerable skill in helping me 
decipher, transcribe and translate Serge's Russian and French 
handwritten letters and manuscripts, written on the cheapest 
flimsy, photocopied poorly.
Various chapters were read by Jon Amsden, Richard Greeman 
and John Eden, and Lee Smith gave the whole thesis his expert 
editor's eye. Edward Taylor provided me with a work space for 
two years and much friendly encouragement as did Jerry Weissman, 
Marc Cooper, Dr. Irving Weissman, James Petras, Diane Poliak, 
Lauren Weissman, and Michael Lauer, who helped me in every 
computer emergency.
Finally I'd like to say NO THANKS to Marc Zborowsky, who 
successfully rebuffed my every request, for hanging up on me and 
shutting the door in my face, to the FBI's FOI-PA (Freedom of 
Information-Privacy Acts) section for deleting so much of the 
text of the released intelligence files on Serge and Zborowsky 
to make reading them a true detective's task.
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Maurice and Perle 
Weissman for their unconditional support, and to Roberto 




Introduction......................................   xi
CHAPTER ONE: IN THE SERVICE OF THE REVOLUTION:
1917-1921..................................  1
1.1 On the way to Petrograd...........................  1
1.2. Serge encounters Bolshevism and Marxism......... 3
1.3. In Revolutionary Russia........................ 6
1.4. From Anarchism to Bolshevism...................... 8
1.5. Serge the Bolshevik in Comintern and Civil War . . 15
1.6. Serge's Civil War Writings....................... 24
Industry: workers control or blanket
nationalization?.........................  31
Brest-Litovsk, Left Communists, and
Socialist Democracy ...................  33
Finland.................................    38
1.7. Civil War: Cheka, Terror, and Revolutionary
Repression....................................  43
1.8. Poland and Stalin' s March on Lvov .............  51
1.9. War Communism, Kronstadt, Emergent
Totalitarianism ..........    54
Kronstadt ...............................  60
Emergent Totalitarianism .............. 67
1.10. Bureaucratic Centralism + NEP, or 'Communism
of associations'?.......   69
1.11. Disillusionment and romantic retreat ........... 72
CHAPTER TWO: ON COMINTERN ASSIGNMENT IN BERLIN AND
VIENNA 1922-1926........    75
2.1 Petrograd to Berlin: Impressions................  75
2.2 Serge's Activities as Comintern Agent in Berlin .. 77
2.3. Conditions in Germany: Background...............  80
2.4 Serge Returns to Moscow......................  86
2.5 Back to Berlin: Russia, the Comintern and the
German Revolution of 1923...................  88
2.6 "The Russian Model of Revolution"................ 90
2.7 The 'Aborted1 German October.  ..........  94
2.9 Watching And Waiting In Vienna: 1923-1925 ....  101
2.10 Writings from Vienna  ......................  106
Serge on Soviet cultural trends and the role
of literature in revolution................  109
2.11 Serge and the Left Opposition.............  116
CHAPTER THREE: BACK IN THE USSR —  THE LEFT
OPPOSITION STRUGGLES 1926-1928.... 121
3.1 Bolshevism at an impasse...................  121
3.2 Serge's view of the Bolshevik's monopoly of
power: the revolution self-destructs .....  124
3.3 Inside the Bolshevik Party.................  127
3.4 The Troika and the anti-Trotsky campaign. 130
3.5 Changing composition of Bolshevik Party and the
rise of bureaucracy..................... 136
3.6 The economic roots of the problem and the
issues at stake: the debates of the 1920 's 139
3.7 Victor Serge: Left Opposition activist....  147
3.8 The fight to be heard . . . for five minutes .... 155
3.9 The Revolution's Tenth Anniversary......... 160
3.10 Expulsion....................................  163
3.11 Joffe's funeral, exile of Oppositionists...
the issue of capitulation...............  164
3.12 Serge's writings on the Chinese revolution .... 172
3.13 The Left Opposition and the Chinese revolution 178
3.14 The Opposition vanquished..................  184
3.15 Arrest.......................................  185
CHAPTER FOUR: STALINIZATION......................... 189
I. 1928-1933: The Bureaucratic Counter-revolution, 
solitary struggles in precarious 
freedom.............................  189
4.1 "Our Intellectual Activity is Prodigious, Our
Political Action Nil.".................  189
4.2 The ' Inner Counterrevolution' : From NEP to
Nightmare................................  196
4.3 The Vocation of Defeated Revolutionists:
Serge, the Clandestine Oppositionist 
in Precarious Liberty..................  206
4.4 "Soviets 1929".....  212
4.5 "Build, build, build, export, shoot, build:"
Serge's view of the First Five Year Plan . . 221
4.6 Resistance.......................................  226
4.7 Stalin's system................................. 228
4.8 The Trials Begin —  Even Silence is Suspect . . 229
4.9 The Remaining Left Oppositionists Purged  240
4.10 Persecution comes home.........................  246
4.11 Serge's Last Testament.........................  249
Chapter Four: Section II ORENBURG 1933-1936 ......  255
II. INTERROGATION AND DEPORTATION: DIGGING THE
GRAVES OF THE REVOLUTION...................  255
4.12 Crimes of Existence................    255.
4.13 Orenburg.........................................  262
4.14 The Crossroads.................................. 270
4.15 Underestimating the fire of the dragon.......  273
4.16 Writings to Nowhere: Paid.....................  282
4.17 L'Affair Victor Serge..........................  283
4.18 Expulsion and Theft............................  288
4.19 The Hunt for the Missing Manuscripts..........  296
4.20 Postscript.......................................  299
4.21 Appendix.........................................  301
CHAPTER FIVE: ANOTHER EXILE AND TWO MORE:
THE FINAL YEARS........   304
5.1 Introduction......................................  304
5.2 A Question of Style.............................  317
5.3 Spring 1936: Belgian socialists are fat........  319
5.4 Trotsky-Serge and Serge-Sedov Correspondence of
Spring and Summer 1936: Reunion of Left
Oppositionist Exiles..........................32 4
5.5 Unraveling the Labyrinth (of Madness): Victor
Serge and the Purges.......................  339
5.6 The Confessions: Why?............................ 346
5.7 The Revolution In Reaction...................  351
5.8 Intellectual Impotence, Moral Complicity: The
Role of Communists and Fellow Travelers in
the West......................................  358
5.9 The tentacles of the NKVD in Europe: Serge and
Reiss, Krivitsky, Barmine, Sedov, Zborowsky 
—  The Web of Blackness Extends............. 363
5.10 Etienne, Serge and Trotsky: Between Two Left
Oppositionists, the NKVD?...................  384
5.11 The 'Priere d'lnserer': Who wrote it and to
what end?...........................   387
5.12 The Fourth International, Kronstadt Debate,
the POUM ....................................  396
SECTION II: FROM PARIS TO MARSEILLES, MARSEILLES TO
MEXICO:THE LONG LAST JOURNEY FROM 
NIGHTMARE TO REFUGE...................  412
5.13 "When Paris Ends, the World Ends".............  412
5.14 The Sense of History...........................  413
5.15 The Macdonalds, and Marseilles:
A shipwrecked continent with too few 
lifebelts, and too many castaways.........  422
5.16 The Emergency Rescue Committee ...............  429
5.17 Villa AirBel —  Chateau Espere-Visa...........  432
5.18 From Marseilles to Martinique to Mexico:
The visa hunt, the FBI and Serge.........  444
5.19 From Mexico, Whither the USSR?................  453
5.20 Stalinism, the emergence of the technocracy




Victor Serge: Political, Social & Literary Critic of the USSR, 
1919-1947; The Reflections and Activities of a Belgo-Russian 
Revolutionary Caught In the Orbit of Soviet Political History
Victor Serge is known primarily as a revolutionary 
novelist, yet his work has received little scholarly literary 
attention. Two doctoral dissertations have explored Serge's 
literary expression in the last twenty-five years. This study 
is the first examination of Serge's historical and political- 
economic writings on the Soviet Union, based on his published 
and unpublished writings.
Victor Serge is a unique political figure whoutilized 
various literary forms to express his view of the nature of the 
social-political-economic system established during Stalin's 
rule. Pamphleteer, historian, poet, novelist, biographer, 
memoirist and journalist. Serge was at once Russian, Belgian, 
French and Spanish; he was anarchist, syndicalist, Bolshevik, 
Left Oppositionist, prisoner and refugee. Serge's experiences in 
the Soviet Union and international communist movement form the 
basis of his political and literary writings. Serge was a 
committed writer with a novelist's eye for detail and 
penetrating description.
The dissertation begins with Serge's arrival in his never 
seen homeland. Born Victor Lvovich Kibalchich in Belgian exile 
to Russian narodniki parents, Serge was drawn to the land of the 
first socialist revolution, the country of his roots and his 
language. He arrived as an anarcho-bolshevik with two prison 
terms and a failed insurrection behind him. In the next twenty 
years, Serge participated in the Bolshevik party, the Comintern, 
and the Left Opposition. He was sent to Germany on Comintern 
assignment, where he participated in the aborted revolution of 
October 1923, and edited the French language edition of 
Inprecor. He was a rank-and-file militant of the Leningrad Left
Opposition, though on intimate terms with its leaders. Like 
most of the 'revolutionary generation of Bolsheviks,' he endured 
imprisonment and deportation. Unlike them, Serge was saved from 
certain death through an international campaign of pressure for 
his release. Though Serge was expelled from the USSR in 1936, he 
did not end his association with its he spent the remainder of 
his life contemplating and acting upon his experience in the 
disfigured revolution.
This thesis investigates Serge's critique of the Soviet 
Union through his life and works. We follow his political 
associations and relations, record his analysis and draw out his 
insights. Serge's mature reflections on the Soviet Union and 
the world are seen through a comprehensive study of his 
experiences and writings from the twenties and thirties in the 
Soviet Union and in European exile. The aim of this work is to 
establish Victor Serge as a contemporary thinker, a man whose 
life spans the tumultous struggles of the first half of the 
twentieth century, while his ideas speak to the problems 
humanity faces on the eve of the twenty-first. His largely 
unpublished or out of print work addresses the key theoretical 
problems of Soviet society as well as the impact that society 
has had on the world struggle for socialism. Victor Serge 
considered the Soviet system under Stalin an anti-human, 
totalitarian bureaucratic society with collectivist tendencies, 
that was neither socialist nor capitalist. It could only 
establish itself through a bloody counter-revolution which 
killed millions while retaining the language of socialism. The 
new system was inherently unstable and in permanent conflict 
with its own people. It is this legacy that the Soviet Union 
today is attempting to reform. Serge's analysis is at times 
uneven, though his thinking is fresh, and scrupulously honest. 
Serge is seen as the historian of the Left Opposition, an 
instinctive, unorthodox and non-sectarian Marxist who retained 
his dignity and optimism for a socialist future, through the 
darkest decades of defeats.
Introduction
Soviet political history is filled with dark pages and 
'blank spots.' The rich and hotly contested development 
theories debated in the 1920's in the Soviet Union, accompanied 
by divisions within the CPSU(B) have been suppressed, just as 
all their leaders and supporters were repressed in the brutal 
purges of the 1930s. Both decades of Soviet history were 
literally written off in the USSR. Gorbachev implicitly 
recognized that in order to reform the Soviet present, there was 
a need for an understanding of social reality, which 
necessitated a rediscovery of the past. Within this context, and 
in order to discredit the heirs of Stalin in the Soviet regime, 
Gorbachev unleashed glasnost and called for a probe into the 
"blank spots" in Soviet history. This study concerns one of 
those blank spots —  the life and work of Victor Serge, 
dissident and oppositionist from 1923 until his expulsion from 
the gulag in 1936.
Victor Serge lived from 1890 to 1947. He was politically 
active in seven countries, participated in three revolutions, 
spent more than ten years in captivity, published more than 
thirty books and left behind thousands of pages of unpublished 
manuscripts, correspondence and articles. He was born into one 
political exile and died in another, and spent his life as a 
sort of permanent political oppositionists he opposed capitalism 
first as an anarchist, and then as a Bolshevik; he opposed 
certain Bolshevik practices with his libertarian leanings; he 
opposed Stalin as a Left Oppositionist; he opposed Trotsky as an 
anti-Stalinist non-sectarian; and finally he opposed fascism and 
capitalism's Cold War as an unrepentant revolutionary Marxist.
Victor Serge's life experience and revolutionary writings 
are an eloquent challenge to orthodox notions of the Soviet 
Union. His refusal to succumb to either the capitalist West or 
the Soviet state assured his marginality and consigned him to a
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life of persecution and poverty. Serge's life and works amount 
to a corrective to Stalinism, and an alternative to Bukharinism 
—  in both Serge's lifetime, and its contemporary incarnation in 
Gorbachev's 'perestroika.' His works are a valuable, neglected 
addition to the existing literature which shed light on the 
formative chapters in Soviet political history. Serge wrote as 
an insider with a particular point of view: a Left Oppositionist 
with an anarchist past. His experience led him not to renounce 
socialism, but to bring to it a declaration of the rights of 
man, enriching socialist goals. He opposed the one party system, 
declaring as early as 1918 and again in 1923 that a coalition 
government, although fraught with dangers, would have been less 
dangerous than Stalin's dictatorship of the secretariat and the 
secret police. Serge criticized the NEP for bringing back 
inequality and misery, while not revitalizing democracy and a 
multi-party system. Serge's proposals for economic reform 
included 'workers democracy' and a 'communism of associations' 
instead of rigid, top-down, anti-democratic 'plans'. Serge not 
only analyzed the political development of the Soviet Union; he 
evoked the atmosphere of the twenties and thirties inside the 
USSR and the Communist movement; a testimony to his literary 
achievement, his political acumen, and his unflagging honesty. 
His writings are passionate, honest and sometimes poetic; above 
all they are critical and retain the ideas of the revolutionary 
generation of Bolsheviks. Serge's works merit a fresh 
examination, both in the West and in the Soviet Union. The 
present work aims in that direction.
Victor Serge, a Belgian born Russian, did not get to his 
homeland until January 1919, at the age of 28. This 
dissertation begins with his political odyssey in the USSR. 
Serge arrived as a seasoned revolutionary anarchist who had 
served two prison terms and fought in a failed revolution (in 
Spain). He quickly joined the Bolsheviks (May 1919) and worked 
on the first administrative staff of the Executive Committee of 
the Communist International, participating in its first three
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Congresses. He fought in the Civil War (seige of Leningrad), was 
Commissar in charge of the archives of the former Secret Police 
(Okhrana), and mixed freely in Bolshevik, anarchist, and 
literary circles in both Leningrad and Moscow. Serge was sent 
on Comintern assignment to Germany to help in the preparation of 
the German revolution of 1923. In Berlin Serge edited the French 
edition of Inprecorr. the main journal of the Comintern. Upon 
the defeat of the German October, Serge moved to Vienna, where 
he continued Comintern work until 1925, when he demanded to 
return to the Soviet Union to take his stand with the Left 
Opposition.
Once back in the USSR, Serge continued to mingle in richly 
varied political, social and literary milieux, earning his 
living as a translator of the works of Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky 
and others. He was an open political activist in the Left 
Opposition and one of the main spokespersons in the Leningrad 
Party Organization for the Opposition. Serge was expelled from 
the Party just after the 15th Party Congress in December 1927. 
Three months later he was arrested and held for eight weeks. 
Upon his release Serge nearly died of an intestinal occlusion.
This brush with death was a turning point for Serge, who 
now traded political activism for the pen and began to write in 
profusion "about these unforgettable times." In the next five 
years of precarious liberty in the USSR, Serge wrote and 
published abroad five books, including three novels and his 
monumental history Year One of the Russian Revolution. Not one 
line of his works was published in the USSR until 1989.
Rearrested in 1933, Serge was deported to Orenburg in 
Kazakhstan, where for three years he and his son nearly starved 
to death. There Serge wrote another four books, all of which 
were confiscated by the GPU when he was expelled from the 
country in April 1936. His release was the result of an 
international campaign of pressure by prominent French 
intellectuals. Serge barely escaped with his life, just four 
short months before the first Moscow trial and the "Great
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Purges."
Once Serge was in the West, Stalin stripped him of his 
nationality and passport. European Communists slandered him, and 
Moscow used all its influence to prevent him from publishing in 
the mainstream press. Nevertheless, Serge began to "unravel the 
labyrinth of madness," The Great Purge, and to analyze the
nature of the social organism emerging in the USSR. This became 
his life's work. Despite enormous personal and economic hardship 
—  his wife was driven insane by the relentless persecutions —  
Serge engaged in a daily struggle to feed himself and his family 
while writing to expose what he saw as Stalin's betrayal of 
everything socialist. Serge remained in Paris until the 
Wehrmacht arrived in June 1940. Fleeing with his family on 
foot, Serge spent a frantic year in Marseilles waiting for a 
visa out of Vichy France, hounded by the Gestapo and the
Stalinist NKVD. In frightful danger, Serge channelled all his
efforts into writing. He was finally admitted to Mexico, where 
he spent the remainder of his life, writing "only for the
drawer" in the face of an almost total publishers' boycott of 
his work. Serge, his head brimming with projects, died in 
poverty in November 1947. He had spent more than ten years of 
his life in various forms of captivity, and had been physically 
hungry almost all his life. His works include more than thirty 
books and pamphlets of history and politics; seven spectacular 
novels, two volumes of poetry, three novellas and a collection 
of short stories; hundreds of articles and essays, biographies 
of Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky, a diary, his own memoirs, and 
translations of the works of Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Figner, 
Gladkov, Mayakovsky and various others. One of his books was 
published under Panait Istrati's name, and he was the 
ghostwriter for Alexander Barmine's Memoir. It is a prodigious 
published record, which has been misinterpreted and, worse, 
largely ignored. Beyond the published works Serge left an 
enormous archive of correspondence, unpublished essays on 
politics, history, philosophy, literary criticism and polemics.
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This study analyzes Serge's work while describing his life.
It sifts through Serge's enormous written record in order to 
present his views and trace the evolution of his thought through 
his political activity. The dissertation is both an 
intellectual history, and political and analytical biography of 
this important but poorly understood figure. The thesis brings 
to light many of Serge's hitherto unknown writings, 
concentrating on his historical and political-economic work (he 
is primarily known as a revolutionary novelist). It aims to 
establish Serge as a contemporary thinker, a man whose life 
experience spans important struggles of the first half of the 
twentieth century, yet whose ideas address dilemmas that still 
confront the world on the eve of the twenty-first century. 
Serge's contribution is of increasing relevance not only in the 
West but also in the Soviet Union where glasnost has allowed 
excavation to begin of the buried Soviet past. Serge's work is 
virtually unknown in the Soviet Union, although the literary 
journal Ural recently serialized The Case of Comrade Tulavev.1 
In the West his Memoirs of a Revolutionary is often cited in 
footnotes, yet his books are largely out of print. As scholars 
East and West probe into that formative period of Soviet history 
when its class relations were formed, Serge's works, in various 
literary forms, go to the very heart of the issues raised.
Serge was a witness to and participant in the Soviet 
revolutionary experience. As an insider, he knew the men and 
women who made the revolution and those who destroyed it. He 
wrote about them in his political works and made them characters 
in his novels. Serge was not a dispassionate objective 
reporter, but an ardent Left Oppositionist whose pplitical 
outlook framed his exposition. Nor was he simply a memoirist, 
but a partisan writer who paid scholarly attention to the 
material at hand. He wrote with a novelist's eye for penetrating
^Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to find Ural in 
Moscow or Leningrad.
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detail, posing essential questions, pointing out contradictions, 
although he often left them unresolved.
Serge's works address the key theoretical problems of 
Soviet society. His writings both correct the record of a 
falsified history and attempt an analysis of the essential 
nature of the Soviet system. Further, Serge could capture an 
idea or reveal an event in prose that exposes the political, 
economic, and especially, social consequences of the emerging 
Stalinist system.
This examination of Serge's critique develops 
chronologically but simultaneously examines several themes: 
Serge as political participant; Serge as descriptive political 
analyst of the USSR; Serge as historian of Soviet Union; Serge 
as novelist of the revolution and its subsequent development. 
Much of Serge's work has been neglected in Soviet Studies. He 
has been maligned by one-time collaborators. (His uneasy 
relationship with Trotsky is discussed in Chapter Five.) Yet if 
Preobrazhensky was the economist of the Left Opposition, then 
Serge was its historian. He represented the expression of the 
historical view of the revolution and its development from a 
Marxist perspective. His strengths were a critical intelligence, 
integrity and independence which prevented him from dogmatizing 
the revolution. These characteristics make imperative a 
clarification of the political critique embodied in his 
writings.
Serge's critique of the Soviet Union began very early: he
argued that the Russian Revolution died a "self-inflicted death 
in 1918 with the establishment of the Cheka." Yet Serge worked 
with the Bolsheviks and supported their policies, including the 
demoralizing suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion. He joined 
the Opposition in 1923. Serge's concerns were always with the 
life and conditions of the masses of people affected by policy. 
Serge viewed Stalin's accession to power as a counter­
revolution, a betrayal of everything the revolution stood for, 
and one of the bloodiest in history. His critique of the
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'Stalinist system' formed the core of his work. Stalin's 
monopoly of power, his brutal anti-democratic methods of rule 
led to a certain type of society, which had not been envisioned 
by its revolutionary founders. Serge wrote that 'socialism in 
one country' had logical consequences which could not be 
avoided. He demonstrated, step by step, what the policy led to: 
forced collectivization, crash industrialization, super­
exploitation, famine, sabotage, terror. The purges, proceeding 
from an internal dynamic set in motion by Stalin's methods of 
industrialization and rule, created new social relations and a 
new, unstable society based on coercion and terror. None of the 
basic problems of the society were resolved by the purges, but 
millions paid with their lives. A costly and wasteful 
industrial infrastructure was constructed, with the help of a 
massive slave labor sector in the camps. All forms of 
collective resistance were broken and any residual resistance 
was atomized, as the weary population concerned itself with 
survival, not politics. In order to consolidate his regime, 
Stalin wiped out the entire revolutionary generation of 
Bolsheviks, all Serge's comrades. The new society, dubbed a 
'concentration camp universe' by Serge, was fundamentally anti­
socialist, anti-democratic and anti-human.
On the eve of his final arrest in the Soviet Union, Serge 
managed to smuggle a letter to his friends in Paris, his 'last 
testament.' Although Serge was to survive, the ideas in the 
testament remained with him the rest of his life. The testament 
amounted to a declaration of the rights of man, and a defense of 
truth and thought which must be an integral part of the 
socialist project, without which the project is "false, bankrupt 
and spoiled." Serge's defense of all human beings, including 
'class enemies' was a response to the Stalinist system of terror 
and murder. In this document Serge declared that he was the 
first to define the Soviet State as totalitarian.
Stalin's rule was chaotic and improvised, but it followed 
the logic of power. Once the bureaucracy usurped power from the
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working class, an inexorable logic generated the terror. This 
'bureaucracy' was often unable to dominate the forces it evoked, 
and the absence of control resulted in abuses going too far. 
Industrialization, collectivization and purges led to the 
formation of a new working class and a new ruling elite, with a 
particular relationship between the two. Serge spent the rest 
of his life trying to analyze and characterize the new social 
formation, to define its nature.
Serge finally defined the Soviet state as "bureaucratic 
totalitarian with collectivist leanings."2 This assignation of 
the term totalitarian was different from the later totalitarian 
school of analysis just as his use of the words bureaucratic and 
collectivist differed from the 'bureaucratic collectivist' 
school. Serge's analysis was dynamic and non-dogmatic: neither 
the ideological clarion call of the later Cold Warriors, nor the 
sterile slogan of a left sect. He simply tried to understand 
the processes at work, and point to the consequences for human 
progress. The Soviet Union, to Serge, was neither capitalist nor 
socialist, operated out of fear of independent thought, was in 
permanent conflict with its own people, and directed a mighty 
totalitarian state machine against them.
His last writings are those of a solitary surviving Left 
Oppositionist trying to come to grips with the new society while 
upholding the principles of the Revolution. He evoked the people 
and the atmosphere of the times in his novels. In exile after 
the defeats of the thirties, Serge viewed the twin 
totalitarianisms of Stalinism and Fascism and tried to perceive 
the essential tendencies of the modern world, which he saw as 
'collectivist,' controlled by an anti-democratic technocratic 
elite. The nemesis to this totalitarian collectivism, in Serge's 
view, was the historically conscious collectivism which would
Vhile the totalitarian school of analysis is well known, 
Serge believed he was the first to coin the term in describing 
the Staiinist system, which he saw as 'emergent' as early as 
1921 during the period of War Communism.
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emerge from decomposing capitalism and enfeebled Stalinism.
One of the most heated and divisive debates in Soviet 
studies during the eighties was between the older 'totalitarian' 
model of analysis and the newer 'revisionist' scholars who 
regard the Stalin period as one of chaos and lack of control. 
Criticizing both the ideas and the sources of the totalitarian 
school, the new revisionists claim the loss of life due to 
Stalin's policies has been greatly inflated.3
Both schools examine seemingly contradictory aspects of 
Soviet reality. Serge took up questions at issue in this debate 
at least twenty years earlier, demonstrating what I contend is 
a superior, though not entirely satisfactory, understanding. 
The Soviet state was totalitarian and incapable of totally 
controlling economic and political events; Serge's work grapples 
with this contradiction, without resolving it theoretically. 
Serge's treatment of this dilemma reflects the discussions that 
raged in Left Oppositionist and Left Menshevik circles,
discussions reverberating in today's Soviet Union in the debate 
of 'plan vs. market.'
Later, working in isolation, Serge played out his ideas on 
the nature of planning versus totalitarian bureaucratic 
administration, though was only able to state the
contradictions, not reconcile them. Socialist planning required 
a genuine workers democracy. Serge came to see Stalinist
planning as non-planning, though he inconsistently continued to 
identify the Soviet Union as a planned economy. He ran into 
difficulties when he tried to generalize the tendencies he saw 
at work in both capitalism and the Soviet Union. His work 
reflects the enormous pressures Marxists faced during and 
immediately after World War II. At the same time he demonstrates 
the agility of his thinking, even though an insufficiently
3Ample examples of this debate exist in the discipline's 
journals and reviews, in the panels at the yearly AAASS 
conferences, and in the new titles published by University 
presses.
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rigorous political economy mars his analysis.
Serge's work touches on another important debate in the 
discipline: vis was Stalinism the inevitable consequence of 
Bolshevism? Serge argued that Stalinism was not the natural 
outgrowth of Bolshevism, but the corruption of it. In a letter 
to Sidney Hook and in the pages of American socialist journals, 
Serge wrote there were seeds contained in Bolshevik thought 
which grew to full blown weeds under Stalin, but there were also 
other seeds which could have flowered into a new democracy, had 
circumstances been different. Notably, Serge insisted that a new 
democracy was what "Lenin and the others endeavored to establish 
with good will and passion in 1917-1918."
There is a paucity of scholarship on Victor Serge. No 
biography exists yet in any language,4 nor any major analytical 
studies; and while he is considered a French writer, there isn't 
a single doctoral dissertation on Serge in France. Only two 
dissertations exist on Serge, one British, one American. Both 
are in the fields of literature and are excellent studies, 
opening the door to future work on Serge's literary expression 
and his place in the tradition of committed modern writers. 
Thankfully, Serge scholarship is getting off the ground in this 
centenary year of his birth with three conferences, a projected 
film and several book collections devoted to Serge or containing 
his writings.
This dissertation is the first examination of Serge's 
political, social, literary and economic writings on the Soviet 
Union. It takes the form of political and intellectual history 
through a total investigation of Serge's life experiences and
The situation will be remedied in the near future as 
Richard Greeman publishes his biography of Serge in France. Next 
year the Serge-Trotsky correspondence will be published in 
English by Pluto Press (I am contributing an introduction), and 
the journal Critique will devote a special issue to Serge which 




The primary sources for this dissertation are Serge's 
voluminous published and unpublished writings, and extensive 
interviews and correspondence with surviving comrades and 
relatives. Writing and researching this thesis has been a lot 
like detective work, carried out in many cities, and several 
countries. Vlady Kibalchich —  Mexico's well-known artist and 
Serge's son who shared most of Serge's experiences with him, 
including deportation in Orenburg, —  has been a valuable and 
treasured resource. I have also conducted interviews and 
correspondence with his daughter, Jeanine Kibalchich, his third 
wife Laurette Sejourne, surviving Left Oppositionist comrades in 
Mexico, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Serge's archive 
left in Mexico has been the richest source of material 
(containing thousands of pages of mainly unpublished essays, 
articles, correspondence and originals of novels); there is also 
the smaller Serge archive at Columbia (donated by Richard 
Greeman); the correspondence Serge conducted with Trotsky, 
Dwight and Nancy Macdonald, Daniel Benedite, Marcel Martinet, 
Sidney Hook, Max Schachtman, Julian Gorkin, Hryhory Kostiuk, 
George Orwell, and others; the thick FBI and Military 
Intelligence files on Serge obtained through several years of 
requests through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA);5 and the 
Hoover Institution has let me preview their sealed Trotsky 
collection within the Boris Nicolaevsky Papers, which contains 
seventy-five letters between Serge and Sedov (Trotsky's son and 
editor of the Bulletin of the Opposition). This is the first 
time anyone has examined these letters. Their existence was 
unknown before the death of Nicolaevsky's widow in 1982 
permitted a thorough examination of the collection's contents.
I have been very fortunate to examine new, (hitherto
5I also obtained Marc Zborowsky's files, hoping in vain to 
find evidence of his role in the Trotsky-Serge rupture. So much 
was deleted from the file that whole pages were blanked out, 
with the exception of the name "Mark Zborowsky."
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unknown) and unpublished Serge material of excellent quality 
which testify to the development of Serge's thought over a 
thirty year span. More primary source material for the
dissertation came from the enormous quantity of journalism Serge 
produced in more than twenty publications in France, Belgium, 
Spain, the United States, Ukraine, Mexico and Chile. Serge's 
articles are mainly in French, but also in Russian, Spanish, and 
English. Secondary sources include the works of Serge's 
contemporaries, much of the vast memoir literature, and the the 
important secondary literature on the Soviet Union and Comintern 
for the years covered by the dissertation.
Serge's critique of Stalinism was the core of his life and 
his work. His life, Serge wrote in the Memoirs, was "integrated 
into history; we were interchangeable." He added that "the only 
meaning in life lies in conscious participation in the making of 
history." Serge was both social analyst and social activist, 
and his contribution to our understanding comes from his ability 
to see social reality clearly and honestly, and to write about 
it poetically.
His writings reflect his experiences, his commitment, and 
the vision which enabled him to survive this century's worst 
cataclysms, without recourse to pessimism. Serge described 
terrible suffering, while explaining how Stalinism came about, 
and what the Opposition would have done in its place. 
Consequently his bleakest descriptions still contain hope and an 
irrepressible optimism for a socialist future.
His writing 'style' is not the traditional "Marxist" one, 
but a literary-autobiographical-political one that transcends 
the boundaries of conventional literature and traditional social 
science. Serge's political task was not to engage in sterile 
sectariana, but to speak up for those who could not speak for 
themselves.
When Serge turned his attention to theoretical analysis, we 
find he had no particular dogmas to uphold. His discussion of
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the nature of the Stalinist system was one that avoided all the 
slogans that have characterized the debate which has divided the 
left for the last fifty years: one would look in vain through 
his writings to find the words 'degenerated workers state' or 
'state capitalist.' He did use the term bureaucratic 
collectivist (twice) but in referring to a WWII Europe that 
included both the Stalinist totalitarian Soviet Union and the 
Nazi totalitarian fascist Germany. Serge preferred instead to 
describe the Soviet Union, to explain how the policies created 
on high affected ordinary people below, and how their reactions 
in turn affected the formulation and execution of policy. When 
Serge was dissatisfied with his own exposition in social 
scientific terms, he turned to literary forms to better express 
the vast political landscape. He did not avoid the political- 
economic debates, he brought new expressive language to them. 
Serge was an instinctive Marxist whose insights and critique 
have yet to be properly assessed, though they address issues 
which are at the heart of present controversies. Perhaps he has 
been more neglected because he fit no recognized political or 
literary tendency: it is hoped this contribution marks a revival 
of critical attention paid to this unique historical figure.
CHAPTER ONE IN THE SERVICE OF THE REVOLUTION: 1917-1921
1.1 On the way to Petrograd
The Russian Revolution of October 1917 ushered in a new 
epoch; a large country had broken from world capitalism and
socialists from all over the world, whose attention had been on
the "epoch of the cannon"1 watched with hope and enthusiasm the 
development of the first society beginning its transition to 
socialism. For Europe, 1917 was the fourth year of the World 
War in which
"The flower of the youth of a continent, an entire 
generation of young men were mowed down ... along 
blood-soaked frontiers, thousands of combatants died 
each day ... [this was] the fourth year of the war for 
the partitioning of the globe among the financial 
imperialists."2
The events of October caught the imagination of 
revolutionaries everywhere; those who could, began to flock to 
Russia,
"Leaving the void and entering the kingdom of will
... where life is beginning anew, where conscious
will, intelligence, and an inexorable love of mankind 
are in action. Behind us, all Europe is ablaze, 
having choked almost to death in the fog of its own 
massacres. Barcelona's flame smoulders on. Germany 
is in the thick of revolution, Austro-Hungary is 
splitting into free nations. Italy is spread with red 
flags....This is only the beginning.3
Victor Serge, From Lenin To Stalin. Monad Press, New York, 
1973, p. 13. First French edition published in 1937.
Victor Serge, Lenin: 1917. Ediciones Transicion, Mexico, 
1977, pp. 19-20. First published in Paris as Lenine, 1917,
Librairie du Travail, 1925, and reprinted with a new preface as 
Vinort ans apres: Paris, Cahiers Spartacus, 1937.
Victor Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary. Writers and 
Readers, London, 1984, p. 67. First published as Memoires d'un 
revolutionnaire par Victor Serge. Editions du Seuil, 1951.
2Leaving the void, and entering his never-seen homeland, was 
Victor Serge.
Evoking the images of war-torn and war-weary Europe, Serge 
recalls stopping with a group of his prisoner-comrades in a 
tavern filled with British soldiers. Serge had been released 
from 15 months incarceration in a French prison camp whose 
regime was notable for the lack of food and a Spanish flu 
epidemic that made death their constant companion. Serge was in 
a group of 40 "Bolshevik suspects" to be exchanged for French 
military officers held by the Russians. The shabby appearance 
of Serge and his group attracted the attention of the soldiers, 
who approached them. "Who are you?" Serge answered their 
questioning faces: "Bolsheviks. Prisoners. We are going to
Russia."4 His message was understood: we are revolutionary 
internationalists on our way to begin the construction of 
socialism. The soldiers response surprised Serge: "Us too! We 
are too! Later you will see!" 5 ["nosotros tambien! Nosotros 
tambien! Nosotros tambien lo somos! Ya lo vereis mas tardel] 
From his prison isolation. Serge hadn't understood the depth of 
inspiration produced by the successful October revolution, which 
was evident on these tired soldiers faces.
Serge reached his homeland expecting to enter into the 
first phase of the world revolution. "This is only the 
beginning." It was January 1919 when Serge set off, the first
4Serge's account of this encounter is in "camino de Rusia," 
first chapter of La Defensa de Petrocrrado: Ano Secnindo de la 
Revolucion Rusa, Mexico, Ediciones Transicion, 1977, pp. 85-6. 
Originally published as La Ville en Danger: L'An II de la 
Revolution Russe. Librairie du Travail, Paris 1924. A slightly 
different version is found in the Memoirs. p. 66.
Victor Serge, La Defensa De Petrocrrado: Ano Seoundo de la 
Revolucion Rusa. p. 86. These 'tommies' affected Serge deeply; 
he also wrote of this encounter in the Memoirs (see 4n above) 
and in Birth of Our Power, p. 244. Here we see how Serge's 
novels blur the lines between fact and fiction.
3days of February when he arrived. The revolution was in its 
second year. It had taken Serge 18 months to make the trip.
Serge had gone to Spain upon his release from prison and 
expulsion from France in 1917. In the middle of the 
insurrectionist street fighting of July 1917, Serge left, drawn 
like a magnet to the distant revolutionary beacon of Russia. He 
was not only 'leaving the void' he was leaving behind him his 
anarchist past. Serge was disillusioned with the anarchists' 
inability to confront the question of power6, and impressed by 
this very characteristic of the Bolsheviks. He tried to reach 
Russia, via France, and was arrested for violating his expulsion 
order, and thrown into a French prison camp as a Bolshevik 
suspect.
1.2. Serge encounters Bolshevism and Marxism
Although Serge was not yet a Bolshevik, he was on his way. 
His commitment was strengthened by his 15 months at Precigne,7 
where Serge joined with the other Russian revolutionaries to 
form a discussion group. Here Serge studied Marxism for the 
first time. While arguing with the only real Bolshevik there 
(the rest were, like Serge, suspected Bolsheviks), Serge put 
forward the idea of a libertarian, democratic revolution, while 
the Bolshevik favored a merciless dictatorship and an 
authoritarian revolution. Serge admitted that theoretically, he
Serge didn't stay for the final insurrection in Barcelona 
in August, 1917. He had seen enough in July: the anarchists 
would not hear any talk of seizure of power. Only his friend, 
the syndicalist leader Salvadore Segui, seemed aware that they 
had no plan beyond the street fighting. Serge said they went 
into battle "as it were, in the dark." (Memoirs, p. 56.)
7Serge's description of his experiences at Precigne form the 
middle section of his second novel, Birth of Our Power, and is 
also described in the Memoirs. pps.63-69. Pierre Pascal, a 
French Communist living in Moscow who married Serge's sister-in- 
law, later wrote a four part memoir called Mon Journal de 
Russie. L'Age d'Homme, Lausanne. In the second volume Pascal 
described Serge's study group in Precigne, p. 107.
stated his point of view badly, worse than the Bolshevik, though 
"from the human standpoint, we were infinitely nearer the truth 
than he was."8 According to the Memoirs and Birth of Our Power, 
the prisoners studied Marx's Civil War in France, kept abreast 
of events in Russia and discussed all the questions facing the 
Bolsheviks. Serge was acquiring the Marxist method of analysis 
which remained with him till his death.9
What Serge already had in common with the Bolsheviks was 
his praxis: Serge was a man of revolutionary practice, who
translated his words into deeds time and again throughout his 
life. His actions in Germany 1923 are one case in point, which 
we will return to later. Revolutionary theory put into practice: 
this is what impressed Serge about the Bolsheviks. In his 
retrospective on the 30th anniversary of the Russian revolution, 
Serge wrote that "the unity between thought and action" was one 
of the characteristics of the Bolsheviks which gave them an
8Serge, Memoirs, pps. 63-4.
9Richard Greeman notes in his unpublished dissertation, 
Victor Serge: The Making of a Novelist (1890-1928). Columbia 
University, 1968, (Hereafter, Greeman) that in the camp 
"Kibalchich thought out the problems of revolution for the first 
time and acquired the thorough Marxist foundation that was to 
guide, but not dominate, his thinking in the future." p. 152. 
The question of Serge's Marxism is thus raised; my contention is 
that Serge's subsequent writing and activity demonstrate that he 
had absorbed Marxist method and used it throughout his lifetime. 
He acted as an instinctive Marxist and a consistent 
revolutionary. Whether or not it guided him or dominated his 
thinking, however is not a semantic difference. Greeman asserts 
that the formative influences of Serge's life, came from his 
anarchist - prison - syndicalist years of 1908-1918; that his 
love for freedom and his abhorrence of authoritarianism are 
residuals of his anarchist past. (Sedgwick would not agree that 
Serge abhorred authoritarianism.) The inference is that these 
qualities must be brought to Marxism and are not part of the 
Marxist tradition. Lenin and Trotsky would agree with Serge's 
concern for the life of the individual within the mass. The 
implication in Greeman's line of reasoning is that the humanist 
side of Marxism is anarchism. Serge himself made no such 
qualification. See also this chapter, pp. 16.
innate superiority over the rival parties with which they shared 
a common outlook.10
What did Serge find in the land of will which expressed the 
suppressed aspirations of all humankind in struggle? "A world 
frozen to death ... a metropolis of Cold, of Hunger, of Hatred, 
of Endurance ...."11 Year Two: Serge managed to arrive in the 
midst of counterrevolution, white terror answered by red terror, 
famine, and disease, to a city expectant of a world revolution 
which would save them. His romantic hopes were met with a harsh 
reality, which Serge does not hesitate to express. The first 
shock was not the cold, or what he described as the worst food 
(black bread and dried fish) any of them had ever eaten. It was 
the first newspaper filled not with "popular ferment, bubbling 
ideas, rivalry of clubs [and] parties,"12 but with an article 
signed by G. Zinoviev on 'The Monopoly of Power. ' Serge quoted 
from memory: "Our Party rules alone ... it will not allow anyone 
.... The false democratic liberties demanded by the counter­
revolution. " The newspaper, Severnaya Kommuna. was dated 
January 1919.
Serge was hit in the face with the basic dilemmas which 
were to concern him for the rest of his life: could revolution 
be separate from freedom? Could acts which are justified by a 
state of siege and 'mortal perils' be elevated into a theory, 
based on the extinction of freedom?13 Serge's worries were at
10Victor Serge, "Trente Ans Apres La Revolution Russe," in 
La Revolution Proletarienne. November 1947.
xlSerge, Memoirs, p. 71.
12Ibid., P- 69.
13Serge's use of the word 'freedom' here and elsewhere is 
vague. For Marxists, freedom is indistinguishable from 
institutions of popular democracy, usually in the form of 
councils. Anarchists, on the other hand, favor participatory 
democracy and community control, but are wary of democratic 
institutions —  even workers' councils. They tend to be very 
'slippery' in their definitions of freedom and democracy.
6the same time premature and prescient. 1919 had seen a choking 
of liberties due to Civil War conditions, but there was still 
freedom of debate within the Party.
1.3. In Revolutionary Russia
Serge's first impressions of Petrograd tell us a lot about 
the early days of the revolution.14 The Finland Station, where 
Lenin had delivered his famous "April Theses" was deserted; in 
fact the city, covered in snow and ice, looked abandoned. The 
people Serge and his group did see looked frozen and hungry ("A 
gaunt soldier" ... " a  woman freezing under her shawls"). In 
the one year since the seizure of power, the population of 
Petrograd had fallen from a million to "scarcely 700,000 souls." 
But the people Serge met were open and curious about the 
political situation in Europe: "All they asked us was whether
Europe would soon be kindled: 'What is the French proletariat 
waiting for before it seizes power?'"15 Serge found the same 
attitude everywhere; nurtured on the knowledge that the Russian 
revolution was but the first —  Lenin often said it was "a 
terrible misfortune that the honour of beginning the first 
Socialist revolution should have befallen the most backward
14Serge was at his best when evoking the atmosphere of the 
new revolution in the midst of peril and ice in the final 
chapter of Birth of our Power. He related the story of being 
housed with a family in Petrograd in an abandoned apartment of 
a former Counselor of the Empire. The rooms were large and there 
was no fuel for heat. They congregated in the nursery, the 
smallest room. For warmth, they burned the massive tomes of the 
Collection of the Laws of The Empire. The scene works as 
literature, politics, history, and irony. Richard Greeman has 
subjected the scene to an insightful analysis in his article " 
'The laws are burning' —  Literary and Revolutionary Realism in 
Victor Serge," Yale French Studies. No. 39, 1967, pp. 146-159. 
Serge confirmed in his Memoirs (p. 116) that the scene actually 
took place, and that he took great pleasure in burning the now 
obsolete statutes of Imperial repression.
15V.Serge, Memoirs, pps. 70-71.
7people in Europe" — they all knew they were doomed without an 
international extension of the revolution.
In Serge's opinion, they were too optimistic about the 
imminence of European revolution. Serge had just come from the 
West, where 13 years of political activity had filled him with 
disgust for the parliamentary opportunism of the social 
democratic mis leaders, and impatience with the ultimate 
irresponsibility of the anarchists who abdicated on the question 
of power. Where was the revolutionary party to lead the 
European masses to revolution? But many of the leading 
Bolsheviks, including Trotsky and Lenin, had also lived abroad 
during the years between the two Russian revolutions and also 
knew the weaknesses of the socialist leaders; was their optimism 
based more on hope than real assessment? Or on their analysis of 
objective conditions ripening, to produce cleavages and form new 
leaders?
Zinoviev, then President of the Soviet, met Serge's 
perception of the sluggishness of the unfolding revolutionary 
process in the West, especially in France, where Serge said jio 
revolutionary upheaval could be expected for a long time, with 
"It's easy to tell that you are no Marxist. History cannot stop 
halfway. "16
Serge met Zinoviev's wife Lilina, People's Commissar for 
Social Planning in the Northern Commune, who told him to go with 
his family to Moscow where conditions were better. He did not 
take her advice, deciding to stay in Petrograd, the revolution's 
front line city. He immediately set about to talk with 
everyone, to mix in all the social and political milieux to get 
a political grounding. Of the democratic intellectuals, Serge 
said:
"If the Bolshevik insurrection had not taken power ... 
the cabal of the old generals, supported by the 
officers' organizations, would have certainly done so , 
instead. Russia would have avoided the Red Terror
16Serge, Ibid. p. 71-2,
8only to endure the White, and a proletarian 
dictatorship only to undergo a reactionary one. In 
consequence, the most outraged observations of the 
anti-Bolshevik intellectuals only revealed to me how 
necessary Bolshevism was." 17
1.4.From Anarchism to Bolshevism
Serge decided that he was neither against the Bolsheviks 
nor neutral; he was with them. He wrote in one of his first 
letters from Russia that he would not make "a career out of the 
revolution, and, once the mortal danger has passed, [he would]
... join again with those who will fight the evils of the new 
regime ....1,18
Serge arrived in Russia as a seasoned revolutionary armed 
with "a critical method, doubt and assurance" and thirteen years 
experience as a socialist, anarchist and syndicalist. His 
political positions flowed from a concrete analysis of actual 
situations. Serge's allegiance to the Bolsheviks was based on 
a sober assessment of the situation, which was grave; he 
determined that the Bolsheviks had not only vision, but the 
necessary will to carry forward the revolution. Their political 
positions were correct, but Serge was already critical of their 
authoritarian excesses. He wasn't critical only of curbs on 
freedom he saw as justified by the revolution's mortal peril; he 
had been to Moscow, and also objected to the stultifying 
structures —  the committees on top of Councils, managements on 
top of Commissions —  in which he saw the perfect breeding 
ground for "a multitude of bureaucrats who were responsible for 
more fuss than honest work."19 They were the 'smart set,' 
decorated in 'chic uniforms' who sent you from office to office.
17Ibid. p. 74.
18Serge, ibid.
19Ibid. , p. 74.
9Serge joined the Bolshevik Party in May 1919. But he still 
kept company with poets, writers, anarchists and Social 
Revolutionaries. He belonged to the "last free thought society" 
and was probably their "only Communist member." This was the 
Free Philosophic Society led by the symbolist novelist Andrei 
Bely. As a confirmed, but critical Bolshevik, Serge was 
developing his Marxism.
Serge's Marxism was fused with an anarchist's spirit and a 
primary commitment to socialism's international character. His 
Marxism was deeply humanistic, preoccupied with questions of 
personal development and individual freedom within the social 
whole. His central concern with the condition of life of the 
masses always meant that Serge saw democracy as an integral 
component of socialist development. It is not a question of 
these aspects of Serge's Marxism coming only from Anarchism: 
Marxism is not devoid of humanism, nor is it simply a formula 
for action. Serge did not become a Marxist simply because the 
Bolshevik-Marxists knew what to do next: but because their
ultimate vision of socialism was one that liberated humanity, a 4 
vision he shared.
Anarchism had become a dead end for Serge, as early as
201913, as Richard Greeman attests, when the goals of the
anarchist bandits of the Bonnot gang led them to violent acts of
murder and robbery. Serge was repulsed by these senseless acts,
21but shared the goals motivating them, and ended up in jail 
when the French judicial system failed to account for this 
subtle distinction. At least the violence of the Bolsheviks (at 
this point) was used to fight for their survival. The anarchists 
seemed much better at pontificating than at moving forward.
20Richard Greeman, op. cit.. p. 154.
21Serge wrote in an article entitled "Les Bandits" in the 4 
January 1912 edition of L 'Anarchie: "Je suis avec les bandits." 
A long passage of this article is quoted in Greeman, ibid.. p. 
116.
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Marxists judge people not just by what they say, but by what 
they do. Serge found the anarchists wanting in the latter, not 
just by their lack of clear policy, but in the case of (some of) 
the Russian anarchists, by their failure to support the 
Bolsheviks, in effect their objective support of the counter­
revolution.22 Serge admitted that anarchism was more a way of 
conducting one's life, whereas Bolshevism embodied a technique 
of revolution that fit its theory of social emancipation.23
Nevertheless what Serge did retain of his anarchism was a 
healthy opposition to authoritarianism. Greeman emphasizes 
Serge's "total opposition to all forms of authoritarianism"24 
while another scholar, Peter Sedgwick, posits a contradiction in 
Serge's attitude to authoritarianism, stating that for an 
anarchist turned Bolshevik, Serge's earlier writings are 
remarkably devoid of public criticism of the authoritarian side 
of Bolshevik rule.25 In Serge's later writings of this period, 
particularly the Civil War novel Conquered City, he is "alert to
22See inter alia Paul Avrich, Anarchists in the Russian 
Revolution. Serge, Les Anarchistes et la Revolution russe. 
Memoirs, From Lenin to Stalin, his numerous articles in Bulletin 
Communiste. and Clarte: also Leon Trotsky, History of the
Russian Revolution. Alfred Rosmer, Moscow Under Lenin, pps. 97- 
101, among numerous other works.
23Serge, "La Pensee anarchiste, " p. 12.
24Greeman, ibid.. p, 155.
25This is a confusion of Sedgwick's not Sergeis. Serge 
himself recognizes the authoritarian characters which have 
populated the anarchist movement, starting with Bakunin himself, 
and not ending with Makhno. As Serge points out, the essence of 
anarchism is the absence of authority; this does not mean that 
authoritarianism cannot exist within figures who oppose 
authority. Sedgwick and Greeman do not see this distinction, 
but Serge did. Serge, "L'Anarchisme, " unpublished essay written 
in the 40s (no date provided), archives, Mexico.
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26the authoritarian worm in the bud of revolution. " Yet in his
writings of the early 20s there is no such criticism, and
Sedgwick says "Serge's public political alignment is an
uncritical retailing of the official legitimations of Bolshevik
statism. "27 The question raised here is whether Serge acted in
a somewhat dishonest way, as a propagandist for the Bolsheviks,
28while being privately critical of the society emerging, or 
what kind of a contradiction this reveals in Serge. Serge's son 
Vlady explained away the 'apparent' contradiction: these were
"early days" for the Bolsheviks, too early to come out with 
pronouncements about the character of the society being
29formed. In any case it was impossible to tell what would 
happen once the immediate danger of foreign intervention and 
Civil War passed. We will return to Sedgwick's criticism after 
examining Serge's synthesis of Marxism and anarchism.
Serge did not try some impossible mix of anarchism and 
Bolshevism, he became a Bolshevik, and subsequently a Left 
Oppositionist, and never returned to anarchism. His later 
opposition was not to Bolshevism, but to its corruption,
26Peter Sedgwick, "The Unhappy Elitist: Victor Serge's Early 
Bolshevism," published posthumously in History Workshop Journal, 
Vol. 17, Spring 1984, pp. 150-156.
27Sedgwick, ibid., p. 151.
28Sedgwick quotes from Guerin's book on anarchism, in which 
Serge apparently told Gaston Leval that the Communists were 
establishing a "dictatorship over the proletariat" while 
publishing pro-regime journalism abroad. See Sedgwick's article 
on Serge's Early Bolshevism, p. 152, and p. 156n.
29Recorded conversation with Vlady in Mexico City, Feb.
1986. Vlady's answer shows that both he and his father took the 
same position as any revolutionary Marxist would in similar 
circumstances. Many revolutionary organizations have approached 
questions of determining the class character of this or that 
revolution in the same manner. For example, with regard to the 
Cuban revolution and the Nicaraguan revolution, the reasoning is 
that it is better to come out late with a negative assessment of 
the revolution's development than too early.
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Stalinism. His preoccupation with the masses, with democracy (is 
this not the question of freedom?) was shared by other Left 
Oppositionists, Marxists all, particularly Trotsky.
The view that Bolsheviks and Marxists are manipulative and 
authoritarian, while undoubtedly true in certain cases, is a 
part of the Stalinist legacy that distorts Marxism. Serge 
himself addressed this point many times in the years to comes he 
admitted that authoritarian seeds existed in Bolshevik thought 
which grew to full blown weeds under Stalin, but there were also 
many other seeds that could have flowered into a full blown 
democracy had circumstances existed for their germination.30
Serge tried to win the anarchists over to Bolshevism, to 
get them to draw the same conclusions as he had. He wrote a 
pamphlet for the purpose, called Les Anarchistes et L ' Experience 
de la Revolution russe. This booklet was written in the summer 
of 1920,31 and published in Paris in 1921; later he wrote three 
essays, "Meditation sur 1'anarchie," "La pensee anarchiste" 
published in 1937 and 1938, and "L'Anarchisme," left among his
unpublished essays from his exile in Mexico. In the first
*
three, Serge discusses the relative merits of anarchism and 
Marxism, looking for a point of synthesis. Serge was aware of 
both the pluses and minuses of the two theories. Marxism was 
superior analytically and organizationally, but would be 
enhanced with the spirit of humanistic idealism of the 
anarchists. This idealism of the anarchist tradition, which was 
a sort of morality, would serve as a corrective to the tendency 
in Bolshevism to subordinate their revolutionary, democratic 
principles to practical necessity, or the force of
30 •"Marxism et Democratie," letter from Serge to Sidney Hook, 
May 1943. Serge Archives, Mexico.
31The book was written before the banning of Party factions. 
Sedgwick intimates that the factions banned had positions which 
closely corresponded to Serge's. See Peter Sedgwick, 
introduction to Serge's Memoirs of a Revolutionary, p. xii.
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circumstances.32 Anarchism was better as a way of conducting
one's life, but not as a theory of change. Serge wrote in the
last mentioned essay that anarchism was well suited to the
terrain of pre-industrialized countries among artisans and
petty-producers; but in the heart of industrial countries,
Marxism had largely surpassed and eliminated anarchism.33
Serge's point of synthesis was more of a plea for humanity
and liberty within Bolshevik practice; neither of which are
qualities alien to Marxism. Serge's writings show more how he
had matured and rejected anarchism, but found Bolshevik practice
wanting and looked back to anarchism for the qualities he would
have wished present in Bolshevik practice. Even here Serge
presents the contradictions; anarchists have been authoritarian
even while opposing authority; and the Bolsheviks' Marxist
conception of the individual's relation to history —
individuals as parts of historical forces —  paradoxically
increased the value of the individuals.34 The other side of the
coin of anarchist individualism, Serge noted, was to reduce
everything to the self, while the Marxist notion of Class, of
individuals consciously acting in collectivities in the process
of history became in Bolshevik thinking a theory of struggle
enabling individuals acting in solidarity to accomplish profound
social change. Thus, the practical effectiveness of class action
actually enhanced the importance of the individual. Serge
explained this apparent paradox in "Meditation sur 1' anarchie":
"Les masses importent lus que toi. One est remis a sa 
place, gueri de 1'hypertrophie du Moi, vilaine 
maladies. Parce que tu as consenti a te perdre, tu te 
retrouveras et fortifie d'avoir touche la terre ferme.
Le marxisme, en subordonnant l'individu a l'histoire -
32Greeman, ibid pp. 153-61, discusses Serge's anarchism and 
Marxism.
33"L'Anarchisme," unpublished typescript, no date, Mexico, 
archives.
34Greeman, ibid., p. 158.
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- que sont les masses —  le penetre d'une confiance 
peut-etre sans bornes; voici qu'ayant renonce a 
1'exaltation de sa petite revolte personnelle, s'etant 
en quelque sorte depouille de lui-meme, il multiplie 
sa force et sa volonte par celles de tous et par celle 
de 1'histoire, mythe scientifique.3
In his balance sheet Les Anarchistes et L rExperience de la 
Revolution Russe. Serge pointed out that the Russian anarchists 
had failed as revolutionaries, by remaining outside the 
revolution. Although many fought in the Civil War, they had 
presented no alternative libertarian program to the Bolsheviks. 
Worse, some took up arms against the new workers state and 
became objectively counter-revolutionary.36
The Bolsheviks, as Serge points out elsewhere, proved 
themselves superior in method, program and practice. Their 
failures did not result from shortcomings in their theory, but 
arose in response to real circumstances. "The proletarian 
dictatorship has, in Russia, had to introduce an increasingly 
authoritarian centralism. One may perhaps deplore it. 
Unfortunately I do not believe that it could have been 
avoided."37
A
The anarchists on the other hand, lacked the will of the 
Bolsheviks, the unity of thought and deed, and at essential
35"Meditation sur l'Anarchie," published in Esprit. March, 
1937, Paris.
36Serge had considered the betrayal of the "blacks" under 
Makhno, who had tried to build an anarchist federation while 
defending themselves against both Whites and Reds, a terrible 
crime of the Bolsheviks, with a demoralizing effect that was one 
of the basic causes of the Kronstadt rebellion. Memoirs, p. 123. 
But he also said the anarchists had abdicated in front of their 
duty to the revolution. Les Anarchistes et 1*experience de la 
revolution russe. pp. 17-26. Quoted in Greeman, ibid, p. 159.
37Les Anarchistes et 1'experience de la Revolution Russe, 
Cahiers du Travail, Paris, 1921, p.29. The quotation cited 
demonstrates how Serge was very careful in his analysis of the 
Russian revolution and its subsequent degeneration, to 
distinguish the avoidable from the unavoidable aspects —  and 
shows how Serge's analysis was rooted in concrete circumstances.
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moments —  in real circumstances—  they were politically 
bankrupt: in Spain (1917) they abnegated power, and in Russia 
they fought against it. The anarchists, Serge said in his 
Memoirs, "had an essentially emotional approach to theory, were
ignorant of political economy and had never faced the problem of
power" and "found it practically impossible to achieve any
theoretical understanding of what was going on.”38 Serge agreed
with Lenin and Trotsky that it was important to have the support
of the best among them. Serge also said that the anarchists
could play a creative role within the revolution as the
guardians of the revolution's idealism, working for greater
freedom within the revolution by insisting on the control of the
masses over the revolutionary institutions.39 "Their [the
anarchists turned communists] lucidity will make them the most
formidable enemies of the climbers, the budding politicians and
i
commissars, the formalists, pundits and intriguers."40
1.5. Serge the Bolshevik in Comintern and Civil War
Serge joined the Bolsheviks after months of discussions 
with various political tendencies. Of the Bolsheviks he met, he 
found them sincere, honest, with bitterly clear vision; except 
Zinoviev, who affected Serge as flabby, a man of puffed
38Serge, Memoirs, p. 104.
39Greeman, Ibid., p. 160.
40Serge, Les Anarchistes et 1'experience de la Revolution 
russe. p. 44.
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confidence, comfortable at the pinnacle of power.41 Serge also 
befriended Maxim Gorky, who had been a friend of Serge's 
mother's family at Nizhni-Novgorod. Gorky was a non-Bolshevik 
critical intellectual whom Serge admired as "the supreme, the 
righteous, the relentless witness of the Revolution."42
Gorky offered Serge work in his publishing house "Universal 
Literature" but Serge declined, because his duty was to the 
revolution, to work within the revolution while retaining his 
critical sense. Serge decided to eschew posts of importance and 
responsibility, to remain at the ground level of the 
revolution.43 This attitude, while on the one hand demonstrates 
that Serge's allegiance to the Bolsheviks contained not a shred 
of opportunism, also shows his assertion of independence as a 
leftover from his anarchism. A 'good Bolshevik' of the non­
opportunist type like Serge may not wish to be cast into the 
limelight of leadership, but would also not decline such 
positions if it was deemed necessary to enhance the quality of 
leaders of the revolution. Personal wishes and political tasks
41Memoirs, pp. 71-2.
42Memoirs, p . 7 3.
43This desire to remain at the rank-and-file level may 
account for the absence of Serge's name in any of the Histories 
of the early Comintern, with the exception of Hulse's book. But 
although Serge may have functioned at 'ground level' he was also 
an intimate of the top Bolshevik leadership, a colleague of 
Zinoviev, Lenin, Trotsky, and others. Greeman also points out 
that both Souvarine and Henri Guilbeaux deny (against available 
evidence) that Serge played an important role in Russia, which 
he attributes to a certain jealousy of Serge's notoriety in the 
wake of *L'Affair Victor Serge of 1936. See Greeman, o p . cit.. 
p.191.
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often come into conflict. Revolutionaries of the Bolshevik 
mould were sometimes called upon to put Party needs before their 
own.
In Victor Serge's case, working for the revolution meant 
working in its propagandists organs, putting his talents to 
good use. Ironically, Serge's first job was as a journalist for 
the newspaper of the Petrograd Soviet, Severnaya Kommuna 
(Northern Commune), the same newspaper Serge had first read with 
horror upon crossing the Finnish border into Russia. Like the 
majority of other Bolsheviks at the time, Serge worked at many 
jobs: he was also a teacher in public education clubs, an
organizing inspector for schools, and a lecturing assistant to 
the Petrograd militia. These many jobs brought him "the means 
of bare existence from one day to the next, in a chaos that was 
oddly organized.1,44 Serge was married by now to Liuba 
Roussakova, whose family had traveled with Serge to Petrograd.
The Communist International was formed in March 1919, and 
although Serge was not yet a member of the Bolshevik Party, he 
was asked by Zinoviev to organize the administration of the 
Executive Committee in Petrograd.45 Serge's political 
experience in Europe meant he was ideally suited to Comintern 
work. The Russian revolution, for the Bolsheviks, (and for 
Victor Serge) it will be recalled, was but "the beginning. " At 




revolution. They envisioned the achievement of power reaching 
fruition only through the world revolution, which would 
establish a socialist commonwealth comprising all the advanced 
sectors of the globe. Like Victor Serge, the Bolsheviks were 
both Russian and world revolutionists. There was no essential 
separation between their national revolution and the world 
struggle for socialism; the two were inextricably linked.46 The 
founding of the Third International, or Communist International 
(Comintern) was but the concretization of this political 
principle.47 The initial manifesto of the Communist 
International was written by Trotsky, in which he extended
46Background information on the Comintern used here comes 
from Leon Trotsky, The First Five Years of the Communist 
International. Theses and Resolutions of the first four 
congresses of the Communist International, Jane Degras, Serge, 
Lenin, Cole, Helmut Gruber, Borkenau, Hulse, etc. in 
bibliography. Also, from 50 Years of World Revolution, article 
by Canadian.
47 Ironically, the founding of the Third International came 
upon the heels of defeat in Germany and the executions of Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebnecht. As we have noted earlier, Serge 
thought the Bolsheviks overestimated the readiness of Europe for 
revolution. This assessment did not keep him from working 
toward that goal, which he shared with the Bolsheviks. The 
question arises nevertheless, how Trotsky, Lenin, and Serge to 
a lesser extent, all of whom had spent considerable time in 
Europe and knew the weaknesses of the European socialist leaders 
(most of whom had supported World War I) , could expect them to 
ride the wave of revolutionary upsurge to a successful 
conclusion. Deutscher intimates that had they known the real 
situation, they may not have founded the International which was 
"fathered by wish, mothered by confusion, and assisted by 
accident." He also suggests they assumed that in real 
revolutionary situations, the small European Marxist sects would 
rise rapidly to influence and leadership, just as the Bolsheviks 
did. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879-1921. Oxford 
University Press, 1970, p. 451-3.
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Marx's historic statement in the Communist Manifesto, Trotsky 
wrote:
“Proletarians of all countries 1 In the struggle 
against imperialist barbarism, against monarchy, 
against the privileged classes, against the bourgeois 
state and bourgeois property, against national 
oppression and the tyranny of classes in any shape or 
form— unite!
Proletarians of all countries, round the banner of 
workmen's councils, round the banner of the 
revolutionary struggle for power and the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, round the banner of the Third 
International —  unite!"48
Serge took part in the first 3 Congresses of the Comintern, 
used his offices to intercede when he could on behalf of victims 
of the Cheka, met through his work the leaders of the 
international revolutionary movements, (of whom he drew 
thumbnail portraits in his Memoirs), and like all his comrades, 
performed a host of functions: he ran the Romance-language
section and publications of the International, met the foreign 
delegates who arrived "by adventurous routes through the 
blockade's barbed-wire barrier,"49 became a trooper in the 
Communist battalion of the Second District during the Civil War, 
engaged in smuggling arms between Russia and Finland, became a 
Commissar in charge of the archives of the old Ministry of the 
Interior, the Okhrana.
The Comintern was perfectly suited to Serge: it shared
Serge's disgust for the spineless and opportunist parliamentary 
social democratic leaders of the European workers movement; its
48Leon Trotsky, "Manifesto of the Communist Internationals 
to the Proletarian of the World," March 1919.
49 •Serge, Memoirs, p. 89. Rosmer, in his Moscow Under Lenin. 
describes Serge as "the best possible guide" because of his 
political background, his knowledge of languages, his 
experiences in the labor movement in various European countries, 
and his curiosity about what was exactly happening in the 
Western democracies and his desire to show the visiting 
delegates of the Comintern the Russian revolution from the 
inside. See Rosmer, ibid., pps, 35-36.
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revolutionary internationalism and political vision matched 
Serge's; and it was made up of men and women like Serge. People 
such as the Russo-Italian socialist and first Secretary, 
Angelica Balabanova, the Canadian anarchist Bill Shatov, the 
American revolutionary journalist John Reed, the Spanish 
syndicalist Angel Pestana, the Italian maximalist Amadeo 
Bordiga, the French syndicalist Alfred Rosmer, and many others. 
Serge admitted that it was in these first meetings that the 
"superiority of the Russians, compared with the foreign 
revolutionaries amazed me."50 Serge befriended Vladimir Mazin, 
his assistant and comrade whose revolutionary record was at 
least as long as his own.
Serge clearly had a deep affection for Mazin, and Serge's 
son Vlady was named for him.51 When the Civil War threatened 
the revolution, Mazin did as he had written: "he renounced his 
command, picked up a rifle, collected a little band of 
Communists and tried to stop the rout and the enemy 
simultaneously. ... [For Mazin, there was] no point in doing 
jobs of organization, publishing, etc., which were fruitless 
from now on; and at an hour when so many men were dying quite 
uselessly out in the wilds, he felt a horror of Smolny offices, 
committees, printed matter and the Hotel Astoria." Zinoviev had 
him appointed political commissar, but Mazin demanded to be 
given a private's rifle. He died at the hands of the Whites.
Mazin, who had begun as a Menshevik and had become a 
Bolshevik, shared Serge's view that the only way to fight for 
democratic and libertarian ideals was in action, within the 
revolution. Serge and Mazin stayed at the Hotel Astoria and 
worked in the Comintern Headquarters in the Smolny Institute of 
Petrograd. Although Balabanova was nominally the first
50Serge, Memoirs. p. 83.
51Suggested by Greeman, op. cit.. p. 184, and confirmed in 
an interview I recorded with Vlady Kibalchich, Mexico City, May
1987.
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Secretary of the Executive Committee and Zinoviev the first 
President, she lived in Moscow, and he stayed in Petrograd as 
head of the Petrograd Soviet. So the Executive Committee was 
divided between Petrograd and Moscow, and since Zinoviev was in 
Petrograd, that is where the real power resided. Thus Serge and 
Mazin, both critical communists, were at the seat of power in 
the Comintern, creating the organization from scratch.52 That 
was the extent of the staff of the organization which would 
coordinate the activities of the world revolutions two people 1 
After Mazin's death, Serge continued alone.53
Serge' s knowledge of languages and his experience as an 
editor were put to good use as a propagandist in the Comintern. 
Serge wrote dozens of articles in the journals of the Comintern. 
Serge himself describes his activities as emissary, functionary, 
secretary editor, translator, printer, organizer, director, 
'member of the collegium' and more.54
Serge's frenetic activity in the Comintern took place, it 
must be remembered, at the height of the Civil War, in 
Petrograd, which was threatened by British troops and the White 
General Yudenich. The battle of Petrograd was the subject of two 
of Serge's books: Pendant la Guerre Civiles Petrograd. mai-iuin
Greeman, op. cit.. p. 181-200. James Hulse notes, in his 
book The Forming of the Communist International. Stanford 
University Press, 1964, that Serge and Mazin, "who were 
virtually conscripted for their assignments with the Comintern, 
found it ironical that they should have been singled out to 
organize and plan the world revolution." Ibid., p. 26. Hulse's 
book on the Comintern is almost singular in mentioning Serge's 
role in its early history, and his sources are Serge himself, in 
the Memoirs, and in his early articles for L ' Internationale 
Communiste 7/8, Nov. Dec. 1919, Stockholm reprint.- It is 
curious that no other authoritative sources seem to exist to 
corroborate Serge's Memoirs (and Hulse's book) on a subject of 
such significance as the formation of the Communist 
International.
53James Hulse, op.cit. pps. 24-29.
54Serge, From Lenin to Stalin, p. 35.
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1919: and La Ville en dangers Petrograd, L'an II de la
revolution55. Serge's activities in the Comintern were 
frequently interrupted by the immediate needs of the city's 
peril. Serge was worried that should the city fall, the 
archives of the Okhrana may fall again into the hands of 
reactionaries, which would provide "precious weapons for 
tomorrow's hangmen and firing-squads. "56 Serge saw to it that 
the archives were packed in boxes and ready to be smuggled out 
or burned at the last moment. He returned to these archives 
later, in 1920, when he wrote an article published in the French 
journal Bulletin Communiste, Nos. 50 and 51, of November 1921. 
These articles became the book Les Coulisses d'une Surete 
qenerale. Ce que tout revolutionnaire devrait savoi t~ snr la 
repression. The English edition was titled What Everyone Should 
Know About State Repression, and it is one of Serge's most well- 
known works.57
But in 1919, Serge's concern was with the survival of 
Petrograd and the revolution: "It seemed, quite plainly," he
5These short books, unlike his history of the first year, 
Year One of the Russian Revolution, are eyewitness accounts with 
all the immediacy of a participant with inside knowledge. They 
are more anecdotal and passionate but no less honest or 
revelatory. The frailties of individuals are highlighted, as in 
Serge's depiction of the anarchist in charge of taking captured 
White guards to jail: out of softness and rememberance of a not 
so distant time when the anarchist himself was imprisoned, he 
let the Whites go. Serge calls this "libertarian craziness," an 
act of "generosity which if it had been repeated, would have 
meant the suicide of the revolution." The whole story, recounted 
in La Defensa del Petroqrado. Ano II. pp. 118-120 is worth 
reading for its style, and its underlying point, which is to 
show the problems anarchists faced when their ideas confronted 
reality.
56Serge, Memoirs, p. 90
57A pirate edition of this book was reissued by the French 
police as an internal education document for the use of their 
'employees' during the 1960s. See Jean Riere's note to English 
edition, 1978.
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said, "to be our death-agony.1,58 Children were evacuated, known 
militants tried to change their appearance; Serge spent his 
nights with Communist troops, and his pregnant wife slept in the 
back of an ambulance.
The siege of Petrograd tested the endurance of the 
the hungry, frozen, and choking revolution. The victory over 
the Whites at Petrograd was organized by Trotsky, described by 
Serge as a real leader, whose energy, organization and 
confidence saved the city, by convincing the workers that 15,000 
Whites couldn't possibly "master a working class capital of 
700,000 inhabitants."59 Both Sedgwick and Greeman agree that it 
was Trotsky's appearance at the Tauride and his saving Petrograd 
from the approaching Yudenich that began Serge's three decade 
long devotion to Trotsky.60
Fighting for the revolution in the Civil War was clearly a 
seminal experience for Serge. Politically, it meant that he saw 
the real choices open to the Bolsheviks, and the heroic 
sacrifices demanded of them. Serge held the Civil War generation 
of revolutionary fighters in the highest esteepa; later he 
criticized others, like the Yugoslav Left Oppositionist Anton 
Ciliga, who were quick to judge the Bolsheviks, without 
understanding the perils they faced when the revolution was at
58Ibid.
59 •Memoirs, p. 92.
60Sedgwick, however, in his article "The Unhappy Elitist, 
Victor Serge's Early Bolshevism", which appeared posthumously in 
History Workshop Journal, Vol 17, Spring 1984, says Serge 
admired Trotsky for all the wrong reasons: for his "force,
intellect, zeal in communication" and not for his commitment to 
the values of libertarian socialism. Sedgwick's criticism is 
ahistorical; Serge was not admiring of authoritarianism, but of 
concrete, decisive action to defend the revolution so that the 
construction of the first socialist society on the globe could 
begin. The article reveals more about Sedgwick than about Serge.
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death's door.61 The hard choices made by both Lenin and Trotsky 
in this period, recognized as drastic but necessary measures, 
were supported wholeheartedly by Serge. It was only later that 
Serge looked back and was able to see the cardinal errors made - 
- the gravest of which was the creation of the Cheka, and began 
to theorize about the nature of 'emergent totalitarianism.'
1.6. Serge's Civil War Writings
Although Serge took the conscious decision to be a writer 
in 1928, he wrote a good deal before that. His Civil War 
writings, which are voluminous, were written both close to the 
events themselves, and again in the later period upon 
reflection. His articles on the Civil War were published in La 
vie Ouvriere (March 1921- July 1926), Bulletin Communiste (13 
articles from April 1921, to Oct. 1924), La Correspondence 
Internationale (1922-5), Clarte (1920-26). His books include 
Year One of the Russian Revolution (1925-28 V. La Ville en 
Dangers Petrograd. L'an II de la Revolution (Nov.-Dec. 1919), 
Pendant la Guerre Civil: Petrograd. mai-iuin 1919 (Jan.1920), 
Vie des revolutionnaires (published in 1930, with a preface 
dated 1929, indicating the work was written earlier, perhaps in 
1922)62, Ville Conquise. the novel about the Civil War and Red 
Terror, written in 1930-31 and published in English as Conquered 
City. 1967, as well as the aforementioned Les Anarchistes et 
1'experience de la Revolution russe.
Serge's writings reveal his public priorities as he saw 
them at the time: 1) This is the first socialist revolution, and 
revolutionaries must be within it; 2) the White terror threatens 
to destroy the revolution, so revolutionaries must defend it; 3) 
Look what happened in Finland: the workers thought they could 
have a peaceful transition to socialism and were drowned in
61See his letter to Anton Ciliga in New International. Feb. 
1939, p. 54.
62Richard Greeman, op. cit., p. 219n.
25
blood by the Whites; 4) The Cheka, instrument of Red terror, the 
Bolsheviks' worst creation, nevertheless was formed as a 
response to the terror of the Whites and the enemies from within 
the revolution, demonstrated by attempts to assassinate Lenin 
and Trotsky.
Although Serge was in this period a convinced Bolshevik, he 
was by no means uncritical. His writings were forceful 
examinations of the negative aspects of the revolution of which 
the Communists were only too painfully aware. Serge 
concentrated on these aspects, as we shall see, in order better 
to analyze and understand; no attempt was made to idealize the 
shortcomings of the revolution or the Bolsheviks even while the 
conclusions he drew of both were positive.
The following examination of Serge's civil war writings is 
selective, dealing with the major issues Serge took positions 
on, leading to the development of his (emerging) critique of the 
Soviet Union. The examination does not proceed text by text, but 
rather by looking at certain selected issues taken up by the 
Bolsheviks. Thus: the treaty of Brest-Litovsk controversy and
consequences, the White massacre in Finland as result, the Civil 
War and role of Trotsky, Lenin, and Stalin (where he was 
offended); analysis of War Communism, opposition to it (Workers 
Opposition) and the subsequent disaster for the revolution in 
the revolt of Kronstadt sailors; totalitarianism emergent, role 
of petty bourgeoisie in formation of bureaucracy; NEP.
When Serge undertook the writing of a history of the 
Revolution, he began with the first year. This is not an 
eyewitness account, and differs considerably from his 
eyewitness, participatory accounts of the Civil War. The latter 
works, witnessed and experienced are much more impressionistic, 
anecdotal and evocative. Year One of the Russian Revolution, on 
the other hand, deals with events that took place before Serge 
arrived on Russian soil. It is a revolutionary history which is 
both partisan and uncompromising, revealing the limited choices 
facing the Bolsheviks in each new situation.
26
His sources were official documents, speeches, memoirs, 
notes, reports, and fragmentary studies.63 In this work as in 
his others, Serge was writing to correct the record, and to draw 
lessons for revolutionaries. The book, pretending no 
'objectivity,' expresses "no other point of view but that held 
by the proletarian revolutionaries,1,64 but does strive to stick 
to the facts.
In trying to resurrect the early history of Bolshevism, 
then, and to distinguish it from what followed, Serge turned to 
the early Bolshevik controversies, beginning with the 
insurrection itself, the role of the urban middle classes, the 
Consituent Assembly and the first flames of the Civil War, and 
the division within the Bolshevik Party over the accord with 
Germany, the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
On the revolution, Serge declared himself with Lenin and 
Trotsky and against the opposers (including Zinoviev, Kamenev, 
and Stalin) within the Bolsheviks. Serge compared Lenin's "On 
the Road to Insurrection" with Marx's "The Communist Manifesto. " 
He also affirmed that Trotsky was in complete accord with Lenin 
and they were both correct on the timing of the insurrection.65
Serge destroyed the notion of the Bolshevik coup d'etat, by 
concentrating on the role of the "party of the proletariat" 
which "expresses at a conscious level, what the masses want and 
carry it out."66 He repeated Lenin's and the Bolshevik's 
conception of the party as "the nervous system of the working 
class," "its brain," which "reveals what they [the working
63Serge, Year One of the Russian Revolution. Author's 
foreword, p. 19.
Victor Serge, from the Foreward, Year One of the Russian 
Revolution, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1972, p. 18. 
First published as L'An I de la revolution russe. Paris, 1930.
65Year One, p. 380n and p. 67.
66Ibid., p. 56.
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class] have been thinking.”67 The Party is the majority party
of the working class ”It is all one multitude.” Serge also said
the Party in 1917 suffered not the slightest bureaucratic
68deformation; its dominant tradition was against opportunism.
Serge's view of the revolution was repeated in his 1920 
article "La Revolution d'Octobre a Moscou, ”69 in his biography 
of Lenin, Lenine 1917. (1925) in From Lenin to Stalin, (1936] 
and his article "Trente Ans apres la Revolution russe" (1947) 
and other works. The revolution was a genuine expression of 
mass sentiment and action by the overwhelming majority of 
workers and peasants, and "the Bolshevik Party was the political 
organization which best expressed the popular sentiment. From 
this fact came its popularity and the effectiveness of its
70activity." Moreover, the superior capabilities of Lenin, the 
"most hated and the most loved man on earth”71 were of supreme 
importance. His genius, Serge wrote, lay in his being a 
consistent revolutionist in times of revolution.72 Trotsky,
67Ibid., pp. 56-61.
68Serge noted in From Lenin to Stalin, "the party discussed, 
tendencies appeared and disappeared, and opposition elements, 
which must not be confused with counter-revolutionists, agitated 
unceasingly in broad daylight during the whole civil war —  
until 1921. They were not to disappear completely until 1925- 
1926, when in consequence all internal life disappeared from the 
Party. ... Men fought and died for a new kind of freedom." pp. 
22-23.
69Bulletin Communiste, Vol. II, Nos. 36-37 (Double issue), 
pp. 612-620.
70Serge, From Lenin to Stalin. Monad/Pathfinder Press, New 
York, p. 23.
71Serge, From Lenin to Stalin, (FLTS) p. 15.
72See Serge's biography of Lenin, Lenine, 1917. Paris, 1925.
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whom Serge calls "the second head of the revolution" was also 
indispensable to its realization.73
Elsewhere, Serge again put to rest the idea of the 
revolution as the work of a small minority of conspirators. 
Urging 'people' to read the words of eye-witnesses such as John 
Reed and Jacques Sadoul, Serge asserts "The Bolshevik 
'conspiracy' was literally carried into power by a colossal and 
rising wave of public sentiment."
Serge's basic attitudes were the same as Lenin's and 
Trotsky's on the early tasks and decisions facing the 
Bolsheviks. If anything. Serge criticized the Bolsheviks for 
their leniency in treating their White enemies, citing instance 
where White officers were allowed to get away instead of being 
shot on the spot, calling this lack of firmness "foolish 
clemency." Serge adds, "the greatest humanity lies in the utmost 
rigour: magnanimity costs too much."75
Serge conformed completely with his newly acquired 
Bolshevism, praising the "party patriotism" of the Bolsheviks, 
a patriotism of "inestimable value in the class war, a 
patriotism of class and party: better to be wrong with the party 
of the proletariat than right against it. There is no greater 
revolutionary wisdom than this."76 By 1928, Serge had
3Serge described Trotsky's role in From Lenin to Stalin, 
pp. 16-19. Serge also drew a portrait of the two leaders of the 
revolution, nameless but instantly recognizable, in his Civil 
War novel. Conquered City, written in 1930-31, published in 
Paris in 1932. In From Lenin to Stalin. Serge quoted from his 
portrait of the two, explaining that although he wrote it in
1919 (to be incorporated into his novel 11 years later) he was 
in Leningrad when writing the novel: if he had used the names in 
1930 "the Black Chamber would not have passed my manuscript. " p. 
22n.
74Serge, "Trente Ans apres la Revolution russe," pp. 3-4.
75Serge, Year One, p. 88 and 381n.
76Ibid. p. 100.
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completely reversed his position: the Opposition, he said, was
defeated by "party patriotism." ...
"the Party that was excommunicating, imprisoning, and 
beginning to murder us, remained our Party, and we 
still owed everything to it; we must live only for it 
since only through it could we serve the Revolution.
We were defeated by Party patriotism: it both provoked 
us to rebel and turned us against ourselves." 7
Although the earlier quote shows the fervor of Serge's new­
found loyalty to the Party which made the revolution possible, 
the latter shows his ability to remain critical was never 
compromised by this allegiance. This was not to be the case for 
many others who had been Party members for most of their 
political life.
Another seeming contradiction emerges between Serge's frank 
portrayal of the besieged revolution in 1918, when the question 
of 'liberty' fell victim to the "avalanche of all the other 
problems which were descending with inexorable force upon the
78young Republic and threatening to engulf it completely," and 
Serge's preoccupation at the end of his life when he wrote that 
"the only problem which revolutionary Russia, in all the years 
from 1917 to 1923, utterly failed to consider was the problem of 
liberty."79 As Serge clearly demonstrated, the revolution was 
hemmed in from all sides: from within, the anarchists80, SR's, 
Mensheviks and Kadets all opposed the Bolsheviks and formed part
77Serge, Memoirs, p. 245.
78Tamara Deutscher, book review of Year One of the Russian 
Revolution, in Critique 1. Spring 1973, p. 95.
79Serge, Memoirs, p. 349. Tamara Deutscher also points out 
this contradiction in her review of Serge's book which, appeared 
in Critique 1. She answers Serge with Serge: " Serge' s own
truthful and despairing narrative provides all the evidence that 
in the 'Year One' there was no chance, no possibility to 
translate into practice his —  and the Bolsheviks —  high 
aspirations and hopes." Critique 1. p. 95.
80Makhno's Black Guard fought the Whites while opposing the 
Bolsheviks.
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of the counter-revolution; famine and epidemic took hold; from 
without, the White armies of Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich and 
later Wrangel were joined by the armies of fourteen capitalist 
powers81 to blockade and strangle the revolution. With all 
these forces determined to destroy the Bolsheviks, the miracle 
is that they survived at all. Serge attributed their victory to 
the superior skill and energy of Trotsky as Commissar of War, to 
Lenin, whose genius lay in his ability to express the unspoken 
aspirations of the man in the street,82 and to the thousands of 
revolutionary fighters who were in the forefront of an immense 
popular movement.83
As for liberty, Serge demonstrated in numerous examples 
that the measures taken were necessary and still were too 
lenient. His position throughout was that of a consistent 
revolutionary giving a candid account of the chain of events in 
the Revolution, Civil War and attempted counter-revolution which 
led to many of the sacred principles upon which the revolution 
was founded —  among them, workers control and workers democracy 
—  being curtailed by force of circumstance. Later Serge would 
theorize on which of the measures taken out of necessity were 
transformed into permanent features of the new society; but 
during Year One, Serge agreed with the direction of Bolshevik
81Leon Trotsky, Between Red and White: Social Democracy and 
the Wars of Intervention in Russia. 1918-1921. New Park 
Publications, 1975. First published in 1922 as Mezhdu 
Imperializmom i Revolvutsiei, Moscow.
82 FTLS, p. 15.
83 Serge, "Trente Ans Apres La Revolution Russe," p. 6. 
There is a large body of literature which takes issue with Serge 
on this point, attributing the victory of the Bolsheviks not to 
their popularity, but to lesser evilism: the peasants preferred 
the Soviets to any of the available alternatives. Schapiro also 
attributes the White's defeat to the less than whole-hearted 
support the Allies gave to the White armies. See for example 
Leonard Schapiro, The Russian Revolutions of 1917; The Origins 
of Modern Communism, Basic Books, 1984, pps. 176-184.
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policy. We will now turn to examine a few of the events forcing 
the Bolsheviks to apparently retreat on matters of principle.
Industry: workers control or blanket nationalization?
Notwithstanding the life-threatening difficulties facing 
the revolution from the very beginning, the early history was 
one of a developing socialist democracy. Both Daniel's The 
Conscience of the Revolution, and Central Committee minutes of 
the Bolshevik Party from August 1917-February 191884 attest to 
the lively atmosphere of free-wheeling and intense debate which 
went on within the Bolshevik Party and between the various 
Parties in the early months.
On the question of industry, the Bolsheviks at first 
favored workers control over industry rather than blanket 
nationalization of the means of production, and State planning 
and centralization at the expense of local initiatives. Lenin, 
following Marx and Engels,85 envisaged a rather long period of 
co-existence with the capitalists; the question of workers 
hegemony was the key. Serge concurred with Lenin and his co­
thinkers, seeing effective workers control rather than total 
nationalization of industry as being organized in "mixed trusts" 
with the "growing participation of the socialist state ... in 
which the capitalists would retain some place."86 This economic
84Reproduced in English in the Pluto Press volume The 
Bolsheviks and the October Revolution. London 1974, and in part 
in R.V. Daniel's A Documentary History of Communism. Volume 1. 
University Press of New England, 1984.
85See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist 
Manifesto.
86FLTS, p. 30. This conception of forms of the market 
surviving after the revolution are relevant to the debates on 
"market socialism" today which are current in Soviet style 
economies from the Soviet Union, East Europe and China to Cuba 
and Nicaragua. The problem is not whether a form of the market 
is possible or desirable, but under what kind of political and 
social control. In a workers state, where there is genuine
(continued...)
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gradualism was called "state capitalism" by Lenin and was based
on the Bolshevik conviction that socialism was impossible in
such a backward setting, but that a gradually socializing Russia
would be an example for the European working class.87
Serge agreed with Lenin here as elsewhere: showing how the
Bolsheviks usually endorsed the initiatives already taken by the
masses (as in the decree of November 14 which invited the
workers to "use their own committees to control the production,
88accounting and financing" of the firms they work in ), Serge 
pointed out the key to the question of industry was the hegemony 
of the proletariat. He worried that the technical
intelligentsia, so necessary to the organization of production, 
if not controlled by the workers, would simply administer the
89society and could revert to exploiting labor. The discussion
86(.. .continued)
workers control, a surviving market does not threaten to 
reestablish generalized exploitation of labor. It is a feature 
of the transition period that is not permanent. The question of 
workers control is vital in this context. That was how the 
Bolsheviks saw the issue in 1917-1918, and is precisely what is 
missing from these debates today.
87Once the Western European proletariat seized power in the 
more advanced capitalist countries, their vast resources would 
be at the disposal of the Russian revolution. In this case, true 
'proletarian internationalism' would translate into German 
socialists building factories in revolutionary Russia.
88 Year One. p. 95. The decree of Nov. 14 legalized the 
intervention of workers in the management of factories; the 
decisions of the organs of control were binding and all 
commercial secrets were abolished. By exercising its control, 
the working class would learn to direct industry. Through the 
nationalization of banking and credit institutions, the workers 
would recover, for the benefit of the State, part of the 
proceeds levied by capital from their labor, thus diminishing 
their exploitation. In this way, the class would progress 
towards the complete expropriation of the exploiters. Ibid., pp. 
135-36.
89Serge stated this idea incompletely in Year_One, pp. 103- 
5, and retured to it in his unpublished essays from his exile in 
Mexico during and after WWII.
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was terminated, in effect, by the encroaching Civil War.
90Nationalization was made imperative for defense.
Serge pointed to the irony contained in the actions of the
dispossessed bourgeoisie:
"Through the civil war that they have begun, the 
former propertied classes lose everything. The logic 
of the struggle demands this. The famine necessitates 
rationing in the cities and requisitions in the 
country where, as a result, peasant uprisings break 
out. To an ever increasing extent, the economy must 
be directed with a view to war, and stringent measures 
of nationalization are extended to the whole of 
production. Factory owners ask to be nationalized, as 
they cannot live otherwise. "91
Brest-Litovsk, Left Communists, and Socialist Democracy 
As has been noted above, the early months of the revolution 
did resemble the "popular ferment, bubbling ideas, rivalry of 
clubs, parties and publications" which were so noticeably absent 
when Serge crossed the border from Finland in Feb. 1919. Serge's 
critical spirit would have met kindred souls had he been able to 
avoid imprisonment in France and made it to Russia in time for 
the first heady months.
One of what Serge called the tendentious myths of the 
Russian Revolution's historiography which he demolished in his
90Nationalization went further than the Bolsheviks had 
intended in 1917 (Serge states that the Bolsheviks had no 
further plans than workers control, nationalization of banks and 
credit institutions and opening the books, allowing the secrets 
of capitalist functioning to be available to the workers [Year 
One, p. 136]) because the workers, like the peasants had carried 
out a de facto seizure of property and nationalization legalized 
the situation; and because the Bolsheviks thought that legal 
nationalization would thwart intervention by foreign governments 
to protect their nationals property. (See David Lane, Politics 
and Society in the USSR, p. 59. Further, Germans had been buying 
up shares in Russian industry, and as part of the provisions of 
the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, all expropriated factories had to 
be returned within one year unless they were nationalized —  
hence the rush for nationalization.
91FLTS. p. 32.
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retrospective on the revolution's 30th birthday was that the 
Bolshevik's immediate goal was to establish a monopoly on state 
power.92 Serge writes that the truth was just the opposite: 
the Bolsheviks were most afraid of being isolated in power. The 
Left Social Revolutionaries participated in the government with 
the Bolsheviks from November until July 1918. They refused to 
recognize, along with a good third of the known Bolsheviks, the 
terms of peace with Germany put forth in the treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk,, and on July 6 began an insurrectional revolt in Moscow 
proclaiming their intention to govern alone and to 'reopen the 
war against German imperialism." They were defeated and from 
then it was left to the Bolsheviks to rule alone. Marcel Liebman 
notes that at this point, "the Leninists ... against their will, 
concentrated the whole state power in their own hands, with no 
share held by other socialist parties."93 And Serge commented 
that "as their responsibilities increased, their mentality
QA
changed."
This 'change of mentality' meant that the Bolsheviks moved 
to suppress their socialist and anarchist opponents, a move that 
is apparent with the benefit of hindsight to have had 
irreversible consequences for the further development of 
socialist democracy. At the time however, what was apparent was 
that the SR's launched a series of terrorist attacks, killing 
first Voludarsky, then Uritsky and attempted to kill Lenin, who 
later insisted that Dora Kaplan, his would-be assassin, not be 
executed.95
92 "Trente Ans Apres La Revolution Russe, " first published in 
Nov. 1947 in the tiny French left wing publication La Revolution 
Proletarienne, directed by the French syndicalist Alfred Rosmer.
93Marcel Liebman, "Was Lenin a Stalinist?", in Tariq Ali 
(ed) The Stalinist Legacy. Penguin Books, England, 1984, p. 140.
94Serge, "Trente Ans Apres La Revolution Russe" p. .
95Serge, FLTS, p. 31.
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The SR's weren't the only early critics from within the 
revolution: arguing against the 'peace of shame,'96
Preobrazhensky and Bukharin, later to stand on opposite sides of 
the industrialization debates, joined with others to put out the 
"Theses of Left Communists" in 1918. Although the debate began 
on the question of war or peace, it turned to industrial policy. 
The Left Communists warned against the growing bureaucratization 
of industry which would divorce the proletariat from control 
over economic and political life and force the regime 
increasingly to rely on bourgeois specialists and capitalist 
methods of labor organization, such as piece-work, one-man 
management and Taylorism.97
The debates over the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk show 
Bolshevism at its best; democratic, principled and yet 
maintaining a balance between flexibility and firmness. Serge 
calls the period "The Great Years." The debates were passionate 
and committed. The minutes of the Central Committee of the 
Bolshevik Party show how deeply divided the Bolsheviks were oh 
nearly every major issue —  with members lining up on different 
sides of every question, threatening resignation on questions of 
principle, only to line up differently on subsequent
98 •questions. The debate with the other socialist parties at 
this juncture were equally lively and creative.
96As the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was called by many 
Bolsheviks, including Serge.
97See "Theses of the Left Communists (1918)" published in 
the first number of the Moscow produced journal Kommunist on 20 
April 1918, translated and published by Critique in 1977. Half 
of the "Theses" are translated in Daniels collection, A 
Documentary History of Communism, Vol. 1, pp. 98-102.
98See The Bolsheviks and the October Revolution: Central 
Committee Minutes of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour party 
(bolsheviks) August 1917-February 1918, Pluto Press, London, 
1974. The minutes pertaining to the Brest-Litovsk terms of 
peace, in particular, show how deep the divisions in the 
Bolsheviks were. Reading this volume is quite a corrective to 
the notion of Bolshevik monolithism in the early period.
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Although Serge was not in Russia to take part in this 
debate, he devoted a chapter to it in his Year One. Serge sided 
with Lenin's realistic approach to the negotiations, because 
they were based on hard facts, not left sentiments. It was 
impossible to conduct a revolutionary war against imperialism —  
the old army didn't exist, and the new one was just forming. 
Serge says "the phrases with which the Lefts were so lavish 
expressed pure sentiment. The reasoning they invoked was simply
99pitiful." Moreover, Serge finds Lenin's realism even "more 
impressive in that he displays no basic tendency to overestimate 
the forces of the enemy."100 Serge had points of agreement with 
Trotsky in this controversy as well, acknowledging that 
Trotsky's wanting to hold out gave strength to the Western 
proletariat, who saw a separate peace as a capitulation to
German imperialism and prolonging the war101. Serge's overall
102agreement was with Lenin, however, on the need for surrender; 
yet from the vantage point of 1928,103 Serge reflected that the 
weakness of German imperialism at that time would have prevented 
it from destroying the Russian revolution —  saying that even a
99Serge, Year One, p. 169.
10°Ibid.. p. 172.
101E.H. Carr suggests that the differences between Lenin and 
Trotsky on Brest-Litovsk were concerned with emphasis: "In the 
Brest-Litovsk controversy, though Trotsky was the most eloquent 
and ingenious advocate of world revolution, he was also the 
champion of the policy of playing off one group of capitalists 
against the other; he was at the opposite pole to those who 
stood on the ground of pure revolutionary principle unsullied by 
compromise or expediency ... On the other hand, Lenin, while 
insisting on the needs of national defence, was so^^far from 
abandoning world revolution that he constantly stressed it as 
the supreme goal of his policy." See E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik 
Revolution 1917-1923. Vol. 3, London, MacMillan, 1953, pp. 55- 
56.
102Trotsky came to side with Lenin as well.
103Serge was writing Year One in the years 1928-1930.
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German occupation would not have meant the collapse of the
„ . , . 1 0 4Soviet regime.
Serge sided with Lenin after carefully examining the 
position of all the opposing tendencies inside and outside of 
the Party. Although he sympathized with the anti-bureaucratic 
stance of the Left Communists, he did not agree with them on the 
question of the peace treaty.105 The Bolsheviks were forced 
into accepting the terms of the peace by the advancing German 
front. Proletarian realism demanded recognition of this fact, 
not adherence to abstract, romantic or dogmatic conceptions. 
"Revolutionary honour,” Serge wrote, "is not put in question
104Year One, pp. 172-3. Upon reflection, Serge appreciated 
better Trotsky's line at the time, which was to exhaust all 
revolutionary possibilities and to convince the proletariat of 
the West of the intransigence of the Bolsheviks before Austro- 
German imperialism. Trotsky's tactic helped dissipate the 
attitude shared by many in the West that the Russians' surrender 
made them responsible for prolonging a hated war.
105Serge examined the Left Communist economic policies and 
Lenin's response in Year One. Here one would expect, given 
Serge's previous and subsequent political development, to find 
a larger measure of sympathy for the positions of the Lefts than 
Serge actually demonstrates. Instead Serge criticized the Left 
Communists for their emotionalism and zeal, and their lack of a 
grasp of the real and desperate state of the revolution —  what 
Serge described as the country "at its last gasp." Lenin had 
grasped the real situation, and was not trapped by any 
'revolutionary subjectivism to which intellectuals of middle- 
class origins are prone' according to Serge, echoing Lenin and 
using his phraseology. (Year One, p. 224) His (Lenin's) 
industrial policies, seen in this regard, were a step forward, 
because they would lead to industry being organized and 
administered, and not to its falling further behind. State 
capitalism, then, Serge argued, quoting Lenin, was a step in the 
direction of socialism. (Ibid. 220) Clearly the situation was 
drastic and demanded far-sighted and rational policies; Serge 
decided Lenin possessed the clarity and foresight necessary. 
Serge also wrote that Lenin's handling of the Left Communists 
was a model of revolutionary politics, and saved the Bolshevik 
Party from suffering a split. Ibid., pp. 220-226.
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when, without abandoning the struggle, one submits to an 
unavoidable defeat."106
Although the terms of the peace were disastrous 
revolutionary Russia lost Poland and the Baltic regions, huge 
tracts of the Ukraine, 27% of her own sown area, 26% of her 
population, a third of her average crops, three-quarters of her
107iron and steel and 26% of her railway network —  Serge 
weighed the pluses as well as the minuses. One of the pluses 
was that the conduct of the discussion showed the health of the 
party which was able to strike a perfect balance between 
authority and democracy, discipline and lenience; the minuses 
were described forcefully by Serge, particularly his description 
of the sacrifice of the Finnish Revolution, which was drowned in 
blood in 1918. Serge has the almost singular merit among 
historians of the revolution of not letting the tragic events in 
Finland get lost in the history of the Russian revolution.
Finland
Serge had passed through Finland on his way to Petrograd in 
January 1919. His description is worth quoting in fulls
Finland received us as foes, for the White Terror was
only just over..... The cold air was heavy with
chilled violence. Without ever leaving the train, we 
crossed this huge land of sleepy woods, snow-covered 
lakes, tracts of whiteness, and pretty painted 
cottages lost in the wilderness. We went through 
towns so tidy and silent that they reminded us of 
children's toys. We had a moment of panic when, as 
evening fell, the train stopped in a clearing and 
soldiers lined up alongside the tracks: we were
invited to get down. The women murmured, 'They're 
going to shoot us.' We refused to leave the train,
10SYear One, p. 175. _
107Schapiro, The Russian Revolutions of 1917. p. 170. Serge's 
figures, which he got from Karl Radek's report to the First All- 
Russian Congress of Economic Councils, give an even larger 
picture of the 'burden of Brest-Litovsk': The Soviet Republic, 
he wrote, lost 40% of its industrial proletariat, 45% of its 
fuel production, 90% of its sugar production, 64%-70% of its 
metal industry; 55% of its wheat. Year One, p. 199.
39
but it was only to give us a breath of air while we 
waited for the carriages to be cleaned and the engine 
to be fuelled with wood. The sentries ignored their 
instructions [they were ordered to shoot at the first 
attempt of anyone to leave the train] and started to 
be pleasant to the children.108
The trip through Finland was also recounted in Serge's novel
Birth of Our Power, where Serge saw in the hostile eyes of the
Finnish guards the bitter defeat of the Finnish workers. What
had happened?
The treaty of Brest-Litovsk had sealed the sacrifice of the 
Finnish proletariat, in whom the Russian revolutionaries had
109rightly placed great hopes. Finland was an advanced 
bourgeois democracy, with a well organized labor movement. 
Constituted as a Grand Duchy, it had been a largely autonomous 
part of the Russian empire since 1809. The Finnish bourgeoisie 
was determined to use WWI to gain independence. After the
successful October Revolution in Russia, the Finns pressed their 
claim on the Soviet government, citing the Bolshevik principle 
of self-determination of nations which included the right of 
secession. On December 18/31 1917,110 the resolution
recognizing national independence of Finland was adopted by the 
Sovnarkora (Council of People's Commissars). But this
independence gave freedom not to the Finnish workers but the 
bourgeoisie.111 The Finnish social democrats, "found
themselves in the position of having to receive freedom not
108Serge, Memoirs, p. 68.
109Serge, Year One, p. 182. Lenin had written, in his "Third 
Letter from Afar, " before returning to Russia, that "the Finnish 
workers are better organizers than us and will help us in this 
field; in their own fashion they will form a vanguard pressing 
towards a foundation of the Socialist Republic."
110December 18 (Old Style), December 31 (New Style) calendar.
11XE. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923. Vol. 1, 
pp. 287-289.
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directly from the hands of socialists, but with the aid of the
112Finnish bourgeoisie."
The Finnish social democrats, formed in the mould of the 
German social democrats, and labeled cowardly and indecisive by 
Stalin during the discussion of Finnish independence at the 
VTsIK (Central Committee) quoted above, had gained a majority in 
the Finnish Parliamentary elections of 1916. They voted in the 
eight-hour day and other social legislation. The question 
presented itself almost immediately: could socialism be
achieved through the ballot box?
Tensions mounted, and a general strike was proclaimed on 
November 14/27 1917, provoked by a serious famine. The strike 
took place just weeks after the successful October revolution in 
Russia, just miles from its frontier.113 Bloody clashes ensued 
between reds and whites. Serge called it a revolution aborted. 
He blamed the Finnish social democratic leaders, who could 
easily have taken power but were indecisive. O.W. Kuusinen, one 
of the principal leaders of Finnish Social Democracy later 
wrote: "wishing not to risk our democratic conquests, and hoping 
to manoeuvre round this turning-point of history by our 
parliamentary skill, we decided to evade the revolution..."114
The situation continued to escalate, and in January, it 
became clear that the parliamentary solution had come to a dead
112Stalin, Sochineniva, iv, 22-24, quoted in Carr, Ibid.,
p.288.
113At the Finnish Social-Democratic Congress in November, 
Stalin, representing the Council of Commissars, appealed to the 
Finnish comrades to seize power, and promised them the fraternal 
assistance of the Russian proletariat. The Social-Democrats did 
make a bid for power, but the promised aid was not forthcoming
because of the provisions of Brest-Litovsk. See E. H. Carr, op.
cit.. and Boris Souvarine, Stalin, p. 100.
114Quoted in Serge, Year One. p. 184. The passage is
striking for its similarity to the situation in Chile 1970-1973, 
when the Popular Unity Coalition came to governmental power and 
attempted a parliamentary road to socialism.
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end. The Finnish social democrats attempted to seize power: 
they introduced workers control over industry, and debated 
whether it was now possible to "establish, without the 
expropriation of the rich or the dictatorship of labour, a 
parliamentary democracy in which the proletariat would have been 
the leading class."115 The 'Finnish commune' lasted but a few 
months, but passed revolutionary legislation and attempted in 
Serge's words, "a workers' revolution conducted in the name of 
an ideal democracy." They were rapidly defeated by the 
'greater realism of the bourgeoisie' and General Mannerheim's 
troops,116 beefed up by a brigade of Swedish volunteers and the 
German Schutzkorps. The White Terror followed. Soviet troops 
had to retire under the provisions of Brest-Litovsk, giving a 
whole new perspective to the consequences of that 'shameful 
treaty'. Helsinki was captured after Mannerheim's troops 
organized a massacre whose main victims were women and children. 
The bloodbath in Finland, which Serge said had only been matched 
by the massacre at the Paris Commune, ended up killing one in 
four Finnish workers. It has since been matched by the equally 
bloody ending to the Chilean working class' experiment with the 
peaceful transition to socialism (1970-1973) —  an experiment 
strikingly similar to the shortlived "People's Republic of 
Finland."
Serge drew theoretical conclusions from the White terror in 
Finland, which he said could not be
"explained by the frenzy of battle ... the psychosis 
of civil war plays a purely secondary role.... The 
terror is in reality the result of a calculation and 
a historical necessity. The victorious propertied 
classes are perfectly aware that they can only ensure 
their own domination in the aftermath of a social
115Serge, Ibid.
116General Mannerheim, of Swedish origin, was a former 
general of the Russian army. One of Helsinki's main 
thoroughfare's is named after this butcher of the Finnish 
working class.
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battle by inflicting on the working class a bloodbath 
savage enough to enfeeble it for tens of years 
afterwards. And since the class in question is far 
more numerous than the wealthy classes, the number of 
victims must be very great.
The total extermination of all the advanced and 
conscious elements of the proletariat is in short, the 
rational objective of the White terror. In this 
sense, a vanquished revolution —  regardless of its 
tendency —  will always cost the proletariat far more 
than a victorious revolution, no matter what
117sacrifices and rigours the latter may demand."
Serge made a final observation: the butcheries in Finland took
place in April 1918. The Russian revolution had, up till that 
moment, been very lenient towards its enemies, and had not used 
terror. "The victorious bourgeoisie of a small nation which 
ranks among the most enlightened societies of Europe" had 
reminded the Russian proletariat of the "first law of social
Thus the defeat of the Finnish proletariat had multiple 
connections to and consequences for the Russian revolution:
(1) the extension of the Russian revolution to an advanced 
Western capitalist country had been crushed; (2) the Bolsheviks' 
hands were tied by the terms of the treaty of Brest Litovsk so 
that they could not come to the aid of their Finnish brothers; 
(3) the savagery of the bourgeois response was a lesson to the 
Western proletariat, demonstrating the high social cost for 
failed revolution; (4) the ferocity of the Finnish bloodbath 
forced the Bolsheviks to abandon clemency and meet white terror 
with red; (5) the Finnish defeat was also the harbinger of 
successive defeats in Central Europe: Germany, Hungary, and 
Poland, and as a consequence occasioned the turn eastward in the 
Bolshevik quest for the extension of the Russian revolution, the
117Serge quoted a group of Finnish Communists who wrote that 
'all organized workers have either been shot or imprisoned.' 
Year One, p. 190.
118 *Serge's discussion on the events in Finland can be found 
in Year One, pp. 182-191.
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convening the Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities and
Toilers of the East in Baku.119 Similar events brought home the
lessons of Finland; in Ukraine, in the failed Bavarian, Baku and
Hungarian communes.
Serge's treatment of the Finnish defeat is an extraordinary
account for revolutionaries mentioned in precious few other 
120histories. Serge had seen the results of the White terror
firsthand, when he crossed from Finland in January 1919 and read
the price of defeat of the Finnish proletariat in the faces of
121the guards escorting them across the border.
1.7. Civil War: Cheka, Terror, and Revolutionary Repression 
Although cognizant of the need to match terror with 
terror, Serge nevertheless was critical and fearful of its use. 
The Civil War was full of horrors which Serge makes no attempt 
to hide, or idealize. His writings do make the case for 
understanding, however, what the stakes were: defeat of the 
revolution wouid have brought greater bloodshed and a
reactionary dictatorship. The victory was a victory for the
122world, for culture, for humanity.
Serge wrote in his Portrait of Staline (1939) that the 
gravest error committed by the Bolsheviks was the establishment
119Aimed at India and China, the Congress was more anti­
imperialist than socialist, and laid some of the seeds which 
were later sown in the debacle of the Chinese revolution of 1927 
—  due to Stalin's Comintern policies. See Memoirs, p. 107-9, 
and the review by Michael Cox in Critique 1 of The First 
Congress of the Toilers of the East documents, pp. 101-102.
120Serge also wrote an article in Clarte on the Finnish 
experience: "Une Grande Experience oubliee: La Commune
finlandaise de 1918," Clarte, Vol. 1926-27, pp. 237-241.
121Described in Serge, Birth of Our Power.
122 'All his writings on the Civil War are similar, a point 
concurred by Greeman, op.cit. p. 234.
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of the Cheka, (Extraordinary Commission for the Repression of
123Counter-Revolution, Speculation, Espionage and Desertion), 
the security force formed to protect the revolution from 
counter-revolutionaries. He called it an inquisition. The Cheka 
judged the accused and mere suspects without hearing or seeing 
them, so there was no possibility of their defending themselves. 
Arrests and executions were determined and carried out in 
secret. In later years this preoccupied Serge enormously, 
writing about the significance of the Cheka's creation and what 
it turned into —  in almost identical terms —  in his Portrait 
de Staline (1939), Memoirs of a Revolutionary (1942-43), and 
"Trente Ans Apres la Revolution russe" (1947). Despite the 
extraordinary measures brought on by a bitter Civil War, Serge 
asked how socialists could forget that public trials were "the
124only guarantee against arbitrary and corrupt actions...." 
Although Serge says Dzerzhinsky was "incorruptible" and a 
"sincere idealist" the personnel gradually selected for the 
Cheka had "psychological inclinations" that prepared them to 
tenaciously devote themselves to the task of "internal defence": 
suspicion, embitterment, harshness and sadism.
"Long-standing social inferiority complexes and 
memories of humiliations and suffering in the Tsar's 
jails rendered them intractable, and since 
professional degeneration has rapid effects, the 
Chekas inevitably consisted of perverted men tending
123The Cheka was originally created at the suggestion of 
Dzerzhinsky as an administrative organ with limited powers of 
investigation of cases. It was subordinated to the Sovnarkom. 
A decree of 5 September 1918 conferred sweeping powers on the 
Cheka, which it never in practice lost. This extension of power 
became known as the "Red Terror." By the end of 1922 it was 
estimated that the Cheka had imprisoned approximately" 60,000; 
the Cheka was also responsible for 140,000 deaths by direct 
execution and a further 140,000 deaths by suppressing 
insurrections in the same four years. The figures were arrived 
at by the historian G.H. Leggett, and quoted in Schapiro, op. 
cit., pp. 183-187.
124 •Serge, Portrait de Staline. Editions Bernard Grasset, 
Paris, 1940, pp. 57-58.
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to see conspiracy everywhere and to live in the midst 
of perpetual conspiracy themselves.
Serge insists that Dzerzhinsky "judged them to be 'half-rotten'
and saw no solution to the evil except in shooting the worst
Chekists and abolishing the death-penalty as quickly as
possible."126
Serge did try to demonstrate the extenuating circumstances 
for this unpardonable terror, to be fair to Lenin's Central 
Committee. The Party knew they would be massacred in the event 
of defeat, and defeat was a real possibility. The previous 
experiences Serge cited, from the Paris Commune to the Finnish 
White Terror were evidence enough that defeats were 
characterized by the "mass extermination of the vanquished 
proletarians." Moreover, the Cheka had innocent beginnings and 
only changed after counter-revolutionary uprisings, the 
assassinations of Volodarski and Uritsky and the attempts on
127Lenin. Nevertheless Serge would say later in his life that 
the Bolshevik revolution died a self-inflicted death with the 
creation of the Cheka, instrument of Red Terror, forerunner of
125Serge, Memoirs, p. 80.
126Ibid.. p. 81. The death penalty was abolished, at the 
recommendation of Dzerzhinsky with the approval of Lenin and 
Trotsky, by the decree of January 17, 1920. Serge recounts that 
he was told that the night the Petrograd newspapers were 
printing the decree, the Petrograd Chekas were liquidating their 
stock! In Petrograd and Moscow, that night, as many as 500 
suspects were shot. The Chekists responsible later justified 
their horrendous massacre with "if the People's Commissars were 
getting converted to humanitarianisim, that was their^business. 
Our business was to crush the counter-revolution forever, and 
they could shoot us afterwards if they felt like it!" Memoirs, 
pp. 98-99. The epilogue to this affair is that the death 
penalty was reintroduced after the Polish invasion in the spring 
of 1920.
127 *Serge, "Trente Ans Apres la Revolution russe," p. 11 (of 
photocopied article from Serge archives, Mexico.)
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the GPU, which exterminated the entire revolutionary generation 
of Bolsheviks.128
But in 1919-1921, Serge was not publicly critical of the 
Cheka. In the conditions of Civil War, it appeared a tragic 
necessity. Privately, Serge interceded frequently on behalf of 
its victims, but his writings of the period contain no public 
condemnation.129 Serge in fact made the case for the need for 
repression given the opportunism of "petty-bourgois 
individualism ... unleashed in chaotic struggles.... The Cheka 
was no less indispensable than the Red Army and the Commissariat 
for Supplies.130
The question which has perplexed Serge scholars and 
historians of revolution is the one of revolutionary repressions 
how to control it, when to end it, how to return to democratic 
practices. The reservations which Serge frequently expressed in 
his later works and in his polemic with Trotsky were not aired 
in his discussion of the problem of revolutionary repression 
(What Everyone Should Know About State Repression) in 1925, 
written for a French readership. Sedgwick finds Serge's ,
1.28Thus Serge dates the beginning of the degeneration of the 
Russia revolution several years earlier than the more common 
figures of 1937-8 (great purge), 1929 (forced collectivization, 
liquidation of kulaks), 1927 (defeat of the Opposition), 1924 
(death of Lenin and Stalin's beginning ascent through 
maneuvering) or 1921 (suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion, 
banning of factions in the Party.) Although Serge cites 1918 as 
the beginning, he says Thermidor was only realized in November 
1927, ironically on the tenth anniversary of the October 
Revolution. This coincided with the defeat of the Opposition 
within the Party and the subsequent expulsion, arrest and 
deportation of it members; and the sacrificing of the Chinese 
proletariat for the prestige and power of Stalin. Memoirs, pp. 
215-243.
129Later, in his dispute with Trotsky over Kronstadt, which 
appeared in the pages of the New International in 1938, Serge 
argued (as he did elsewhere) that the establishment of the Cheka 
was fatal for the future course of the revolution.
130Serge, What Everyone Should Know About State Repression, 
p. 62.
47
justification of the Cheka —  as an 'effective' instrument of 
repression —  crass and incredible in light of his subsequent 
writings. He attributes Serge's statement that the Cheka "acts 
along the line of historical development" in the cause of "an 
energetic class conscious of what it wants...."■ and Serge's 
admission that "excesses, errors and abuses" are to be limited 
by "the political and moral control of the most conscious 
vanguard of the working class."131 to be professional 
apologetics. Greeman also finds this work wanting.
Sedgwick traces Serge's "even more authoritarian, 
autocratic standpoint than that argued by the regime's orthodox
132defenders in the Leninist line" to his elitist leanings, 
which Sedgwick defines as anti-Marxist. According to Sedgwick, 
Serge's outlook comes from his anarcho-syndicalist past and the 
anti-democratic ideas of Georges Sorel. Greeman, on the other 
hand, attributes Serge's apologia for repression to his 
"Communist conformism" during this period of his life. Greeman 
writes that Serge's discussion of the problem of repression is 
largely disappointing, and lacking his customary "verve and 
passion." While admitting that Serge's arguments in defense of 
the Red Terror are familiar, and "theoretically impeccable"133, 
they nonetheless do not "come to grips with the central problem 
of revolutionary repression: the need to limit and control it in 
order to prevent its becoming a permanent feature."134
Sedgwick, "The Unhappy Elitist: Victor Serge's Early 
Bolshevism," op.cit., pp. 150-151. He is referring to Serge's 
1925 book called What Everyone Should Know About State 
Repression.
132Sedgwick, ibid.. pp. 152-3.
133Greeman, Op. cit., pp. 265-268. Greeman cites Serge's 
contention that the Red Terror will disappear with the end of 
class contradictions as falling short of actual relevance.
134Greeman, ibid.
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The problem raised is very real and relevant. The key to 
the question in the abstract is one of workers hegemony and 
institutionalized democratic workers control within the 
proletarian dictatorship. But the Bolsheviks were faced with the 
erosion of democracy, the use of repression, and the growth of 
bureaucracy in actual, concrete circumstances. Serge could 
agree with early Bolshevik policy because there was a 
Qualitative difference between the repression exercised by the 
proletarian dictatorship fighting for its life from the Whites 
(even though it crucially erred in suppressing the non-bourgeois
135parties of the Left Social Revolutionaries, and anarchists ), 
and the crushing of the revolution from within by a one-man 
dictatorship (Stalin) over the one-party dictatorship over the 
proletarian dictatorship. Greeman correctly points out that the 
tragedy of the situation was that "once democracy outside the 
party was destroyed, it was doomed to die within it."
Serge pointed out painstakingly the events which brought 
the Bolsheviks to their position of monopoly of power. The 
opposition parties themselves went from competition with the 
Bolsheviks to harsh opposition to them and the revolution. 
Serge noted in the Memoirs that political life could not be 
separated from the reality of Civil War and War Communism. 
Discontent turned into hardened opposition, and as such, 
increased the regime's authoritarianism: from the Bolshevik
leadership's point of view, discontent turned into enemy
135Here the problem expressed itself in how to keep the rival 
Parties and organizations from letting their differences with 
the Bolsheviks turn into hostility to the revolution itself. 
The Mensheviks were outright opponents of Soviet rule; the 
anarchists were divided, and the Left SRs evolved from boycott 
to collaboration to insurrection against the Bolsheviks. But 
Serge was correct to insist that no matter how bankrupt these 
dissidents were, they were right to demand freedom of expression 
and the restoration of liberty in the Soviets, (even though the 
Soviets were but empty shells compared to what they had been in 
early 1918.) Memoirs, p. 118.
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activity.136 Serge himself found the dissenters, excepting the 
Workers Opposition, to be politically bankrupt. The Bolsheviks 
were unwilling to allow counter-revolutionary opposition to 
exist, and increasingly, as the Civil War, famine and War 
Communism continued, the opposition became counter­
revolutionary.
The issue of revolutionary repression and democracy cannot 
be discussed outside of the political and social context. Serge 
was correct to point out the circumstances which led to the Red 
Terror and it consequences for both the oppositions and the
137regime itself. Sedgwick's criticism of Serge is ahistorical.
Although Serge's private activities and later writings 
attest to his misgivings about Bolshevik excesses and 
authoritarian practices in these early years, he nevertheless 
remained with them because they were still superior to all the 
existing alternatives.138 What were missing in the period in
136Memoirs, p. 118.
137Sedgwick also slips too easily into psychologizing, 
especially in trying to identify the reasons Serge became so 
attached to Trotsky. To Sedgwick, Serge is drawn to Trotsky's 
"force, intellect, zeal in communication" and not any 
perceptions of Trotsky as championing the "values of libertarian 
Socialism." Sedgwick, History Workshop, Spring 1984, p. 154. 
Sedgwick clearly prefers the Serge of the 30s and 40s to the 
early Serge of the Civil War period. But rather than seeing 
Serge's position evolving with the socio-political events 
themselves, he attributes Serge's early Bolshevism as an elitist 
and hence anti-working class posture derived from Serge's recent 
syndicalist past. Instead of quoting Serge himself to back this 
up, Sedgwick resorts to politics by association, quoting Serge's 
friend Andreu Nin, and articles written, not by Serge, in the 
French Vie Ouvriere to which Serge also contributed.
138Serge named four characteristics which gave the Bolshevik 
Party the edges (a) its Marxist conviction, (b) its view of the 
hegemony of the proletariat in the revolutionary process, (c) 
its intransigent internationalism, and (d) the unity between 
thought and action. Serge, "Trente Ans Apres la Revolution 
russe," p. 8.
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which political pluralism was terminated, first in the society 
at large, and then within the Party itself, were institutions 
that could guarantee that democratic freedoms, suspended for a 
specific time frame for specific political reasons, would later 
be restored. The tragedy of what actually happened is that a 
virtue was made of historical necessities and authoritarian 
anti-democratic practices were extended and institutionalized. 
The tragedy has turned to bitter farce as subsequent revolutions 
have imitated the Bolshevik experience, perversely arguing that 
the new autocratic policies represent some sort of higher form
1.39of political governance.
Serge's arguments in this period provide no satisfactory 
resolution to the problem of repression and the restoration of 
democracy. The combined effects of economic crisis, Civil War 
and internal counter-revolution meant that any alternative to 
Bolshevik dictatorship would be chaos, or worse. No democratic 
institutions still existed in reality; the Soviets after 1918 
were merely auxiliary organs of the Party, de facto Party 
Committees. The Party itself had been invaded by careerist, and 
bureaucratic elements. For Serge, the only hope against the 
evil of bureaucratization and for the sometime return of 
democratic practices lay in "the discreet dictatorship of the 
old, honest, and incorruptible members ... the Old Guard"140 
This wishful thinking represented a static appreciation of the 
Old Guard, divorced from time and circumstance. Although Serge 
could not resolve the dilemma into which history forced the 
Bolsheviks, he was able to express the tragedy in literary form 
in his novel about the Cheka and the White terror, Conquered
139James Petr as discusses the problem of the relationship of 
repression and democracy in the transition period in 
"Authoritarianism, Democracy and the Transition to Socialism," 
in Socialist Register 1986.
140Memoirs, p. 119.
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City, where the bitter fruits of victory under siege are 
translated into a defeat of revolutionary ideals.141
1.8. Poland and Stalin's March on Lvov
Capital punishment was abolished in January 1920, because 
it seemed that the Civil War was ending. Serge later wrote that 
he had "the feeling that everyone in the Party expected a 
normalization of the regime, the ending of the state of siege, 
a return to Soviet democracy and the limitation of the powers of 
the Cheka, if not its abolition."142 Although the country was 
exhausted, there were still great reserves of "faith and 
enthusiasm." Serge saw the fatal moment for the future of the 
revolution in the summer of 1920, when Pilsudski's Polish army 
invaded the Ukraine. Pilsudski's aggression against the
revolution coincided with France and Britain recognizing General 
Baron Wrangel, who was entrenched in the Crimea with the
remnants of Denikin's army.
Pilsudski was turned back at Kiev, but Lenin and the 
Central Committee took the opportunity to try to provoke a 
Soviet revolution in Poland. They undertook a march on Warsaw, 
which they imagined would be victorious, thereby creating an
ally and scrapping the Treaty of Versailles. Lenin, with
information more than a year out of date, believed the Polish
141Richard Greeman, in his foreword to the English 
translation of the novel, says Serge answered the difficult 
question presented by the need for revolutionary repression in 
the form of this tragic novel, which poses the irony of victory 
in defeat and defeat in victory. Conquered City. Writers and 
Readers Cooperative, 1978, pp. xiv-xv.
142Serge, "Trente Ans Apres la Revolution russe," p. 12. 
Deutscher confirms that Trotsky also looked forward to the 
curtailment of the powers of the Cheka and the abolition of the 
death penalty as steps in the direction of an domestic truce 
which would allow the parties of at least the socialist 
opposition to resume open activity. These hopes were 
overshadowed by the "horrors of war" which "had not yet receded 
into the past. Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 
1879-1921, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 447.
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143workers and peasants would greet the invaders as liberators.
To the Bolsheviks, Poland represented the bridge between Russia 
and Germany —  where revolutionary ferment was still kindling 
after defeat. Tukhachevsky's army was sent to Warsaw. Serge 
described Lenin, in high spirits, pointing to a map of the 
Polish front while discussing the progress of Tukhachevsky's 
march, at the Comintern's Second Congress. His speeches, Serge 
recalled, were "confident of victory"144
Trotsky had serious misgivings of the risks involved in the 
venture, and Tukhachevsky complained of his troops' exhaustion. 
Stalin, who at Tsaritsyn had carried out his own version of 
revolutionary terror and intrigue against Trotsky145, was 
ordered to provide support to Tukhachevsky. Instead, Stalin, 
Budyenny, and Voroshilov decided to march on Lvov (Lemberg) to 
assure themselves of a personal victory. Stalin was defeated at 
Lvov, and never forgot the people who criticized his actions 
there: Tukhachevsky and Trotsky (who criticized his methods at 
Tsaritsyn.)
The Red Army was defeated at the gates of Warsaw when the 
Polish workers and peasants failed to rise. Serge conjectured 
that the defeat at Warsaw would probably not have come had
143Deutscher, op. cit.. p. 465.
144Memoirs. p. 108.
145Serge described Stalin's intrigues at Tsaritsyn against 
both Trotsky and the repression against the anarchists and SRs 
there in his Portrait de Staline. pp. 49-56. Stalin's exploits 
are also discussed by Souvarine in Stalin, pp. 222-253, by 
Trotsky in My Life, and by Deutscher in his biography Stalin. 
Stalin, jealous of Trotsky's successes in the Civil War, 
supported the opposition to Trotsky's use of conscription, 
discipline and old military specialists in the Red army. The 
nucleus of this opposition was at Voroshilov's HQ at Tsaritsyn. 
Stalin's opportunistic support of the opposition's democratic 
concerns for the Army did not extend to his administration of 
Tsaritsyn, where he organized the local Cheka, and instituted 
inexorable repression, discovered numerable "plots" and resolved 
all doubts about suspected conspiracies with the simple order to 
shoot any suspects. Souvarine and Serge, op.cit.
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146Stalin followed orders to provide support to Tukhachevsky. 
Had it won, the Red Army would have acted as a substitute for 
the Polish working class, and a dictatorship of the proletariat 
would have been established without the participation of the 
Polish proletariat. Practicing revolution by conquest was 
certainly contrary to Marxist principles, though it was the 
product of the Bolsheviks' fear of being isolated in the world; 
the rout at Warsaw had been a desperate attempt to break out of 
their isolation. Serge drew the lesson: "revolution cannot be 
brought into a foreign country at the point of a gun. 
Pilsudski,.. .wins the battle of Warsaw. Russia loses a common 
border with Germany, and Germany loses its chance of 
revolution."147 And in the Memoirs, Serge concluded: "This
point marked a kind of boundary for us. The failure of the 
attack on Warsaw meant the defeat of the Russian Revolution in 
Central Europe... Once more the westward expansion of the 
revolution had failed. There was no alternative for the 
Bolsheviks but to turn east. Hastily, the Congress of the 
Oppressed Nationalities of the East was convened at Baku."148
It was at this point that Serge "began to feel.. .this sense 
of danger from inside, a danger within ourselves, in the very 
temper and character of victorious Bolshevism."149 The growth 
of privilege, intolerance, and the widening gap between stated 
theory and reality, all alarmed Serge. He was amazed that 
Zinoviev could still believe in the imminence of proletarian 
revolution in Western Europe, that Lenin could believe in the 
prospects of insurrection in the East.150 Serge added, "The
146 .Memoirs, pp. 108-9.
147 ^Serge, From Lenin to Stalin, pp. 33-34, "Trente Ans Apres 
pp. 12-13, and Memoirs, pp. 108-9.
U 8 - ,  .  .Ibid.
149Memoirs, p. 112
150See also footnote 45 above.
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wonderful lucidity of these great Marxists was beginning to be 
fuddled with a theoretical intoxication bordering on delusion; 
and they began to be enclosed within all the tricks and 
tomfooleries of servility. "151 Yet Serge still saw Bolshevism 
as "tremendously and visibly right," marking "a new point of 
departure in history. " The problem was that the revolutionary 
State was now better as a weapon of war than as a means of 
organizing production. More than ever, Serge saw the young 
State, in the process of disowning its former promises, becoming 
a danger to itself. As the Civil War drew to a close, the 
country was drained, exhausted and paralyzed by a moribund 
economic regime which was intolerable to the population: the 
regime of War Communism.152
1.9. War Communism, Kronstadt, Emergent Totalitarianism
War Communism, as the social and economic system of the
Civil War years came to be known, was, according to Lenin,
"thrust upon us by war and ruin. It was not, nor could it be,
a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the
proletariat. It was a temporary measure."153
Yu. Larin, in a discussion at the Socialist Academy, said
of War Communism:
"We had to run the economy in the almost complete 
absence of normal economic conditions, and so 
inevitably the planned economy turned simply into the 
allocation of whatever was available. ...That is the 
principal reason why the planned economy under war 
communism took the form of administrative measures,
151Ibid. . p. 113.
152Serge, "Trente Ans p. 13.
153Lenin, cited by Maurice Dobb in Soviet Economic 
Development. Routledge, Kegan & Paul, London, 1966, p. 123.
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not of economic regulation but of administrative
allocations."154
The system of War Communism did away with market relations and 
instead set up direct exchange between town and country through 
the requisitioning of grain and direct State distribution of 
industrial goods, concentrated economic authority and power, and
155eliminated money as a form of distribution.
Although War Communism evolved gradually as a reaction to 
circumstances, an ideology of War Communism developed with it, 
becoming a source of illusion to some about the possibility of 
a fast and immediate transition to communism. This was not 
based on an understanding of Marxism, but rather, superficially 
turned Marxism on its head.156 It was a travesty of the Marxist 
vision of communism, which presumed a highly developed 
productive base, an abundance of goods and services, and an 
advanced, more democratic system of citizen participation in 
political, social and economic life than existed anywhere. Nor 
could communism exist in a single country. War communism, on the 
other hand, was based on social disintegration, destroyed 
production, absolute scarcity of goods and services, and 
centralized political authority and coercion. It could not be 
viable for long.
Serge began his description of War Communism by attacking 
Bukharin, for writing in his The Economy in the Period of
154Yu. Larin (Mikhail Aleksandrovich Lourie), quoted in Alec 
Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, Penguin Books, London, 
1969, p. 80.
155For background on War Communism, the following sources 
were used: E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution. Vol. II, pp.
147-280, Isaac Deutscher , op.cit.. pp. 487-510, Alec Move, op. 
cit., pp. 78-82, Trotsky, Mv Life, Maurice Dobb, op. cit., 
Robert Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution, pp.92-118, and 
Serge, Memoirs, pp. 114-134, Portrait de Staline, pp.57-59, and 
other works cited in discussion.
156Once Stalin was in power, (after 1928-9) he appears to have 
copied the policies of war communism, and instituted it as his 
version of Marxist economic and social politics.
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Transition, which Serge considered "schematic Marxism" that the
157present mode of organization (War Communism) was to be final. 
Yet Serge pointed out no one could live under it; it was the 
reign of the black market, which everyone had to use, even 
Communists, in order to eat. Industrial production fell to less 
than 30% of the 1913 figure, as workers, in order to feed 
themselves and their families, spent their time making goods for 
the black market, instead of working in production.
The winter of 1920-21 was particularly torturous. Without 
fuel for heat pipes froze and sanitary conditions deteriorated. 
Famine was everywhere and typhus set in. Serge described a 
mansion that had once belonged to the society beauty Morskaya in 
which rooms were plastered with frozen excrement. Since the 
toilets wouldn't flush, the soldiers stationed there had 
installed field latrines on the floor boards.158 Excrement 
seemed to line the streets and houses, waiting for the spring 
thaw and more disease. The situation was critical, and Serge 
recalled seeing a veteran revolutionary who told him the only 
way to put an end to speculation and to restore order was to 
resort to force. Serge, writing in the Memoirs some 20 years 
later, indicated that force "only made matters worse."159 There 
is no written record of his thinking about War Communism at the 
time, however.160
157Serge, Memoirs, pp. 115-118.
158Ibid., p. 117.
159Ibid., p. 118.
160Except for the already mentioned Civil War novel, 
Conquered City and two books about the siege of Petrograd, his 
journalistic output in this period concentrated on an analysis 
of the revolution (La Revolution d'Octobre a Moscou," Bulletin 
Communiste, Sept. 1921), an analysis of the middles classes in 
the revolution ("Les Classes moyennes dans la Revolution russe, " 
Clarte, 1922,) an article on Russian writers and the revolution 
"Les Ecrivains russes et la revolution," Clarte, 1922, an 
article on the four French Comintern delegates who perished at
(continued...)
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Serge defined the system as requisitioning in the 
countryside, strict rationing in the town, wholesale 
nationalization of production, suppression of dissent and 
Bolshevik monopoly of power, a state of seige and the Cheka. The 
state of production was so catastrophic —  workers fled to the 
countryside in search of food, or were so occupied with the 
black market that they were lost to industry —  that drastic 
measures were needed to restore the nation's productive capacity 
and return to a normal working environment. Trotsky came up 
with the extreme solution of forcing workers back to work much 
like soldiers, in a scheme known as the militarization of 
labor.161 Trotsky presented his ideas in Dec.-Jan. 1919-1920, 
and met with an avalanche of protest. Lenin was wholeheartedly 
in favor of militarizing labor. Just as the policy was being 
implemented Trotsky traveled to the Urals and saw not only the 
desperate state of agricultural production but also the apathy 
and "numb insensibility"162 of the people. He concluded that 
war communism was not the remedy and some economic freedom was 
necessary to revitalize the peasantry. In February 1920, Trotsky 
proposed to end the system of requisitioning and to restore the 
market in the country. Trotsky' proposals were rejected by the 
Central Committee, and it was only after another disastrous 
year, that Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy, essentially 
taking up these very same proposals. During that year's delay, 
the Bolsheviks had to contend with mass discontent, culminating 
with the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion. The revolution 
was at a crossroads.
160(. . .continued) ^
sea on their return; and articles on Mazine, Korolenko, the
confession of Bakunin, Raymond Lefebvre.
161Deutscher, op. cit.. pp. 490-493.
X62Deutscher, ibid., p. 496.
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Serge was critical of War Communism in his Memoirs, written 
in 1941-2, describing its non-viability, sympathizing with its 
opponents, but also critical of its solution, the New Economic 
Policy. But in his treatment of War Communism, to which he 
devoted a chapter in Year One of the Russian Revolution, Serge 
was far less critical. He firstly called 'War Communism' a 
misnomer, agreeing with Kritsman163 that the system represented
164"the organization of the natural economy of the proletariat." 
Serge said the system was a "project for the organization of the 
Socialist society. undertaken in the most difficult 
circumstances."165 Further, he said that
"the Factory Committees, were increasingly assuming 
managerial functions in productions in this process 
the direct management of production by the producers 
was beginning to be realized, and the organization of 
production began to be merged with the organization of 
the working c l a s s 166
Serge was writing of the system in 1918-1919, not the 
later, more disastrous period of 1920-21. It was understandable 
that he saw the policy of War Communism as an attempt to shore 
up the economy in a period of complete breakdown of production 
and exchange, and for him to point to those aspects of the 
attempt which resembled the socialist goals of the future. Serge 
defended the Bolsheviks' dictatorship of the Party in the 
circumstances of working class decomposition due to the ravages
163Kritsman was a Bolshevik economist and one of the first 
leaders of VSNKh (Vysshyi Sovet Narodnovo Khozyaistva) or 
Supreme Council of National Economy. Serge wrote in "The Worst 
Counter-Revolution," Inprecorr. Vol. 2, No. 108, Dec. 1922, of 
the play on words of VSNKhs 'Steal without fear, there is no 
master.'p.
164Quoted in Year One, p. 357 and 410-lln. It came from L.
Kritsman's Geroicheskii Period Velikoi Russkoi Revoliutsli, 
Moscow, 1926, which Serge called "remarkable" and "the only book 
which undertakes a serious analysis of War Communism."
165Year One, p. 357.
166t . . jIbid.
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of Civil War and famine, because there was no other possible 
choice. Democratic practices gave way to authoritarian 
centralism because of the demands of the situation and the 
influx of new Party members with no Marxist training. The 
Bolsheviks were right, in this "epoch of social war" to promote 
policies that would rapidly develop a "proletarian class
167consciousness." Serge's reasoning was theoretically correct. 
It took him two years of experiencing War Communism to see the 
gaps between theory and reality, and to clearly analyze and act 
upon the shortcomings.
The system provoked general discontent and organized
opposition. Serge was well placed to follow the discussion as
practically the only member of governing circles in Petrograd to
be on good terms with Mensheviks, Left SR's and anarchists. He
had many long discussions with Shlyapnikov of the Workers
Opposition, the only oppositional grouping Serge did not find 
168bankrupt. The Workers Opposition believed the revolution was 
doomed unless the Party restored genuine freedom and authority 
to the trade unions, workers control of production, and true 
Soviet democracy/ Serge listened with sympathy, but did not 
side with the Workers Opposition.169
The painful and bloody Civil War drew to a close, leaving 
a drained and exhausted country and a frustrated and discontent 
population. Anarchists were gaining support and were preparing
167Ibid.. pp. 368-371.
168Ibid.. p. 118.
169Memoirs. pp. 122-123. He treated the Workers Opposition 
sympathetically in his Retrato de Stalin, p. 58, pointing out 
their concern for the misery of the working class, the growing 
privileges of the bureaucracy and the strangulation of liberty. 
Serge took part in the Party discussions in Petrograd on the 
trade union question, and was horrified to see the "Party 
steamroller" at work, rigging the voting for Lenin and Zinoviev. 
It was no way to resolve any problem. Memoirs. p. 123.
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their Congress when the Cheka suddenly arrested them en 
masse.170 Serge was horrified by this treatment of the 
anarchists, especially of Makhno, who had successfully fought 
the White army of Denikin and Wrangel, only to be betrayed by 
the Reds. Serge said this "fantastic attitude of the Bolshevik 
authorities" had a terribly demoralizing effect and contributed 
directly to the revolt at Kronstadt.
Kronstadt
Serge wrote profusely about the significance of the 
suppression of the Kronstadt uprising, and it was a serious 
point of contention between Serge and Trotsky in 1938, which we 
will return to in chapter 5 of the present work. Serge's 
description of the Kronstadt events, written in the Memoirs, 
have been published separately as a pamphlet by the anarchist 
group "Solidarity" in London, and his work is widely cited by 
students of the Kronstadt controversy.171
For Serge, the errors and mistakes of power were exposed 
with the handling of the Kronstadt rebellion of Feb-March 1921.
170Memoirs, p. 122.
171Serge wrote on Kronstadt in the Memoirs, pp. 124- 
132,(reprinted by Solidarity Press, London, 1967); New 
International, July 1938, "Once Mores Kronstadt", pp. 211-212, 
(reprinted in the Monad Press Book Kronstadt, by Lenin and 
Trotsky, New York, 1979); February 1939 "A Letter and Some 
Notes,", p. 53-4; La Vie Ouvriere, no. 152, March 31, 1922, "La 
tragique d'une revolution"; no, 159, May 19, 1922 "Le probleme 
de la dictature"; No 182, November 3, 1922, "Dictature et
contre-revolution economique." Also, see the articles published 
in La Revolution proletarienne: Nos. 254 and 257, September 10,
1937 and October 25, 1937 under the title "La Vie et les faits"; 
no. 277, August 25, 1938, "Sur Cronstadt 1921 et quelques autre 
sujets"; and no. 281, October 25, 1938, "Cronstadt 1921: Defense 
de Trotsky, response a Trotsky, (under the title "La Vie et les 
faits"), no. , November 1947, "Trente Ans Apres la Revolution 
russe,"; in Retrato de Stalin, Ediciones Libres, Mexico 1940, p. 
58; and in The Life and Death of Leon Trotsky, written in 
collaboration with Natalia Sedova Trotsky, New York, Basic 
Books, 1975, 106-108.
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The sailors were protesting against the economic regime of War 
Communism and the dictatorship of the Party; but according to 
Serge they only revolted because of the brutality with which 
Kalinin refused to listen to them. As the quote below shows, 
Serge agreed the Bolsheviks were right to fight to hold on to 
power, but their mistake was "To panic at the Kronstadt revolt, 
which they could have handled.. .with persuasion and 
understanding." Nevertheless, Serge declared himself on the 
side of the Party, against the "infantile illusions" of the
172backward workers of Kronstadt.
The drastic economic situation of the country had isolated 
the Party in power. Serge wrote that the intentions and virtues 
of the Party were practically irrelevant since it could not 
govern a starving nation and maintain its popularity. The 
masses had lost their enthusiasm and the continuing sacrifices 
demanded by difficult circumstances were wearing down the 
remaining revolutionary activists. Petrograd workers were on 
strike, and the Kronstadt mutiny began as a movement of 
solidarity with the Petrograd workers. Lack of food, ferocious 
winters, sickness and constant requisitions "spread bitterness" 
everywhere. Serge said,
"This despair left people open to confusing bread 
with counter-revolution. If in this situation, the 
Bolsheviks had let go the reigns of power, who would 
have taken their place? Wasn't it their duty to hold 
on? They were right to hold on. Their mistake was to 
panic at the Kronstadt revolt which they could have 
handled in any number of ways, as we who were there, 
in Petrograd, know well."173
Serge lived in the Hotel Astoria at the time, with the 
Petrograd leadership and the Cheka. Working in the Smolny, he 
was fully aware of events. Serge was uniquely placed as a 
Bolshevik with access both to the leadership circles of the 
Party and to the opposition groups outside the Party. He met
172 "Trente Ans..." pp. 13-15, and Memoirs, pp. 124-132.
173Serge, "Trente Ans Apres la Revolution Russe," p. 13.
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with the anarchists, including the American anarchists Emma 
Goldman and Alexander Berkman who tried to mediate the conflict
174as important members of the international working class.
Serge's version of events show a mess of fabrications, 
cover-ups and bungling. Where persuasion and understanding were 
needed, the President of the Executive Committee of the Soviets 
used only threats and insults.
"Instead of being fraternally received, the Kronstadt 
delegation to the Petrograd soviet was arrested by the 
Cheka. The truth about the conflict was hidden from 
the Party and from the country as a whole by the 
press, which for the first time, lied shamelessly, 
saying that a White general, Koslovski, was in charge 
in Kronstadt.175
The well intentioned mediation efforts of Goldman and Berkman 
were inexplicably refused and instead of mediation, the cannons 
opened up a "fratricidal battle and the Cheka later shot its 
prisoners." Serge agreed with Trotsky that the sailors had 
changed since the revolutionary days of 1917, when they were in 
the vanguard of the revolution. It was true that now they
174Serge met with the American anarchists nightly, but at the 
crucial meeting where the mediation attempt was discussed, held 
at Serge's father-in-law's house (Alexander Russakov) Serge did 
not attend as it had been decided that only the American 
anarchists would undertake this initiative because of their 
prestige, and the influence they held with the Kronstadt Soviet. 
Serge was on the verge of leaving the Party over Kronstadt, but 
was won over by his comrades who told him "where would you go? 
You have to face it, there is no one but us." Apparently 
Serge's ambivalence earned him the mistrust of both sides in 
this affair: Sedgwick notes that Marcel Body (Un piano en
bouleau de Carelies mes annees de Russie 1919-1927, Paris 1981) 
told of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman's hostility to Serge. 
(Sedgwick, "The Unhappy Elitist...", 15n, p. 126) After the 
failure of the mediation attempt the Russian mediators were 
arrested and Zinoviev offered the Americans the chance to tour 
the whole of Russia by special train to "Observe...and 
understand." Serge was spared because of his reputation and the 
'kindness of Zinoviev, Zorin, and others." Memoirs, pp. 127-8. 
See also Victor Serge to Angelica Balabanova, Oct. 23, 1941.
175"Trente Ans Apres..." p. 13.
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expressed the aspirations of backward peasants, but Serge also 
said that ruling circles had changed as well.
Kronstadt was a tragedy, made even more so because of the 
insidious role played by rumor-mongering. Serge blamed Kalinin 
and Kuzmin176 whose "brutal bungling had provoked the 
rebellion." The uprising of the sailors had been non-violent 
and according to Serge, the majority of Communists had rallied 
to their cause, proving the instability of the Party at its 
base. Kalinin and Kuzmin, had shown, from the first moment, no 
intention of using "anything but forcible methods" when it was 
still possible to mitigate the conflict.
The whole affair was shrouded in lies. The official press, 
which only "eulogized the regime's achievements" and concealed 
everything else, left the way open for all manner of rumors to 
be generated. The campaign of slander —  begun by certain 
sectors of the Party and the Cheka and picked up by the Press —  
had the effect of stifling any discussion of the issues raised 
by the sailors. The sailors program, which Serge called "a 
programme for the Renewal of the Revolution" included: new
elections to the Soviets, freedom of speech and press for all 
revolutionary groups, free trade unions, freedom of action for 
the peasants, release of political prisoners, abolition of road­
blocks, and an end to requisitioning in the countryside. Yet as 
Serge himself admitted, the political conjuncture was one of a 
life or death struggle for survival, in which death meant 
proletarian blood would be spent in profusion. Abstract demands
Kuzmin was the commissar in charge of the fleet and the 
army. Rumor had it that he had been brutally handled during his 
captivity at Kronstadt, and had been earmarked for ~execution 
with orders written by counter-revolutionaries. When Serge saw 
him at Smolny following his 'escape from Kronstadt' Serge 
expressed incredulity that the sailors would shoot him. Kuzmin 
admitted it had been an exaggeration, that the so-called 
counter-revolutionary 'execution order' was but "some little 
sheet written in threatening terms." Nor had he been handled 
brutally, but "had a warm time of it, nothing more." Memoirs, 
pp. 126-7.
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which were politically correct did not address the issue of the 
counter-revolution of the peasants and the Whites, although the 
demands did point to the danger that the excesses and abuses of 
power posed for the health of the revolution.
Worst of all for Serge —  worse than the abuses of 
authority —  was the realization that the Party had lied; a 
barrier had been broken. The press "was positively berserk with 
lies ... and this was our own Press, the Press of our 
revolution, the first socialist Press, and hence the first
177incorruptible and unbiased Press in the world!"
Yet Serge, after "many hesitations and with unutterable 
anguish" declared himself with the Party on the issue of 
Kronstadt. Greeman finds his position "difficult to
178understand." But Serge explains his position very well; the
choice was to support the party reluctantly or unleash the
counter-revolution, which already had the embryonic forms of a
black fascism. There was no choice. Serge's explanation
deserves quotation in fulls
"Kronstadt had right on its side. Kronstadt was the 
beginning df a fresh, liberating revolution for 
popular democracy: 'The Third Revolution!' it was
called by certain anarchists whose heads were stuffed 
with infantile illusions, [my emphasis] However, the 
country was absolutely exhausted, and production 
practically at a standstill; there were no reserves of 
any kind, not even reserves of stamina in the hearts 
of the masses. The working class elite that had been 
moulded in the struggle against the old regime was 
literally decimated. The Party, swollen by the influx 
of power-seekers, inspired little confidence. Of the 
other parties, only minute nuclei existed, whose 
character was highly questionable. It seemed clear 
that these groupings could come back to life in a 
matter of weeks, but only by incorporating 
embittered, malcontent and inflammatory elements in 
their thousands, no longer, as in 1917, enthusiasts 
for the young revolution. Soviet democracy lacked 
leadership, institutions and inspiration; at its back
177Memoirs, pp. 125-6.
178Greeman, op. cit.. pp. 277-79.
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there were only masses of starving and desperate men.
The popular counter-revolution translated the 
demand for freely-elected Soviets into one for 
'Soviets without Communists'. If the Bolshevik 
dictatorship fell, it was only a short step to chaos, 
and through chaos to a peasant rising, the massacre of 
the Communists, the return of the emigres, and in the 
end, through the sheer force of events, another 
dictatorship, this time anti-proletarian. Dispatches 
from Stockholm and Tallinn testified that the emigres 
had these very perspectives in mind; dispatches which, 
incidentally, strengthened the Bolshevik leaders' 
intention of subduing Kronstadt speedily and at 
whatever cost. We were not reasoning in the abstract.
We knew that in European Russia alone there were at 
least fifty centres of peasant insurrection. To the 
south of Moscow, in the region of Tambov, Antonov, the 
Right Social-Revolutionary school-teacher, who 
proclaimed the abolition of the Soviet system and the 
re-establishment of the Constituent Assembly, had 
under his command a superbly organized peasant army 
numbering several tens of thousands. He had conducted 
negotiations with the Whites. (Tukhachevsky suppressed 
this Vendee around the middle of 1921.)
In these circumstance it was the Party's duty to 
make concessions recognizing that the economic regime 
was intolerable, but not to abdicate from power, [my 
emphasis] 'Despite its mistakes and abuses', I wrote,
'the Bolshevik Party is at present the supremely 
organized, intelligent and stable force which, despite 
everything, deserves our confidence. The Revolution 
has no other mainstay, and is no longer capable of any 
thoroughgoing regeneration.'179
Serge acted as a consistent revolutionary —  brutally 
honest and rooted in concrete socio-economic conditions. He was 
not alone; other dissident communists joined him in supporting 
the Bolsheviks, since there really was no other organized force. 
But Serge was demoralized by the whole affair. The Tenth Party 
Congress, which convened in Moscow at the same time as the Red 
Army was attacking the Kronstadt fleet, ironically abolished 
requisitioning, and the system of War Communism, and proclaimed 
the New Economic Policy (NEP). As the demands of the Kronstadt 
sailors were being met, they were being massacred.
179Memoirs, pp. 128-129.
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NEP, according to Serge, was a response to Lenin's
realization that the regime had become untenable in a rigid
position, and which Trotsky, the year before had denounced as
dangerous and in need of the changes Lenin had just proclaimed.
The NEP abolished requisitions in the countryside, reestablished
the freedom of commerce and small-scale business, and made
concessions on attractive terms to foreign capital. "In a word,
it [NEP] loosened the mortal grip on the country of the complete
180'statization' [state control] over production and exchange."
It amounted to a partial restoration of capitalism, but did not 
bring with it any relaxation of authority or political 
tolerance.
Instead, a purge was directed toward the Party, while the
other Parties were effectively outlawed. Serge lamented that
disciplinary measures were directed at those "with a critical
outlook" rather than against "the unprincipled careerists and
2.81conformist late-comers". As far as the other parties were 
concerned, Serge sympathized with Raphael Abramovich's criticism 
of the Bolshevik Central Committee in 1921 for not being more 
tolerant to those who "accepted the parameters of the Soviet 
constitution." A policy directed toward reconciliation would 
have been more desirable. Serge admitted that had "a coalition 
government ... been formed at this time, it would have 
internalized certain dangers, but, and this is well-proven, they 
would have been less than the danger of this monopoly of 
power..."182
180"Trente Ans Apres... ", p. 14.
181Memoirs. p. 135.
182"Trente Ans Apres..., " p. 14. Although Serge was upholding 
the right to voice and organize around critical viewpoints, he 
also admitted elsewhere that by 1921 all revolutionaries were 
already inside the Bolshevik Party, as the other parties had 
proved their bankruptcy in the course of the revolution and 
Civil War. Yet Serge was correct, nevertheless, to criticize 
the effects of the growing siege mentality within the Party.
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Emergent Totalitarianism
1921 was a crossroads for the revolution, though Serge did 
not consider it Thermidor.183 Interestingly, at the height of 
the Kronstadt assault Serge quoted Lenin as saying to one of his 
friends: "This is Thermidor."184 It was a turning point for the 
Party, for Soviet democracy and for the Comintern as well, as 
the Kronstadt events coincided with the collapse of a Communist 
rising in Germany. The defeat would signal new tactics in the 
International, passing from the offensive to the defensive.
March 18 was a day of ironies: Kronstadt sailors were 
meeting their death shouting "Long live the world revolution!" 
on the 50th anniversary of the Paris Commune, while in Berlin, 
German communists were going down in defeat. Serge described the 
atmosphere in Smolny as tense and somber, with conversation 
generally being avoided "except with ... closest friends, and 
among close friends, what was said was full of bitterness."185
According to Serge, although the term 'totalitarianism ' 
did not yet exist, it was on its way to crushing the revolution. 
The monopoly of political power, the Cheka, the Red Army had 
turned the dream of the 'Commune-State' into a far off 
theoretical myth. War Communism, famine (with its bureaucratic 
rationing-apparatus), Civil War and counter-revolution had 
killed Soviet democracy. Serge said he belonged to "the 
pitifully small minority" that realized what was happening. 
There had been hope that the conditions of peace would bring
183Thermidor was realized in November 1927, according to 
Serge, ironically on the tenth anniversary of the October 
Revolution. This coincided with the defeat of the ^Opposition 
within the Party and the subsequent expulsion, arrest and 
deportation of its members; and the sacrificing of the Chinese 
proletariat for the prestige and power of Stalin. Memoirs, pp. 
213-225.
184Memoirs, p. 131.
le5Ibid., p . 132.
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about a spontaneous resurgence of Soviet democracy, but no one 
had any conception of how this would happen. Serge concluded 
that renewal from within was not possible, that only the 
extension of the Russian revolution would bring fresh energy and 
the resources for industrialization. But the German communists 
had just been defeated and world revolution was not at hand.
Serge began to question certain aspects of Marxism in light 
of subsequent events and to look especially at this period as 
the beginning of what he called Soviet totalitarianism. He 
believed he was the first to coin this term, in 1921. It was 
later taken up by Trotsky, and subsequently by anti-communist 
and liberal critics of the Soviet Union. Later in Serge's life, 
he extended his analysis to the first socialist utopian 
experiments.186
What Serge was questioning was the totality of the 
socialist goal. Capitalism in its advanced industrial form was 
a world system which dominated every aspect of life —  making 
everything conform to its overt and covert organization of 
social, economic and political existence. Marxism, therefore, 
had as its response and its goal, to renew and transform 
everything from property and social relations, to the world map, 
and the inner life of man. The physical world would be changed 
through the abolition of national boundaries and man's inner 
life would be transformed by liberating the mind from religious 
thought. Thus, Serge concluded that the project itself, insofar 
as it aspired to total transformation, was etymologically
187totalitarian. Of course in this sense capitalism is
186Typescript, "A definition of Socialism, " unpublished, no 
date, Serge archives, Mexico.
187Serge discussed his views of emergent totalitarianism on 
pp. 133-134 of the Memoirs. He differs significantly from the 
later 'totalitarian school of Sovietology;' Serge's analysis was 
not static, but rather looked at the society through the dynamic 
of conflict; nor did he see the Soviet Union as classless, as do 
the Totalitarians of the Friedrich, Brzezinski, Kornhauser mode 
of thinking.
69
totalitarian as well. One cannot opt out of capitalism,
capitalist ideology is pervasive and ubiquitous, and capitalist
political power does not tolerate any opposition which in a real
sense threatens its integrity.
But Serge went on to point out the dual nature of socialism
ascendant, in its democratic and authoritarian aspects. Serge's
analysis was fraught with contradictions, of which he, and the
Bolsheviks in general, were only too aware. Serge points to the
source of the Party's intolerance as its conviction that the
Party "is the repository of truth." This conviction gives the
Party both moral energy and simultaneously a "clerical mentality
188... quick to become Inquisitorial."
The Bolsheviks were aware of the contradiction between 
their democratic goals and their authoritarian methods, 
justified by the danger of reaction. Serge said they could 
often only surmount their contradictions through demagoguery. 
Serge never criticized Lenin for not being sincere in his goal 
of the 'broadest possible workers democracy.' Yet Serge asked 
rhetorically what the meaning of .'rule' was, referring to 
ubiquitous posters announcing 'the rule of workers will never
189cease.' At this point Serge did not resolve the theoretical 
problem he raised with regard to the contradiction between the 
totality of the Marxist project and it's practical consequences. 
Yet he did posit an anti-bureaucratic alternative, with elements 
of syndicalism, for more democratic practical functioning in the 
period of transition to socialism, to which we will return 
presently.
1.10. Bureaucratic Centralism + NEP, or 'Communism of 
associations'?
Although NEP was bringing economic recovery and life to the 




indicated other Civil War veterans were equally confused; why 
did they fight and spill so much blood, to see a return of the 
market?190 Serge was most distressed that democracy had been 
obliterated, yet glad that War Communism was over.
Serge was opposed to even a limited revival of the 
capitalist market, and instead proposed an alternative which 
would bring about a degree of prosperity without giving rise to 
speculation, greed and corruption. He began to argue for a 
'Communism of associations' as opposed to the 'Communism of the 
State.' Cognizant that the Bolshevik leadership had already 
embarked upon and was committed to the NEP solution, Serge 
offered his theoretical vision to visiting Comintern delegates 
and international revolutionaries in casual meetings at the 
Hotel Lux, fully aware his ideas would remain at the level of 
theoretical interest, but nonetheless worthy of reflection.
In Serge's view, economic recovery could have been achieved 
without a return to the market -—  by freeing the State-strangled 
cooperatives to initiative from below in the form of 
associations which would take over the management of different 
branches of the economy. He gave the time-honored shoe
192example. There was a shortage of both shoes and leather, yet 
the rural areas had plenty of leather. In Serge's vision, the 
unfettered shoe makers cooperatives could easily have obtained 
the necessary leather and made the shoes, if left to themselves. 
They would likely charge high prices for these shoes, but less 
than the exorbitant prices encountered in the black market. The 
State would intervene in the arena of price regulations in this 
instance, the State could assist this form of workers control by 
exercising a downward pressure on prices.
190Memoirs p. 147.
Ibid.
192 *It would be interesting to count how many treatises on the 
Soviet economy resort to the example of shoe production.
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Workers in other branches of production would similarly 
spontaneously organize cooperatives to fill collective needs. 
Serge's view of the State and planning would be "not something 
dictated by the State from on high, but rather as resulting from 
the harmonizing, by congresses and specialized assemblies, of 
initiatives from below. "193 Serge did not elaborate on the 
State's role in distribution in this cooperative form of workers 
controlled production. But production in this manner could avoid 
the twin evils of the capitalist market and the 'muddle and 
paralysis' of 'stringent bureaucratic centralism.' Serge's view 
of economic relations represent basic, objective forms of 
spontaneous cooperation, what Ernest Mandel more than 60 years
194later would call "articulated workers' self-management." 
Combined with democratic planning at the macro level, this 
economic form would constitute the ideal for the transition 
period that is moving toward socialism, while still containing 
money and some market forms. Serge was vague on the role of 
planning in his early critique, (seeing the plan as harmonizing 
initiatives from below) but elaborated more fully after 
evaluating the experience of Stalin's industrialization and the
195nature of the Soviet economy. Clearly Serge's view is more 
than a syndicalist reprise;196 it is much closer to the Marxist
193Memoirs, pp. 147-148.
194Ernest Mandel, "In Defence of Socialist Planning," in New 
Left Review 159. September-October 1986, pp.22-32. (The article 
itself runs from pp. 5-37.)
195See chapters 4 and 6 of the present work.
196Sedgwick intimates in his introduction to the Memoirs that 
Serge's vision represents an advanced syndicalism. Robert 
Daniels, in Conscience of the Revolution also refers to the 
anarcho-syndicalist side of Leninism; unfortunately Stalinism 
has distorted Marxism to such a degree that when democratic, 
workers control is put forward, it is immediately attributed to 
a syndicalist or anarchist throwback. As I have argued 
elsewhere in this thesis, Serge's influences after 1917 were
(continued...)
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notion of socialism, as the planned self-rule of the associated
197producers.
1.11. Disillusionment and romantic retreat
Serge was disgusted by the growing bureaucratization of the 
Bolshevik Party and the self-serving opportunists entering its 
ranks, stunned by the Kronstadt events, and psychologically 
exhausted. He associated with two Communist sections, the 
French language Communist group and the Petrograd Russian 
communists; after Kronstadt he wondered with many of them how 
they could usefully serve the revolution, 'without closing their 
eyes.' Serge had no interest in bureaucratic sinecures; he was 
offered a diplomatic post in the Orient, but declined. The 
Orient interested him but not diplomacy.198
Serge participated in the Third Congress of the Comintern 
in Moscow (June-July 1921) which he found utterly lacking in 
inspiration. The foreign delegates, in their desire to approve, 
had abdicated all critical thinking, and didn't seem to notice 
the discrepancy between the lavish privileges they enjoyed and 
the condition of the starving populace. Serge found them "quick 
to adulate and reluctant to think."199 Almost immediately after 
the congress, Serge retired to the countryside.
15(...continued)
Marxist, and it was his lifelong project to rescue Marxism from 
its Stalinist deformation and restore in the public perception 
the synonymity of Marxian socialism and democracy.
197Serge was not alone in his preoccupation about the 
direction of the economy, seemingly destined toward either blind 
market forces, or authoritarian bureaucratic centralism. These 
issues are the same ones which surface in 1923 with the Left 
Opposition of the New Course. Serge here predates their 
concerns by two years.
198Memoirs, p. 149.
199Ibid., p. 138 and p. 146.
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Serge thought he had found a way out. He and his father- 
in-law Russakov, a group of his French communist friends, and 
some Hungarian prisoners-of-war founded 'the French Commune of 
Novaya-Ladoga' on an abandoned estate north of Petrograd. 
Demoralized by the petty greed, corruption and speculation 
revived under NEP, and the lack of political liberty, Serge and 
his comrades retreated to the countryside to live off the land.
The harsh realities soon hit these revolutionary romantics. 
They were boycotted by the local peasants who went so far as 
stealing their corn and tools, while refusing to sell to them. 
The peasants viewed Serge's group with hostility and hatred, 
calling them "Jews" and "Anti-Christs." After three months of 
hunger and exhaustion, the Commune was abandoned.
Serge returned to Petrograd and continued frequenting 
literary and humanist circles. He belonged to 'Volfila' or the 
'Free Philosophic society' whose guiding light was the symbolist 
poet Andrei Bely. Serge was the only Communist member.200
Yet Serge was increasingly bothered by the petty- 
profiteering and corrupting influence of money —  the seeming 
resurgence of all the filth of former times.201 His friends 
shared his distress and many quietly dropped out of political 
life. Serge's sojourn in the agricultural commune indicated he 
was of like mind. But Serge confessed that he was made of 
'tougher stuff,' having both a "broader vision of the 
Revolution" and "less individualistic sentiment." Although 
Serge was less optimistic than the Bolshevik leadership about 
the prospect of successful revolution in the West, he agreed 
that Russia's only chance for survival was pinned on the 
international extension of the Revolution. Serge was convinced 
that revolutionary Russia, in the throes of hunger, Isolation 
and defeat, would collapse if left to itself. He decided to go
200Ibid.. p. 150.
201Serge, From Lenin to Stalin, p. 39.
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to Central Europe, "the focus of events to come" to work toward
building a "Western working-class movement capable of supporting
202the Russians and, one day, superseding them." His wife 
Liuba, in precarious mental and physical health after all the 
privations, and his own anxiety with the turn of events in the 
Soviet Union also propelled him to leave. A change of scenery 
and new activity would be welcome. He accepted a Comintern post 
in Berlin, editing the French edition of the Comintern journal
203Inprecor. or La Correspondence Internationale. It was late 
1921.204
The revolutionary stance Serge took in late 1921, to 
rigorously analyze the political conjuncture and determine the 
necessities and possibilities of the moment took him on his 
illegal European assignment. The same logic would bring him 
back to Russia four years later, to take his stand with the Left 
Opposition, the only hope Serge saw for revolutionary renewal 
after internal and external defeat, corruption and decay.
202Memoirs, pp. 155-56.
203Inprecor is an acronym of International Press 
Correspondence.
204Articles datelined Berlin, penned by Serge under his 
pseudonym "R. Albert," began to appear in November 1921.
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CHAPTER TWO: ON COMINTERN ASSIGNMENT IN BERLIN AND VIENNA
1922-1926
2.1 Petrograd to Berlin: Impressions
The contrast provided by a simple journey to another 
country could not have been more dramatic. Serge stopped with 
his family in Talinn, now Reval, in Estonia. Seeing some 
bricklayers building houses, Serge was overcome with emotion. 
After witnessing so much destruction, this simple act of 
building moved him deeply.1 The streets lined with shops made 
Serge recall the Volga territories, where "the children of 
Russia were turning into living skeletons." Serge said he now 
understood the theory and politics of the self-determination 
of nationalities, "raised as it was to perfection by the 
blockade of the Revolution."2
Serge travelled to Berlin 'illegally' with a dozen other 
agents of the International. Although Serge was vague about 
the date,3 Richard Greeman placed his arrival in Berlin in 
December 1921, with Serge's chronicle beginning with the 
events of 1922.4
Once in Berlin, Serge was instantly struck by the 
orderly collapse of post-Versailles Germany. Capitalism was 
rampant, amidst insolvency. According to Serge, the 
capitalists lived in fear of revolution; only the Social-
Victor Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, p. 157-8.
2Ibid.
3Serge is often imprecise about dates in the Memoirs. He 
wrote of his activities in the USSR in Autumn 1921, and begins 
his discussion of Germany with the events of 1922. In his 
Clarte article of Dec. 1, 1923, Serge says he arrived 'at the 
end of 1921.'
4Richard Greeman, Victor Serge. The Making of a Novelist 
(1890-1928). unpublished dissertation, Columbia University, 
1968, p. 284.
76
Democrats believed in capitalism's future!5 Serge placed the 
blame for Germany's state of collapse on the industrial 
bourgeoisie, who were completing the ruin of the German 
economy which the war had begun. The bourgeoisie, driven now 
to speculation and no longer capable of sustaining the arts, 
sciences, universities, libraries and other hallmarks of 
civilization, had become the enemy of German culture as it had 
developed since 1848.5
The German Social Democrats had the misfortune to preside 
over this societal disintegration,7 although they did so with 
a very democratic constitution. Serge saw these social 
democratic misleaders as the standard-bearers of the liberal 
bourgeoisie of 1848, with their enlightened, optimistic 
attitudes. Yet Weimar Germany gave the impression of a 
society self-destructing: everything appeared for sale,
including "the daughters of the bourgeoisie in the bars, the 
daughters of the people in the streets, officials, import and 
export licenses, State papers, businesses in whose prospects 
nobody believed."9
The decay and accompanying decadence tHat characterized 
Germany in the period of 1922-23 had the effect of making the 
'spartan' conditions of the proletarian revolution in the 
Soviet Union look clean, pure and healthy by comparison, so 
that even Russia's authoritarian excesses could be put into 
some kind of perspective from this state of decline. Thus the 
change of scenery afforded by the assignment to Germany had
5Memoirs, pp. 159-160.
6R. Albert, "Devant la revolution allemande: Les Riches
contre la nation,: Clarte. No. 46, (Nov. 1, 1923), p7 428.
7And in taking on the responsibility, shared some of the
blame.
0
Serge. Memoirs, p. 160.
9Ibid. p. 159.
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the affect of reanimating Serge insofar as the Soviet Union 
was concerned. His acquaintances and colleagues in the 
Comintern had the same affect on Serge: he remarked that the
editorial staff of Inprecor, the "intellectual and political 
mentor of the world Communist movement, was of an outstanding 
mediocrity.10
2.2 Serge's Activities as Comintern Agent in Berlin
Serge set to work in his new duties as Comintern agent and 
editor of La Correspondance International, the French edition 
of Inprecorr, or International Press Correspondence. 
Inprecorr was published simultaneously in three languages, 
with the German edition being the fullest.11 Serge wrote 
under various pseudonyms, often writing whole issues of the 
magazine.12 He most often used the name 'R. Albert' writing 
the section entitled "Notes d'Allemagne" of LCI, usually 
datelining his articles Berlin.13 In the Memoirs, Serge said 
his articles signed Victor Serge were datelined Kiev, a city
“ttid., p. 162.
nThe Comintern had various publications, usually 
published simultaneously in several languages. 
Konnnunisticheskii Internatsional (beginning in 1919) was 
published in Russian, German, French and English, with the 
Russian edition coming out most regularly; Internationale 
Presse-Korrespondenz (beginning in Sept 1921) was published in 
German, English and French, the English and French being less 
full than the German; Serge edited the French edition, called 
La Correspondance Internationale. For a description of these 
journals, see E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923; 
Volume 3, Bibliography, pps. 580-582; and Franz Borkenau, 
World Communism. Bibliographical Notes, pp. 430-431.
12According to Julian Gorkin, Serge's close associate in 
Mexico, in an interview conducted by Richard Greeman in Paris 
in 1964. Cited in Greeman, op.cit. p. 286.
13His articles are listed in the Bibliography. A 
collection of Serge's writings on Germany are being prepared 
for publication in Spanish. (EDP 1988)
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Serge had never visited.14 These articles mostly dealt with 
the Soviet Union.
Since Serge's activities took on the character of 
clandestine political life, he was known first as Siegfried 
and then Gottlieb at his office at the Rote Fahne (Communist 
Party daily), Dr. Albert in town and in his articles, Victor 
Klein on his papers, Alexei Berlovsky in his travels to 
Russia.15 Serge functioned as an underground agent. When he 
passed Radek in the street, they exchanged knowing glances but 
did not speak.
Serge's analysis of the world situation which had partially 
propelled him to move to Central Europe to help build "a 
Western working class movement capable of supporting the 
Russian and, one day, superceding them"16 was not altered by 
his sojourn in Germany. Although he was only too aware of the 
weakness of German revolutionary leadership, he still viewed 
socialist revolution in Europe as the key to the salvation of 
civilization. Serge was also alert to the danger of fascism 
which was gaining ground.17 This overall perspective guided 
his articles of the period, which essentially promoted the 
Comintern line on Germany. Serge intimated that he was 
sometimes obliged to print things he knew were wrong, and he 
watched the growing careerism and corruption of the Comintern
14Memoirs, p. 161.
15Alexei Berlovsky was a former Russian prisoner-of-war 
in Germany. Memoirs, p. 161.
16See previous chapter, p. 97-98 infra.
17Serge had followed the progress of fascism closely and 
opposed the leadership of the International on this question. 
They underestimated the threat of reaction, but Serge said 
this "new variety of counter-revolution had taken the Russian 
Revolution as its schoolmaster in matters of repression and 
mass-manipulation through propaganda ... [and] had succeeded 
in recruiting a host of disillusioned, power-hungry ex­
revolutionaries; consequently, its rule would last for years." 
Memoirs, pp. 160-163.
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with alarm. His colleagues Gyula Alperi and Franz Dahlem 
struck him as typical of the new kind of unthinking, yes-men 
who were filling the Comintern ranks. With such human 
material staffing the Comintern, domination of national 
sections by the Russian leadership, already a tendency due to 
their status as successful revolutionists and founders of the 
International, was accelerated.
Serge changed identity and nationality, he wrote, as 
required by circumstances. He bought a Polish identity card 
for $10 and a few cigars from the Berlin Polizeiprasidium, 
which turned out to be useless, because the Polish annexation 
of Upper Silesia reinforced the anti-Polish feeling in Germany 
and made life impossible until he traded his Polish 
nationality card for a Lithuanian one.18
Serge kept abreast of events at home in the Soviet Union. 
As a member of the Comintern Executive, he traveled to Moscow 
to attend meetings. In his capacity as a journalist, he 
attended the historic meeting of the Three Internationals on 
April 22, 1922 at the Reichstag building in Berlin.
Representatives of the Socialist International, the Two-and-a 
Half International19 and the Third International met to lay 
the basis for cooperation between socialists. The meeting 
ended in failure after representatives of the Second 
International attacked political persecution in Russia 
generally and in particular the impending Moscow trial of the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party leadership. Never a defender of 
the SR's —  the party of the 'middle peasantry' as he called 
them in Year One —  Serge sympathized with their criticisms,
18Memoirs. p. 158.
19The name given by its enemies to the ' International 
Working Union of Socialist Parties, popularly known as the 
'Vienna Union'; Serge thought it an appropriate name for the 
centrist groups "conglomerated midway between the reformists 
and the Bolsheviks." See E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 
Vol. 3, pp.407-8, and Serge, Memoirs, p.163-4.
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but quoted Bukharin's responses "These people are determined
never to fight for Socialism." Serge noted that Bukharin then
added as though "by way of a directive, 'Our Press must attack
20them mercilessly.'"
Serge was greatly distressed watching the proceedings of 
the trial against the SR's from Berlin. Now that the Civil 
War was over, he wrote, "were we going to shed the blood of a 
defeated party which, in the old days, had furnished the 
Revolution with so many of its heroes?" What worried Serge 
most was that he heard the Politburo's decision to 'behead 
this peasant party of significance' was taken in the belief 
the revolution was 'moving towards an inevitable crisis with 
the peasantry.'21 Serge moved into action to prevent this 
'calamity' along with Clara Zetkin, Jacques Sadoul and Boris 
Souvarine. Gorky also wrote Lenin. In the end, no one was 
killed. The Serge who had privately interceded on behalf of 
victims of the Cheka during the Civil War was continuing on 
the same path, from Berlin.
2.3 Conditions in Germany: Background
Germany had been in the throes of a revolutionary crisis 
since 1918. The war had bled the country white; its best 
brains and talent had been wasted on the battlefield which 
made a few German financial speculators very wealthy. Strikes 
and mutinies increased towards the end of the war, gathering 
widespread support.
The support of the war by the leaders of Germany's left 
and center parties had produced big cleavages between the 
leaders and the masses. The political spectrum in Germany
2Q
Serge, ibid..p. 163-4. Serge certainly agreed with
Bukharin that these Second Internationalists would never fight 
for socialism; he had amply noted how in Germany they believed 
in capitalism more than the bourgeoisie, and were responsible, 
as power-holders, for the murder of Liebknecht and Luxembourg.
21Ibid.
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ranged from ultra nationalists and fascists on the right, to 
Social Democrats and Independents in the center, to the 
Spartakus on the left, synonymous according to one writer, 
with revolutionary.22 The last days of the war had seen 
violent mutinies in the Armed Forces. 'Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards' in Berlin prepared for a general strike on November 
9, 1918. With this strike the monarchy was swept away and the 
armistice was signed the next day.
The Social Democrats and Independents formed a joint 
government headed by Ebert and Scheidemann. Serge called them 
the "Socialists of counter-revolution,"23 and their 
government one of "social conservatism."24 The anti­
revolutionary Social Democrat Gustav Noske was named war 
minister. Increasingly, the society was polarized between left 
and right. Serge's impression was that the young people 
wanted revolution, but that they were both nationalistic and 
socialist-inclined, although they wanted nothing to do with 
their Social Democratic leaders.25 The key leaders of the 
Spartakusbund, forerunner of the German Communist Party, were 
imprisoned during the war. Karl Liebknecht, son of Wilhelm 
Liebknecht, and Rosa Luxembourg, the brilliant Polish Marxist 
—  both anti-war Zimmerwaldian revolutionaries —  were among
those imprisoned and then freed after the armistice in
26November 1918. Upon their release and the armistice, the 
revolutionary crisis became acute.
22See Borkenau, p. 112.
23Serge, Year One of the Russian Revolution, p.324.
24Ibid. . p. 342.
25Memoirs. p. 160.
26Serge was similarly imprisoned during much of the war 
and released upon the signing of the armistices see Chap. 1 
infra. Liebknecht was released in October, prior to the 
Armistice, and Luxembourg was released about a month later, 
after the end of the War.
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The left was divided politically and geographically.
Rosa Luxembourg, Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jogiches, Franz Mehring
and Paul Levi were in Berlin, while another group in Bremen
was inspired by Radek and Lenin. Luxembourg was the most
capable Marxist in Germany.27 Serge said she was "the only
brain of Western Socialism in the same class as Lenin and 
28Trotsky." She was opposed to revolutionary coups before 
the mass movement was ready to contest power. They would 
become ready to take power through what she saw as a building 
crescendo of strikes and the formation of councils, embryonic 
organs of the workers state, or class dictatorship of the 
proletariat.
Serge wrote about the defeat of the German workers in
291918 in his history Year One of the Russian Revolution.
He saw the German Communist Party as too young and 
inexperienced and without the cadres or the leadership capable 
of daring initiative. The German proletariat, on the other 
hand, said Serge, was too subservient to the Social Democrats, 
who had become the defenders of capitalism. Liebknecht was 
too impatient and made a grave error in signing the manifesto 
calling for the deposing of Ebert and Schiedemann without 
consulting the Central Committee, and in so doing, initiated 
an untimely insurrection which he was unable to guide. 
Luxembourg initially opposed Liebknecht and then supported 
him. She was, as Serge noted, clearsighted but powerless.30
27She and Lenin had polemicized with one another over the 
question of self-determination of nations, and the role of the 
vanguard party —  the Leninist theory of organization. She had 
also been at odds with Radek, the Comintern emissary to 
Germany, when they had been leaders of different factions of 
Polish social Democracy before the war.
28Serge, Year One of the Russian Revolution, p. 322.




The armistice had signalled the collapse of the 
established political order in Central Europe and was the 
prelude to the revolutionary struggles of 1919. The 
Bolsheviks and the Zimmerwaldian leftists viewed these events 
as the approach of revolution in Europe, the beginning of the 
realization of their deepest hopes.31 Anti-war strikes in 
Central Europe during 1917-1918 now became political and more 
openly revolutionary. Workers and Soldiers councils appeared 
in Berlin, Munich, Vienna, and Budapest.32 Soviet Russia 
watched keenly the unfolding events in Germany, seeing 
parallels with their own revolutionary development. The 
Bolsheviks were heartened by the revolutionary upsurge in 
Central Europe, which they viewed as central to their own 
survival. Their hopes were to be dashed.
In Germany, the consequences of the failed Spartacist 
uprising in Berlin in January 1919 were catastrophic. 
Directed against the policies of Ebert's Social Democratic 
Government, the uprising ended with the arrest and murder on 
January 15 of Germany's most capable revolutionary leaders, 
Rosa "Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht. War Minister Gustav 
Noske, charged with the suppression of the Sparticist 
uprising, ordered the assassination of the two 
revolutionaries.33 Two months later, Leo Jogiches (Tyszko)
31See Lenin and Trotsky's statements to the ViTsik on 
October 3, 1918: Lenin began, "The German crisis means either 
that the revolution has begun, or that it is imminent and 
inevitable" (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 28, pp. 101-103) and 
Trotsky continued,"If the proletariat of Germany undertakes 
the offensive, the first duty of Soviet Russia, in the 
revolutionary struggle, will be to take no account of national 
frontiers. Russia of the Soviet is no more than the vanguard 
of the German and the European revolution...." (Quoted in 
Serge, Year One, pp.316-317.)
32Glasgow and Seattle also were the sites of revolutionary 
strikes and the formation of workers councils in 1919.
33Theses Resolutions and Manifestos of The First Four 
Congresses of the Third International, p. 462n.
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was similarly murdered, to be followed later by the death of 
Franz Mehring and the assassination of Eugen Levine, 
effectively decapitating Germany's young Communist Party. The 
repercussions were to be felt in the succeeding revolutionary 
waves culminating in the revolution of 1923. The leadership of 
the KPD was left in the hands of the young intellectual Paul 
Levi, who had been Rosa Luxembourg's lawyer and was greatly 
influenced by her political thinking, though he lacked her 
stature. Karl Radek, the representative of the Soviet 
Government in Germany took an active leadership role. There 
is no evidence of Serge's role, other than his journalistic 
output as a propagandist for the Comintern, in any of the 
sources consulted, except Serge's own Memoirs.
The defeats of 1919 were not the end of the revolutionary 
crisis. There followed the Kapp Putsch and the General Strike 
of March 1920. The young and inexperienced Communist Party of 
Germany adventuristically tried to unleash a general offensive 
before the majority of the workers was ready to accept its 
lead. Having burned itself in March, the KPD wavered in 
crucial moments in the 1923 revolutionary crisis.
The defeats in 1920 revealed the crisis of revolutionary 
leadership and the contradictions of Comintern policy. 
Bukharin, Zinoviev and Radek believed that in light of the 
developing revolutionary potential, the European parties were 
too inactive, and had to assume the offensive. At home, Lenin 
was calling for the revolutionary breathing spell and peaceful 
coexistence: NEP had supplanted War Communism. The
contradictions between the revolutionary breathing spell and 
the revolutionary offensive were reflected in the German 
party. The Kapp putsch, led by German generals and put-down by 
the general strike of German workers (led by the German trade 
union federation under Legien) presented a moment of choice 
for the German Communist Party. The leadership of the Party 
had vacillated —  first opposing the strike and then reversing 
its stand. The revolutionaries had missed a rare opportunity
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to attempt to take power following the General Strike. As a 
result, the German Party was mangled. Comintern leaders 
differed in their analysis of the Kapp putsch and the 
opportunistic approach of the KPD, but roundly attacked Levi. 
Events had moved quickly and the Bolsheviks watched from a 
distance; those closer to the ground had a more nuanced 
understanding of the difficulties of the situation.
The occupation of the Ruhr by the French in January 1923 
led to a disastrous devaluation of the mark and economic decay 
befell the country. Protests against the Versailles Treaty 
and its consequences grew, sparked by the French occupation. 
The Communist Party's ranks grew rapidly as the economic 
crisis further polarized German society.
Serge's articles from Germany concentrated on the 
conditions of decay, utilizing statistics to show the 
impoverishment of even the German middle classes, reduced like 
the workers to hunger and begging in the wake of massive 
unemployment and galloping inflation. Characteristically, 
Serge evoked the ambience by describing what happened to one 
person, in this case "an old lady with a black lace neckband" 
paying for her purchases at a store with hundred mark notes 
from the previous year, during the "age of Walter 
Rathenau."34 When she was told the money was worthless, she 
became confused. Events, Serge explained, needed to be 
followed hourly, as they hurried on at a dizzying pace. 
Inflation was catastrophic, accompanied by widespread 
speculation in currency; the rate of exchange with the dollar 
often changed twice a day, which caused utter chaos in 
commerce. People took to rioting outside the grocers and 
bakeries. Since there was no rationing, the shops could be 
stripped of their wares by panicked shoppers with money as 
often as the exchange rate changed. Hunger and destitution 
set in in the working class neighborhoods.
34Memgirs, p. 168.
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Politically, Serge's articles reflect the general line of 
Comintern policy toward Germany, and more specifically, of the 
emerging Left Opposition within the Bolshevik Party, Serge's 
assessment of conditions in Germany were more guarded and 
cautious than that of the Bolsheviks, because he was there to 
see the actual state of revolutionary leadership. The debates 
around Germany's KPD and the role of the Comintern in the 
revolution of 1923 were decisive in the internal struggle 
emerging in the Bolshevik Party. Much of German revolutionary 
policy was decided in Moscow. Radek travelled back and forth 
frequently. Serge also travelled to Moscow on Comintern 
business.
2.4 Serge Returns to Moscow
Serge returned to Moscow to attend an enlarged session of 
the Comintern Executive. The date in the Memoirs for this trip 
was the end of 1922, precisely the time for the Fourth 
Congress of the International. But Serge did not attend the 
Fourth Congress of the Comintern, which in any case was held 
in Petrograd.35 As Richard Greeman points out36, Serge was 
wrong about the date. Rosmer gave June 12, 1923 as the date 
of the Executive meeting, which he also attended,37 and 
Greeman spoke to Jeanne Maurin, who recalled seeing Serge in 
Moscow in June 1923. Serge's description of Moscow's 
convalescence included "bare-foot youngsters” running in the 
streets until dawn, offering flowers to lovers, suggestive 
more of June than December in Russia.
Serge was pleasantly surprised by the relative prosperity 
he encountered in Russia, due to NEP. It will be recalled,
35Rosmer, Moscow Under Lenin, pp.167-172, and Theses 
Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the 
Third International, pp.309-436.
36Greeman, op. cit., pp. 293-294.
37Rosmer, Ibid., p. 196.
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38Serge was opposed to NEP, which he saw as a regression, 
reintroducing disparities in wealth, with the reappearance of 
greed, and the quest for lucre; in short, the vices they had 
hoped to eliminate in making the first successful socialist 
revolution in the world. The return of the market, it seemed 
to Serge, made a waste of all the blood spilt in the Civil War 
and attendant famine.
But NEP was a response to famine and the standstill in 
industry —  insupportable conditions. As opposed as Serge was 
to market solutions, he was glad of any change which would 
revive industry.39
While Serge despaired of the gambling, corruption, theft, 
and the growing chasm between "the prosperity of the few and 
the misery of the many, "40 he admitted conditions had 
improved, and this was nowhere more apparent than in the arts. 
New writers, previously unknown, were now considered 
seriously, among them, Boris Pilniak, Vsevolod Ivanov, and 
Konstantin Fedin.41 Serge was very much encouraged by the 
fact that these writers, none of whom were Communist Party 
members, and all "intense, impetuous, saturated with virile 
humanism and a critical spirit"42, were allowed to publish, 
and were greatly loved. Russian literature was being reborn 
after the years of Revolution and Civil War. The state of the 
arts was a sign of health that Serge observed in other spheres 
as well. The collapse which had seemed imminent upon Serge' s 
departure a year earlier had not occurred, and although there
38For Serge's views on the NEP, see previous chapter 
infra, pp.91-97. ^
39Memoirs, pp. 147-148.




were still signs of poverty, people were not dying of hunger. 
The Cheka terror had ended and faded into memory.
But the Comintern Executive seemed all too familiar. Signs 
of corruption, servility and bureaucratism were increasingly 
apparent in the functioning of the International. As to the 
meeting itself, Serge acutely observed the degeneration of the 
Comintern, though he didn't pay attention to the proceedings 
of the discussion, stating in the Memoirs, that he couldn't 
recall the nature of the deliberations at hand. This is 
rather surprising, as this was the meeting in which Radek 
delivered his famous "Schlageter Speech" which so confused the 
International delegates,43 appealing as it did to rank and 
file Germans on the basis of nationalism, attempting to 
convince them that the communists alone were capable of 
fulfilling their desires and aspirations.44
2.5 Back to Berlin: Russia, the Comintern and the German 
Revolution of 1923
Serge returned to Berlin in the summer of 1923 in time for 
the July-August mobilizations and strikes. Germany was in the 
midst of the crisis provoked by the French occupation of the 
Ruhr. Serge remained in Germany until the defeat of the 
(German) October revolution made the situation too dangerous 
for him to continue in his work. Serge's analysis and account 
of events in Germany are virtually the same in his Memoirs of 
1941 and his articles written between 1923-26, more than 
fifteen years earlier. His LCI articles are journalistic and 
expose the machinations of German Social Democracy during 
1923, the year of revolutionary crisis. There is also a great
43See Rosmer, ibid., pp. 196-198.
44See E.H. Carr, The Interregnum. 1923-1924. pp. 174-185, 
and Gruber, op.cit..p. 437. Serge mentions the 'Schlageter 
line' which Radek pushed through in the Memoirs, though not in 
conjunction with the meeting he (Serge) had attended. Memoirs, 
p.169.
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deal of information on the disintegration of the German 
economy and its effects on the deteriorating situation of the 
German working class. In his later articles, Serge's post­
mortem of the revolution puts forward the line of the Left 
Opposition in the Russian Party and Comintern, but is nuanced 
by his personal observations.
The conditions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, which 
Serge described as "a noose around the German nation's 
neck"45, destroyed the economy with the high social and 
economic costs of heavy reparations payments. The rich became 
'self-seeking' speculators, and the masses became
increasingly destitute. The crisis provoked by the 
reparations grew worse daily. Inflation was such that workers 
salaries, fixed at the beginning of the week, were worthless 
by payday.46 Finally the Cuno government announced it could 
no longer pay the reparations, the country was bankrupt.
The political and economic disintegration of Germany 
caused widespread misery and hunger. The workers fled the 
democratic parties, and the ranks of the Communists and the 
fascists swelled. The German people, known for their 
orderliness, began to riot, and loiter, albeit in a 
disciplined fashion. Serge described rioting in front of 
bakery shops, yet observed proletarian discipline in the 
looting of a shoe shop, with the workers waiting in line for 
their turn to steal, and coming out 'scrupulously empty- 
handed' if there were no shoes to fit them.47
The working class response to the disintegrating economy 
was mobilization. "Each day brought its windfall of strikes,
45Serge, Memoirs, p. 169.
46See R. Albert, "L'Allemagne en 1923: 1'Inflation
catastrophique," La Vie Ouvriere. Dec. 1925-June 1926, Nos. 
310-370, and R. Albert, "Notes d'Allemagne," La Correspondance 
International, July - Nov. 1923.
47Memoirs, p. 169.
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and every night the sinister silence echoed with revolver- 
shots . "48 The workers movement was on the march again. In
49a series of articles entitled "Au Seuil D'Une Revolution," 
Serge described the mood of the masses of Communists and 
nationalist students as one of "strike now" —  "Lochslagen."
Most of the political preconditions of a revolutionary
situation were present in July-August 1923. As Trotsky
pointed out, these included
"a crisis of existence for the nation and the 
state,...a crisis of the economy and especially of 
the country's finances; a parliamentary crisis; an 
utter collapse in the ruling class' confidence in 
itself; disintegration of social democracy and the 
trade unions; a spontaneous increase in the 
influence of the Communist Party; a turn by petty- 
bourgeois elements toward communism: a sharp
decline in the morale of the fascists." 0
In August, a succession of strikes extended throughout German 
industry, which were political in character and continued 
until the existing Government of Cuno resigned. Stresemann 
then became Chancellor and pledged to put an end to the Ruhr 
crisis and to stabilize the mark. Stabilizing the mark would 
involve deep social cuts, however, in a polarized society that 
was already hungry.
2.6 "The Russian Model of Revolution"
The authority of the Bolsheviks on the basis of their 
successful October revolution established a Russian model of 
revolution which other Communist Parties sought to emulate.
48Ibid.. p. 169.
49R. Albert, Clarte, Nos. 52 and 53, Feb. 1 and 15, 1924.
50Trotsky, "Through What Stage Are We Passing?" June 21, 
1924, speech delivered to the Fifth All-Union Congress of 
Medical and Veterinary Workers, from Zapad i Vostok, collected 
in Leon Trotsky, The Challenge of the Left Opposition (1923— 
1925), Ed. Naomi Allen, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1975, 
pp.167-174.
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The Bolsheviks themselves saw events in light of their own 
experience; thus Lenin characterized Germany's 1918 events as 
'1905'; the January 1919 clashes were Germany's 'July Days,' 
the Kapp Putsch was "the German Kornilov affair."51 While 
the German Communists were visibly weaker and less capable 
than their Russian counterparts, events were progressing 
according to a pattern.
The pattern of the 'classic' model of revolution shaped 
both the Soviet and German communists' perception of events. 
The centrality of the German Revolution to the survival of the 
Russian revolution caused the Bolsheviks to see too many 
similarities on the surface of German events with their own 
revolutionary development while ignoring the important signs 
that there were crucial differences in the subjective 
leadership. One writer went so far as to say the German 
Revolution of 1923 didn't exist as a possibility except in the 
heads of the Russian Left Opposition who depended on the 
German revolution for their survival.52 To the Russian 
revolutionaries, the vision of a Communist industrial Germany 
uniting with agrarian revolutionary Russia was a combination 
which would not only mean salvation to both countries, but 
could inspire the international working class to world 
revolution. Capitalist exploitation would be part of the 
past.
It was in the context of this vision that Radek pushed 
through his 'Schlageter line' to appeal to the rank and file 
nationalists to join with the Communists.53 Curiously, Serge
51E. H. Carr, Volume 3, pp. 175-6.
52Franz Borkenau, World Communism, pp 243-256.
53Albert Schlageter was a young nationalist agitator who 
was shot by the French troops on the Ruhr on May 26, 1923. 
According to Carr, (The Interregnum, pp 170-176) Schlageter 
became a martyr and symbol to the nationalists; his name 
became a symbol of the revival of German national honour and
(continued...)
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made no comment on the political content of Radek's Schlageter 
line. Was the appeal to the fascist rank and file a 
concession to nationalism? Serge obviously did not see the 
line as a move to the right, but rather a tactical maneuver 
leading to the contestation of power, and as such was part of 
the left's revolutionary action. Serge said of the Schlageter 
tactics "It's playing with fire— all right let's play with 
fire! .. .Loschlagen! — Strike now! "54
The German crisis was enormously exacerbated by events 
in Russia which were played out in the Comintern.55 From May 
until August 1923, all actions of the German KPD and the 
Comintern were initiated by Radek.56 Yet the strikes of 
August 1923 caught the German party and the Comintern 
politically unprepared. The workers movement had been 
ascendent throughout the summer, culminating with the August 
strikes. The Comintern shifted into action at the high point, 
and tried to escalate events when they were beginning to ebb.
53(.. .continued)
a battle-cry to "spur ... fresh deeds of violence against the 
French aggressor." p. 177. Radek's speech to the enlarged 
session of the Comintern Executive stated: "Today National
Bolshevism means that everyone is penetrated with the feeling 
that salvation can be found only with the communists. We are 
today the only way out. The strong emphasis on the nation in 
Germany is a revolutionary act, like the emphasis on the 
nation in the colonies." International Presse-Korrespondenz. 
No. 103, June 21, 1923, p.; 869, quoted in Carr, op cit, p. 
177.
54Memoirs, p. 169.
55The events of Germany in 1923 pointed to the crisis 
within the German Communist Party, the Comintern and the 
Soviet Party, already embroiled in factional disputes, brought 
about by NEP, the industrialization debates, the ebb of
international revolution, Lenin's illness, and the succession 
of leadership, with the triumvirate of Zinoviev, Kamenev and 
Stalin organizing against Trotsky and indirectly against 
Lenin.
56Carr, Ibid. p. 174.
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Brandler, the KPD leader, was called to Moscow to prepare the 
German revolution, and was kept there in endless debates until 
early October, while the KPD underwent a transformation from 
mass work to military preparations.
The Bolsheviks and the Comintern now went on the 
offensive, determining KPD policy from Moscow. The German 
Revolution's proposed date was set by the Bolsheviks to 
coincide with the 6th anniversary of the Russian October 
Revolution. This policy was much criticized, but Trotsky 
wrote an article defending it, entitled "Is It Possible to Fix 
a Definite Schedule for a Counter-Revolution or a 
Revolution?"57 The article was translated into several 
languages.
Serge became alarmed when the date of the insurrection 
was fixed from Moscow, while in Germany he witnessed stocks of 
arms being seized every day, and the mood of the masses 
passing from urgent expectation and 'insurgent enthusiasm' to 
'weary resignation.' Serge wrote Souvarine in Moscow in order 
to convey to the Executive Committee of the International, 
that "unless the Party's initiative joins with the spontaneous 
movement of the masses, it is doomed beforehand.1,58
Radek had also wired Moscow saying that the German masses 
were not ready. Zinoviev and Bukharin spurred the Germans on. 
Trotsky at first said he needed to learn more about Germany 
before expressing his opinion, but then decided Germany was 
ripe for revolution, and proposed planning the insurrection in 
advance.59 Although Radek and Serge had differences with
57The article appears in The First Five Years of the 
Communist International, Volume 2. by Leon Trotskyf" Monad 
Press, 1972, pp. 347-354.
58Memoirs, p. 170.
59Deutscher, Vol. 2, pp. 142-145. Deutscher notes that 
Brandler balked, feeling, as he put it, that he was not the 
German Lenin, and asked the Politburo to assign Trotsky to
(continued...)
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Trotsky on this score, they were buried in face of the fight 
against Stalin, in which they stood together in the Left 
Opposition.
2.7 The "Aborted' German October
The plan decided on was artificial, trying to force 
events from the outside. Although Trotsky and Radek had 
serious misgivings about the divisions within the KPD between 
Brandler (who Trotsky supported) and Maslow and Fischer,—  
divisions over the decision that the moment for the seizure of 
power had arrived —  they nevertheless believed the revolution 
in Germany had to be directed with bold and decisive 
action.60
Uncertainty at the highest levels in the Comintern gave 
way to a plan of action. KPD members Brandler, Heckert and 
Bottcher were to enter the Social Democratic Dresden cabinet, 
which, according to Comintern directives, was seen as the 
springboard for revolution.61 The Communists were to use 
their influence from within the government to arm the workers. 
Red Saxony and Thuringia were to lead the insurrection. Serge 
lived with the workers and youth who prepared to fight; some 
were veterans of November 1918, and January 1919, old 
Spartakists who lived though "the murder of . . . Karl and Rosa,
59( .. .continued)
lead the insurrection. Instead of Trotsky the Politburo 
assigned Radek and Pyatokov. Serge was part of their
entourage. Had Trotsky gone and led a successful revolution, 
he would have been the leader of both the Russian and German 
revolutions and consequently too powerful for Stalin. On the 
other hand, had Trotsky been killed leading an unsuccessful 
German revolution, he would have become a martyr, like Che 
Guevara. It was better for Stalin to keep Trotsky in the 
Soviet Union.
60Carr, Interregnum, p. 218, and Deutscher, Vol. 2, pp.
142-145.
61Serge, Memoirs, p. 171.
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the dictatorship of the man of blood, Gustav Noske." He noted
02
these men were ready to do anything they were asked.
There were several reasons the Comintern's plan was 
clumsy; haste, indecision, and amateurish preparations 
combined in a disastrous mixture. The political premise was 
correct, but the plan was based on insufficient and outdated 
information. Trotsky had understood since 1918 the crisis in 
revolutionary leadership, the famous subjective factor that 
was decisive in a revolutionary situation. Serge had agreed 
with Trotsky yet added there was also a 'crisis of popular 
consciousness' not to mention an already bureaucratized 
International.63 Taken together, an essential ingredient for 
a successful revolution was absent.
The Comintern analysis of the German situation had been 
outstripped by events. Conditions in October were not as 
favorable as they had been in July; the social crisis was less 
acute, and the stabilization of the mark had eased the 
economic situation. Deutscher said the political situation 
was thus calmer. Borkenau saw the situation as anything but 
calm, but blamed the Communists for not realizing they lacked 
support. In his view, the drift of disaffected social 
democratic workers was more to the right than to the left; he 
cited a decline in trade union membership as proof that 
workers were withdrawing from politics. Gruber said the German 
KPD should have known the situation better, especially with 
regard to the strength and inclinations of the fascists, and 
he criticized the Russians for seeing too many "homologues to 
their October Revolution." Carr also wrote that although the 
situation in Germany 'had lost none of its tenseness', the 
underlying political conviction of the revolutionary situation 




miscalculation of the revolutionary consciousness of the 
working class.64
The German KPD Zentral had failed to arouse the masses 
and prepare them for insurrection. The arsenals were empty. 
Seeing this at the last moment, the insurrection was called 
off by the Russian military experts including Piatokov, but 
word did not get to Hamburg,65 where 300 disciplined and 
courageous communists took over the city and found themselves 
isolated and doomed. A bloody sequel took place there, as the 
communists rose and fought for four days.66
Serge said there were "few of us who realized the full 
extent of the defeat in the first moments".67 Hitler staged 
his abortive coup in Munich on November 9. Although the 
putsch failed, Serge did not underestimate Hitler's potential. 
In fact, one salient feature of Serge's articles in La 
Correspondance International. and Bulletin Communiste for the 
year 1923 was his appreciation of and attention to the 
significance of the fascist danger.68 In his later article in
Deutscher, Vol. 2, pp. 142-144, Borkenau, World 
Communism, pp. 247-8, Gruber, International Communism in the 
Era of Lenin, p. 441, Carr, Interregnum. pp. 210-215.
65 ecause as Carr wrote of an inexplicable tragic blunder, 
in which Thalmann and Remmele, two members of the KPD Central 
Committee left the conference of workers organizations at 
Chemnitz before it ended, under the impression that the 
insurrection's success was assured, and gave the order in 
Hamburg for the rising to begin. Had they stayed to the end 
of the conference, they would have received word that the 
insurrection was called off. Interregnum, p.p. 221-222.
66Gruber, op. cit. p. 442n.
67 Ibid.
68See articles signed 'R. Albert' in LCI, no. 61 (31 July 
1923), no. 63 (7 August 1923), no. 77 (28 Sept 1923), no. 78, 
(2 oct. 1923), no. 89 (9 nov. 1923), no.90 (13 Nov. 1923); and 
in BC, no.41 (11 Oct. 1923) and no. 47 (22 Nov. 1923).
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La Vie Ouvriere69, Serge explained that German capitalists 
did not yet need Hitler, as they had been able to stabilize 
the situation, but they would keep him in reserve, should the 
crisis flare up again.
The defeat of the German revolution paved the way not only
for Hitler, but also for Stalin. The failure yet again of
revolution in Europe left the Bolsheviks isolated and in
turmoil. The Russian Party crisis entirely dominated the
German debate. Its effects were felt throughout the Comintern.
The evaluation of the KPD in the post-mortem of the German
'fiasco,' as Carr termed it, became a battleground in the
struggle within the Russian Politburo between Trotsky, Radek
and Piatokov on one side versus Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev
on the other. Trotsky wrote seven years later,
"The internal discussion in the Russian Communist 
Party did not lead to a system of groups until the 
events in Germany in the fall of 1923. The 
economic and political processes in the USSR were 
molecular in character and had a comparatively slow 
tempo. The events of 1923 in Germany gave the 
measure of the differences on the scale of that 
gigantic class struggle. It was then and on that 
basis that the Russian Opposition was formed."70
The deliberations on the German question marked the first
time Stalin had participated in the life of the Comintern.
His attitude was revealed six years later when Brandler
(expelled from the International) sought to clear himself by
publishing Stalin's letter to Zinoviev and Bukharin, opposing
the insurrections "It is in our interests that the fascists
should attack first. ... Moreover, according to all
information, the fascists are weak in Germany. "71 Zinoviev
go
R. Albert, La Vie ouvriere. No. 60, 1926.
70"Greetings to La Verite," Writings of Leon Trotsky, 
1930. Quoted in Trotsky, The Challenge of the Left Opposition 
(1923-1925). p. 163.
71This account is to be found in Rosmer's excellent book, 
Moscow Under Lenin. Monthly Review Press, 1971, pp. 208-209.
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hesitated, but tended to favor the insurrection. Brandler was 
opposed, but was forced to assume leadership of the action. 
Later Stalin and Zinoviev blamed Brandler in an attempt to 
clear the International of responsibility.
In the wake of defeat, recriminations and scapegoating 
went on between the German Party, the Comintern and the 
Bolsheviks. Ruth Fischer and Maslow lined up
opportunistically with Stalin and Zinoviev, Trotsky supported 
Brandler, and everyone agreed that the revolutionary 
leadership had been woefully inadequate.72 Serge concurred, 
but begged the question of the working class: were they
revolutionary? Serge's account is loaded with quotes telling 
us they weren't: they were too 'respectable,' too moderate.
Characteristically, Serge's analysis begins and ends with the 
actual condition and political consciousness of the working 
class.
The Weimar Republic survived the October and November
crises of 1923, said Serge, only through the weight of the
inertia of the masses. The bulk of the masses were
uninvolved; the unemployed sold themselves for a crust of
bread to the Nazis, the Social Democratic leaders were too
invested in a crumbling social system, while its workers were
too frightened of revolution. In the ensuing search for
scapegoats, Serge noted that out of defeat came
"the lying, the suppression, the demoralizing 
discipline that ruins consciences. Nobody talked 
about the basic fault. The whole Party lived on 
the involuntary bluff of functionaries whose first 
concern was not to contradict their superiors."73
Misinformation had accumulated, passing through a hierarchy of
functionaries and secretaries, until the KPD CC could^say to
72Peter Sedgwick, in "Victor Serge and Socialism," 
International Socialism 14. 1963, says "everybody
demonstrated the crying inadequacy of the leadership of 
everybody else..." p. 20.
73Memoirs, pp. 174-5.
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the International that they were prepared, but in reality they 
were only prepared on paper.74 Part of the problem resulted 
from the chain of command which went through the Russian 
Politburo , the Comintern and the German Party. The 
consequences were to create conditions for further 
bureaucratization. Serge argued in his article in Clarte that 
the disease of bureaucratization had its hand in the bungling 
ineptitude of the German fiasco. The German Party had not 
only allowed all initiative to come from Moscow, but remained 
passive while a revolutionary situation developed under their 
noses . When they should have been developing connections with 
the mass struggle, the German communists concentrated on 
gathering arms —  and this they did fictitiously; more on 
paper than in fact.75 Accepting a date for the insurrection 
in this situation was yet another indication of the 
bureaucratic isolation from reality which paralyzed them in 
the end.
The German events coincided with the beginning of sharp 
factional strife in the Bolshevik Party. The Platform of the
76 *46 appeared in the same month of the German defeat, as well
74Serge, Memoirs, pp. 174-5, Gruber, Op. Cit., p. 441.
75The inflation of arms gathering on paper, performed by 
bureaucratized militants who wished to look good to their 
superiors was then covered by the superiors to look good to 
their superiors, until it looked on paper as if the Party was 
ready for insurrection, when in fact they were not. R. Albert, 
"Au Seuil D'Une Revolution," Clarte. Feb. 15, 1924, p. 97. 
Serge's analysis of the crippling behavior of bureaucratism 
and the consequent effects of acting with inaccurate 
information in the German events were to find their reflection 
in the subsequent developments in the Soviet Union.
76A Manifesto signed by Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, 
Breslav, and 43 other leading members of the party, issued on 
October 15, 1923. The Manifesto attacked the gulf separating 
the "secretarial hierarchy" and the "quiet folk" or "general 
mass of the Party" and complained of the ossification of the 
party leadership; and declared that the "casual, unconsidered
(continued...)
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as Trotsky's two letters which opened the great period of 
debate and factional struggle within the Russian Party. The 
German affair was inextricably involved in the crisis in the 
Russian Party and the Comintern. Radek, a Left Oppositionist 
(with Trotsky) came up against Zinoviev's power in the 
Comintern. Members of Comintern sections took positions in the 
debate, to the growing alarm of the Stalin, Zinoviev and 
Kamenev, who worried that foreign leaders might side with the 
Left Opposition. In fact, Radek reminded the Politburo that he 
was responsible for his actions in Germany not to the 
Politburo of the Russian Party, but to the World Congress of 
the Comintern, of which the Russian Party was a section like 
the others.77 The question of dominance of the Stalin faction 
in the Comintern was thus acutely posed.
The well-documented debate in the Comintern on the German 
revolution opposed two differing assessments of the defeat. 
One took the view that the German proletariat had not been 
ready to seize power when the call was made, the other 
maintained that conditions had been ripe for revolution but 
the moment had been lost because of the crisis of 
revolutionary leadership. Serge's assessment fell somewhere 
between the two; he saw a crisis both in revolutionary 
leadership and in popular consciousness.78 He did not side 
with Zinoviev or Stalin. Now that another opportunity for
76(.. .continued)
and unsystematic character of the decisions of the central 
committee...’' had brought the country into a "grave economic 
crisis." The Manifesto, or 'Platform of the 46' is reproduced 
in full in E.H. Carr, The Interregnum 1923-1924. pp.367-373.
77Trinadtsataya Konferentsiya Rossiisskoi
Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol'shevikov) (1924), p. 173, cited 
in Carr, The interregnum 1923-1924, p. 236.
78 The crisis of popular consciousness and the 
bureaucratization of the International were both expressions 
of what Trotsky called the crisis of revolutionary leadership. 
Thus Serge's view was a more nuanced version of Trotsky's.
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world revolution failed, the inward looking faction 
( 'socialism in one country' ) came to the fore. Serge was well 
aware of the consequences for the Comintern and the Russian 
revolution, and he alluded to them in his Clarte articles and 
Memoirs.
Serge left Berlin for Vienna by way of Prague with his 
wife Liuba and son Vlady the same day (Nov. 9, 1923) that 
General von Seekt took power to restore order. At the last 
moment the Soviet Embassy left them to fend for themselves, 
deciding to neither compromise itself, nor take any risks by 
helping illegal agents. Serge had lived in difficult 
circumstances without money or proper papers for two years, 
but had experienced his third revolution.
2.8 Watching and Waiting in Vienna: 1923-1925
From Vienna, Serge followed events in the Soviet Union, the 
Comintern, and the turbulent Balkans. These included the death 
of Lenin; Zinoviev's Estonian fiasco (Zinoviev, Serge said, 
was called "Lenin's biggest mistake."79); the Georgian 
affair, in which Stalin had shown his hand through 
Ordzhonikidze (Serge called him [Ordzhonikidze] "an honest and 
scrupulous man tormented by recurrent crises of conscience"); 
and Bulgaria, still 'pregnant with revolution."
Austria itself was a peaceful country governed by 
enlightened Social Democrats who were engaged in building 
workers housing and biding for time in the knowledge that 
their powerful neighbors' influence (Germany, Italy and 
Hungary) would decide their future. Serge arrived with his 
diplomatic passport, and while enjoying Vienna's sweet music, 
preoccupied himself with international questions.
The years of Serge's sojourn in Vienna, 1923-1925, 
coincided with the years of watching and waiting throughout 
the Comintern and to a certain extent within the Soviet Union
79Memoirs. p. 177.
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itself. Vienna had become the crossroads of the
International, where leading international revolutionaries
were either living or spending time. Serge had the
opportunity to converse and discuss with many of them, and
through his recollections of these conversations reveal what
they were thinking privately —  thoughts they would not
express publicly. Once again, Serge found himself in a nerve
center of political activity.
In Vienna, Serge watched the deterioration of the Soviet
Party and Comintern, stricken with a bureaucratic cancer. He
associated with some of the finest revolutionary minds of the
day, and sketched thumbnail portraits of them in the Memoirs.
80He studied Freud and Marx, associated with Lukacs and 
81Gramsci, both in Vienna, and continued in his 'non-
80Of Lukacs, Serge wrote: "Lukacs was a philosopher
steeped in the works of Hegel, Marx, and Freud, and possessing 
a free-ranging and rigorous mind. He was engaged in writing 
a number of outstanding books which were never to see the 
light of day. In him I saw a first-class brain which could 
have endowed Communism with a true intellectual greatness if 
it had developed as a social movement instead of degenerating 
into a movement in solidarity with an authoritarian Power. 
Lukacs' thinking led him to a totalitarian vision of Marxism 
within which he united all aspects of human life; his theory 
of the Party could be taken as either superb or disastrous, 
depending on the circumstances. For example, he considered 
that since history could not be divorced from politics, it 
should be written by historians in the service of the Central 
Committee." Memoirs, p. 187.
81Serge described Gramsci as "an industrious and Bohemian 
exile, late to bed and late to rise .... Gramsci fitted 
awkwardly into the humdrum of day-to-day existence, losing his 
way at night in familiar streets, taking the wrong train, 
indifferent to the comfort of his lodgings and the quality of 
his meals; but intellectually, he was absolutely alive. 
Trained intuitively in the dialectic, quick to uncover 
falsehood and transfix it with the sting of irony, he viewed 
the world with an exceptional clarity. ... When the crisis in 
Russia began to worsen, Gramsci did not want to be broken in 
the process, so he had himself sent back to Italy by his party 
.... a fascist jail kept him outside the operation of those
(continued...)
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existent' capacity as representative of the Soviet press. Of
his life at that point, Serge wrote:
"All we lived for was activity integrated into 
history; we were interchangeable; we could 
immediately see the repercussions of affairs in 
Russia upon affairs in Germany and the Balkans; we 
felt linked with our comrades who, in pursuit of 
the same ends as we, perished or else scored some 
success at the other end of Europe. None of us 
had, in the bourgeois sense of the word, any 
personal existences we changed our names, our 
posting and our work at the Party's need; we had 
just enough to live on without real material 
discomfort, and we were not interested in making 
money, or following a career, or producing a 
literary heritage, or leaving a name behind us; we 
were interested solely in the difficult business of 
reaching socialism.1,8
Rarely has the life of a revolutionary been evoked so
eloquently. Serge had the unique ability and talent to
capture the mood of what life was really like, or what a
person was like (in his remarkable thumbnail sketches), to
document reality in a creative literary style. Above all, he
never forgot that politics and history were composed of
people, and that these individuals' characters were connected
to their public activities. How else could a paragraph
describing the lack of personal existence of a revolutionary
be so immediately personal?
Of the Russians Serge knew in Vienna, he said they
managed to "keep their plain integrity and abundant
81 ( .. .continued)
factional struggles whose consequence nearly everywhere was 
the elimination of the militants of his generation. Our years 
of darkness were his years of stubborn resistance." Memoirs. 
p. 186-187. I quote these perceptions of Serge because of 
their extraordinary quality in themselves, and because they 




83optimism." These were revolutionaries whose usefulness had 
been exhausted but had been given sinecures abroad, where they 
could observe first hand the decay of the bourgeois world, and 
where their voices would not be heard. Included among these 
revolutionaries were Adolf Abramovich Joffe, just back from 
China and Japan, who appeared to Serge as a "wise physician, 
almost affluent in his appearance and almost comical in his 
gravity, who had been summoned to the bedside of a dying 
patient."84 The others were Dr. Goldstein, "old" Kozlosvsky, 
and Yuri Kotziubinsky, with whom Serge shared confidences. 
Kotziubinsky had been a hero in the Civil War, along with 
Evgenia Bosch and Yuri Piatakov. Serge also met Angelica 
Balabanova again, Lukacs, Gramsci85, Bela Kun ("a remarkably
odious figure ... the incarnation of intellectual inadequacy,
86uncertainty of will, and authoritarian corruption" ).
They had almost no contact with Austrian Social Democracy 
and the Communist Party, which had divided in two, with only 
100 members in each group. Although Austro-Marxism had 
produced fine minds, and organized one million proletarians, 
it had failed to take power three times in ten years through
• 87"its sobriety, prudence, and bourgeois moderation."
83Ibid.. p. 181.
84Ibid. . p. 182.
85Gramsci had known of Serge before they met in Vienna. 
Gramsci had translated Serge's Lenin 1917 and some of his 
Clarte articles and published them in his paper L 'Ordine 
Nuovo. Serge's relations with Gramsci are discussed by Sergio 
Caprioglio and Elsa Fubini, editors of the Italian edition of 
Gramsci's prison letters. Gramsci also alludes to Serge in a 
letter dated September 13, 1931. See Antonio Gramsci, Lettere 
del carcere. S. Caprioglio and E. Fubini, ed. (Turin, 1965), 




Serge spent his time discussing the fate of the Russian 
revolution, the Comintern and the world situation with his 
friends, and writing.88 He noted that he and Gramsci had 
commented that the 250,000 new militants, recently recruited 
to the Bolshevik Party couldn't have been worth much if they
89had waited for the death of Lenin to enter the party. With 
Lukacs, he had discussed whether or not revolutionaries who 
had been condemned to death should commit suicide.90
Serge wrote of the impending fascist danger in Austria in 
the French La Vie Ouvriere in 1925, which became "an 
ineffectual pamphlet" in Russia. Serge wrote that the 
Austrian working class could survive only so long as Weimar 
Germany existed; with the collapse of the Weimar Republic, 
Austria was doomed.91 Serge's journalism in this period 
dealt mainly with questions of international solidarity, (the 
campaign against the terror in Spain waged against Serge's old 
comrades; against the White terror in 'Bulgaria ruled by the
92knife' ) or cultural topics, in which he was less frustrated 
with following the official line, as both Comintern 
functionary and Bolshevik Party member.93
88He began his first novel, Men In Prison, wrote a 
biography of Lenin, Lenine 1917. wrote on culture and 
revolution in a series of articles in Clarte, which later 
formed the backbone of a small book Serge produced called 
Literature and Revolution, published in 1932.
89Referring to the 'Lenin levy'. Ibid, p. 186.
90Lukacs had decided when he was imprisoned that he had 
no right to suicide as a Central Committee member, charged 
with setting an example. Ibid., p. 188.
91Victor Serge, "Le Fascisme en Autriche," La Vie 
ouvriere. October and November 1925.
92Memoirs, p. 190.
93Greeman, op. cit., p. 304.
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2.9 Writings from Vienna
As we have noted Serge was fairly disillusioned with the 
bureaucratic cancer and nationalist focus of both the Soviet 
Party and the subservient Comintern, and had already thrown 
his lot in with the Left Opposition. Serge's political doubts 
were reflected in his writings in this period, albeit in an 
Aesopian fashion. As Richard Greeman pointed out, Serge 
wisely avoided direct political questions in his writings, as 
that would have called into question his loyalty to the 
Bolshevik Party, of which he was still a member.94
Serge wrote a biography of Lenin, just after his death in 
1924, which on the surface looks like a typical product of the 
cult of Lenin which followed his death. Serge's assignment, 
to write a biography of Lenin for the French reading public, 
did not seem unusual, given that Serge had translated Lenin's 
State and Revolution into French, and had worked in the Lenin 
Institute translating Lenin's Collected Works.95 Serge had 
known Lenin personally, and his wife had been Lenin's 
stenographer in 1921.96 The news of Lenin's death, came to 
Serge in a train in Austria; he recalled overhearing the 
conversation of two Austrian petty-bourgeois' about the death 
of a revolutionary, and Serge was overwhelmed thinking of 
Lenin's remarkable human achievements.97 Serge quoted Andres 
Nin, who said that the unity of the Party had depended on this
94Greeman, op. cit.. p. 304.
95See Chapter ?, infra, p. . Serge later was allowed to 
continue his translations of Lenin in the Lenin Institute, but 
he was closely supervised by "experts charged with the trask of 
uncovering possible sabotage in the disposition of 
semicolons." His name was also removed from the published 
volumes. Memoirs. p. 273.




'shadow of a man, no more than that' and that afterwards, 
'there's going to be a riot.'98
The significance of Serge's biography of Lenin, is not so 
much its actual content but the contexts it was written from 
Vienna, after the defeat of Germany, and thus world 
revolution, in the context of the Stalin's rising star, just 
now rising above the Triumvers, an ascent which utilized 
methods alien to makers of the Russian revolution, and 
unfortunately only a preview of methods to be used in the near 
future. The book reads like an official account, and is
QQ
perhaps Serge's least inspiring text. Yet underneath what 
reads like a mediocre and unimaginative piece of official 
propaganda, Serge was able to analyze Lenin's role in the 
revolution in such a way as to make an implicit criticism of 
the official line of Stalin's leadership. Without 
understanding the context in which Serge wrote the book, 
however, its oppositional significance is not immediately 
apparent.
Describing Lenin in the year of the revolution, Serge 
stressed two points: Lenin's internationalism and view of the
Russian Revolution as but "a strong impulse to the 
international socialist movement"100; and Lenin's commitment 
to the role of the masses in the revolutionary process and 
construction of the workers state. Considering Stalin's 
policies and actions, the book is a veiled attack on the 
direction of the Party in 1924-25.
98Ibid.
99Richard Greeman calls it 'pedestrian', but says the 
pedestrian quality points to Serge's objective position 
(indeed that of the entire Left Opposition) as a loyal member 
under the yoke of the party.
100yictor Serge, Lenin 1917. originally published by 
Librairie de Travail, Paris, no date; quotes here from Spanish 
edition, Ediciones Transicion, Mexico, 1977, p. 26.
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Serge followed the course of the year 1917, and 
demonstrated Lenin's decisive role. Lenin to Serge was the 
embodiment of 'thought as action' and the 'absolute harmony 
between intelligence and will."101 Serge underscored Lenin's 
understanding of the role of workers in taking power and 
constructing socialism and in this sense the whole book is ah 
attack of Stalin and the troika, who showed contempt for the 
masses and ruled by dictatorial fiat. Serge was able, by 
emphasizing Lenin's understanding of the role of the organs of 
workers democracy in advancing the mass struggle, and without 
referring at all to the struggles following Lenin's death, to 
accentuate the democratic side of Lenin, making the book an 
oppositional text.
Serge was also able to attack Comintern policy in the
German revolution of 1923 in his book on Lenin, without
• • 102 mentioning Germany or the Comintern. Under the heading
"Marxism and Insurrection," Serge quoted Lenin on the 'art of
insurrection. ' Lenin wrote that a revolution, if it was to be
successful could neither be a conspiracy nor a plot, but must
be supported by the advanced class, and by a revolutionary
plan of the people. "The insurrection must be supported at
its point of inflection of the growing revolution, at the
moment in which the activity of the masses reaches its highest
level, and in which the doubts of the masses following the
enemy also reaches their high point..."103
101Serge, Lenin 1917. p. 24.
102Serge invoked Lenin to attack both the German Party and 
the Comintern for the pre-planned insurrection, which was 
artificially imposed on a working class with an inadequate and 
insufficient revolutionary leadership.
103Ibid., p. 60. The Spanish text reads: "La insurreccion
debe apoyarse en el punto de inflexion de la revolucion 
creciente, en el momento en que la actividad de las masas 
alcanza su mas alto grado, en que tambien las dudas en las 
filas enemigas alcanza el suyo..."
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Serge on Soviet cultural trends and the role of literature in 
revolution
As was to be the case throughout Serge's life in periods 
of proscription of political activity, imprisonment, or in 
this case, political censorship due to Party discipline, Serge 
shifted his attention to literary questions, or wrote novels. 
Serge was first and foremost a political animal, and it was 
only when he couldn't participate politically that he turned 
to literary activity. The Vienna period was one of watching 
and waiting, as the real center of political activity was 
raging within the Soviet Party itself. Serge did not take 
part in Austrian political life. His attention returned to 
literature again after 1928, when he was expelled from the 
Bolshevik Party and was later imprisoned. This time however, 
Serge broadened his literary activity, becoming a novelist 
himself.
Serge's articles on Russian cultural and artistic life, 
which were published in Clarte and La Correspondance 
Internationale mark his entry into the field of literary 
criticism, to which he would return in 1932, when he published 
a little book called Litterature et Revolution.
Serge wrote some 25 articles in the period 1922-1926 
which chronicle culture in the Soviet Union. He profiled the 
leading Soviet artists, and by way of their work, discussed 
the trends and conditions of culture in post-revolution Soviet 
society. These articles document Serge's impressions and 
analyses of the brief cultural renaissance during the Civil 
War and under NEP. Serge was no stranger to the Soviet 
literary scene, although he hadn't yet become a novelist. It 
will be recalled that Serge had associated with literary 
artists during the Civil War and had belonged to the Volfila 
group.104 Serge had kept up with their work, and their fate. 
He noted many of their suicides in the post 1925 period.
104See Chapter 2 infra, p. 96.
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Serge had not only interpreted the works of these early Soviet 
artists for the French reading public, he also translated some
105of their works: Andre Biely's "Christ est ressuscite" and 
Gladkov's Le Ciment.
Although Serge was a convinced Bolshevik, he was not in 
the least dogmatic. He associated with Christian and symbolist 
writers, and certainly did not think that only revolutionary 
writers should be regarded. Serge appreciated creative 
genius, whether it was revolutionary or reactionary, 
materialist or mystic. He placed writers and artists in a 
special category and put the rights of artistic self- 
expression above politics and the political struggle 
itself.106
In his chronicle of literary trends in the Soviet Union, 
Serge traced the continuity of pre-revolution literary 
traditions in the current cultural scene. He examined the 
role of literature in the revolution and vice versa. In an
107article called "Les Ecrivains russes et la Revolution"
Serge discussed the revolutionary content of the "metaphysical
108anguish and mystical resurrection" of Chekhov, Gorky,
Korolenko and others and the importance of maintaining their
revolutionary idealism. The ending of capitalist exploitation
for Serge was never simply an end in itself, but only the
means by which creative expression could blossom and flower.
It was a necessary beginning. Serge wrote,
" ...les revolutionnaires ont besoin de la 
comprendre et de 1'aimer. Car la question qu'elle
105A. Biely, "Christ est ressuscite," Clarte, No. 27, 
1923, p. 77, translator Victor Serge.
105Richard Greeman, op cit, pp. 310-314, discusses Serge's 
appreciation of Biely, Gumilev and Blok, and his struggle for 
the preservation of their artistic rights.
107
Published in Clarte, 1922, pp. 387-390.
108Greeman, op. cit.. p. 320.
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pose denote l'eternelle insatisfaction, la 
repugnance du bonheur mediocre, 1'aspiration a 
sortir du cycle de la vie vegetative ou purement 
animale de tant d'esclaves et de tant de maitres, 
pour monter enfin a la vie humaine dont la 
justification ne peut evidemment resider que dans 
des affirmations d'energies superieures qui sont 
1'amour, 1'intelligence et la volonte
creatrices.109
The revolution was to be measured in human, spiritual and 
cultural terms as well as economic ones, and artists would be 
evaluated by their ability to insert themselves and their art 
within the context of the revolution. Having defined his 
position on art and revolution, Serge then examined the 
novelists and poets. He wrote that Mayakovsky had created a 
unique revolutionary work with his poem "150,000,000" which 
was new in both form and content. Serge lauded Mayakovsky, 
the futurist, and the Christian poets, leaving the least 
praise for the Communist poets. He finished by discussing the 
limits of "proletcult, "110 anticipating the literary debates 
that seem to surface in every revolution on whether or not a 
proletarian culture could exist. This was hotly debated *in 
the late 20s and early 30s in the Soviet Union, ending with 
the choking of creativity under Stalin and the birth of Soviet 
socialist realism.
Serge wrote a series for Clarte on the "Vie 
Intellectuelle en Russie des Soviets" in which he first 
described Russian cultural conditions and trends, and then 
took up the question of 'revolutionary culture'. Serge wrote
109 •"Les Ecnvams russes et la Revolution," Clarte, 1922,
p. 388.
110The proletcults had emerged at the height of the Civil 
War years of 1918-1921, battling for a proletarian culture, 
founding circles in small towns, covering city walls with 
posters, putting on plays, producing poets, setting up 
courses, elaborating theories, and founding an international 
committee. See Victor Serge, "Is a Proletarian Literature 
Possible," a translation of Clarte. no. 12, March 1, 1925, in 
Yale French Studies, p. 137.
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that the weight of the older, pre-revolutionary artists and 
their ideas still dominated the newer revolutionary artists, 
struggling to establish new movements. A parallel existed 
between the new revolutionary artists and the new nationalized 
industries, both struggling against older established ways. 
The new artists had absorbed the dynamism of the revolution, 
but were impressionable and unformed. Serge did not consider 
these artists revolutionary yet, because they hadn't developed 
an "architecture of ideas" about the revolution, and although 
they were imbued with the creative energy unleashed by the 
revolution, their understanding of the revolutionary process 
lacked depth. "Ils en ont fort bien observe les petits 
aspects: ils n'en ont pas penetre la loi profonde. "111
These writers were in fact closer to populism than to 
proletarian culture; they spoke of 'the people,' an imprecise 
term more used by liberals and populists than revolutionary 
Marxists. Serge explained that the revolutionary Marxist 
intellectuals had been too busy to write fiction, and those 
who wrote showed the influence of NEP. Writers did not stand
4
above society and its movement; they developed with the 
revolution and its stresses and strains.112 There was no 
time to have developed a proletarian culture in the space of 
a few short years, especially when considered against the time 
it had taken to generate bourgeois culture. Within this 
theoretical framework, Serge turned his attention to 
individual writers,including Pilniak, Libedinsky, Ivanov, 
Tikhonov, Serafimovich, and Mayakovsky.113
111 "La Nouvel ecrivain et la Nouvelle litterature," 
Clarte. 1923, pp. 160. —
112—. . .Ibid.
113 These writers were profiled in Clarte. nos. 36, 1923, 
("Boris Pilniak"), Vol. 1923, ("La Semaine" de I. 
Lebedinsky"), no. 56, 1924, ("Vsevolod Ivanov,") and No. 74, 
1925, ("La Litterature epique de la Revolution: N. Tikhonov
et Serafimovitch,").
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Serge's examination of Mayakovsky celebrated the young 
futurist poet's form and style, and the vigor brought to it by
114the Bolshevik revolution. But according to Greeman,
115Serge's critique of Mayakovsky is the critique of a 
classicist —  according to Serge, the poet lacked equilibrium, 
he used too much hyperbole, and was excessively 
individualistic, too iconoclastic, and futuristic only in a 
superficial way. Mayakovsky was still influenced by the 
decadence of pre-revolutionary poetry, and had not succeeded 
in expressing his individuality without depending on old 
myths. Serge said Walt Whitman had succeeded lyrically where 
Mayakovsky failed. Serge decided Mayakovsky had the stamp of 
the old in him, but insisted it could be nothing else since 
the new culture could not be created overnight, but would come 
only after creative individuals had assimilated the 
consciousness, belief patterns and ideology of the new 
society.116 Serge concluded that rigorous Marxist criticism 
of culture must develop with total freedom for artistic 
expression, to support the conditions necessary for the 
germination of a new culture in this transition period.
In the penultimate article Serge wrote in the Clarte 
series, ""Une Litterature proletarienne est-elle possible?" 
Serge discussed some of the new literary groups and their
114Richard Greeman, op. cit.. p. 334.
115Victor Serge, "Mayakovsky, " Clarte, Vol. 1924, 504-508.
116Mayakovsky was very annoyed by Serge's Clarte article, 
asking him, "Why do you say that my futurism is no more than 
Past-ism?" Serge answered, "Because your hyperboles and 
shouts, and even your boldest images, are all saturated with 
the past in its most wearisome aspects. And you write ' In 
men's souls / Vapor and electricity....' Do you really think 
that's good enough? Surely this is materialism of a 
peculiarly antiquated variety?" Serge said they parted 
cordially but Mayakovsky became so official that Serge never 
met him again and most of the friends he had in his youth also 
dropped him. Memoirs, p. 267-268.
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journals. He considered Na postu the best and most 
characteristic example of the new reviews: it was rigorous yet 
easy to read, clear and consistent ideologically/ a journal of 
"demolition and savage attack" as well as of criticism. 
Citing examples of its criticism and style. Serge quoted 
Sosnovsky who had attacked Gorky's bitterness and defense of 
old intellectuals as "the ex-falcon turned hedgehog." The 
review criticized Voloshin, ("the poetic counterrevolution"), 
Pilniak, Ehrenburg and Nikitin as calumniators of the 
Revolution. The State library directors were criticized for 
clumsy editing, Kollantai for her books on free love; even 
Lunarcharsky's theater came under fire, as did Mayakovsky's 
claims of a proletarian Futurism. Serge said the 'mutual 
attacks by Bolsheviks' were a joy to read.117 The review 
had problems too, especially when at the Moscow Association of 
Proletarian writers meeting in 1923 it demanded that the Party 
undertake "the rational and tactical leadership in art."118
Nikolai Bukharin entered the debate with the most 
sensible answers, wrote Serge, proposing that since the 
country was 95% peasant, the literature should be peasant, and 
above all, should not be restricted, nor regulated by the 
State. Proletarian writers had to "win literary authority for 
themselves" by freely competing with other creative
119movements. Bukharin was the only Politburo sponsor of the 
idea of a separate proletarian culture, but vigorously opposed 
"methods of mechanical coercion" in achieving the new 
literature. Writers organizations should not be modeled on the
117Victor Serge, "Is a proletarian literature possible?" 
translated from Clarte 12, March 1, 1925, and published in 
Yale French Studies. 1967, p. 138-139.
lleIbid. . p. 140.
119Krasnaia nov', No. 4, 1925, pp. 271-2, quoted in
Stephen Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, Oxford 
University Press, 1973, p. 205.
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Party or Army and only a multiplicity of writers organizations
would allow artists the wide latitude they needed for artistic
creation. Bukharin declared, "Let there be 1000
organizations, 2000 organizations; let there be alongside MAPP
120and VAPP as many circles and organizations as you like." 
The literary dispute did not yet relate to the political 
tensions and divisions within the Party.
Serge criticized the boring works of gifted young writers 
who were so "theory-obsessed" and "hamstrung by their 
preconceptions" that their literature failed altogether. 
Serge attacked the Association of Proletarian Writers for 
asking writers to "not imitate bourgeois art forms, but to 
surpass them to create new forms" and to write only monumental 
works on proletarian life. These pronouncements lacked 
insight and a grounding in concrete reality. Serge asked, how 
could a young writer from a workshop surpass the expertise of 
bourgeois art methods?121
Serge based his ideas on Trotsky's Literature and 
Revolution. (Serge called Trotsky's work "definitive"122) in 
which Trotsky denied that a proletarian literature could 
exist; the new culture would be universal, not proletarian, 
since the proletarian dictatorship would give birth to a 
classless society. During the transition period of the 
proletarian dictatorship, there wouldn't be time for a genuine 
culture to develop, since the conditions for the development 
of intellectual culture —  normal production, high technology, 
well-being, leisure and time —  would be more appropriate to 
the communist society that would supplant the proletarian 
dictatorship. Even the term "proletarian culture' could be
120Cohen, Ibid.
121Serge, "Is a Proletarian Literature possible," p. 142-
3.
122 -Serge, Clarte 12, March 1, 1925, p.144. (English
translation)
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dangerous, since it anticipated future culture within the 
framework of the present. Serge concluded that the state of 
culture mirrored the crossroads of the revolution, and its 
future was intimately connected to the future of the 
revolution. Serge's analysis of culture (as of politics in 
general) was deeply influenced by Trotsky, who provided the 
theoretical germ.
Serge put aside the question of culture when he returned 
to the Soviet Union to stand with the Left Opposition, but 
returned again to these questions after his arrest and 
expulsion. Many of the ideas he had expressed when criticizing 
or admiring other Russian writers, ideas about style and 
structure, were incorporated into his own novels, which were 
ideological at their core. Greeman asserts that Serge owed a 
literary debt to the Russian writers of the 1923 period, and 
was able both to continue their traditions and surpass 
them.123
2.10 Serge and the Left Opposition
Critical of the use of terror, the bureaucratization of 
the Party and the State, the growing privileges which distanced 
the bureaucracy from the population and the aims of the 
revolution, the Left Opposition of Trotsky and others 
identified the bureaucracy as rooted in the new conditions of 
Soviet rule. Given that the original revolutionary working 
class had been largely decimated by Civil War and foreign 
intervention and the new working class was drawn mostly from 
a semi-literate peasantry, the Left Opposition argued that it 
was necessary for the Soviet state to promote an early and 
gradual industrialization as a precondition for the 
regeneration of class consciousness of the newly formed 
proletariat, with just one foot out of the countryside.
123Greeman, op. cit.. p. 342-3.
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Industrial expansion would ensure that an increasing 
portion of the population would be grouped around collective 
production relations, which would serve to generate a 
proletarian consciousness amongst the mass of the population, 
as opposed to the petty-bourgeois consciousness of the 
peasantry.124 As the working class grew, the bureaucracy 
would need to cede to it increasing control over the political 
administration of the society. The logic of this position 
also pointed to a dilemma which was not addressed: given the 
inevitable rise of bureaucracy in the terrible conditions in 
Russia, the new bureaucracy would be called upon to reform 
itself, to carry out policies which would lead to its own loss 
of power in favor of the new working class it was being called
125upon to create. Theoretically the new working class would 
serve as a check against bureaucratic excesses and anti­
democratic measures.
Serge was anxious about the growth of the rich peasant and 
the self-serving bureaucrat and about the weakness of industry 
under NEP (New Economic Policy) conditions;126 a crisis was 
developing that demanded immediate attention. Without the 
hoped for success of the world socialist revolution, the 
Soviet Union would be forced to industrialize on its own.
Preobrazhensky, the economist of the Left Opposition, 
argued that the 'primitive socialist accumulation' had to come 
from the private peasant sector, but had to result from a 
reciprocal relationship; higher productivity in industry would 
provide goods for the peasants, and an increase in 
agricultural production would only be possible with a 
revolution in technique (mechanization), and more farm
124See Evgenii Preobrazhensky, 0 Morali. quoted in 
Filtzer, op cit.. p. 18, 276n.
125See Filtzer, Ibid., pp. 18-19.
126Serge, From Lenin to Stalin, pp. 40-42.
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machinery required higher productivity from the working class. 
In the end, the Left Opposition argued the problem could only 
be solved by material assistance from victorious revolutions 
in the advanced capitalist countries. They were doomed.
Bukharin came up with the opposite program, developing 
Stalin's notion of 'socialism in one country': increased
incentives (opportunity for profit) for the peasant to 
stimulate growth. Stalin, (the center) was jealous of 
Trotsky's potential influence and wanted to undermine his 
authority; so he supported Bukharin's program largely as a way 
to weaken Trotsky's political influence. Consequently, the 
critical need for industrial accumulation was postponed while 
NEP proceeded apace. The political and economic situation 
hurtled toward disaster as the deteriorating crisis met 
continued neglect.
During the period 1923-26, Stalin, in charge of Party 
organization, packed the Party bureaus with people loyal to 
him (for which they were well compensated127), predetermining 
the outcome of Party debates. Thus, to find an audience for
i
his alternative political program, Trotsky would have had to 
go outside the party, something he was not prepared to do.
Serge joined the Left Opposition in 1923-1924 while in 
Vienna. He wrote that Trotsky's works, The New Course and The 
Lessons of October stood as "flashes of daylight" in the 
"spiritual impoverishment of recent years."128 Serge met 
discreetly with other Oppositionists in Vienna to discuss 
these "pulsating pages."
"Then, bound by discipline, prisoners to our daily 
bread, we went on endlessly printing our news- 
sheets, with the same insipid, nauseating 




true. Was it really worth while being
revolutionaries if we had to ply this trade?" 129
The jargon filling the pages of the International's
publications —  Serge said the Oppositionists called it
'Agitprop Pidgin'-- the stifling air of monolithism and '300%
approval' made life difficult for Serge. He refused to carry
out a dishonest directive from Bela Kun dealing with the
French Party. Monatte, Rosmer and Souvarine were being
hounded out of the French Party for showing political courage
in criticizing Stalin. Everything Serge observed strengthened
his view that the Comintern was going rotten from within, and
the only way to save it was to go back to Russia, to fight for
the regeneration of the Bolshevik Party. Serge could have
remained in Europe in relative comfort; but his revolutionary
spirit compelled him to return to the Soviet Union, to fight
against the corruption of the Party in the front ranks of the
Left Opposition. Lukacs had told him
"...don't be silly and get yourself deported for 
nothing, just for the pleasure of voting defiantly. 
Believe me, insults are not very important to us. 
Marxist revolutionaries need patience and courage; 
they do not need pride. The times are bad, and we 
are at a dark cross-roads. Let us reserve our 
strength: history will summon us in its time."130
Serge did not heed Lukacs warning.131 Instead, he told
Lukacs if Moscow and Leningrad proved to be unbearable, he
would ask for an assignment in Siberia, where he would "write
129Ibid. p. 191.
130Ibid. . p. 192.
13JLukacs, on the other hand, fell into disfavor over his 
book History and Class Consciousness, and was expelled from 
the Party. He later recanted, followed Stalin through the 
worst years, producing 'spiritless works.' He was 'summoned 
by history' again in 1956, this time to oppose Soviet tanks 
invading his native Hungary, where he was now Minister of 
Culture. He was deported to Rumania, but later was allowed to 
return to Hungary.
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the books now maturing in my head and wait for better 
days."132
132Serge, Memoirs. p. 192.
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CHAPTER THREE: BACK IN THE USSR —  THE LEFT OPPOSITION
STRUGGLES 1926-1928
3.1 Bolshevism at: an impasse
Serge returned to the USSR to stand with the Left Opposition 
in its battle for the soul of Bolshevism. He arrived in 1925, 
before the 14th Party Congress which broke up the ruling 
Triumvirate of Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev.
Serge had traveled by way of Berlin. Again he was struck by 
contrasts: Berlin had suffered —  it cost a "trillion for a
postage stamp" —  but the city lit up the night sky; Leningrad1 
was dark and depopulated; its inflation and unemployment 
(150,000) were much worse than Berlin's.2 The cost of returning 
to the market revealed itself everywhere: beggars and abandoned
children roamed the streets. Young girls, the daughters of 
"famine and chaos" with nothing but their youth to sell sidled 
up to managers and bureaucrats. A morbid alternative to such 
degradation was evident in the swelling suicide lists Serge 
checked daily as an editor.3 But five years of NEP had ended 
famine, and for those who could afford it, the grocers' displays 
were abundant and sumptuous.
Disturbing incidents pointed to a moral crisis in NEP 
Soviet society, which Serge called a "social inferno." Evoking 
the ugly atmosphere in 1926 of what he called the 'obscure early
1 Petrograd's name was changed to Leningrad after Lenin's 
death. Lenin would never have stood for this during his 
lifetime, although while he was alive Stalin had changed the 
name of Tsartisyn to Stalingrad, Elizvetgrad was changed to 
Zinovievsk, and factories, ships and schools also bore the 
name of Central Committee members. No one dared flatter Lenin 
in this way, he would not have tolerated it. Only with his 
death could Stalin begin first the cult of Lenin, and then his 
own cult. See Boris Souvarine, Stalin, pp. 303-4.
2 Victor Serge, Memoirs, p. 193.
3 Ibid, p. 199.
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stages of a psychosis' which would grow in intensity, Serge 
cited the 'epidemic' of gang-rapes. He tried to explain this in 
terms of conflict between a resurgent sexuality and its 
suppression, first by revolutionary asceticism, then by poverty 
and famine. Soviet youth had neither the inhibitions of 
bourgeois religious training, nor the moral values of the 
revolutionary generation. Theirs was the culture of the 
streets, in which sexual exploitation and promiscuity thrived on 
the misery of the environment.4 In place of the restrictive 
sexual mores of their parents, the notions of the new generation 
were based on the 'oversimplified' theories of Alexandra 
Kollantai, who said "you make love just as you drink a glass of 
water." Serge had posed a serious problem, quoting a discussion 
current among University students (in 1926) about Enchmen's 
theory on the disappearance of morals in the future Communist 
society. Without theorizing on the question, or even offering 
his own ideas, Serge simply lamented, "how difficult is social 
transformation!"5
Serge returned to a country plagued by a mood of surrender
t
to desperation and death —  a calm, gloomy, oppressive 
atmosphere in which the creative and the revolutionaries alike 
were driven to take their own lives. Serge named some of the 
well-known victims, while reminding the reader that Leningrad 
had ten to fifteen suicides per day, mainly among the under- 
30s.6
4 Serge, Memoirs, p.205.
5 Serge, Memoirs, pp. 205-207. Remarkably, Serge has
alluded to the problem which would surface decades later, of 
a spiritual and moral vacuousness endemic in alienated and 
apathetic Soviet youth who lack political, social or religious 
purpose.... Serge understood in 1926 the crisis of ideology 
which would result from the conditions of Soviet rule.
6 Ibid.. p. 199.
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Serge wrote about the suicides of oppositionists such as 
Lutovinov (of the Workers Opposition) in May 1924; of Glazman, 
Trotsky's young secretary; of Evgenia Bogdanovna Bosch, about 
whom he had written in Year One of the Russian Revolution (she 
had been a hero of the Civil War, one of Bolshevism's "greatest 
personalities."7) Her suicide was seen officially as an act of 
indiscipline, a proof of her oppositional politics and 
disloyalty. So she was not given a national funeral nor a burial 
place in the Kremlin wall. Preobrazhensky objected to the mean, 
small-minded treatment of Bosch's memory and remains and he was 
told to "hold his tongue."8
Poets began to kill themselves, a significant phenomenon 
for Serge who saw in these acts a signpost for the revolution, 
no longer able to hold onto its artists —  first Yesinin, later 
Mayakovsky, the two giants of Russian poetry. Yesinin hung 
himself in his hotel room with a suitcase strap, after writing 
his last lines in blood, for lack of ink. Serge, called to his 
room in the Hotel International, said farewell to "our greatest 
lyrical poet ... of the Revolution's singing Bohemians... 30
* g
years old, at his peak of glory, eight times married...."
Serge had returned then, to a Soviet Russia in the throes 
of a crisis very different from the one which racked the country 
he had left four years before. The threat of civil war and 
foreign intervention had given way to a new, internal threat: 
budding class antagonisms wrought by market forces, presided 
over by a single Party in power, and within that Party the 
normal democratic dynamic was being suffocated by bureaucratic 
maneuvering.
7 Ibid., p. 194.
8 Ibid.. p. 195.
9 Ibid.
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3.2 Serge's view of the Bolshevik's monopoly of power: the
revolution self-destructs
Looking back at the NEP period (1921-1928) 20 years later, 
Serge affirmed that the introduction of NEP should have been 
accompanied by a coalition government. Sharing power would have 
been dangerous for the Bolsheviks, but the dangers would have 
likely proved less terrible than those that resulted from the 
monopoly of power.10 In fact, discontent and opposition within 
the Party and working class forced the Central Committee to 
adopt a 'state of siege' stance (albeit mild, especially 
compared to what came later), rather than a policy of 
reconciliation and tolerance towards other socialist elements, 
principally left Mensheviks and anarchists (both of whom 
accepted the Soviet constitution). Having said this, Serge wrote 
that deeper reasons had to be examined for this preservation and 
strengthening of the monopoly of power. After the trauma of 
Kronstadt, the Central Committee was afraid to open the 
political arena to competition from the Mensheviks and Left 
SR's.
More importantly, Serge offered another explanation for the 
Bolsheviks' trusting only themselves in power11: that the
Bolsheviks were committed to world revolution. A coalition 
government in Russia would have weakened the Comintern, whose 
task was to guide and direct the coming revolutions. The role 
of the Russian Party in the Comintern was paramount, for as we 
have seen in the last chapter, Serge considered the European 
revolutionary leaders inferior politically to the Bolsheviks. 
Yet isolated in the Soviet Union, how capable could the
10 Victor Serge, "Trente Ans Apres La Revolution Russe," 
published in La Revolution Proletarienne. Nov. 1947, p. 22. 
This retrospective of Soviet development written on its 
thirtieth birthday, was published in the month of Serge's 
death.
11 Serge often conceded that by this juncture, all the 
revolutionaries were already inside the Bolshevik Party.
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Bolsheviks be in directing the revolutionary leaderships of 
other countries?
Here Serge touched on what he considered the "greatest and 
gravest error of the Party of Lenin and Trotsky" and posed the 
question of whether the Bolsheviks' enthusiasm for European 
revolution was justified. Conceding that a satisfactory answer 
to this question was not possible, he nevertheless maintained it 
needed to be asked and 'delimited.'12 Serge agreed that 
capitalism was finished as a stable force; the Bolsheviks were 
right, he said, to say that if socialism did not replace 
capitalism, another period of barbarism would follow. Writing 
after World War II, Serge surveyed what it had cost humanity to 
have failed to to establish world socialism.
The Bolsheviks had hoped that social transformations would 
take place in Europe through the awakening of the masses, who 
would reorganize society on a rational and equitable basis. 
Their mistake, wrote Serge, was to not see clearly that the 
transformation that was taking place proceeded amidst a 
'terrible confusion of institutions, movements and beliefs'13;
4
the clarity of vision the Bolsheviks possessed was absent in 
Europe. Yet they were right to see the key to their salvation 
in Germany. The German revolution would have saved both Russia 
and Germany. This was not idle speculation, Serge insisted, 
because despite other struggles it may have produced, the German 
revolution would have spared history the 'hellish machinery of 
Hitlerism and Stalinism.'
There is a characteristic tension in Serge's argument here. 
He often brilliantly and perceptively posed essential questions, 
but then failed to resolve them. Often, pointing out a problem 
or a contradiction is all Serge intended, then he moved on. In 
the case of the German revolution, Serge contradicted himself.
12"Trente Ans Apres La Revolution Russe," p. 23.
13 Ibid., p.24.
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The Bolsheviks commit their "gravest error"14 in misjudging the
revolutionary mood of the West European masses; yet they
correctly analyzed the crisis of putrefying capitalism. Serge
agreed with the Bolshevik's analysis, supported their actions,
but criticized them for not being able to foresee the
consequences of their actions.
The Bolshevik's mistake, according to Serge, was to
misinterpreting the political understanding and energy of the
working classes in the West, Germany in particular.15 The
Bolsheviks' militant idealism, Serge wrote, caused them to miss
connecting with the working classes in the West. As a result
the Comintern remained a creature of the Soviet Party-State.
John Reed's struggle with Zinoviev was a case in point. Serge
maintained that this delusion helped create the 'fallacious
doctrine' of socialism in one country. Further the tactics of
the Stalinized Comintern facilitated the triumph of Nazism in
Germany. Serge's criticism never implied that the Russian and
German parties should not have undertaken the struggle:
"In fighting for revolution the German Spartacist, the 
Russian Bolsheviks, and all their worldwide comrades 
were struggling to prevent the global cataclysm which 
we have just lived through. They understood what was 
approaching. They were moved by a great will to 
liberation. Anyone who ever rubbed shoulders with 
them will never forget it. Few men in history have
14 Although Serge uses the superlative, he elsewhere 
proclaims their most "incomprehensible error" the 
establishment of the Cheka; the handling of the Kronstadt 
rebellion was for Serge the culmination of the "errors and 
mistakes of power." "Trente Ans Apres..." p. 18, and -p. 23.
15 •The mistake of the West European working classes was 
far more grave: they refused to support the struggle, believed 
in the return of the social progress of prewar days; were 
afraid of risks and allowed themselves to be fed with 
illusions; and allowed themselves to be led by mediocre 
leaders who feared revolution. See Serge, "Trente Ans 
Apres..." p. 26.
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ever been so devoted to the cause of men as a whole.16
3.3 Inside the Bolshevik Party
Stalin had successfully begun concentrating organizational 
power in his hands in 1922, when he became General Secretary, at 
the time considered a relatively unimportant administrative 
post. He became known as "Comrade Card Index" (Tovarishch 
Kartotekov)17, the man in charge of assembling, reorganizing and 
classifying personnel files. Stalin paid close attention to 
organizational details, always to his own advantage. This 
'administrative' post gave Stalin the opportunity to accumulate 
Power by placing people loyal to him in key positions throughout 
the apparatus. As Serge put it, Stalin had long been boring from 
within; his "tireless activity consisted in placing his 
creatures everywhere. His political flair lay in translating 
with great practical skill the aspirations of the parvenus of 
the revolution."18 He carefully prepared the 14 th Party 
Congress which ousted Zinoviev and Kamenev; Serge wrote in his 
biography of Stalin that Zinoviev and Kamenev had lost power 
without realizing it. The Party had ceased voting and 
discussing sometime ago; its role had shrunk to approving the 
secretaries designated by the Central Committee, (in reality, by
16 Ibid. p. 25.
17 Cited in Geoffrey Hosking, The First Socialist Society: 
A History of the Soviet Union From Within. Harvard University 
Press, 1985, p. 140.
18 Serge, Russia Twenty Years After, p. 153. Today, as 
documents from the twenties are beginning to be examined, we 
find Serge to have been on the right track. In an article in 
Arcrumenti i Fakti. No. 27, 1990 Alexander Podshchekoldin, who 
has had access to the Archives of the CPSU, shows how Stalin 
was able, in the first nine months of his job as Gensec, to 
buy the loyalty of Party functionaries through granting them 
wide pay differentials and extravagant privileges.
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Stalin.)19 Souvarine called this process, which took five
20years, Stalin's "molecular coup d'etat."
In contrast to Stalin's attention to detail, Trotsky, 
although described by Lenin as a zealous administrator, 
concerned himself with policy and theory. Lenin had called him 
the most "capable' man on the Central Committee. Echoing Lenin, 
Serge stated that only Trotsky had the necessary stature to lead 
the Party. Serge considered Trotsky the "most lucid of the 
inheritors of the 'heroic times'"21 armed with a program which 
in Serge's view, correctly addressed the key problems facing the 
young Soviet state. But Trotsky, a latecomer to the Bolsheviks 
with a Menshevik past, didn't belong to the old 'coterie' of 
Bolshevik militants who had been in the Party since 1903, and 
was unacceptable to them.
As Lenin fell gravely ill, a struggle broke out over who 
would 'succeed' him. On his death bed, Lenin proposed an 
alliance with Trotsky. His last letter called for Stalin's
19 Serge, Retrato de Stalin, p. 71.
20 Serge, Twenty Years After, p. 154, and Souvarine, 
Stalin, chapters VIII and IX. Serge read Souvarine very 
closely, and obviously agreed with most of his formulations. 
His own work is peppered with quotations from Souvarine. (He 
sometimes disagreed with Souvarine, taking him to task in long 
footnotes, such as on page 162 in Russia Twenty Years After. 
Here Serge criticizes Souvarine's easy characterization of the 
Opposition's defeat as the result of its own mistakes. Serge 
remonstrates against Souvarine for accusing the Oppositionists 
of a lack of practical sense. Says Serges "the practical 
sense of revolutionists who deem it necessary to fling 
themselves under the chariot wheels because it is in the 
higher interests of the proletariat, is just as different from 
that of the parvenus to whom the morrows of the great defeats 
of the working class offer invaluable opportunities for^-better 
installing themselves in power. Souvarine ought to know this, 
after all, for he, too, was a 'doctrinary' vanquished by the 
'empiricists' because of his devotion to the International of 
the great years, (p. 162n)
21 Victor Serge, "Trente Ans Pres la Revolution Russe," 
p. 27. Serge always distinguished the civil war revolutionary 
generation of Bolsheviks from the 'parvenus' who followed.
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removal.22 Lenin's 'Testament', as it became known, showed that 
Lenin had been preoccupied in his last months with the growth of 
bureaucratism. Serge quoted Souvarine, who said that the
dictatorship of the proletariat was being replaced by the 
dictatorship of the secretariat.23
Lenin had also feared a split in the Party. Souvarine 
thought Lenin's attitude much more ambivalent than Trotsky's 
version in Mv Life, often cited by Serge. Souvarine believed 
Lenin was so worried about a split that he sought to
counterbalance Stalin and Trotsky with each other. Despite 
Lenin's concern, within a year of his death, the Party divided 
into Left, Center and Right tendencies, holding opposed 
perspectives on industrialization, collectivization,24 the 
bureaucratization, and 'permanent revolution' versus 'socialism 
in one country.'
During the last year of Lenin's illness and the year 
following his death (1923-24), Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin 
teamed up in a vicious campaign against Trotsky and the Left
Opposition. At the 13th Party Conference in January 1924, the
first of a long line of completely stage-managed gatherings25,
22 See Trotsky, Mv Life, p.
23 See Boris Souvarine, Stalin, pp. 432, and all of 
chapter IX.
24 The differences were over the tempo and pace of 
industrialization, and how to finance the process.
25 Robert Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution, p.
233.
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the triumvers denounced Trotsky and the Forty Six26 as guilty of 
a "petty bourgeois deviation from Leninism."27
3.4 The Troika and the anti-Trotsky campaign
As we have just seen, once Lenin was too ill to participate
actively in Party life-, the 'old' party members, who had
vacillated on the October revolution —  Zinoviev, Kamenev,
Bukharin and Stalin —  began to organize against Trotsky.
Rewriting history and attacking Trotksy's independence from the
Bolshevik Party before 1917, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin formed
the Triumvirate, or Troika, which effectively ruled the Party
28and campaigned against Trotsky and Trotskyism. The aim was to 
prevent Trotsky from garnering a majority in the Party and
29replacing Lenin. The troika began a campaign of lies to
attack Trotsky. They used the press to promulgate anti-Trotsky 
slanders, but libraries were also supplied with what Serge 
called 'dishonest books.' Kamenev (Trotsky's brother-in-law) 
had the distasteful job of directing this falsification of 
history and ideas, and later spoke to Trotsky about it "with 
unrestrained cynicism."30 In this same period (throughout 1924) 
the Comintern became a monolith, and the international sections
26 The "Platform of the 46," a document signed by 46 
Bolsheviks including Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Breslav and 
others, was an anti-bureaucratic paper which criticized the 
"ever increasing, and now scarcely concealed, division of the 
party between a secretarial hierarchy and the 'quiet folk', 
between professional party officials recruited from above and 
the general mass of the party which does not participate in 
the common life." The entire Platform of the 46 is published 
in E.H. Carr, Interregnum. pp. 374-80.
27 Deutscher, Vol. 2, p. 132. —
28 Trotksy called the Troika's anti-Trotsky campaign "a 
fight against the ideological legacy of Lenin." Mv Life, p. 
508.
29 Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, p. 75-77.
30 Serge, Russia Twenty Years After, p. 153.
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were instructed to condemn Trotskyism. Those who dared oppose 
of even question the line were expelled. The French Party 
eliminated Rosmer, Souvarine31 and Monatte at this time. This 
was called the 'Bolshevization' of the Comintern.32
The Troika feared Trotsky as the most capable 
revolutionary leader of the masses. (Trotsky had been a mass 
leader in October, while Lenin had led the Party) . Trotsky had 
organized the military victory in the civil war. He was a 
magnificent orator and brilliant theoretician, a man full of 
self confidence. From both a psychological and social point of 
view, Trotsky was ill-suited to the struggle for the apparatus. 
Superior in character, as well as theoretically and politically, 
to other members of the new ruling group33, Trotsky had no taste 
for gossip, intrigue, slander or treachery. His presence made 
others uncomfortable.34 He was a "revolutionary to his bones35"
31 Souvarine was expelled for translating and publishing 
Trotsky's New Course.
32 The "Bolshevization' of the parties of the Communist 
International was the theses of Bela Kun at the fifth congress 
of the International in June 1924 Zinoviev saw the Comintern 
as the 'single world party.' Ruth Fischer, now the leader of 
the German party, echoed Zinoviev, calling for a monolithic 
International. The parties imitated the internal structure 
of the Bolshevik Party, banishing dissent, demanding 100% 
approval of the Leaders' positions. Serge called it the 
perfection of the bureaucratic machine. See Russia Twenty 
Years After. pp. 153-154. See also Deutscher, The Prophet 
Unarmed, pp. 146-147, and Theses and Resolutions of the 
Communist International.
33 Referring here not to Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamenev 
with whom Trotsky could engage in theoretical debate,-but to 
Stalin's cohorts Kalinin, Voroshilov, and like 'mediocrities. '
34 Trotsky explained that he didn't partake in social 
'amusements' with other members of the leading stratum, in 
order to avoid boredom; moreover, when he did appear, group 
conversations would stop, and those in conversation would look 
either bitterly or shamefacedly toward Trotsky. Mv Life, p. 
525.
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whose concern was class struggle, both national and global. He 
measured human personality on "the Marx scale,"36 that is, he 
judged men by their capabilities in serving the demands of 
historical necessity.
Trotsky remained silent during the campaign against 
Trotskyism. He came down with a fever of unknown origin that 
kept him in bed and out of the struggle. Trotsky confessed that 
it was then that he realized, "with absolute clarity the problem 
of the Thermidor —  with, I might even say, a sort of physical 
conviction."37 Lying in bed, Trotsky analyzed the historical 
curve of development which created such a large demand for 
slander, and which allowed such a degradation of the theoretical 
level of argument.
This was the political atmosphere in Moscow and Leningrad to 
which Serge returned from his years abroad. He described the 
Party as in a state of slumber. The universities had been 
purged, the public was apathetic, and youth had turned in on 
itself. Trotsky wrote on cultural questions, but refrained from 
activity. Although the situation was bad enough, Serge wrote 
that the Oppositionists remained optimistic. Their optimism was 
based on their conviction of the correctness of their ideas, 
rather than on the actual state of their struggle. Trotsky 
published a series of articles that became Towards Capitalism or 
Socialism (published in 1926) which affirmed that they were on 
the way towards socialism, and that a private sector should be 
maintained around the nationalized factories. Serge discussed 
Trotsky's ideas in a series of articles in La Vie Ouvriere.38
35 The phrase is Sieva Volkov's (Trotsky's grandson). 
Private conversation, Mexico City, May 1987.
36 Trotsky, Mv Life, p.532.
37 Trotsky, Mv Life, p. 534.
38 Serge, Memoirs, p. 209.
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Serge recalled a directive brought to him by Victor Eltsin 
from "the old Man" (Trotsky) which said: "for the moment we
must not act at all: no showing ourselves in public but keep our 
contacts, preserve our cadres of 1923, and wait for Zinoviev to 
exhaust himself...."39 Serge interpreted this to mean activity 
would be reduced to literary activity and studying, to keep up 
morale. The Opposition for the moment remained under Party 
discipline and kept their political and organizational activity 
to a minimum. Their theoretical output in this period, however, 
was prodigious.
The waiting period was fraught with difficulties for the 
militants of the Left Opposition circles. We will return to 
these difficulties in the discussion of Serge's activities in 
Leningrad. Trotsky laid low and refused to go outside the Party 
to fight. Limiting the attempt to spread Oppositionist ideas to 
within the Party meant the fight was hopeless —  Stalin had 
packed the party with his loyal mediocrities who shouted down 
the Oppositionists.
Once the triumvers had defeated Trotsky and removed him 
from the Commissariat of War, the bonds of their solidarity 
snapped.40 A year of growing political divergences within the 
Politburo ensued, accompanied by petty maneuvering between 
Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin. The Leningrad and 
Moscow organizations of the Party were in conflict; Zinoviev 
headed the Leningrad organization, while Stalin was in control 
in Moscow. Zinoviev denounced the kulak danger and the 
bureaucratic regime, which he himself created.41 But it wasn't
39 Ibid.
40 Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, p. 241.
41 Panait Istrati, Soviets 1929. Les Editions Rieder, 
Paris, 1929, p. 115. This book was actually written by Serge. 
His authorship has been cited in several sources, among them 
in the introduction to the first volume of Istrati's trilogy 
Vers 1'autre flamme. republished in France in 1980 with an
(continued...)
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until April 1925 that political differences were to emerge 
within the Triumvers. Zinoviev was opposed to 'socialism in one 
country' and entered into conflict with both Stalin and 
Bukharin. Throughout the summer of 1925, the dissension was kept 
out of view. Zinoviev and the Leningrad organization attacked 
Bukharin and Rykov, which Deutscher said inadvertently helped 
Stalin to consolidate his position at the helm.42 The Troika 
of Stalin-Zinoviev-Kamenev broke up at the 14th Party Congress 
in December 1925. The 14th Party Congress brought the conflict 
into the open; for the Opposition, it ended the period of laying 
low and waiting. Zinoviev and Kamenev, maneuvered out of power 
at the Congress, were now on the side of the Opposition. 
Bureaucrats of the worst order themselves, Zinoviev and Kamenev 
now attacked bureaucracy, and in 1926, joined with Trotsky 
forming the United Opposition to Stalin.
•k * *
With hindsight it is easy to say that an open fight should 
have been waged in the period 23-25, and the question naturally 
arises: why did Trotsky choose to remain within the Party? Why 
did he not take the battle to the mass of workers? Trotsky 
probably could have staged a successful coup early in the 
conflict. He had widespread support among the masses and in the 
army. But he was opposed to palace coups. What would such a 
'victory' have meant?
Trotsky also still believed that the Party, even though now 
degenerated, was "the only historic instrument which the working
41 (.. .continued)
introduction by Marcel Mermoz, by the Fondation Panait 
Istrati, Union Generale D'Editions, Paris, pp. 29-30. The 
second volume of the trilogy was Soviets 1929 and the third 
was penned by Boris Souvarine, although published as written 
by Istrati.
42 Ibid. . p. 242.
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class possessed for the solution of its fundamental tasks."43 
Trotsky evidently believed that if there were even a remote 
possibility of internal rectification in the Party, it had to be 
tried. Serge agreed that failing to struggle against the 
bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet regime would have meant 
a further demoralization in the international labor movement.44 
But Trotsky confined his terrain of battle to the Party, where 
he least stood a chance of victory.45
Confining the battle to the Party ranks left the masses of 
workers with no arena for activity as a class. Why didn't the 
Opposition campaign for a genuine revival of the Soviets? 
Caught in the dilemma of trying to promote democracy while 
remaining loyal to an organization that prohibited opposition, 
the Left Opposition undermined its own struggle. Trotsky did 
not stand a chance within the Party, even though, as Serge said, 
he alone had the stature to succeed Lenin. How could Trotsky 
hope to win over the bureaucrats he was attacking in the new 
course? Moreover the weariness of the masses left them passive; 
the Party filled with self-serving mediocrities, had no 
vitality. Under these conditions, exacerbated by the failure of 
the world revolution, the struggle was practically doomed from 
the outset.
In fact Serge's post-mortem on Soviet democracy was that it 
had been killed long before, by Civil War, War Communism, 
Kronstadt, and the dilution of the Party —  recruiting without 
training, taking in the 'profiteers,' adventurers, and 'petty
43 Trotsky's declaration at the Thirteenth Party Congress, 
1924. Quoted in Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, p. 161.
44 Serge, Russia Twenty Years After, pp. 155-156.
45Moreover, Anton Ciliga maintained Trotsky was more 
popular than Stalin in the country at large, and that all he 
had to do was show himself at the factories in the three major 
cities to ensure his victory. But, Ciliga continued, Trotsky 
wanted to avoid an open break in the Party. Ciliga, The 
Russian Enigma, p. 86.
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parvenus' who supported without question the banning of factions 
and other parties.... Without 'democratic morals or the freedom 
of tendencies' (Trotsky's demands in the New Course) within the 
Party, not much of a fight could be waged.
3.5 Changing composition of Bolshevik Party and the rise of 
bureaucracy
The Lenin levy in the spring of 1924 brought a mass of
inexperienced workers into the Party, strengthening Stalin's
position. Serge wondered what the worth of these communists
could be if they waited until Lenin died to join the Party.46
The quarter-million new recruits (later to be 500,00047), Serge
remarked, changed the party from one of the Vanguard to one of
the Rearguard. He defined this new party as "a mass party of
backward workers led by parvenu bureaucrats."48 How effective
could the Opposition be among these political illiterates? The
Oppositionists were effectively isolated. They were also
organizationally hamstrung, as the ban on factions had been in
effect since 1921. Party patriotism ran deep and the idea of
going over the head of the Party to the masses was not
considered. Serge wrote to his friend Jacques Mesnil, in 1928:
"Basically what is happening —  leaving aside the 
economic roots of the problem...—  boils down to this: 
the elimination of one generation by another. Those 
who made the revolution are removed by those who are 
rising. The new generation did not know the class 
struggle in its clear and direct forms, nor the yoke 
of the old regime. On the contrary, it has been told 
time and again that it was victorious and it ends by 
believing it... .Nor did it go through the civil 
war. . .Everything we went through before, the difficult 
and perilous working out of convictions, the tempering 
of the militant by devotion and individual effort',*' the
45 V. Serge, Russia Twenty Years After, p. 150.
47 Hoskings, op. cit. . p. 143.
48 Serge, Twenty Years After, p. 151.
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courage of being in a minority, scrupulous theoretical 
intelligence, revolutionary lyricism —  all these 
things are alien to it. It is fed an official 
science, it has an oversimplified, avid and practical 
mentality of the parvenu on the make. It naturally 
distorts the clearest ideas as its interests dictate, 
ready to retain the old prestige-labels so long as 
they cover something new. Since heredity weighs down, 
since the country is one of small peasant property, 
since the pressure of the capitalist encirclement is 
enormous —  the attempts to deny it are ludicrous —  
you now have a whole new potential bourgeois ism, 
latent but already pushing upward and even flourishing 
in places, and infinitely skilful in disguises. I am 
intimately acquainted with writers, with 
intellectuals, who are, at bottom, our mortal enemies, 
whose anti-socialist convictions have the firmness of 
rock: their professions are made in Marxian terms,
they remove heretics from editorial staffs... .And they 
understand quite well what they are doing. Their 
whole problem lies in staying on for a few years and
then the game is theirs....... This process has
overtaken the party. Here is the membership 
proportion of a cell that I know well: 400 members,
20 of whom go back to August 1921, and 3 or 4 to 
August 1917. Consequently, 380 against 20 came over 
not to the militant or the painful revolution, but to 
the power, and after the N.E.P. Two elements must be 
discerned there: men of mature age— they deliberately
refrained from joining before the NEP. That's clear 
enough. And the young: they know neither capitalism
nor the civil war and the creator of a Red Army built 
out of nothing has less prestige in their eyes than 
the minister of the hour."49
Serge's analysis of conditions in the party made it plain that
it was being taken over by NEPmen, former bourgeois and
opportunists of every stripe who recognized power and wanted to
be part of it. The Opposition had no hope of winning within
such a Party. Again, why didn't the Opposition take their
program outside the Party?
Serge answered the criticism made of Trotsky^ for not 
resorting to a coup which would probably have been successful 
given his popularity and standing. Quite simply, Serge wrote,
49 - •Victor Serge, letter to Jacques Mesnil, quoted in RTYA, 
pp. 151-152n.
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that would mean "forgetting that socialism and workers'
democracy cannot be born out of pronunciamentos. It is to the
merit of the revolutionist that he refuses to take to this road,
so tempting to all the ambitious."50 Serge also cautioned that
a Marxist must look deeper than whether or why Trotsky did or
didn't fight during this period. The Marxist, wrote Serge,
understood that the socialist revolution which unfolded in
Russia could never be considered apart from the international
labor movement.51 Although by 1923 both the Russian Party and
the International were 'dulled' and 'stiffened at the joints'
the Russian proletariat still hoped boundlessly for a successful
outcome in Germany and actively worked toward that end. The
bureaucratization of the International compromised everything,
wrote Serge52. The bureaucratic conquest in the Soviet Union
could be explained, above all else, he continued, by the defeat
of the workers' revolution in Central Europe.
inally, in relation to the process of bureaucratization,
Serge in 1938 found it necessary to again clarify the situation
in a "Reply to Ciliga" written in Oct. 1938, that is many years
and experiences later:
In reality, a little direct contact with the people 
was enough to get an idea of the drama which, in the 
revolution, separated the communist party (and with it 
the dust of the other revolutionary groups) from the 
masses. At no time did the revolutionary workers form 
more than a trifling percentage of the masses 
themselves. In 1920-21, all that was energetic, 
militant, ever-so-little socialistic in the labor 
population and among the advanced elements of the 
countryside had already been drained by the communist 
party, which did not, for four years of civil war, 
stop its constant mobilization of the willing —  down 
to the most vacillating. Such things came to pass:
50 Serge, Russia Atter Twenty Years, pp. 147-148.
51 Ibid.
52 Here his position, written in 1936, is less nuanced 
than in’1923-1925 and tallies exactly with Trotsky's. Ibid. 
p. 148.
139
a factory numbering a thousand workers, giving as much 
as half its personnel to the various mobilizations of 
the party and ending by working only at low capacity 
with the five hundred left behind for the social 
battle, one hundred of them former shopkeepers .... 
And since, in order to continue the revolution, it is 
necessary to continue the sacrifices, it comes about 
that the party enters into conflict with that rank and 
file. It is not the conflict of the bureaucracy and 
the revolutionary workers, it is the conflict of the 
organization of the revolutionists —  and the backward 
ones, the laggards, the least conscious elements of 
the toiling masses. Under cover of this conflict and 
of the danger, the bureaucracy fortifies itself, no 
doubt. But the healthy resistances that it encounters 
—  I mean those not based upon demoralization or the 
spirit of reaction —  come from within the party and 
the other revolutionary groups. It is within the 
Bolshevik party that a conflict arises in 1920, not 
between the rank and file —  which is itself already 
very backward —  but between the cadres of the active 
militants and the bureaucratic leadership of the 
Central Committee. In 1921, everybody who aspires 
to socialism is inside the party; what remains outside 
isn't worth much for the social transformation. 
Eloquence of chronology: it is the non-party workers
of this epoch, joining the party to the number of 
2,000,000 in 1924, upon the death of Lenin, who assure 
the victory of its bureaucracy. I assure you, Ciliga, 
that these people never thought of the Third 
International. Many of the insurgents of Kronstadt 
did think of it; but they constituted an undeniable 
elite and, duped by their own passion, they opened in 
spite of themselves the doors to a frightful counter­
revolution. The firmness of the Bolshevik party, on 
the other hand, sick as it was, delayed Thermidor by 
five to ten years.53
3.6 The economic roots of the problem and the Issues at stake: 
the debates of the 1920's
The issues which embroiled the Party and the Opposition in 
both political and literary activity revolved around the 
questions of industrialization, internationalism, and 
bureaucracy.
53 Victor Serge, "Reply to Ciliga," New International. 
Feb. 1939, p.54.
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Serge wrote that from 1924-1925 it would have been possible 
to "curb the formation of a rural bourgeoisie without leaving 
the framework of NEP." Failure to do so led to a civil war with 
the peasantry in the form of forced collectivization.54 Had it 
begun at the right time, industrialization would have improved 
relations between town and country. Trotsky advocated such a 
policy. According to Serge, Preobrazhensky, Sokolnikov55 and 
Piatakov took these ideas up numerous times, before they became 
the program of the Opposition.55
The civil war had decimated the working class and in place 
of the fallen workers came semi-literate peasants, without class 
consciousness, without class traditions, and without 
revolutionary consciousness. The surviving working class and 
the newly formed workers labored under conditions remote from
54 Serge, Russia 20 Years After, p. 278-9.
55 Sokolnikov was a leader of the Zinoviev group with 
Kamenev and Krupskaya at the Fourteenth Party Congress. As 
Finance Minister, he espoused 'rightist' economic policies, 
encouraging private enterprise; but he stood with the left on 
the issues of Party democracy, political reform, and the 
struggle against bureaucracy and Stalin's growing power. See 
Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, p. 247; Daniels, The 
Conscience of the Revolution, p. 291, and E.H. Carr, Vol. 6, 
Socialism In One Country, part two, pp. 73-74.
56 Serge, Ibid. Serge's writing here, in the conclusion 
to Russia Twenty Years After, was done hastily to get the book 
out quickly; nevertheless Serge's lumping together of 
Sokolnikov with Preobrazhensky and Piatakov in the context of 
Oppositionist economic policy is highly misleading, and can 
only be considered as historical sloppiness. Sokolnikov 
defined the Soviet state as 'state capitalist,'with the major 
shortcoming of the leadership (apart from its anti-democratic 
and bureaucratic tendencies) was its inability to make the 
system function efficiently. He favored the expansion of 
agricultural production before the expansion of industry —  in 
direct conflict with Preobrazhensky's economic prescriptions 
and coincided with the Opposition on political questions, such 
as bureaucracy and on the need for Party democracy. See fn 28 
above.
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socialist goals: without any say in factor management, and
without power or voice in political decision-making.57
In response to the revolution's isolation, Stalin concocted 
the doctrine of 'socialism in one country' which Bukharin 
developed into a theory. The doctrine emerged from the physical 
and political reality of isolation. Stalin reacted
pragmatically to events, improvising theories to fit 
circumstances and objectives, rather than proceeding from any 
theoretical understanding or overall vision. Socialism in one 
country was a product of pessimism and fantasy: pessimism about
world revolution; and the fantasy that a classless communist 
society could be built in a single, backward and beleaguered 
country, surrounded by the capitalist world market. The idea 
was not entirely new: the utopian socialists and nationalists 
had advocated a similar, isolated socialism. The concept was 
completely alien to Marx and Engels, to Lenin, and even to 
Stalin himself, before he became demoralized with the world 
struggle and power hungry in the domestic one.58
The Opposition argued against Stalin's 'reactionary
59utopia,' instead counterposing to it Marxist economic theory. 
To try to maintain the proletarian revolution within the
See Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist 
Industrialization. pp. 13-15.
58 Stalin was compelled to admit that Marx and Engels 
never entertained the idea, and said the idea was "first 
formulated by Lenin in 1915." This reference to Lenin is 
entirely unfounded, as the overwhelming bulk of his work 
states precisely the opposite, that "For the final victory of 
socialism, for the organization of socialist construction, 
the efforts of one country, particularly of such a peasant 
country as Russia, are insufficient. For this the efforts of 
the proletarians of several advanced countries are necessary." 
Many other similar citations of Lenin's show his understanding 
of the international character of socialism. See Max 
Schachtman, Genesis of Trotskyism: The first Ten Years of the 
Left Opposition. IMG Publications, London, 1973, pp. 18-19.
59 The phrase comes from Trotsky's Permanent Revolution, 
p. ix.
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boundaries of the Soviet Union, the Trotskyists argued, would 
inevitably lead to its succumbing to its own internal and 
external contradictions. Internationalism is not a sentiment, 
but is based on the development of the world economy, which 
becomes increasingly interlinked as it evolves. Trotsky wrote in 
Permanent Revolution, "internationalism is no abstract principle 
but a theoretical and political reflection of the character of 
world economy, of the world development of productive forces, 
and the world scale of the class struggle." The debate between 
the nationalist conception of socialism and socialist 
internationalism was opened in 1925, but assumed greater 
importance in 1927, in the wake of the Chinese revolution. While 
the theoretical debate continued, the crisis in the country 
deepened.
Bukharin's conversion from left communist and 
'proletarianist' to theorist of the right opposition, to a pro­
market, nationalist, socialism in one country, was also based on 
the defeat of world revolution.60 Recognizing that Soviet Russia 
was left with the Russian peasantry, Bukharin turned to them 
with new enthusiasm. But instead of improving conditions, 
Bukharin's policy of encouraging the kulaks to enrich themselves 
meant things were going from bad to worse. "There was talk of 
broadening the rights of inheritance," Serge wrote, and "Stalin 
proposed in a barely veiled form the restoration of landed 
property for the rich peasants.61 There was squalid, 
heartbreaking poverty, an ulcer in our young society, while
60 Bukharin had come a long way from the early Left 
Communist of 1918, and the enthusiastic supporter of War 
Communism in 1919-1920, in which he proclaimed the mode of 
organization under War communism as 'final.' See chapter 1 
infra, p. 73.
61 See E.H.Carr, Vol. 6, Socialism in One Country, pp. , 
and Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, p. 244.
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wealth was arrogant and self-satisfied."62 Serge's anxiety, 
matched by the Left Opposition, while deeply felt, was not based 
on emotion, but on an intellectual appreciation of economic 
truth; the society was becoming bourgeoisified and degraded.
What were the facts? In an article published in Clarte in 
1927, Serge discussed the social structure of the countryside, 
quoting an inquiry done in 1925 by the Communist Academy of the 
Caucuses, the Ukraine, the Urals and the region of
63NovoSizirsk . The study found that the peasantry was thus 
divided: poor peasants (with only a few machines) made up 25-
40% of all families; middle peasants 40-50%, and kulaks, or rich 
peasants, with most of the machinery making up 15-25% of all 
families, not a negligible quantity. Beyond that, the poor 
peasants often cultivated their plots with tools rented from 
kulaks. Moreover the poor and middle peasant together held only 
35-65% of arable land, the rest belonging to the kulak. These 
findings led the Commission of the State Plan to declare "small 
circles of rural capitalists hold a considerable part of the 
wealth in the countryside."64 Still more wealth was held by the 
merchants and traders (NEPmen) who benefitted from the market, 
at the expense of the worker and poor peasant. Serge found even 
more threatening the fact that the "kulak, the merchant, the 
intellectual bourgeois are becoming one, with many links to the 
bureaucracy of the State and the Party ... laying down the basis 
of a duality of powers which menaces the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. " 65
62 Victor Serge, From Lenin to Stalin, p.40.
63 Victor Serge, "Vers L'industrialisation," Part II, 
Clarte XVI-10, 29 Nov. 1927, p.486.
64 Serge, Ibid.
65 Serge, Clarte, p. 488. In this section of Serge's 
article ("Vers L'Industrialisation" pt. II) Serge quotes from 
the Counter-Thesis of the Opposition (counter to the Thesis
(continued...)
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Serge saw the country approaching "a crisis which might 
arouse a hundred and twenty million peasants against the 
socialist power and place it at the mercy of foreign capital by 
forcing it to import (on credit? and under what conditions?) 
great quantities of manufactured goods."66
Both Preobrazhensky and Bukharin sought to increase 
national wealth, but while Bukharin thought this was only 
possible through private accumulation, Preobrazhensky argued in 
his New Economics that 'primitive socialist accumulation, 'must 
be accomplished by taking more out of the private sector than 
was put into it. There was no alternative, given their 
isolation, to hardships and restricted consumption. Had a 
socialist revolution occurred in an advanced capitalist country 
with an industrial base, as Marx envisioned, the problems would 
have been different. Given this situation, there would have to 
be sacrifices, but in Preobrazhensky's view the decision to 
impose hardships would be a conscious one made by the 
proletariat.67
65(.. .continued)
approved by the Central Committee, written by Rykov and 
Krjijanovski) written by Zinoviev, Trotsky, Kamenev, Rakovski, 
Piatakov, Smilga and others, and published in the discussion 
documents of pravda of 17 November.
66 Serge, From Lenin to Stalin, p. 41.
67 Preobrazhensky discussed the difference between what 
he called 'primitive socialist accumulation' and capitalist 
accumulation in the New Economics. Capitalist accumulation 
takes a "ruthless, barbarous, spendthrift attitude to labour 
power, which it attempts to treat like any other purchased 
commodity which forms one of the elements of production.. The 
limits of exploitation and oppression in this sphere are the 
purely physiological limits (the worker has to sleep and eat) 
or else the resistance of the working class." But "from the 
moment of its victory the working class is transformed from 
being merely the object of exploitation into being also the 
subject of it. [my emphasis] It cannot have the same attitude 
to its own labor power, health, work and conditions as the 
capitalist has. This constitutes a definite barrier to the
(continued...)
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Preobrazhensky's program was based on a thoroughgoing 
workers democracy, and although it meant the peasantry would be 
squeezed, he never favored forced collectivization or forced 
grain requisitions. There would also have been growth in the 
private peasant sector. Yet Preobrazhensky realized that 
without an extension of the revolution to the West, the Soviet 
Union was doomed.
Trotsky had certain disagreements with Preobrazhensky's 
formulations which some interpreted to mean that it was possible 
to accomplish primitive socialist accumulation within the Soviet 
Union alone, or in association with other underdeveloped 
countries. Trotsky not only thought this unrealistic, but saw 
that it opened the door for a theoretical accommodation to 
socialism in one country. Trotsky also differed with 
Preobrazhensky on the pace of industrialization. These 
differences were not fundamental, however; both Trotsky and 
Preobrazhensky advocated the necessity of systematically taking 
up industrial accumulation, and neither held any brief with 
'socialism in one country.'68
The battle lines were drawn. The opposing forces formed 
up: the bureaucracy was with Stalin, the opposition with
Trotsky.
Serge entered the battle in 1927, just before the 15th 
Party Congress in which the Opposition was expelled, by 
publishing "Vers L'Industrialisation” in two parts in the French 
review Clarte. The article put forward the platform of the 
opposition with interesting nuances of difference. The article 
clearly employed caution in its style of argument —  Serge was 
still a member of the Party, under Party discipline —  but
67(.. .continued)
tempo of socialist accumulation, a barrier..." Evgeny 
Preobrazhensky, The New Economics. Oxford University Press, 
1965, p. 122.
68 Deutscher discusses the differences between Trotsky and 
Preobrazhensky in his The Prophet Unarmed, pp. 237-238.
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nevertheless was completely at odds with 'official' policy. The 
novel points Serge introduced into the debate concern the 
financial resources for industrialization, the pivotal point of 
contention between the 'left' and 'right' oppositions. Serge 
noted that even the policy of allowing the peasant to accumulate 
was being undermined during the NEP by the NEPmen themselves. 
Private capital dominated the retail trade in NEP Soviet Union, 
buying wholesale in the cities to sell retail in the provinces. 
The private traders, not the State, thus reaped the profit of 
squeezing the peasantry.69 Admitting that statistics were 
difficult to obtain, Serge quoted from the Koutler inquiry 
carried out by the Institute of Economic Research of the 
Commissariat of Finance, which showed that private capital in 
1926 had reached 1/14 of its pre-war level.70 Serge estimated 
that private commerce in 1925-1926 had attained 7.5 billion 
rubles per year out of a total GNP of 31 billion. Given that 
even these figures were deceptive, Serge concluded that a mixed 
economy was impossible because private capital gouges the 
profits from state production. A vivacious new bourgeoisie was 
being constituted, obtaining its capital exclusively from the 
"pillage of state goods and by speculation"71. Serge conceded 
that this was made possible by the weakness of Soviet industry 
and distribution. His solution was the same as the Left
Preobrazhensky had admitted that a part of the surplus 
product was captured by private capital in the form of 
merchant's profit, due in large part to the inadequate state 
of the system of distribution in the young Soviet state. He 
also conceded that the Nepmen were profiting on internal 
loans; but he did not go as far as Serge did in terms of the 
scale of wealth obtained by nascent new bourg. See 
Preobrazhensky, The New Economics, pp. 189-190.
70 Serge, Vers, quoting Kondoruchkine, Le Capital prive 
devant la justice sovieticrue, Librairie de l'etat, 1927.
71 Serge, "Vers L'Industrialisation," Part I, Clarte XV-8, 
p. 440, 20 October 1927.
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Opposition's: industrialization on a large scale. How to
finance the industrialization?
...to industrialize, we need capital. The capitalists 
won't give us credit. Where will we get the money? We 
have just seen that the peasants accumulate wheat and 
money; we have seen that private commerce rakes in big 
profits; we have seen the bureaucracy rip off a 
parasitical amount that Stalin and Rykov evaluated 
last year at more than 300 million rubles per year.
The necessary capital for industrialization 
circulates, therefore if the dictatorship of the 
proletariat could seize this capital for the growing 
new bourgeoisie the industrial development of the 
Soviet Union could be undertaken with unprecedented 
vigor." para 23-24. (Nous venons de voir que les 
paysans accumulent du ble et des fonds; nous boyons le 
commerce prive realiser de beaux benefices; nous 
allons voir la bureaucratie prelever sur les frais 
d' administration une dime parasitaire que Staline et 
Rykov evaluaient, l'an dernier, dans un manifeste 
memorable, a plus de 300 millions de roubles par an.
Les capitaux necessaires a 1'industrialisation 
circulent done dans le pays."72
Like the Left Opposition, Serge saw the only way out of the 
economic impasse in large scale industrialization, financed 
through the elimination of NEP speculation and profiteering. 
The role of the international proletariat, Serge added, was to 
aid this process, at least intellectually. Serge stressed the 
role of the international proletariat, but he did so in the 
vaguest of terms. Industrialization might be undertaken in a 
single country, but Serge nowhere argued that this could be 
misconstrued as accomplishing socialism in one country. Serge's 
article did not pose the problem as ultimately insoluble in 
socialist terms, as both Preobrazhensky and Trotsky finally did.
3.7 Victor Serge: Left Opposition activist
72 Serge, ibid.. p. 441.
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Serge did not come to oppositionist ideas suddenly. As we 
have seen, he had been critical of anti-democratic and 
bureaucratic tendencies from the moment they surfaced when the 
revolution was only a few months old. The events of the years 
1923-1927, however, were so alarming, that even Lenin's politics 
would have placed him in the camp of the Opposition. Krupskaya 
said she would have expected Stalin to imprison Lenin... Lenin's 
last Testament indicated where he would have been likely to 
stand in the fight.
When Serge joined the Left Opposition in Vienna in 1923-24, 
he had been agreeing with oppositional views for several years. 
Serge, like the others, felt obligated to rescue the revolution 
from those who were destroying it from within73; to revive its 
essence and vision —  to create a democratically planned economy 
controlled by the associated producers, which could serve as an 
example to the international working class. The Oppositionists 
fought against Stalin's narrowly nationalist and bureaucratic 
conception of Soviet development, crudely 'legitimized' by a 
single phrase of Lenin's taken out of context.74
Serge's activities within the Left Opposition had three
dimensions: domestic, international, and literary. Trotsky
called him one of the Opposition's most capable members.75 The 
French historian Pierre Broue identified Serge as 'marginal' 
within the Left Opposition76, because Serge was not one of its 
theoretical leaders and did not agree 100% with all its
politics. Serge wrote no theoretical treatises such as
3 One of the themes Serge stressed in recounting his 
reunions upon his return to the USSR with people he ^-hadn't 
seen since 1921 was: 'we did not create the Revolution to
come to this.'
74 See Robert V. Daniels, The Conscience of the 
Revolution. Simon and Schuster, New York, p. 252.
75 Leon Trotsky, Writings, Supplement to 1929-30, p.
76 In a private conversation in Mexico City, May 1987.
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Preobrazhensky's New Economics, or Rakovsky's analysis of the 
First Five Year Plan in Crisis. As a spokesman/ historian, 
pamphleteer, and revolutionary novelist, however, no one else in 
the Left Opposition was as valuable as Serge. Serge was an 
unorthodox member, due to his unique revolutionary experience in 
the international working class movement. We will show later 
that the Left Opposition was not monolithic, and Serge was an 
excellent example of its thinking, capable militants.
Serge's unique qualities made him a valuable addition to 
the Oppositions his knowledge of languages, his international 
revolutionary experience (by now in three revolutions), and his 
stature as a well known intellectual in France. Serge was a 
regular contributor to the press of the International Communist 
movement, mainly in France, but also in German and English 
speaking countries. His articles in Inprekor. Bulletin 
Communiste, Clarte, La Vie Ouvriere, etc. helped spread the 
Opposition platform and gathered support for its politics. As a 
member of the Leningrad cell of the Soviet Party, Serge was a 
public spokesman for the Opposition and as a member of the 
clandestine Leningrad Opposition Serge helped recruit more Party 
members to the Opposition. Serge also played a role in the 
Opposition leadership, conferring with Trotsky, Preobrazhensky, 
Radek and others on Opposition policy.
The Opposition sought out Serge immediately upon his return 
to Russia at the end of 1925. Vassily Chadayev met Serge in 
Leningrad and gave him the password 'Taras' which the Piatakov 
Circle in Moscow designated for Serge to use to contact the 
clandestine Opposition in Leningrad.77 Although the Trotskyists 
had been playing a waiting game since 1923, they met regularly 
and Serge was invited to join their circle.
The group met in the Astoria in the agronomist N.I. 
Karpov's room. The group usually consisted of Karpov, Serge, 
two or three students of working-class origin, two old Bolshevik
77 Serge, Memoirs. p. 207.
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workers who had been "in every revolution in Petrograd for the 
last twenty years," the worker Feodorov who later was executed 
as a member of the Zinoviev tendency, and two Marxist 
theoreticians 'of genuine worth.' (Grigori Yakovlevich Yakovin
78and Feodor Dingelstedt.) Alexandra Lvovna Bronstein —  known
as "Babushka" —  usually chaired the meetings.79 Alexandra
Lvovna was the mother of Trotsky's two daughters Zinaida (Zina)
and Nina, both of whom were to perish. Bronstein herself was
deported and disappeared during Stalin's years of Terror. Serge
said he had known few Marxists "as free in their basic outlook
80as Alexandra Lvovna." Nikolai Pavlovich Baskakov, who
questioned whether the system could be reformed. Chadeyev81, who
78 Yakovin had been in Germany and wrote what Serge 
described as an excellent book on Germany. He spent many 
years in Oppositional activity, making the rounds of the 
prisons, and disappeared in 1937. Dingelstedt was one of the 
Bolshevik agitators behind the mutiny of the Baltic fleet in 
1917. He published a book on "The Agrarian Question in 
India "s and was described by Serge as representing an extreme- 
Left tendency which, like Sapronov, considered the regime's 
deterioration now complete. Serge said that like, Yakovin, 
Dingelstedt was never broken. Memoirs, pp. 207-208.
79 She was Trotsky's first wife, with more than 35 years 
of revolutionary experience; in fact, she brought Trotsky into 
the Marxist circle she ran in Nikolayev in the 1890's. This 
was Trotsky's first political experience. See Trotsky, Mv 
Life, pp.
80 Serge, Memoirs. p. 208.
81. Chadeyev, who became Serge's friend and collaborator 
in the Opposition and members of the same Party cell at the 
Krassnava Gazeta, was the first of their circle to be killed. 
After spending six months in prison in 1928, Chadayev w,as sent 
on assignment by Krassnava Gazeta to investigate kolkhozes in 
the Kuban. Once there Chadeyev wrote of corruption and 
rackets there in building, industry and agriculture. He had 
obviously stepped on too many toes and asked too many 
questions. On 26 August 1928 the local authorities insisted 
he take a carriage to another town; although the carriage was 
accompanied by a militiaman, he made himself scarce when only 
Chadeyev's carriage was stopped by 'bandits.' Chadayev was
(continued...)
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raised the question of the collectivization of agriculture long
before the Party leadership, was the only one in the Opposition
to privately put the question of a second party. He predicted
the 'great trials of deception.' These outstanding characters
rounded out the group with Serge, who specialized in
international questions. Serge emphasized that this was the sum
total of the roll call of the Leningrad Opposition Circle, and
that there was never any other Centre of the Left Opposition in 
82Leningrad. Serge's insistence (written in 1941) must be in 
response to later charges by the GPU of 'Trotskyite' centers in 
Leningrad.
Moscow's Opposition circle numbered more than 500 according 
Victor Eltsin83. The Party was 'in a state of slumber' and the 
Opposition kept up its morale by writing and publishing LDT's 
Collected Works. All this was to change when the inner-party 
struggle came alive with the ouster of Zinoviev and Kamenev from 
the Troika at the 14th Party Congress in December 1925.
Serge mentioned in his Memoirs that he passed through 
Moscow in the spring of 1925 and learned that Zinoviev and 
Kamenev were about to be overthrown at the upcoming Party
81 (.. .continued)
shot with sawn-off rifles in the face and chest. His 
murderers were never discovered, the Leningrad Committee 
prevented a public funeral for him (he had fought in the 
revolution) and his headstone was smashed into pieces. See 
Serge, Memoirs, p., 214-215, and 242-243.
82 Memoirs. p. 208.
83 Trotsky's secretary and son of Boris Mikhailovich 
Eltsin, an old Bolshevik and Opposition leader who spent time 
with Serge in Orenburg and became a character in his novel 
Midnight In The Century. Victor Borisovich Eltsin, who had 
the "cool temperament of a tactician" spent five years in 
prison and was then deported to Archangel. Deutscher called 
him one of Trotsky's "gifted secretaries." See Deutscher, The 
Prophet Unarmed, p. 431, and Serge, Memoirs, p. 209, 307.
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Congress.84 Yet he expressed surprise when they were 
outmaneuvered by Stalin at the Congress. The action confused 
the Left momentarilys Serge thought the bureaucratic regime 
organized by Zinoviev couldn't get any worse, and thought any 
change "must offer some opportunity for purification. I was 
very much mistaken..."85 In fact the victory of the Stalin- 
Bukharin-Rykov coalition over the Zinoviev group, which had 
controlled only Leningrad, gave Stalin the opportunity to shift 
the blame for everything —  including the defeats in Bulgaria 
and Germany, the bloody episode in Estonia, the revival of 
class-distinctions, two million unemployed, scarce goods, the 
simmering conflict with the peasantry, the extinction of all 
democracy, the Purges and repression in the Party and the 
campaign of slander against Trotsky86 —  on his erstwhile 
colleagues Zinoviev and Kamenev.
As much as Serge had detested Zinoviev and his style of 
politics, he admitted Zinoviev was sincere in his opposition to 
socialism in one country, in his internationalism. Zinoviev's 
own bureaucratic practices in the period up to 1925 were now 
used against him. Zinoviev and Kamenev had now awakened to the 
fact that their policies had not only sponsored the growth of a 
nascent bourgeoisie, but had allowed bureaucratic maneuvering to
This trip of Serge's, while he was on assignment for 
the Comintern in Vienna, most likely was on Comintern 
business. It was probably upon his return to Vienna that he 
put in his categorical request to return to the Soviet Union.
85 Ibid., p. 210. This error of Serge's seems incredible 
given his earlier political insights. Serge quoted Mrachkovsky 
who opposed uniting with Zinoviev, who "would end by deserting 
us and Stalin would trick us." Ibid. Yet Serge's position in 
December 1925 points to the level of confusion within the 
Party as to who represented the real danger and to Stalin's 
ability to bore from within and cover his tracks, at this 
point. Serge's confusion can be seen as a reflection of the 
situation within the Party, in which alliances still shifted 
and had not solidified yet into more permanent tendencies.
86 ibid. p. 211.
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destroy the Bolshevik party in a real sense, by diluting it and 
robbing it of political practice, its 'substance.'
Stalin soon attacked the Leningrad machine controlled by 
Zinoviev, which Zinoviev apparently thought was impregnable. 
Serge said the machine Zinoviev had forged since 1918 crumbled 
within a week under the 'hammer-blows' of Gusev, sent by the 
Central Committee to instal new committees. Serge's Opposition 
circle had walked out and abstained in the Leningrad faction 
fight. They were shocked, shortly thereafter, when Trotsky had 
concluded an agreement with Zinoviev. "How could we sit at the 
same table with the bureaucrats who had hunted and slandered us
87—  who had murdered the principles and ideas of the Party?"
Zinoviev and Kamenev signed a declaration which 
recognized Trotsky's position of 1923 on the internal Party 
regime as correct. Serge's view of the 'overnight' change in 
his comrades in the Leningrad Party was magnanimous s he 
reflected that they must have been tremendously relieved not to
have to fabricate lies anymore. Whereas they attacked Trotsky
• 88just days before, they now spoke of him admiringly. Zinoviev
and Kamenev presented Trotsky with letters as evidence of their
conspiracy with Stalin, Rykov and Bukharin in the smear campaign
against him.
Serge's Leningrad Center numbered some twenty militants. 
The Zinoviev tendency in Leningrad numbered more than 500. When 
the Zinovievists demanded the immediate fusion of the two groups 
and asked for the Left Opposition's name lists, Serge's group 
balked. "What would they be up to tomorrow?" Serge, Chadayev 
and others immediately set up clandestine meetings with a view 
to recruiting as many as possible to the Left Opposition for the 
time of the merger of the two oppositions. Afraid of being 
swamped, they wanted the two tendencies to face each other with
87 Ibid.. p. 212.
88 Serge, Ibid., p. 212.
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organizations of equal size. Serge reported they were 
successful, with more than 400 organized on the day of the
89merger.
While they were recruiting to the Trotskyist tendency Serge
followed Chadayev and Nechayev to Moscow to brief Trotsky.
Trotsky was "shivering with fever; his lips were violet-colored,
but his shoulders were still set firmly and the cast of his face
displayed intelligence and will."90 Trotsky justified the
amalgamation of the two tendencies to them on the basis that the
salvation of the revolution depended on it. Serge noted that
Trotsky's house was being watched and photographed from across
the way by the GPU. Visitors were instructed to pretend to blow
their noses as they left the house.
The unification of the two Leningrad oppositions was
brought about by Preobrazhensky and Smilga, who were sent to
Leningrad to sort out their differences. Serge's impressions of
these men in 1926 merits inclusion here:
"Preobrazhensky had the broad features and short 
auburn beard that befitted a man of the people. He 
had driven himself so hard that during the meetings it 
seemed that he might at any moment drop off to sleep; 
but his brain was still fresh, and crammed with 
statistics on the agrarian problem.
Smilga, an economist and former army leader who in 
1917 had been Lenin's confidential agent in the Baltic 
fleet, was a fair-haired intellectual in his forties 
with spectacles, a chin-beard, and thinning front 
hair, ordinary to look at and distinctly the armchair 
sort. He spoke for a whole evening in a little room 
to about fifty workers who could not move at all, so 
closely were they squeezed together. A Latvian giant 
with gingerish hair and an impassive face scrutinized 
all who came in. Smilga, sitting on a stool in the 
middle of the room, spoke, in an expert's tone and 
without one agitational phrase, of production, 
unemployment, grain and budgetary figures, and of the 
Plan that we were hotly advocating. Not since the 
first days of the Revolution had the Party's
89 Ibid.. p. 213.
90 Ibid.
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leadership been seen in an atmosphere of poverty and 
simplicity like this, face to face with the militants 
of the rank and file.
Serge's recollection of meetings such as the one just 
described provide us with much more than just an account of how 
and when the Opposition met, what they discussed, and what they 
did, although his Memoirs are an important historical source for 
that as well. Serge's eye for penetrating detail, his 
descriptive depth, his ability to sum up a figure's character 
through a physical description provide flesh and blood to our 
knowledge of the life and death struggle of those years in the 
Bolshevik Party. The Memoirs allude to theory more than working 
at it; they are very much an insider's account. Serge's 
chronicle of the struggle, however, of the Oppositions's 
developing political battle[s], is an indispensable companion to 
the minutes, resolutions and documents of the battles
92themselves. In other works , Serge tried his hand at political 
analysis, historical interpretation and theoretical questions, 
sometimes more successfully than others.
3.8 The fight to be heard ... for five minutes
Because Serge's account of the activities of the Left 
Opposition in the years 1926-1928 is markedly more intimate than 
the histories and even Trotsky's My Life in places, it is worth 
including here some of the more important encounters and 
episodes.
Serge wrote that the battle of ideas took place on three 
issues: Soviet agriculture, Party democracy, and the Chinese
91 Ibid., p. 214.
92 For example, Serge's Year One of the Russian 
Revolution: his Destiny of a Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin: 
Portrait de Staline: his articles on Germany, the Chinese 
revolution, industrialization, bureaucratization and the 
purges, etc.
156
Revolution. 93Party discussions at that point consisted in long 
monologues by Party hacks justifying 'socialism in one country,' 
and denouncing the Opposition. According to Serge, everything 
said on China was dictated by the bureaucracy and was completely 
falsified.
Crude maneuvers such as long lists of speakers were used to 
prevent Oppositionists from speaking. Serge and Chadayev were 
effectively clandestine, and thus able to get on the list. 
Oppositionists were given just five minutes, so they adopted a 
style to get as much out in five minutes as possible before the 
shouts drowned them out.
Serge was able to score a few points in these prepared five 
minute bursts; but to have argue in this way was profoundly 
demoralizing. As their Party 'comrades' kept up their shouts of 
"Slanderers! Traitors!" Serge wrote that they suddenly felt 
"that the enemy was in front of us and prison was a step
94away." The points Serge was able to score were meager: on the 
occasion of Adolf Abramavovich Joffe's suicide95, Serge was able 
to render homage and closed by demanding from the cell Secretary 
details on how and why Joffe died. But the cell Secretary was 
able to bury Joffe under a mound of memoranda. Demoralized,
93 Serge, Memoirs, p. 215.
94 Ibid., p. 218.
95 Adolf Abramovich Joffe, "an outstanding figure" (p. 
136) of the Russian Revolution killed himself, leaving a 
political testament addressed to Trotsky, which was first 
stolen by the GPU and later released to him. Joffe's 
experience included prisons, exile, the revolutions of 1905 
and 1917, Brest-Litovsk, the German Revolution, the Chinese 
Revolution, embassies in Tokyo and Vienna. He was 47. His 
testament affirmed his right to commit suicide as a 
revolutionary act, as a "protest against those who have 
reduced the Party to such a condition that it is totally 
incapable of reacting against this disgrace" (the expulsion of 
Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee. He addressed 
friendly criticisms to Trotsky, and "exhorted him to 
intransigence against orthodox Leninism" (Memoirs, p. 229).
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Serge and Chadayev despaired of even trying to speak. Then
after one night when they had kept quiet, they scored a moral
victory: the normally apathetic audience cried for the two of
them to answer the ' activists.' Serge and Chadayev won an extra
vote that evening and discovered that forty workers supported
them discreetly, with an equal amount of sympathizers around
them. Learning from other sources, they discovered this was the
general situation throughout the party.
Serge described another meeting they held with Zinoviev and
Trotsky in a small room packed with fifty people. When a woman
worker asked Trotsky what would happen if the Opposition were
expelled from the Party, Trotsky explained that "nothing can
really cut us off from our Party."96 Serge commented that what
was reassuring about this meeting was watching the 'men of the
proletarian dictatorship' returning to the poor districts to
gain support "from man to man." Despite the courage,
simplicity, and humanity exhibited by the former leaders, which
Serge so aptly conveyed (and which he excelled at describing in
his novels), the sense of tragedy was already present. Serge
accompanied Trotsky home from the meeting and reported:
"In the street Leon Davidovich put up his overcoat 
collar and lowered the peak of his cap so as not to be 
recognized. He looked like an old intellectual in the 
underground of long ago, true as ever after twenty 
years of grind and a few dazzling victories. We 
approached a cabman and bargained for the fare, for we 
had little money,. The cabman, a bearded peasant 
straight out of old Russia, leaned down and said,
'For you, the fare is nothing. Get inside, comrade.
You are Trotsky, surely?' The cap was not enough of 
a disguise for the man of the Revolution. The Old Man 
had a slight smile of amusement: 'Don't tell any one 
that this happened. Everybody knows that cabmen 
belong to the petty-bourgeoisie, whose favor can only 
discredit us....'" 7
96 Ibid., p. 219.
97 Ibid. p. 220.
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Serge's description is amusing, tender, and tragic. The 
attraction of Serge to the Opposition is obvious, and works 
quite well for the reader as well. Serge's talent as a writer 
and spokesman the Opposition, presenting the human element of 
the Opposition, as well as the distillation of its overall 
political stance, is still effective in winning sympathy for its 
politics.
Serge wrote of another Opposition meeting, which took place 
in his apartment, around the kitchen table. On this occasion, 
Karl Bernardovich Radek was present, who gave "an impression of 
extreme intelligence, which was, at first encounter, 
disagreeable because of a certain flippancy; but beneath the 
sarcastic retailer of anecdotes, the man of principle shone
98through." The meeting was cut short at midnight by a
telephone call warning them that the GPU was on its way to 
arrest them all.
Political life had deteriorated greatly by this point. It 
was difficult to maintain morale. The Central Committee had 
gangs of 'activist' thugs out in . the streets breaking up
99'illegal meetings' by force. The situation was grim, and
Serge was certain that they would be defeated since the mass of
workers were indifferent to their struggle. He confided this to
Trotsky, who told him: "There is always some risk to be run.
Sometimes you finish like Liebknecht and sometimes like
Lenin. "10° Serge summed up his own feeling:
"... even if there were only one chance in a hundred 
for the regeneracy of the Revolution and its workers' 
democracy, that chance had to be taken at all costs.
I was unable to confess these sentiments openly to any 
one. To the comrades who, under the firs in the
98 Ibid. p. 221.
99 The presence of street thugs terrorizing opposition is 
strongly reminiscent of tactics more commonly reserved for 
fascist dictatorships.
100 Ibid. p. 220
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cemetery, or on a waste plot near a hospital, or in 
poverty-stricken houses, demanded some promise of 
victory from me, I would answer that the struggle 
would be prolonged and harsh. So long as I confined 
this way of talking to personal conversations with a 
few people, it worked, it made their faces harden; but 
if was used against a more numerous audience, it cast 
a chill. 'You behave too much like an intellectual,'
I was told by one of my friends in our Centre. Other 
agitators were lavish with promises of victory and I 
think that they themselves lived on such hopes."
We learn from Serge that the Program of the Opposition was 
a collective effort, with Zinoviev writing the chapters on 
agriculture and the International with Kamenev; Trotsky wrote 
the chapter on industrialization; and Smilga and Piatakov edited 
the draft. The Program served not only to demonstrate that the 
Opposition's ideas represented the way forward, but also to 
expose the absence of ideas put forward by the Party. Serge 
noted that the combined effort of drawing up the Opposition 
program was the last time collective thinking was allowed in the 
Party, and even that was cut short by the GPU raids.102
With all legal means of expression closed not only to the 
Party Opposition, but also to the anarchists, syndicalists and 
Maximalists, the Central Committee controlled absolutely the 
dissemination of the printed word. Nonetheless, the Platform of 
the Opposition appeared clandestinely.
The programme of the Opposition attacked the growth under 
NEP of the kulak, trader and bureaucrat as anti-socialist 
forces. Also under fire were the low wages, high unemployment, 
and high indirect taxation which increased the misery of the 
masses. Calling for the development of Kolkhozes, a progressive 
tax-system, the creation of new industry (attacking the 
'pitifully weak version of the Five Year Plan'), and the 
abolition of the State alcohol trade, the Opposition also
101 Ibid. . p. 220-221.
102 Memoirs. p. 222.
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demanded that the Soviets be restored, self-determination of 
nationalities and revitalization of the trade unions and the 
Party. The Comintern was also heavily criticized, especially 
for the policies in China which led to a bloody disaster.
3.9 The Revolution's Tenth Anniversary
Serge saw the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution 
as that point in which the "exhausted Revolution had turned full 
circle against itself."103 Elsewhere, Serge had described the 
anniversary as the realization of Soviet thermidor, finishing 
the cycle of the Revolution's first ten exultant years.104 
Serge's description of the speeches of Trotsky and Zinoviev on 
this occasion, barely audible under the torrent of abuse, 
including the throwing of books (Trotsky sarcastically 
commented: "Your books are unreadable nowadays, but they are
still useful for knocking people down....') suggests that the 
rage expressed by the Party faithful came from what they saw as 
treasonable conduct. After all, the Opposition was also part of 
the ruling bureaucracy.
One of the last hurrahs of the Opposition took place on the 
tenth anniversary of the Revolution, Nov. 7, 1927. The
Opposition had decided to take part in the anniversary 
demonstration/parade. This public manifestation of the 
Opposition, according to Isaac Deutscher, who uses Serge's 
description as a reference, amounted more to an appeal to the 
Party than an attempt to go over the party directly to the 
masses. Carrying banners proclaiming the slogans of the 
Opposition, as well as placards with Zinoviev and Trotsky's 
names, the Oppositionists were attacked by Party activists, 
beaten, dispersed and charged by mounted militiamen. IDeutscher 
wrote that the Opposition was defeated in this demonstration,
103 Memoirs, p. 225.
104 In "Trente Ans Apres La Revolution russe,"
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not only by Stalin's readiness and repressive response, but by 
the underlying contradiction in the Opposition's actions a 
public demonstration of opposition to the conduct and policies 
of the Party, while maintaining loyalty and self-discipline 
within its ranks.105
Serge's description of the brawl which took place, though
nearly quoted in full by Deutscher, takes on a different
meaning. Deutscher describes Serge's brush with an angry crowd,
stressing Serge's physical and by implication political
isolation. Deutscher translates the workers silence following
the party activist's threat as ominous. In Serge's description,
after shouting the names of Trotsky and Zinoviev to an
astonished crowd, an
"organizer, roused from his sluggishness, answered in 
a spiteful tones '— to the dustbin!' No one echoed 
him, but all at once I had the very distinct 
impression that I was about to be cut to ribbons.
Burly characters sprang up from nowhere and eyed me up 
and down, a little hesitant because after all I might 
be some high functionary. A student walked across the 
clear space that had arisen all around me and came to 
whisper in my ear, 'Lets's be off, it might take a
turn for the worse. I'll go with you so that you
won't be hit from behind.'"
Deutscher's translation imbues Serge's sluggish organizer's 
shout with "threat and fury" and the lack of 'echo,' the workers 
remaining silent. The difference here is that Serge leaves the 
impression that although the crowd was astonished to hear the 
names of the Opposition leaders shouted, their lack of response 
to the organizer was not complicity with him, but refusal to 
take up the action against Serge. Serge goes on to describe how 
burly characters sprang up from nowhere and began to eye him,
making him fear for his safety. Deutscher's rendering of the
episode leaves the impression that the crowd, though probably 
intimidated, was with the Party. Serge on the other hand,
105 Deutscher discusses this demonstration in Vol. 2, The 
Prophet Unarmed. Trotsky: 1921-1929. pp. 372-376.
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describes a non-complicit and shocked crowd, that although 
intimidated, would not go against the Opposition, and thus the 
need for the appearance of the 'burly' thugs. In the end, the 
Party through the press accused the Opposition of a mini­
insurrection that day. In fact, Serge described battles between 
hundreds of oppositionists with the militia on horseback.106
Louis Fischer was also on hand that day, and described it as 
filled with tension. Rumors had circulated that the Red Army 
would make a bid for power against the Stalin regime but nothing 
happened. Fischer was in Moscow, Serge in Leningrad, and the 
demonstrations differed in degree of violence. According to 
Fischer, the Chinese students of Moscow's Sun Yat-Sen University 
"threw Trotzkyist slogans in the air"107 and the GPU moved in 
to arrest some of them. Later pictures of Trotsky were torn 
down from buildings, and when Trotsky and Zinoviev, appeared 
they were not allowed to speak.
The subtle difference between Serge's and Deutscher's 
account leaves intact a common judgment —  that the Opposition 
was defeated, that thermidor had been realized. Both accounts 
agree that the Opposition could not rouse the crowd or masses to 
engage in action against the Stalinist regime, against the 
Party. Serge understood the reason; the Opposition had been too 
loyal, had allowed party discipline to choke off its ability to 
command a platform for its ideas in the society at large. 
Trotsky had succumbed to the oft repeated criticism of 
"outsider" to the Bolshevik party by trying too hard to prove 
his loyalty, which proved to be his undoing. Trotsky couldn't 
have acted alone, nonetheless, and the other Oppositionists were 
perhaps even more loyal to the party than Trotsky, judging by 
the lengths they later went to, to remain within its ranks.
106 Memoirs, p. 226.
107 *Louis Fischer, Men and Politics. An Autobiography, 
Jonathan Cape Ltd., London, Nov. 1941, pp. 91-92.
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Serge would later say, one had to have been in the Party to 
understand its psychology.108
3.10 Expulsion
On November 14, 1927, one week after the demonstration, the 
Opposition was expelled from the Party. The expulsions were 
published on the 16th of November. The ousters ensured that the 
Opposition would have no voice in the upcoming 15th Party 
Congress. Once out of the Party, the former Central Committee 
members had to move out of the Kremlin, where they had resided. 
Trotsky had already vacated the Kremlin, and Serge went to see 
Zinoviev as he was moving. Serge found Zinoviev and Radek, 
amidst their belongings. Zinoviev, "feigned a supreme
X09
tranquility" taking with him only a poignant death mask of
Lenin. Kamenev dropped by and Serge noted that his beard had
turned completely white, though his eyes remained 'unclouded.'
That was the last time Serge saw Kamenev.110 Serge's impression
of Radek, in the process of sorting and destroying papers,
surrounded by books is very revealing of his characters Radek
confided that he deplored the fact that the Opposition had
followed Trotsky's advice and broke with the Group of Fifteen
(Sapronov and V. Smirnov). The Fifteen had called the ruling
group a bureaucratic police regime which had replaced the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Radek also bemoaned that
"We've been absolute idiots! We haven't a halfpenny, 
when we could have kept back some pretty spoils of war 
for ourselves! Today we are being killed off through 
lack of money. We with our celebrated revolutionary 
honesty, we've just been over-scrupulous sods of
108 /See, for example, Victor Serge, From Lenin to Stalin,
p. 86, Portrait de Staline. (chapter XXI), "The Third Moscow
Trial," in La Revolution Proletarienne, March 1938, Seize
fusilees. p. 19, 31-34, Life and Death of Leon Trotsky, (with
Natalia Sedova), pp. , and Memoirs. pp. 333-334.
109 Memoirs, p. 227.
110 Ibid., 228.
164
intellectuals.' Then without a pause, as though it 
were about the most commonplace matter: 'Joffe killed 
himself tonight...'"
Serge's unigue talent of summoning up the multifaceted 
character of these two revolutionaries by means of a quote, or 
a physical detail (the beard gone white but eyes are clear) 
renders a sense of intimacy with these great actors of the 
revolution at their low ebb. Serge's motive was not simply to 
reveal unattractive characteristics of Zinoviev or Radek, for 
example, but to fairly portray personal characteristics which 
form a part of political motivation. Without belaboring the 
point about the role of personality in politics, Serge also 
created very effective literature. Hence, the normally high 
strung Zinoviev appeared tranquil, alone with an abandoned death 
mask of Lenin full of grief and mortality. Radek interspersed 
political considerations with base personal complaints and 
seemed to lack human feeling in his reaction to Joffe's suicide. 
It was Serge's ability to sketch these personal portraits that 
rounds out our knowledge of these political figures. It is as 
if, by drawing out character traits while delineating political 
alignment, Serge evoked the whole person, albeit refracted 
through Serge's own values of rigorous revolutionary honesty. 
The sum adds to a heightened understanding for the reader of the 
actors in the Russian revolution and hence the process itself.
3.11 Joffe's funeral, exile of Oppositionists ... the issue of 
capitulation
Joffe's suicide was a landmark in the inner-Party 
struggles. Louis Fischer had gone to see Joffe a week before his 
suicide, and described him as extremely ill and racked with 
pain, though curious about the revolutionary consciousness of 
the European proletariat. Joffe asked Fischer whether he 
believed revolution was around the corner in Germany, China,
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England, America. Fischer replied in the negative to each, 
distressing Joffe whose body was already tortured with pain111. 
Joffe wrote in his testament that his death was "a gesture of 
protest against those who have reduced the Party to such a 
condition that it is totally incapable of reacting against this 
disgrace" (the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the CC) . 
His funeral was the Opposition's last public demonstration and 
Trotsky's last public appearance.
The GPU had tried to prevent the funeral from becoming a
show of strength of the Opposition. Both Trotsky and Rakovsky
spoke, and the crowd protected Trotsky, who told them:
Yoffe left us, not because he did not wish to fight, 
but because he lacked the physical strength for 
fighting. He feared to become a burden on those 
engaged in the struggle. His life, not his suicide, 
should serve as a model to those who are left behind.
The struggle goes on. Everyone remains at his post.
Let nobody leave.112
Serge was also at the funeral. It reminded him of another
demonstration of different persecuted oppositionists at the same
cemetery just six years before: Kropotkin's funeral. Serge
remarked that there was a secret justice in the persecution that
was now descending on 'us'—  who had persecuted the anarchists
in the Revolution's early years. (1921) Serge's curious
statement can be interpreted in two ways: 1) that his allegiance
to the Bolsheviks, albeit to the Oppositional wing within was
tinged with guilt for the way Bolsheviks had treated their
opponents in years of the Red Terror (there is something almost
religious in this form of guilt); or 2) that Serge was most at
home as a marginal, persecuted Oppositionist (which in fact is
what his whole life experience had been.)
111 Fischer, op cit.. p. 92-93.
112 Deutscher, op. cit., pp. 381-384. Fischer also 
describes the funeral and the crowd protecting Trotsky in his 
autobiography, p . 93.
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The Fifteenth Party Congress saw the Centre and Right 
congratulating themselves for successes in all fields. One of 
these important 'successes' was the expunging of the 'Menshevik' 
Social Democratic' deviation on its way to becoming a 'Second 
Party' spearheading 'third force reaction.' [This was the 
language used to characterize criticism.] Bukharin took the 
floor at the Congress to denounce the crimes of Trotskyism. He 
explained that Trotskyism was preparing to establish a second 
party which would rally behind it all disaffected and those who 
hated the regimes in this way a split would undermine the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and the Opposition would thus
113spearhead the hidden 'third force reaction.'
Bukharin's argument resonated within the Opposition, which 
was divided on the question of capitulation. Serge was caustic 
about certain Oppositionists' desire to capitulate in order to 
prove their loyalty in the face of the purging, and wrote that 
the 'third force' was "already organized in the heart of the 
bureaucracy. "114 The transformation which Zinoviev and the other 
capitulationists from Leningrad could not see had already begun 
in the Party and signaled the end of all vital initiative in the 
Party.
The expulsion of the Opposition marked the death of the 
Party. A party without any discussion or dissent is not a 
political party in the real sense of the word. Yet the 
Zinovievites were certain that there was no political life 
outside the bureaucratic machine that they had helped to build, 
that no humiliation was too great to find a way back in. Serge 
wrote that Zinoviev had passed a note to Trotsky: "Leon
Davidovich, the hour has come when we should have the cpurage to 
capitulate....' Trotsky: 'If that kind of courage were enough, 
the revolution would have been won all over the world by
113 -Serge quoted Bukharin in Memoirs, p. 231.
114 Memoirs, p. 232.
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now....9 "115 Zinoviev and Kamenev recanted, which Serge said 
was seen by the Trotskyist Opposition as political suicide. 
Although it was not evident yet how far the hunt for enemies 
would go, Serge saw clearly enough that the Party was dead and 
loyalty oaths were fruitless. Yet the blow was deep. The 
psychology of being a Bolshevik Party member meant that finding 
oneself cut off from the Party was tantamount to religious 
excommunication —  it was political death. That psychology 
prevented the Opposition from taking their ideas to the masses 
at large, and in a sense represented a form of contempt for 
them, since the notion that thoughts must be filtered through 
the Party represented a form of elitist contempt for the ability 
of the ordinary worker to judge for himself which policies were 
correct. Although Serge suffered less from this way of
thinking, no one in the Opposition campaigned for such broad 
democratic ideas, at least not in 1927. If one reads what 
Trotsky had to say about democratization, it is all about inner- 
party democracy. Serge on the other hand challenged the 
decision to ban political parties, not just the ban on factions 
in the party. By the time Trotsky wrote Revolution Betrayed 
(1936) he called for a multi-party system, but in 1927 the 
struggle was to cleanse the Party from its bureaucratic, 
opportunist and non-Bolshevik (in the Leninist sense) direction.
Trotsky's position on the Party is at face value internally 
contradictory. By refusing to go outside the Party, or indeed 
to form a new Party, Trotsky affirmed his belief that even if it 
were not possible to regenerate the party from within, it 
remained necessary to demonstrate the impossibility by trying 
(and failing).116 Trotsky shared with other Oppositionists and
115 Ibid.
116 Today Trotskyists are still divided on this dilemmas 
When the American section of the Trotskyist Fourth 
International expelled its opposition in recent years, the 
expelled opposition immediately split into two organizations.
(continued...)
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the capitulators an acceptance of one-party rule. Serge was 
more evasive on the question, as he later would be in defining 
the class nature of the Stalinist state. Without saying 
directly that it was time to form a new Party, Serge wrote of 
the dangers of totalitarianism, of the consequences of party 
patriotism, and of the blind loyalty which prevented his comrade 
Oppositionists from taking their fight to the society at large. 
Serge was still in the Party and this is probably the reason for 
his elusive approach to the question. After 1928 Serge stated 
his position more clearly, as we shall see.
Once the Opposition had been expelled the Soviet press
overflowed with the most fantastic charges against them.
Although no "insurrectionary plots" had been contemplated in
1927, Serge wrote that the question of a Trotskyist coup had
been discussed at the end of 1925 and beginning of 1926, because
it was plainly obvious that Trotsky would have had the support
of the army and even the GPU. According to Serge, Trotsky
dismissed out of hand the possibility of a seizure of power
"out of respect for an unwritten law that forbade any 
recourse to military mutiny within a Socialist regime; 
for it was all too likely that power won in this way, 
even with the noblest intentions, would eventually 
finish in military and police dictatorship, which was 
anti-Socialist by definition."117
Serge agreed with Trotsky on the question of ends and 
means, since the end 'commands its own means' which in this case 
would be entirely inappropriate. Trotsky himself admitted that 
a coup against the leadership would have been relatively easy
116(. . .continued)
One organization wanted only to be recognized as an open 
tendency of the Party which had just expelled them, hence 
publicly stating their aim of being reintegrated; the other 
formed a separate public organization, effectively recognizing 
the 'bankruptcy' of the party which had expelled them and 
aiming to replace it as the new American section of the Fourth 
International.
117 Memoirs, p. 234-5.
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and bloodless, "but its consequence would have been a speedier
triumph for the very bureaucracy and Bonapartism against which
118the Left Opposition took its stand"
It is difficult to dispute this declaration of revolutionary 
principle, yet at the same time, one must question it in light 
of subsequent developments. In today's Soviet Union, Trotsky is
119attacked as the 'super-industrializer' hence super-Stalinist , 
yet his program of industrialization was entirely different than 
Stalin's crude interpretation imposed on Soviet society in the 
first Five Year Plans. The crucial elements of difference 
included force and tempo. Trotsky saw industrialization as a 
way of regenerating class consciousness as well as solving the 
economic problems of the country; his program included broad
inner party democracy as the only way to ensure creative debate
120on the complex way forward . Restoration of the Soviets would 
have ensured democratic participation of the society at large in 
political decision-making, and genuine planning in industry and 
agriculture (as opposed to planning by bureaucratic fiat) would 
necessitate work-place democracy. Given Trotsky's adherence to 
this policy which presumably would have been put into practice 
in power, the outcome of industrialization would have saved 
millions of lives. In this respect, Trotsky's refusal to employ 
all available means to defeat Stalin seems irresponsible. One 
can say with relative certainty that in his place, Lenin would 
have seized power. Nevertheless, Trotsky and Serge's arguments 
were powerful and command respect for their adherence to 
rigorous revolutionary principles.
The capitulators were offered posts far from the nerve 
centers of Leningrad and Moscow. Rakovsky was sent to Astrakhan,
118 Quoted in Serge's Memoirs, p. 235.
119 See, for example, Dmitry Volkogonov, "The Stalin 
Phenomenon" in Literaturnaya qazeta, Dec. 9, 1987.
120 ■See Trotsky, The New Course. New Park Publications, 
London, 1943, 1972, chap. Ill, pp. 18-27.
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Radek and Smilga, among others, to Siberia, Preobrazhensky to
the Urals. Trotsky refused to agree to such a post and was
forcibly removed from Moscow and sent to Alma Ata. Natalia
121Sedova's account of their 'removal' is poignant and symbolic.
A few days before Trotsky was forcibly removed. Serge went
to say good bye to the Old man at Beloborodov's residence in the
House of the Soviets in Granovsky. Comrade Oppositionists kept
a constant watch on Trotsky while they themselves were being
watched by the GPU. Serge described 'the Bolshevik from the
Urals who in 1918 had the task of deciding the lot of the
Romanov dynasty and had even lately been People's Commissar of 
122the Interior" as still majestic: "his hair standing nearly
white on his head, ... he exhaled a fierce, caged energy." 
Arrest for everyone was around the corner, and they all knew it. 
Serge and Trotsky discussed the Opposition abroad. Serge's 
Oppositional work was to take on an even more urgent 
significance since outside support must now more than ever be 
built in the face of enforced political inactivity within the 
USSR. Serge had collaborated with Magdeleine and Maurice Paz in
123Paris in the publication of the journal Contre le Courant 
Trotsky read and approved of the journal, telling Serge he must 
immediately go to France to work on the spot. Trotsky added, "We
121 See Leon Trotksy, Mv Life, pp. 562-571.
122 Memoirs. p. 233,
123 The title came from a phrase of Lenin. The journal 
staunchly defended the Opposition against the campaign of 
persecution,. The Paz circle in France later grew and a new 
bi-monthly journal took the place of Contre le Courant, .oalled 
La Revolution proletarienne. Its contributors were mainly 
revolutionary syndicalists and literary figures including 
Georges Duhamel, Charles vildrac, Georges Pioch, Leon Werth, 
Marcel Martinet, and Henri Poulaille. These French 
intellectuals later waged an international campaign to secure 
Serge's release from the Stalin's prison camps. See Richard 
Greeman, "Victor SergesThe Making of a Novelist (1890-1928)" 
unpublished dissertation, p. 393.
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have begun a fight to the finish, which may last for years and 
require many sacrifices. I am leaving for Central Asia: you 
try and leave for Europe. Good luck!"124
Serge's work with the French comrades was not simply
literary. He had been the political guide of visiting French
revolutionaries and had belonged to the French group of
Bolsheviks in Russia. Rosmer had written of Serge earlier in
1920125 describing him as the best possible guide in Russia
because of his astute political sense and intimate knowledge of
Russian and international affairs. When Gerard Rosenthal and
Pierre Naville, two French surrealists who later became
prominent Trotskyists (Rosenthal became Trotsky's lawyer and
Naville has remained a Trotskyist activist to this day in
France) were selected as delegates of the French Communist Party
to attend the Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the Revolution,
Serge took them around Moscow. They accompanied Serge to keep
watch over Joffe's body prior to the funeral, and Serge took
them to visit both Zinoviev and Trotsky. The French comrades had
questioned Zinoviev on the prospects for the Opposition in the
International. His crude approach shocked Serge, Rosenthal and
Naville. Zinoviev:
"We are starting the Zimmerwald Movement all over 
again.. .we are already stronger than they were. We 
have cadres practically everywhere. In our time, 
history moves faster..."125
Zinoviev's statement left Naville and Rosenthal incredulous: but
Serge assured them that he believed Zinoviev was serious.
Serge began to concentrate his Oppositional activity on 
literary activity in France. His relationship to the French 
political and literary scene was of critical importance for
124 Ibid, P- 234. Serge did not reach Paris for another 
nine years, three of them in captivity.
125 Rosmer, Moscow Under Lenin, Monthly Review Press, New 
York and London, 1971, pp. 35-37.
126 Memoirs, p. 231.
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several reasons: it allowed him to earn a living in the years
1927-1936 by publishing in France (he was prevented from 
publishing a single line within the Soviet Union); he was 
provided a platform for the ideas of the Left Opposition in 
Europe, and thereby to win the allegiance of comrades in France, 
Belgium and Spain, and to create a public for the novels he 
wrote in the next five years; and he built a reputation for 
himself as a revolutionary writer and serious novelist. That 
public was mobilized in his defense when Serge was arrested.
3.12 Serge's writings on the Chinese revolution
The journals Clarte, Contre le Courant, and La Lutte des 
Classes provided Serge his platform for disseminating the 
politics of the Opposition. The Opposition disagreed with 
Stalin on both domestic and foreign policy: the
industrialization debate at home, and Comintern conduct abroad, 
principally in China. Accordingly, Serge's most important 
articles in Clarte were "Vers L'Industrialization"127 and a five 
part series on the Chinese revolution called "La Lutte des 
classes dans la revolution chinoise.1,128
Serge's articles on China are important not only for the 
rigorous analysis put forward, but because their appearance in 
Clarte turned the attention of the French-speaking communist
127
Clarte, Part I, No. 15, Nov. 1927, pp. 436-442, and
Part II, No. 16, Dec. 1927, pp. 485-491.
128 There were seven articles in all. Six appeared in 
Clarte. the first "Le Bolshevisme et l'Asie" Clarte. New 
Series, No. 7, 15 Mar. 1927, p. 195-199; then the five part 
series entitled "La lutte des classes dans la Revolution 
chinoise" appearing in Clarte. New Series, No. 9, 15 mar 1927, 
pp.259-266; No. 11, 15 juillet 1927, pp. 323-329; No. 12, 15 
aout 1927, pp. 356-362; No. 13, 15 sept. 1927, pp. 382-392;
No. 14, 15 oct. 1927, pp. 406-412; and the last article
"Canton," appeared in La lutte des classes. Num. 1, fev-mars
1928. Clarte was a Marxist and Communist journal, independent 
of the Communist Party, but controlled by it. The two 
editors, Marcel Fourier and Pierre Naville, both belonged to 
the Party.
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movement to the Chinese revolution and the debate it had 
provoked within the CPUSSR and Comintern. Thus Serge was able
129to influence political debates in France. The articles were
to have a profound impact on Serge's future political life, as 
they were the immediate cause of his expulsion from the Russian 
Communist Party. The five part series, plus two additional 
articles, put together make a 180 page book130. Serge's work 
on China remains relatively unknown. The richness of
information and the perspectives and analysis Serge developed 
were later to appear in the classic studies of the Chinese 
Revolution, such as Harold Isaac's The Tragedy of the Chinese 
Revolution, and Trotsky's Problems of the Chinese Revolution.
Pierre Naville131, who visited Serge in the Soviet Union in 
1927 found Serge very preoccupied with the Chinese question. 
Serge himself said he lectured on China to clandestine meetings 
of Oppositionists, discussing the problems with the Official
129 Pierre Naville, in his preface to the French and 
Spanish recompilation of Serge's Clarte articles, wrote that 
throughout 1926 any articles in Clarte on China simply 
reflected Comintern line uncritically. That changed when the 
writings of Trotsky and Zinoviev began to filter out of the 
USSR, and with the appearance of Serge's articles, which 
"established the real characteristics of the 'class struggle 
in the Chinese revolution'" and "notably clarified the errors 
of the Comintern." Naville commented that Serge's articles 
made Clarte realize it had committed a series of errors, and 
turned the attention of the French leftists to the Chinese 
revolution. Pierre Naville, Preface, La Revolucion China
1926-1928. pp. 8-10.
130 Published in France as La Revolution chinoise. 1927-
1929. Paris, Savelli, 1977; and in Mexico by Vlady, as La 
Revolucion China 1926-1928. Mexico. Editorial Domes, S.A., 
1984.
131.Naville, who later wrote extensively on China, wrote 
the preface to the French and Spanish editions of the 
collection of Serge's articles on China.
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line on China, and examining Mao Tse Tung's articles, which
132Serge found noteworthy.
Serge was well informed on events by comrades who had 
returned from China, including Joffe, Radek (the Rector of the 
Chinese University in Moscow), Zinoviev and Trotsky. The only 
Western sources available to Serge were Le Temps. the 
conservative French newspaper, Deutsche Alleqmeine Zeitunq, the 
historian Rene Grousset, the libertarian novelist Paul Morand,
133the reactionary catholic Henri Massis, and Romain Rolland.
In order to write his analysis of China, Serge immersed 
himself in Chinese history from 1911 to 1927, basing himself on 
a rigorous Marxist analysis, and above all on clear concepts of 
revolution. Amidst all the confusing arguments on the special 
class conditions in China, Serge stressed key components for 
revolution that the revolutionary party must heed. These 
components, including the independence of the proletarian party 
—  even if in embryo, and the hegemony of the proletariat134, 
emphasized the primary, essential role of class struggle in 
history135 in China as in Russia, a fact which had been lost by 
the leadership. On the 'sacred union' with the national petty- 
bourgeoisie against the foreign imperialists, Serge quoted 
Lenin, reminding the reader that political power rests on 
economic power and in class divided society the government can 
only represent the possessing classes. The 'sacred union' in
132 Memoirs. p. 220.
133 "Le Bolshevisme et l'Asie," Clarte. New Series, Num.
7, 14 Mars 1927. Serge also had access to the publications of 
the Communist International, and to the French Communist 
journal, L'Humanite.
134 •Victor Serge, Clarte. num. 12, 15 August 1927, p. 105 
of the Spanish recompilation. Serge stressed, quoting Lenin, 
that communism should not be subordinated to Sunyatsenism, nor 
the Communist Party to the Kuomintang.
135 Ibid, p. 141, Spanish edition.
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practice meant the abdication of the proletariat. The bloc of 
four classes, Serge wrote, was a regression from Marxism to
1.36liberalism, reminiscent of Menshevik confusion in 1905. 
Serge added that the revolutionary vanguard must guard against 
adventurism and premature insurrections, and most importantly, 
must stress the absolute necessity of creating Soviets, organs 
of dual power, without which the Communist Party substitutes 
itself for the action of the masses and must necessarily become 
a bureaucratic political apparatus.
Serge also emphasized that the Chinese comrades pay 
attention to the specificities of China's social structure, and 
shouldn't mechanically apply the Russian model of revolution (as
137was the case in Germany in 1923). The proletariat was a tiny 
minority in China. It would need the support of its natural 
allies, the peasants, but the revolutionary vanguard must 
liberate itself from the petty-bourgeois intellectual prejudices 
and liberalism of Sun Yat Sen. It must also free itself from 
idealist doctrines, from nationalism, and must break with the 
past; an intellectual liberation would be necessary to have a 
clear communist conscience.138
Serge also counseled that it would be impossible to go 
forward without a rigorous balance sheet of past errors and 
successes. The horrible errors of the Soviet Party and the 
Comintern were never subjected to self-examination. The
136 Serge, La Revolucion China 1926-1928. pp. 141-145.
137 In fact, Serge pointed out that the Kuomintang adopted 
the rigid, monolithic internal structure of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, and was supported in this move by 
the Comintern. The Kuomintang became the Chinese section of 
the Comintern and remained so even after the massacre of 1927. 
The opportunistic adoption of the centralized, non-democratic 
internal regime was directed against the Chinese communists. 
Serge, La Revolucion China, pp. 125-127. (Clarte no. 13, 15 
Sept. 1927.)
138 Ibid. p. 147.
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Kuomintang remained the Chinese section of the Comintern even 
after the massacres.
If the tone of Serge's articles seemed too didactic, it 
expressed the utter frustration of the Opposition in the face of 
the beheading of the Chinese revolution for the sake of inner 
party victory in the Soviet Union. Serge's articles were meant 
to persuade and convince, to reach out and explain to the
international communist community that there was an alternative 
political point of view. Although his tone was urgent, Serge's 
analysis was clear, rooted in empirical fact, and not in the
least dogmatic. The style of argument which he adopted was
similar to all Serge's political-historical works: it was not 
polemical demagoguery, but careful attention to detail, the 
scrupulous compilation of important statistics, leading to clear 
theoretical conclusions.
Serge's Chinese articles are also remarkable for his
perspicacity. Twenty two years before Mao Tse-Tung led the 
victorious Chinese revolution to success (in 1949) Serge 
recognized the clear-sightedness of an "unknown young communist 
militant" called Mao Tse Tung. Referring to two works of
139Mao , Serge wrote that he had read many works on China, but
did not encounter the clarity of Mao anywhere else. Serge said
that Mao's formulations reminded him of Lenin in 1917-1918. He
then quoted Mao's conclusions:
"The leadership of the revolutionary movement must 
belong to the poor. Without the poor there is no 
revolution. Distrust of the poor is distrust of the 
revolution; attack them and you attack the revolution.
Their revolutionary measures have been an infallible 
justice."...
"If the completion of the democratic revolution is 
represented by the number ten, the part of the cities 
and the army must be represented by three and that of
Mao Tse-Tung, "Analysis of Classes in Chinese 
Society" (March 1926) and "Internal Information on an 
Investigation of the Peasant Movement of Hunan," (March 1927) .
177
the peasants that have made the revolution in the 
countryside a seven."14
To this Serge added his own comment: "if the leaders of the
revolution had been inspired by such a clear conception/ all
victory would have been possible.1,141
What Serge saw in Mao was an uncompromising commitment to
the poor, which seemed refreshing in the morass of class
collaboration and kow-towing to nationalist generals. Yet if
one looks at Mao's statement more carefully, it is anything but
clear, except in its commitment to the mass of Chinese peasants.
In terms of class analysis, however, Mao's concept of the 'poor'
is vague in the extreme. There is no discussion, at least in
Serge's quote, of the role of the proletariat. It seems to me
that Mao's quote is more similar to the Lenin in 1905 of "Two
1.42Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution "
rather than the Lenin of 1917. Nor does the quote reveal that 
Mao was clear on the character of the Chinese revolution, using 
the term 'democratic' rather than 'social' to describe the 
revolution. The whole point of Serge's Chinese study, in fact, 
was that the actions of workers and peasants in China leading up
140 Mao Tse-Tung, op cit, quoted in Serge, "La Lutte des 
classes dans la Revolution chinoise," Clarte, num. 12, 15 aout 
1927, p. 358. Translation is mine.
141 .... ibid.
142 Although one could argue with Lenin on his
conclusions in this particular work, he was never unclear on 
concepts. Even in this work, Lenin was clear that the
proletariat would need to take the lead, allied with the
peasant, in completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution as 
a prelude to the consummation of the socialist revolution. 
The revolution would lead to the 'revolutionary-democratic 
dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry', but once 
the revolution was accomplished the peasant would no longer be 
revolutionary, and the proletariat would once again have to 
take the lead, first in splitting the peasantry between the 
rich peasants and the poor, landless, semi-proletarian
peasants, in order to carry forward the socialist revolution. 
See "Two Tactics of Social Democracy" pp. 94-96. [check page 
number in collected works]
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to 1927 demonstrated the ripeness of social revolution, and 
amounted to a clarion call for the proletariat to take the lead 
with the peasants behind them, to make the revolution. Serge's 
study was an application of Trotsky's theory of 'permanent 
revolution.' The policies of the Soviet Communist Party and the 
Comintern had been criminal in that they aiimed at inhibiting 
the socialist character of the Chinese revolution, subordinating 
it to the interests of the bourgeois democratic nationalists.
Where Serge and Mao coincided was where both recognized the 
particularities of Chinese social structure in promoting an 
indigenous revolution, as opposed to a 'model' the Russian party 
in the Comintern sought to artificially impose. The tragedy of 
the Chinese revolution was that in the world communist movement 
it took a back seat to the internal struggle in the Russian 
Party.
3.13 The Left Opposition and the Chinese revolution
The articles Serge wrote for Clarte first exposed him to
repression. Serge surprised even himself with the accuracy with 
which his study on China had predicted defeat. The Left 
Opposition had effectively propagandized on the regime's 
disastrous policies in China throughout 1926-27. Serge had said 
that "China galvanized us all."143 China's ascendant revolution 
in 1927 represented for the Opposition the next vital struggle 
for the international extension of the revolution, an 
affirmation of Lenin's theses on the national and colonial 
question.
The Opposition's arguments on China proved embarrassing for 
the regime, which desperately sought a victory to use as a
143 Memoirs p. 216.
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showpiece at the 15th Party Congress. Chinese masses had 
advanced from victory to victory in 1927; Hong Kong was 
blockaded by Canton, a revolutionary republic had been 
proclaimed in the south of China, and Soviet advisors were sent 
in.144 This coincided with the defeat of the Opposition in the 
USSR and the consummation of Stalin and the bureaucracy in 
power. Serge explained the thrust of Chinese policy as one 
defined by a new social stratum, driven by a different 
ideology,145 —  which had driven the workers from power in the 
USSR, leaving only the name of the proletariat in its 
dictatorship.146 Serge dared to suggest that the new 
functionaries in power feared the victory in China more than 
they pretended to desire it.147 Stalin's policy (executed by 
Comintern delegates in China) commanding entry into the 
Kuomintang by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) "first paralyses 
it, then compromises and strangles it."148 The Opposition's 
admonitions were ignored. In fact, they were not allowed to 
speak. The Comintern enjoined the Chinese revolutionists from 
forming soviets, arming themselves, or encouraging peasant 
revolts. The Chinese workers and peasants were led from one
144 Victor Serge, From Lenin to Stalin, p. 45.
145 ^V. Serge, Russia Twenty Year After, p. 256.
146 Serge, From Lenin To Stalin, p. 45.
147 Trotsky would later say this assessment was too 
radical. See discussion on pp. infra.
148 Serge, RTYA, p. 256.
180
149ambush to another. Stalin's 'bloc of four classes' policy,
wrote Serge, was a travesty of Lenin's revolutionary policy.
With the debacle in Shanghai, protest mounted in the Soviet 
Union. Serge, filled with despair, took his five minutes time 
to speak out in his branch meeting. He shouted "The prestige of 
the General secretary is infinitely more precious to him than 
the blood of the Chinese proletariat!" Serge wrote that a 
"paroxysm or hatred" swelled up, and the hysterical audience was 
on the point of lynching the Oppositionists.150
Stalin needing a victory to counterbalance the bloody 
defeats, sent his cousin Lominadze along with Heinz Neumann to 
foment an uprising in Canton, to coincide with the opening of 
the 15th Party Congress in December 1927. After forcing the 
Chinese Communists against their will into the bourgeois 
Kuomintang, forbidding the creation of Soviets, holding the 
agrarian revolution in check and preventing the Chinese 
Communists from arming the workers without the permission of the 
bourgeoisie, Stalin switched course. Now he urged the Chinese 
Communists to immediately bid for power by staging an 
insurrection. C.L.R. James, in a discussion on the History of
149 Stalin , inspired by Bukharin, claimed this policy 
would encourage a socialist evolution in China by means of 
penetration into the Kuomintang. Instead it sealed their (the 
revolutionaries) fate. Their blood flowed freely, largely due 
to Stalin's consideration of China's insignificant national 
bourgeoisie, his fight with the Opposition, and his disastrous 
leadership of the Comintern. See Souvarine, op cit. pp. 440- 
443, Deutscher, Vol. 2, pp. 323-327, Serge From Lenin to 
Stalin, pp. 45-49, RTYA, pp. 255-237.
150 Memoirs, p. 217.
181
the Left Opposition with Leon Trotsky in April 1939, quoted 
Victor Serge on Stalin's zig-zag, saying the Commune was 
necessary "if only for a quarter of an hour” for the sake of the
151 •Sixth World Congress of the Comintern. Souvarine wrote m  
his biography of Stalin that Stalin needed "a victory bulletin 
as an argument against the 'pessimism of the Opposition. ' The 
result is a revolutionary rearguard action, isolated, artificial 
and doomed to failure."152
Canton blazed in glory just long enough for the Soviet 
press to print rapturous proclamations of triumph. Their 
shortlived victory bathed Stalin in adulation through the first 
two days of the Congress. The next day the Cantonese Commune 
was drowned in its own blood.153 While Chinese revolutionaries 
bled and died, the Congress pronounced the expulsion of the 
Opposition, which the Comintern untiringly approved. Serge said 
this was the first time the bureaucratic regime
"stubbornly sabotaged a prodigious revolutionary 
movement because its own (national) interests, 
contrary to those of the proletariat, forced it 
to..... (the Comintern approved everything) ... without 
having to overcome the slightest nausea when it stood
151 Writings of Leon Trotksv r1938-19391, Pathfinder 
Press, Inc, New York, 1969, pp. 261-264.
152 •Boris Souvarine, op cit. p. 471.
153 ^Serge noted that the fate of the 'subalterns' 
Lominadze and Neumann were not treated kindly for their 
services in China. Lominadze became an Oppositionist after 
the Chinese events and committed suicide in Sverdlovsk in 1935 
on the eve of his arrest; Neumann disappeared in the purges of 
1937, having taken refuge in the USSR from the Nazis. His 
wife was turned over to the Gestapo after the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact. From Lenin to Stalin, p. 49, and Memoirs p. 173.
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before the deepest pools of blood, the most enormous
or the most pettifogging knavery." 4
Trotsky's discussion with C.L.R. James mentioned above 
shows a different nuance on this issue. The thrust of the 
argument of Serge and Souvarine (and James) is that the 
bureaucracy, acting in its own interests, sabotaged the Chinese 
revolution. Trotsky wrote in My Life that the "epigones'
leadership in China trampled on all the traditions of
155Bolshevism" but that they were anxious for the success of the
revolution. Trotsky affirmed that Voroshilov, Chicherin and
others, all Stalinists, sat on a committee with Trotsky and 
considered Trotsky's attitude too pessimistic. Yet the crux of 
the difference as Trotsky enunciated it to James in 1939, was 
that Stalin and company genuinely wanted to push a dictatorship 
of the proletariat and peasantry156 onto what they believed was 
a bourgeois democratic revolution in China. In other words, 
Serge's position, shared by James, led to the conclusion that 
the bureaucracy could not support a proletarian revolution
because it was a bureaucracy, whereas Trotsky, while agreeing 
"that bureaucrats acquired "bureaucratic habits in thinking" and 
thus "proposed to restrain the peasants..so as not to frighten 
the generals157," nevertheless saw Stalin's position as one of 
not understanding the dynamic of either the Russian or the 
Chinese revolution. He said that Stalin and Bukharin were 
overwhelmed by events in China just as they were in Russia in 
1917 until Lenin came. Trotsky continued:
154 Serge, Russia Twenty Years After, pp. 159-160.
155 Leon Trotsky, My Life, p. 552.
156 This formulation is not accidental; the clear 
conception of the hegemony of the proletariat, put forward by 
Serge and the Opposition, is muddled in Stalin's 'twin 
dictatorship.'
157
Trotsky, Writings 1938-9, p. 262.
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"In different writings of theirs you will see passages 
that show that they never understood. A different 
form of existence, their bureaucratic habits affected 
their thinking and they reverted to their previous 
position. They even enshrined it in the program of the 
Comintern: proletarian revolution for Germany,
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry for
semicolonial countries, etc."158
The difference Trotsky wished to stress in 1939 was that the
degeneration of the revolution was still in process in 1927, not
yet completed. Stalin acted not out of contrary class
interests, but out of a crude understanding of Marxism, which at
crucial junctures, as in March 1917, caused him to miss the boat
in the face of real revolutionary events. Likewise Trotsky
believed Bukharin was egually confused as a Marxist (a point
Serge often suggested as well), and this was clearly apparent in
his wide swings —  from dialectician to realist, from left
159communist, to right oppositionist.
As for the effect the Chinese defeat would have on the inner 
party struggle, Trotsky recalled scores of Oppositionists
visiting him in the offices of the Chief Concessions Committee 
in the wake of the Chinese bloodbath. He wrote that the younger 
comrades were certain that the bankruptcy of Stalin's policy was 
bound to bring victory to the Opposition. Trotsky wrote:
... I was obliged to pour many a bucket of cold water 
over the hot heads of my young friends —  and over 
some not so young. I tried to show them that the 
opposition could not rise on the defeat of the Chinese 
revolution. The fact that our forecast had proved 
correct might attract one thousand, five thousand, or 
even ten thousand new supporters to us. But for the 
millions the significant thing was not our forecast, 
but the fact of the crushing of the Chinese
158 Trotsky, ibid. p. 263.
159 This is not to say that people can't develop and 
change, or that they don't at various times write 'absurd 
things' (Trotsky's quote) but that in the case of Stalin and 
Bukharin, the consistency was in misunderstanding the nature 
of the Russian revolution, and thus the complexity of Marxist 
thought and method.
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proletariat. After the defeat of the German 
revolution in 1923, after the break-down of the 
English general strike in 1925, [sic] the new disaster 
in China would only intensify the disappointment of 
the masses in the international revolution. And it was 
this same disappointment that served as the chief 
psychological source for Stalin's policy of national- 
reforraism. "1 0
3.14 The Opposition vanquished
Serge explained that the defeat of the Opposition, (and
hence the working class) by the 'parvenus' could only be
understood from the international angle, by the twin defeats of
the revolution in Europe and Asia —  Germany in 1923, China in
1927. Souvarine, on the other hand, attributed the defeat of
the Opposition to its own mistakes161. Serge admitting that the
Opposition had 'committed a number of secondary mistakes,'
considered Souvarine's insight too detached to accurately
evaluate events. In particular, Serge wrote it was unjust to
compare Trotsky's attitude to the Party with Robespierre's
deference for the Convention of Thermidor. Souvarine had written
“In' both cases, the actual power of empirical politicians
triumphed, by a cynical combination of force and astuteness,
over doctrinaires poorly equipped with a practical sense."162
Although Serge would later agree that party patriotism clouded
the sense of the Opposition, in 1936 he answered Souvarine:
"Isn't it plain that the practical sense of 
revolutionists is basically different from that of the 
empirical politicians who represent other social 
formations? The practical sense of Liebknecht has 
little in common with that of Noske. The practical 
sense of revolutionists who deem it necessary to fling 
themselves under the chariot wheels because it is in 
the higher interests of the proletariat, is just as 
different from that of the parvenus to whoitr" the
160 Leon Trotsky, Mv Life, p. 553.
161 Souvarine, op. cit., p. 472.
162 Souvarine, ibid., p. 474.
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morrows of the great defeats of the working class 
offer invaluable opportunities for better installing 
themselves in power. Souvarine ought to know this, 
after all, for he, too, was a 'doctrinary' vanquished 
by the 'empiricists' because of his devotion to the 
International of the great years."163
The problem with this is that by throwing themselves 
'under the wheels of the chariot ..in the higher interests of 
the proletariat' the Opposition did not help the immediate 
interests or lives of the proletariat or the revolutionaries who 
perished in great numbers in the years to follow.
3.15 Arrest
Preobrazhensky met with Serge and warned him to stop 
publication of his article on Canton or risk years in jail.164 
Serge was convinced he would be deported anyway and went ahead, 
although as a precaution he let a Parisian comrade put his 
signature to Serge's article devoted to the Canton Commune.165
Preobrazhensky was right, and Serge was soon called up 
before the Party's Control Commission. He was expelled from the 
Party, ostensibly for calling the decision of the 15th Congress 
to expel the Opposition a 'grave error.' The astonished Control 
Commission of the Leningrad Central District, headed by the 
tired old worker Karol, expelled Serge forthwith: the Party 
Congress wasn't capable of error!166
Serge was arrested three months later. In the interim, the 
killings began. The first of the Oppositionists to be killed 
was Albert Heinrichsen, a worker the Putilov factory in the 
Leningrad suburb of Narva, and the former commissar of a Red 
battalion at the front. When the GPU came to arrest him he flew
163 Serge, Russia Twenty Years After, p. 162n.
164 •Memoirs, p. 239.
165 Serge, RTYA, 16On.
166 Memoirs, pp. 239-240.
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into a rage and said "Ah, you have come to the point of locking 
up the Leninists! And you aren't ashamed of yourselves! 
Thermidorians!" He was taken by force and the next day his wife 
was informed he had committed suicide. She insisted on seeing 
his body and when she finally found it, the bruises and 
mutilation made it clear that he had been savagely beaten. 
Serge and others pressed for an official investigation, to no 
avail. This was in Dec. 1927, or Jan. 1928. Serge's comrade 
and good friend Vassily Chadayev followed in August 1928, 
assassinated on the highway near Kuban with the complicity of 
the authorities. Chadayev had written on the agrarian problem, 
advocating efforts toward collectivization. After six months in 
prison, he was sent on assignment to Kuban by Krassnava Gazeta. 
His dispatches exposed racketeering and corruption. His reward 
for his honesty was a hail of dum-dum bullets.167 At about the 
same time Trotsky's secretary George Valentinovich Butov died 
after carrying on a hunger strike for 50 days. Serge noted that 
when the Lord Mayor of Cork died from hunger strike the 
civilized world was shocked. Butov's fate remained unknown.168
Serge's arrest came three months after the 15th Party 
Congress. Two agents came to his door at midnight and made a 
beeline for Serge's translations of Lenin. Serge ironically 
commented on the seizure of Lenin's writings, to which the 
soldier replied: "don't joke, we are Leninists too, you know." 
Serge commented: Perfect: we were all Leninists together.
After an all night search, Serge was taken to jail. Serge 
commented in the Memoirs that his 7 yr old son Vlady wept not in 
fear, but anger. Vlady recalled the event as his first
167 Memoirs, pp. 242-243.
168 The stories of the fate of these Oppositionists is 
found in Serge's Russia. Twenty Years After, pp. 94-114.
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"Trotskyist act": Vlady rescued a portrait of Trotsky from
1.69under the heels of the GPU agents ransacking the apartment.
Serge's first Soviet arrest was to last 7-8 weeks. He was 
held in the old House of Arrest. His warder had 'taken Trotsky
170out for his walks after the 1905 Revolution...' Serge was 
held without charge in a tiny cell meant for solitary but 
cramped with three others. Serge wrote the prison was packed 
with victims targeted by the 'hated functionaries who were 
obsessives, maniacs, and torturers by profession." Serge passed 
the time rereading Dostoevsky. Serge determined that he would 
not take part in any 'recantation', and he was soon released 
with the proviso he not take part in 'anti-Soviet activity.'
Serge owed his release to the efforts of his Parisian 
friends who had caused enough commotion to embarrass 'high 
circles.' Clarte, now published under the title Lutte de 
Classes published an editorial protesting his arrest, the 
persecution of Oppositionists, and attacking the bureaucratic 
regime. The editorial outlined Serge's political past, the many 
articles he had contributed to a wide variety of French 
journals, and his years of service to the revolution now bent on
171persecuting the Opposition for its opinions.
Not all French communist intellectuals mobilized on his 
behalf, however. Once he was released Serge's erstwhile comrade 
Vaillant-Couterior reported in L'Humanite that Serge had been 
treated well, and Barbusse let him know that during his 
imprisonment Barbusse had removed Serge's name from the masthead 
of Monde.
Although Serge admired some of Barbusse's prose, he found 
him a slippery character. After meeting Barbusse in the Hotel
169 Taped interview with Vlady, Mexico City, May 1987.
170 Memoirs, p. 240.
171 See "Victor Serge en prison," Clarte. Vol. 1928, No.
4, pp. 89-90. The editorial is quoted in full in Richard 
Greeman, op cit. pp. 400-401.
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Metropole at the Tenth Anniversary celebrations, just prior to 
Serge's arrest, Serge commented:
Right from the first I saw him as a quite different 
kind of person; concerned above all not to be 
involved, not to see anything... .all with the aim of 
making himself the accomplice of the winning side!
Since it was not yet known whether the struggle had 
been definitively settled, he had just dedicated a 
book, at great length, to Trotsky,... .When I told him 
about the persecution, he pretended to have a headache 
or not to hear,... .My jaws shuddered as I realized 
that I was face to face with hypocrisy itself."172
Nonetheless, Serge felt compelled to answer Barbusse's
opportunistic action. He carried on a correspondence with
Barbusse, which was later published in 1937 in Les Humbles as
"trois lettres de Victor Serge a Henri Barbusse. " The letters
recount Serge's experience of arrest, interrogation and release,
and defend his Oppositional views. Barbusse's letters suggested
that the campaigns for Serge' s release had harmed the Soviet
Union and that Serge was somehow responsible. Serge diligently
answered Barbusse's barbs, blaming the regime for its treatment
of the Opposition.
The treatment that Barbusse and other French 'comrades' had
meted out to Serge —  out of cowardice, complicity and slippery
opportunism, contrasted sharply with the lonely and courageous
struggle of the vanquished Opposition. The dark period was just
beginning, and the men with whom Serge had shared struggles for
the last decade were one by one disappearing secretly to the far
corners of the USSR. The stage of struggle just commencing in
would be especially bitter. While prison and exile were nothing
new to these seasoned revolutionaries, those now persecuting
them were their former comrades and the state which they had
helped to create.
172 Serge, Memoirs, p. 238.
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CHAPTER FOUR: STALINIZATION
I. 1928-1933: The Bureaucratic Counter-revolution, solitary
struggles in precarious freedom
4.1 "Our Intellectual Activity is Prodigious, Our Political 
Action Nil."
If the years 1926-28 represented the "deadlock of the 
revolution" for Serge, the years 1928-1933 comprised his 
"years of resistance" followed by three years (1933-1936) of 
captivity. His personal experience in those years illuminates 
the struggle of the Opposition against the Party-State as well 
as the struggle of the individual against the 'relentless, 
overwhelming pressure of a totalitarian system.m1
1928 —  a watershed year in Soviet political development 
—  was a turning point in Serge's life. He was expelled from 
the Bolshevik Party, though he remained a Left Oppositionist, 
and was arrested that spring. The arrest was short and 
inconsequential in terms of his other periods of captivity, but 
clearly marked a new period in Serge's life. Open political 
activity was now denied him, ending a period of 10 years of 
furious activity within the Bolshevik Party and another 13 years 
of political activity in Europe2 as an anarchist, syndicalist, 
and socialist.
Another significant event was to mark this point in Serge's 
life: he suffered an attack of intestinal occlusion just days 
after his release from prison. His physical condition had never 
been strong, probably due to a life of privation from 
childhood.3 Serge felt he had narrowly escaped death. 1928
1Memoirs, p. 244.
2More than six of these years was spent in prison.
3 •His childhood was extremely poor; Serge described meals 
of stale bread dunked in coffee; his younger brother didn't
(continued...)
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marked the year that he suffered a 'political death' as well as 
a nearly dying. In such moments, one is forced to consider the 
deeper meaning of one's life, and to evaluate one's life work 
and duty. Serge did exactly this and determined that he must 
give the rest of his life over to writing. He sketched out in 
his mind a series of documentary novels about these 
'unforgettable times.'4
Serge's decision to become a serious writer was conscious, 
deliberate, and supported by those around him. The decision did 
not come out of the blue, but had antecedents. We have already 
discussed Serge's last meeting with Trotsky, in which they 
discussed Serge's literary intervention in the French left. 
Vlady, Serge's son, recalled Nikos Kazantzakis' words to Serge 
when he stayed with the family in Leningrad six months before 
Serge's arrests he insisted that Serge was a writer, a novelist, 
first and foremost. Vlady felt Kazantzakis' words were well 
taken by Serge.5 Richard Greeman considered 1928 as a "crucial 
turning point in Serge's life"6, and Serge himself wrote of his 
decision, taken in a moment of 'rich and tranquil inner
3(...continued)
survive the spartan regime, dying of starvation at the age of 
9. Memoirs, p. 5. Serge's 5 years in a French prison also 
contributed to his weakened physical condition, as did his 
years in Orenburg, later.
4Memoirs, p. 161
5In private conversation, May 17, 1987, Mexico City.
Ironically, Kazantzakis returned from Russia feeling sorry he 
and Serge had not enjoyed a closer rapport. In the biography 
of Nikos Kazantzakis, Helen Kazantzakis (his wife) wrote that 
Kazantzakis thought Serge "a tried and tested revolutionary 
... [who] had translated Trotsky .. .had known Lenin intimately 
from the early days, and all of Lenin's comrades. You could 
have confidence in him. " Nikos Kazantzakis. a Biography based 
on his letters, Helen Kazantzakis, Creative Arts Book co., 
Berkeley, 1983, pp. 222-223.
6Greeman, op. cit., p. 415.
191
lucidity' at death's door.7 The decision however, was guided 
principally by political considerations. Serge had a lot to 
tell.
Serge explained that when he entered the Russian revolution 
he gave up writing literature. Serge obviously believed the 
needs of the revolution precluded 'serious writing.' As editor 
of the French Inprecorr. and a frequent contributor to various 
French journals, Serge chronicled and analyzed the heady years 
of revolution, Civil War, and the German revolution. Yet he 
considered that this work contained "nothing of value" since 
"there was such a striking discrepancy between my sensibility 
and my opinions."8 Being a Party journalist was not serious 
writing in Serge's estimation.
Ten years later, Serge felt in tune with himself and 
thought that the reactionary phase now entered would be lengthy. 
He also reasoned the West would be stabilized and since he was 
"refused the right to join the work of industrialization, except 
at the price of my freedom of opinion, I could [while remaining 
uncompromising as an Oppositionist forced into inactivity] 
provide a serviceable testimony on these times."9
To Serge, writing was something to engage in when one was 
unable to fight actively to change the world. By his own 
admission, he had renounced writing when he entered the Russian 
revolution, only returning to it during periods when open 
political action was not feasible, as in the Vienna years. 
Political journalism, which was part of the political struggle 
itself, Serge continued throughout his life. Writing 
literature, however important and illuminating, took a back seat
7Memoirs, p. 263-4.
Ibid. p. 262. Serge's articles in Inprecor during the 




to what Serge termed his 'duty' as 'dictated by history 
itself.'10 Unceremoniously prevented from further active 
service to the revolution he had served ten years, Serge would 
now bring the political maturity gained during his years of 
struggle to his writing. No longer bound by party discipline, 
Serge was freed from caution, Aesopian language and the 
'striking discrepancy between my sensibility and my opinions.' 
He set to work on Year One, gathered material for Year Two, and 
finished Hen in Prison, his first novel.
Serge traded activism for the pen, and wrote with a missions 
to expose and analyze the significance of the rise of Stalinism 
and the Stalinists. Serge worked ceaselessly until he died, 
churning out novels, histories, pamphlets, polemics. In the 
years 1928-1936, while still in the Soviet Union, Serge wrote 
four novels, two short stories, one volume of poetry, six works 
of history, politics and literary theory; translated three 
novels, poems, and seven volumes of history, politics, theory 
and memoirs. Such a prodigious, almost incredible record is even 
more amazing, considering the difficult circumstances in which 
Serge labored.
Serge also resolved to write a certain way. He eschewed the 
personal and sentimental which characterized French novels; he 
would write about great historical events, in which the actions 
of the masses, not of a single character, would drive the plot.
Serge's historical and political works are partisan yet 
scholarly, coherent and analytical and based on first hand 
knowledge on both personal his experience and his immersion in 
source material. Yet he searched for a vehicle which would 
allow a larger "scope for showing men as they really live, 
dismantling their inner workings and penetrating deep into their 




entirely and demanded time and access to resources he could not
afford. Serge turned to literature, but not for its commercial
value nor snob appeals his conception of writing needed a
"mightier justification":
"as a means of expressing to men what most of them
live inwardly without being able to express, as a
means of communion, a testimony to the vast flow of
life through us, whose essential aspects we must try
to fix for the benefit of those who will come after 
.. 12 us."
Other Serge studies have analyzed his literary expression. 
Richard Greeman has written various articles and the last 
section of his doctoral dissertation examines how Serge's 
political conceptions led him to adopt a revolutionary literary 
style suitable to his subject. William Marshall has written a 
thesis on the relationship between ideology and literary 
expression in the works of Victor Serge, and various others13 
have analyzed Serge's literary output. Serge himself wrote, in 
his Memoirs and his Carnets, of his literary influences and 
motivations. What was crucial to Serge was what he had to tell, 
and he adopted an appropriate form to do so; that of 
revolutionary testimony. Here we are more concerned with the 
political / historical events and controversies in which Serge 
was both witness and participant, and with his perceptions of 
these subjects as expressed in his political allegiance and 
activity, and in his political, historical and journalistic 
writings. The emphasis here is on analyzing the 'other' Serge,
12 Ibid.
13For example, Roy Johnson, "Victor Serge as Revolutionary 
Novelist," in Literature and History A New Journal for the 
Humanities, Vol. 5s 1 Spring 1979, pp. 58-85, John Berger, The 
Look of Things Essays by John Berger, New York, Viking Press, 
1974, pp. 74-79, Alan Swingewood in The Novel and Revolution, 
The MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1975, pp. 169-190, Irving 
Howe, "Serge's Novel," in The New International, January- 
February 1951, pp. 56-59.
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the serious political writer /activist whose views shaped and 
reflected important historical events.
* * *
During the five years Serge spent in precarious liberty in 
Moscow and Leningrad, his literary writings in Western Europe 
paralleled his own life. The left in the West found his work 
too critical and thus boycotted it; bourgeois critics found it 
too revolutionary and withheld public comment. Within the 
Soviet Union, Serge was told, point-blank: "You can produce a
masterpiece every year, but so long as you are not back in the 
line of the Party, not a line of yours will see the light l"14 
To this day, not a single one of Serge' s books have been printed 
in the Soviet Union.15
Serge was not singled out for boycott. The fate of Soviet 
writers and artists under Stalin was tragic. Those who managed 
to conform to Stalinist strictures published, but Serge agreed 
with Max Eastman, these were "writers in uniform." Censorship 
mutilated creative expression. Serge recalled seeing the first 
edition of the Encyclopedic Dictionary, the product of years of 
work, sent to be pulped. Serge himself translated Maria 
Shaginyan's novel Hvdrocentral, a product of bureaucratic 
conformity.
The history of the annihilation of Soviet non-conformist 
writers in the years of the Great Terror —  well-known and 
lesser-known —  has yet to be written. Under the 'glasnost' of 
Gorbachev in today's Soviet Union, some writers are being 
resurrected, but no account of their collective fate has been 
published. Serge wrote an essay on "La Tragedie des ecrivains 
sovietiques (Conscience de l'ecrivain)" published in Paris in
14As told to Serge by Ilya Yonov, an old friend, former 
Zinovievite Oppositionist, now the head of the literary 
publishing house of the State Press. Memoirs, p. 262.
15A1though Men In Prison was translated, proofread and 
made into pages. Ibid. In 1989, some of Serge's fiction 
finally began to appear in Soviet literary journals.
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Jan. 1947 and reprinted in English in Now No. 7 (1947) in which 
he traced the fate of some writers, and discussed the 
contortions of the surviving conformist writers. In the article. 
Serge mentioned the fate of certain "master-writers" of Soviet 
Literature, such as Boris Pilniak, Isaac Babel, Voronski, 
Ivanov-Razumnik, and Osip Mandelstam. How the hundreds of 
lesser-known writers, authors of revolutionary memoirs vanished, 
is something known only to directors of the Secret Service of 
the Political Police. Serge added that perhaps they knew and 
only perhaps since "the police chiefs who made the purges have 
themselves disappeared. The rule is that once the man is 
suppressed, his works are eliminated, his name is no longer 
pronounced; it is erased from the past and even from history. "16 
Serge characterized the atmosphere for writers in this 
period as one of 'overpowering, sickening absurdity.' Writers 
were 'compelled to fanatical obedience' in their 'prestigious' 
meetings of the writers union. Serge recalled the confused 
reaction of the great Bavarian anarchist poet/playwright Ernst 
Toller, when "young men of letters, who were none the less 
practically unlettered, suggested the formation of 'mopping-up 
squads,' to go to the second-hand bookshops and remove from them 
historical works which the Leader had just attacked. "17
Serge was entirely out of place among such 'literati' and 
his presence both compromised and reproached them. In order to 
make a living, Serge worked for the Lenin Institute, translating 
into French Lenin's collected works, although as an 
oppositionist, his name was kept out of the published volumes. 
His translations were "checked, line by line, by experts charged
16"The Conscience of the Writer" reprinted from Now in 
David Craig's anthology Marxists on Literaturer Penguin Books, 
Middlesex, England, 1973, p. 439. French edition, published as
supplement to Masses Jan. 1947 in "Les Egaux" p. 7.
17Memoirs, p. 272.
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with the task of uncovering possible sabotage in the disposition 
of semicolons."18
4.2 The 'Inner Counterrevolution's From NEP to Nightmare
By 1927-28, the combination of lack of industrial policy 
and the growth of the private sector in agriculture led to a 
grain crisis.19 The low prices peasants were offered for their 
grain coupled with the high prices charged for scarce industrial 
goods was a powerful disincentive to produce more than the 
peasant needed for himself and his family. Then a series of 
poor harvests threatened both the state's export plans and food 
supplies. The peasants boycotted grain requisitions and Stalin 
responded by ordering extraordinary measures to collect the 
grain. Red Army soldiers began to take the grain from the 
peasants at gunpoint.
Serge wrote in Soviets 1929 that there were five real 
causes of the crisis: 1) the general poverty of the Russian 
peasants and the backward state of agriculture which used 
millions of ox carts and was unaware of the existence of 
chemical fertilizers; 2) the growth in population from 135 
million in 1914 to 145 million in 1926, despite the war and 
famine; in times of peace growth would be 2-3 million per year;
3) the weakness of industry which meant scarcity of quality 
goods, and high prices for manufactured goods compared to low 
prices offered for the peasant's grain; 4) the effects of the 
bureaucratic regime in the countryside which in practice 
frustrated all the decrees and allowed the real kulaks to hide
18Ibid. p. 173.
19A useful discussion of the chain of events set in motion 
by the general crisis in NEP in 1927-28, leading to the 
wholesale and ruthless collectivization of the peasants in
1929-30 can be found in Moshe Lewin's book Russian Peasants 
and Soviet Power: A study of Collectivization, Northwestern 
University Press, 1968.
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what they actually had; and 5) the conscious resistance of the
rich peasants, sustained by the majority of cultivators because
"all peasants are at ease ... who dream unconsciously of
20becoming a little capitalist."
The grain crisis, predicted by the Left Opposition 
broke out less than three months after the expulsion of the 
Opposition at the Fifteenth Party Congress. Pravda declared in 
February 1928 that the peasants refused to deliver their grain 
to the state because they weren't paid enough for it. Nor were 
there sufficient commodity equivalents to make it worth their 
while.21
Stalin's Central Committee responded with Article 107 of 
the Penal Code on concealment of stocks22. Requisitioning began 
as fields were stripped of their crops. Reminiscent of the 
Civil War period and War Communism, "Communists were found at 
the roadsides with their skulls split open. The stacks of 
confiscated grain were set on fire. There was no fodder at 
all 1,23
Serge used both the terms 'requisitioning' and 'confiscated 
grain' to discuss the razverstka, or method of (forced) 
procurement of grain. Moshe Lewin called the razverstka —  
especially in the use of article 107 against the kulak in 1928,
■—  an 'emergency measure', "the allocation by administrative
20Panait Istrati (ghosted by Serge), Soviets 1929. pp. 22-
23.
21Serge, RTYA, p. 163.
22Serge, Memoirs, p. 246.
23Ibid. Lars Lih devoted an article in Slavic Review, 
Winter 1986, to a discussion of how the 'quota assessment' —  
his preferred translation of razverstka —  was carried out 
during War Communism, and how the term has been misinterpreted 
by many historians as requisitioning or confiscation, the 
terms Serge employed.
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order of quantities of produce to be delivered by households,
irrespective of the views of the latter."24
Stalin's brutal bureaucratic response to the grain crisis
set a pattern of response to difficulty, leading his regime from
one exploit to another, with increasing human and social costs.
The issue of power remained paramount. Opposition was settled
first by deportation, later by prison or death. Serge noted
that Stalin was caught in a blind alley with no policy, but was
"dominated by the instinct of preservation. "25
As Stalin was ridding himself of Party opposition, he
suddenly faced massive peasant resistance —  more than 300
centers of peasant insurrection flaring up simultaneously in 
26Soviet Eurasia —  and thus declared war on the peasantry, 
designating them as kulaks, to be wiped out as a class.
Serge devoted a chapter to the grain crisis and the kulak 
in his Soviets 1929, as well as a chapter on collectivization 
and industrialization in his Destiny of a Revolution of 1936- 
37.27 In the 1929 work, Serge explained the background to the 
crisis and restated the positions of the left, right and center 
of the Party in posing solutions. We will further analyze this 
work below.
24Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and soviet Power, pp. 217- 
218, and p. 532.
25RTYA, p. 163.
26Serge, Memoirs. p. 257.
27It should be noted here that Serge's ideas are spread 
throughout his works, but rarely contradict each other-.- Thus, 
an argument that is bluntly stated without elaboration in his 
Memoirs of 1941 is illustrated and explained in one of the 
other books, or in an article. Sometimes the same argument is 
repeated verbatim in several places. His consistency of 
position allows us to selectively quote from one or another of 
his works, since the four main texts of Serge are broadly 
similar and in places practically identical though written 
over the space of more than a decade.
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To break the considerable resistance of the peasants,
Stalin embarked on a war against the class enemy and began mass
deportation of the so-called kulaks and their families to the
icy north. In a brilliant little book, From Lenin to Stalin,
Serge demonstrated the interrelation of cause and effect in the
Soviet experience, showing how the consequences of a policy, or
of no policy, cannot be evaded. Examining the consequences of
Stalinism, in fact, led Serge to state unequivocally that it is
"a hundred times untrue that the end justifies the 
means. ... Every end requires its own means, and an 
end is only obtained by the appropriate means. ...
More personal well-being, more liberty, fewer lies, 
more dignity, more respect for humanity. The 
socialism which proceeds otherwise gives in to a sort 
of inner counterrevolution, discredits itself and 
risks suicide.''28
Economic factors plus bad leadership led to the crisis of 
1928 and to the terrible solutions which destroyed the soul of 
socialism. Stalin spent years defeating Trotsky while industry 
stagnated, while NEPmen and rich peasants grew comfortable. By 
1928 the peasant lost his incentive to sell grain or even to 
sow, since his crops were likely to be stolen. The political 
struggle within the party had overshadowed everything for 
Stalin; power was paramount. Thus years were lost in starting 
industrialization. Because the Opposition was perceived as a 
threat to the rule of the center and the right, they ignored and 
rejected the substance of Opposition policy and the dangers that 
policy addressed.
As Serge noted in his 1936 study, Russia Twenty Years 
After, the return of requisitioning met with fierce resistance, 
especially since the requisitions were illegal and ran counter 
to the often repeated promises the Party had made, to the 
peasants. Stalin's response to the resistance was to dispossess 
the peasant and force him on to the collective farm.
28FLTS p. 58.
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Serge maintained that no one had foreseen or could have 
predicted wholesale, forced collectivization. The idea was 
madness, especially since the Collective farms weren't prepared. 
The very idea of collectivizing agriculture had been to make it 
advantageous both to the peasants and national agriculture. The 
plan, conceived since 1925-26, envisioned collectivizing only as 
much land as could be supplied with agricultural machinery. The 
whole purpose of collectivization was to industrialize 
agricultural production and provide an attractive alternative to 
the small farms of the peasantry. The Kolkhoz without tractors 
made no sense. Indeed, Serge referred to collective farm 
activity as "large-scale motoculture."29 He added that 'this 
would have been the only, the genuine socialist policy and the 
peasants would have promptly convinced themselves of the 
benefits of the new mode of production over small-scale and
30primitive cultivation."
Stalin's actions, as Serge pointed out, were no longer
dictated by the interests of the 'community,' but by those of
the emerging bureaucracy. Stalin declared war on the
resisters, "designated as enemies of the people ... [to] be
'liquidated as a class'." Those now labeled kulaks, including
many peasants, Serge pointed out, who had fought well for the
soviets were suddenly driven from their homes
"packed together in cattle carts and sent in 
trainloads to the subarctic tundras, the forests of 
Siberia, the marshes of Narym, the sandy wastes of 
Kazakhstan. All the deserts of the vast Russias are 
going to swarm with little white crosses. Several 
million peasants will undergo this fate. It will be 




history has ever known and its concrete details are 
atrocious."31
Quoting the Russian scholar Prokopovich who used admittedly 
unreliable official statistics (at the time Prokopovich was 
making his study the statisticians were being imprisoned and 
shot) Serge estimated that when collectivization was completed
32in 1936, 5 million peasant families had disappeared. We need
not go into the details here about how this forced policy was
carried out, but in the last five years a wealth of literature
has appeared in the West on the collectivization and the famine
in the Ukraine, and the subject is now being examined seriously
in the Soviet Union itself, as a result of 'glasnost.' While
the bureaucratic policy had terrible consequences for millions,
Serge sought to demonstrate how people had resisted. He
recounted the story a comrade had told him about the resistance
of women in a Kuban Cossack village:
They had undressed, thinking that nobody would dare to 
take them, nude, from their dwellings and lead them to 
the train by force. The young communists, the party 
and G.P.U. men, surrounded the village in which all 
the men had previously been arrested, dragged from 
their homes the dishevelled women and their kids, 
crazed with fear and rage, and brutally drove this 
naked floe to the station... .The children the old 
folk, and the feeble succumbed en masse. The
newspapers, however, overflowed with copy on the 
collectivist enthusiasm of the agrarians. In Monde I
RTYA p. 168. Serge suggested elsewhere that 5 million 
peasant families suffered this fate, a figure confirmed by 
Moshe Lewin in his study on Soviet Peasants. Lewin affirmed 
that 5 million households and 10 million peasants were
affected, although this figure indicates that peasant 
households only contained 2 people. Moshe Lewin, 'Russian 
Peasants and Soviet Power, pp. 507-508. Recent scholarship on 
collectivization both in the West (Robert Conquest's study on 
the artificially created famine) and within the Soviet Union, 
now suggests even greater numbers. In a Soviet study reported 




read the shocking prose of Barbusse on the miracle of 
the collectivization."33
The resulting devastation on agriculture is by now well 
known. Peasants slaughtered their livestock and burnt their 
grain. The country went from poverty to famine. There was no 
bread for workers in the cities nor for soldiers in the army. 
Bread-cards were issued, wages dropped, the black market grew 
and industry was affected. Total collectivization promised 
utter disaster and even Stalin had to call a halt when it had 
reached 68%, in March 1930, at the height of terror, famine and 
frenzy. His famous article, "Dizzy with Success"34 called a 
temporary retreat.35 As entire populations were deported, Serge 
noted that peasants rushed toward the borders of China, Poland, 
and Rumania, risking machine-gun fire to cross. "In a message
3 RTYA, pp. 168-169. As a footnote to this barbarous 
episode, the Central Committee member in charge of beating 
naked women with rifle-butts as they were driven to be loaded 
in cattle-cars, —  comrade Sheboldayev —  was shot in 1937 for 
his enthusiasm. Memoirs, p. 247.
34Stalin, "Golovokruzhenie ot uspekhov. K voprosam 
kolkhoznogo dvizheniia," Sochineniia 12 s 191-199. The article 
"Dizzy with Success" appeared in Prayda, March 2, 1930.
35The whole question of collectivization, 
industrialization and terror is being opened in the Soviet 
Union today. The new information resulting from this research 
will be vital to enhancing our understanding of these 
processes. In an article that recently appeared in the Soviet 
Nedelya, April 11-17, 1988, by Russian Republic Honored
Scientist Igor Vasilyevich Bestuzhev-Lada (Doctor of History, 
head of a sector of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of 
Sociological Research, and Professor at Moscow State 
University) states that "It is clear that the article "Dizzy 
with Success" (March 2, 1930) was simply a tactical maneuver. " 
He questions, therefore, why the policy was continued once its 
disastrous, 'catastrophic' nature had become clear. Later in 
the same article, Dr. Bestuzhev-Lada wonders whether Stalin's 
shooting of Yagoda and Yezhov wasn't again 'diversionary 
maneuvers' in the spirit of the article "Dizzy with Success," 
suggesting that both were attempts to 'adjust the process' 
rather than any real retreat. See Nedelya, April 11-17, 1988,
pp. 10-11.
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to the Government, the Abkhazes of the Southern Caucasus offer 
it all their possessions; with oriental politeness, they thank 
the government for all the benefits it has heaped upon them and 
ask only one favors permission to emigrate to Turkey.1,36
With the publication of Stalin's reproach to forced 
collectivization in March 1930, permission had effectively been 
given to leave the kolkhoz. The peasants left en masses between 
March and June 1930 half of the newly 'collectivized' peasants 
abandoned the collective farms. Had the collectivization drive 
not been halted there would have been no spring planting. Once 
the crops were harvested in the autumn, the collectivization 
campaign was renewed with vigor, although the artel (allowing a 
private plot, cow and chickens) was now made the basic unit. 
Scarcity resulting from the peasant's dislocation turned to 
famine by 1932. The problem of reduced harvests resulting from 
peasant resistance was exacerbated by the State confiscation of 
grain for the cities, the army and export.
Such were the results of Stalin's attempt to destroy an 
enemy class. Trotsky had noted that an entire class could not 
be eliminated by administrative methods, but "only by a change 
in technology and the mode of production.... It was no more 
possible to create large-scale mechanized agriculture out of 
wooden ploughs and kulak horses than it was to create a ship by
37adding up fishing boats." Trotsky's perceptions of the
36Serge, FLTS p. 64.
37Leon Trotsky, Bvulleten' Qppozitsii, IX (1930), p. 3. 
Quoted in Richard Day's excellent article "Leon Trotsky on the 
Problems of the Smychka and Forced Collectivization" in 
Critique 13. 1981, pp. 55-68. In an interesting variation of 
Trotsky's quote, Anton Ciliga, cites Trotsky as having said: 
"By putting together the poor hoes and the poor nags of the 
mujiks one no more creates large agricultural estates than one 
creates a large steamer by putting together a lot of fishing 
boats." Anton Ciliga, The Russian Enigma. London, The Labour 
Book Service, 1940, p. 270. (First published in Paris in 1938 
as Au Pays du Grand Mensonqe.) Finally, Serge quotes Trotsky
(continued...)
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problems the Soviet state had with the peasantry came from an 
understanding of Marxism. He wrote that the transcendence of 
the contradiction between industry and agriculture would require 
the industrialization of agriculture. Serge concurred. Stalin 
and Bukharin, on the other hand, in the period before wholesale 
collectivization and following the logic of 'socialism in one 
country,' sought to overcome the urban-rural contradiction 
through the mechanism of trade and finance between the sectors. 
Trotsky emphasized that the material transformation of the basis 
of rural production was the key to the urban-rural 
contradiction.
Serge bemoaned the absence of socialist spirit and the 
disregard of the Marxist classics, especially Engels' ideas on 
the socialist attitude to small peasant property. Serge 
recalled Lenin's recommendations: make an ally of the middle 
peasant, fight the rich peasant who is becoming a small 
capitalist, but do not coerce the peasant masses.38 Lenin's 
policy towards the peasants during the Civil War, despite 
mistakes and abuse, led to victory; Stalin's crude parody in
1930-31 led to disaster.
Understanding the interrelation of industry and agriculture 
was fundamental to the formulation of policy. Stalin's 
dictatorial reactive agricultural policy led to distortions in 
industry. Total collectivization, unforseen and unplanned, 
created a need for giant factories to produce agricultural
37(.. .continued)
in FLTS: ..."From his exile in Constantinople, Trotsky never 
ceased to protest severely against what he considered a 'fatal 
economic adventure. ' No more than you can build a 
transatlantic liner by assembling hundreds or thousands of 
fishing smacks —  he wrote with bitter irony —  can you create 
modern, large-scale agriculture by forcing small farmers to 
pool together their ploughs, their oxen, and their 
chickens... .True socialist collectivization must be brought to 
the farmer by showing him the unquestionable advantage of its 
mechanization and planning." FTLS, p. 66.
38RTYA. p. 169.
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machinery. This used up resources intended for other sectors. 
As Serge observed, collectivization produced a shortage of raw 
materials, hostility, a ruined agriculture, and destroyed the 
plan for industry. As hostile peasants hoarded grain and 
destroyed their livestock, agricultural output dwindled;39 
Stalin demanded higher quotas and extracted every last grain in 
the Ukraine for the cities and export. This state-organized 
famine killed 7 million peasants in 1932-33.40 To Serge's 
credit he wrote about this atrocity when it was widely denied in 
the West.41 Serge noted wryly that collectivization produced 
anarchy rather than a plan, quoting Souvarine's expression, 'the 
anarchy of the plan.' Serge wrote: "Instead of applying a
political pattern, Stalin is reduced to improvisations."42
The period of forcible collectivization is being 
reevaluated by scholars both in the West and in the USSR. 
Serge's writings on the beginning of the creation of the
9Trotsky had predicted that all-round collectivization 
would destroy incentives and lead to "all-round weeds in the 
fields." Bvulletin' Qppozitsii. XXXI (1932), p. 6, quoted in 
Day, Ibid, p. 67.
40Serge, RTYA, p. 170. See also Bohdan Krawchenko, "The 
Famine in the Ukraine in 1933," Critique 17. 1986, pp. 137- 
147, and Robert Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow. Oxford University 
Press, 1986.
410n the fiftieth anniversary of the famine in 1983, the 
whole story of the suppression of the facts by prominent 
Western journalists such as Walter Duranty of the New York 
Times and Louis Fischer of the New Republic came out. Few 
correspondents reported the truth about the famine, although 
it was thought that Duranty had sold out or the Soviets had 
something on him. One of the exceptions was the reporting by 
Malcolm Muggeridge of the Manchester Guardian who wrote a 
series of articles describing the horrors of the famine in 
Ukraine and the North Caucasus. Andrew Smith, in his Memoir,
I Was a Soviet Worker, wrote of a boat trip on the Volga which 
passed through the starving hamlets of the countryside, 
described in grisly detail. The Western coverage of the 
famine is discussed in Conquest, op. cit.. pp.308-321.
42 Serge, RTYA. p. 163.
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Stalinist system are that of a revolutionary documentarian, 
analyst, witness and participant. He analyzed Stalin's 
political directives and their effects on ordinary Soviet 
citizens. In Serge's analysis, collectivization and forced 
industrial development were part of the attack arsenal of the 
emerging Stalinist elite on the whole of Soviet society. In 
analyzing these events, Serge stood on the left of the Left 
Opposition, although easy characterizations are elusive and 
inadequate. As we shall see below, Serge's writings on 
industrialization are extremely penetrating, right from the 
beginning. As early as 1929 Serge pointed out that the Soviets 
were creating useless factories, wasting tremendous human and 
social resources. His analysis is contradictory —  not just 
because reality itself was contradictory, but because of 
internal contradictions in the Left Opposition's analysis which 
they couldn't have seen at the time. In the space of a few 
pages Serge would question the nature of industrial growth, and 
then follow with a statement about how a planned economy was 
responsible for the accomplishment of industrialization. This 
contradiction, which fits within the constraints of Trotsky's 
political position, will be discussed in the last chapter 
dealing with Serge's last writings on the Soviet Union.
4.3 The Vocation of Defeated Revolutionists: Serge, the
Clandestine Oppositionist in Precarious Liberty
At the beginning of 1928 Serge remained alone with 
Alexandra Bronstein, Trotsky's first wife, in the Leningrad 
branch of the Opposition. There had already been many arrests, 
thanks in large measure to effective GPU infiltration.43 Serge
One of the agents, Tverskoy cleaned up the Moscow 
Opposition, including the old Bolshevik Boris Mikhailovich 
Eltsin, who was to appear in many of Serge's novels as 
'Elkin.' After Tverskoy successfully led the Oppositional 
sympathizers in Moscow factories into arrest, he offered his 
services to the Leningrad Opposition —  ostensibly to help
(continued...)
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believed that the only way to survive would be to work openly, 
intransigently, in a loyal opposition to the Party which was 
strangling itself. Trotsky was in exile in Alma-Ata, writing 
that the system was still proletarian, to be defended, as was 
the Party. Serge's thoughts were filled with bitter irony; in 
the Memoirs he noted that nobody was willing to admit that the 
bureaucratic state "had emerged from our own hands to crush us" 
and that the idea, held throughout the Party and the Opposition 
that the only way to serve the Revolution was through the Party, 
consigned the Opposition to "rebel and turn us against 
ourselves." ... "We were defeated by Party patriotism.1,44 Serge 
wrote these lines in 1941, and it is not possible to know if he 
was projecting his thoughts from 1941 backward to 1928, but if 
it is true that he advocated an open, loyal opposition to the 
Bolshevik Party in 1928, (albeit without an organization) Serge 
was indeed a maverick; other oppositionists wavered between 
capitulation and clandestinity, with a view to being 
reintegrated into the Party.
The Stalinist counter-revolution made the question 
academic. Open political agitation was simply not possible. 
Serge wrote that the leaders of the defeated Opposition 
(presumably Zinoviev, Preobrazhensky, Trotsky et al) discussed 
setting up a strong clandestine organization which would later 
"achieve rehabilitation in the Party...with freedom of speech 
and propaganda"45 Serge opposed the idea, calling it an 
illusion in the face of a powerful and ubiquitous secret police
43(.. .continued)
them 'reorganize'. Alexandra Bronstein and Serge refused his 
'help' but he nevertheless organized "fifty or so workers, 
only to have it [the shadow organization] rally noisily to the 
'general line' within two months, while those who resisted 
were thrown into jail. This police manoeuvre was repeated in 
all the working-class centres." Memoirs, p. 245.
44Ibid.o. 245.
45 Ibid., p. 244.
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dedicated to seeking out and crushing opposition, and secondly 
because "our own ideological and sentimental loyalty to the 
Party made us vulnerable both to political manoeuvrings, and 
even more, to police provocation." Serge again reiterated that 
open activity was preferable to being bundled into illegality, 
that the Opposition must defend its right to exist, write, 
think, speak openly. The hopelessness of the clandestine 
project also contained an irony: the vanquished opposition had 
not fought for freedom of expression and propaganda within the 
society at large. Were they now demanding something for 
themselves which they had denied their previous opponents? 
Preobrazhensky and Trotsky had much to say about inner-party 
democracy in the 1920's: it was not until the second half of the 
thirties that Trotsky wrote of political pluralism and a multi­
party system in the USSR. Serge consistently defended broad 
democratic rights both inside and outside the Party, and had 
even suggested in 1923-4 that a coalition government was 
preferable to the bureaucratic rule on its way to becoming the 
'dictatorship of the secretariat and secret police.'
During the next two years Stalin turned on the Right 
Opposition, initiated dekulakization and collectivization and 
began his program of crash industrialization. The Opposition 
was scattered to the far reaches of the Soviet Union.46 The 
Oppositionists' confusion in the face of what appeared to be 
Stalin's adoption of some of the tenets of their own program —  
albeit a crude caricature of their positions —  made unity among 
them difficult. Serge admitted that "the vocation of defeated 
revolutionists in a totalitarian state is a hard one. Many 
abandon you when they see the game is lost. Others, whose
46In fact, by 1929 only three well known Oppositionists 
in the entire U.S.S.R. remained in liberty, albeit precarious: 
Andres Nin in Moscow and Alexandra Bronstein and Victor Serge 
in Leningrad. They were under surveillance, as were the wives 
of Oppositionist deportees. See Victor Serge and Natalia 
Sedova Trotsky, The Life and Death of Leon Trotsky. Wildwood 
House Ltd, London, 1975, p. 161.
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personal courage and devotion are above question, think it best 
to maneuver to adapt themselves to the circumstances.”47
Serge recognized that Stalin had taken elements of the 
Opposition programme, emptied of their democratic content, and 
ruthlessly implemented them. The Opposition had proposed a tax 
on the rich kulak —  Stalin had him eliminated. The Opposition 
had proposed a limiting NEP —  Stalin had it abolished. The 
Opposition had favored industrialization —  Stalin initiated it 
late, on a grand scale, at enormous human and social cost. The 
banner of the Opposition's program had been working class 
democracy —  one Opposition fundamental that Stalin made no 
attempt to appropriate.
Still, some Oppositionists rallied to Stalin and the 
'general line' because elements of the Opposition program were 
applied. Perhaps capitulation was preferable to political 
immobility. The Party was still the 'only game in town' and for 
life-long revolutionaries to be cut off from political activity 
was to live without meaning. In this manner Piatakov, 
Krestinsky, Sokolnikov, Antonov-Ovseenko, Ivan Smirnov, and 
Smilga all capitulated.48 Zinoviev and Kamenev made
47Serge, FLTS, p. 53.
48Isaac Deutscher, in the second volume of his Trotsky 
biography, suggests that Stalin lured these Oppositionists to 
his side with his 'left turn' as he needed their assistance to 
defeat the Bukharinists and take on the kulaks, but he feared 
that a reconciliation with Trotsky would mean Trotsky's 
triumph. His secret appeals to the confused Oppositionists 
centered on the futility of their Opposition now that he was 
implementing elements of their program. Indeed, Trotsky had 
called for 'critical support' for Stalin against Bukharin, the 
kulak and the NEPmen. The persecuted and ^exiled 
Oppositionists, whose morale was at a low point, saw the 
reasons for their Opposition disappear as their 'cause' was 
partly taken up by their persecutor. Their battle became 
purposeless according to Deutscher, who attempted to unravel 
their thought processes. See Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed 
Trotsky; 1921-1929. pp.407-411. The recantations and
capitulations did not affect all Oppositionists: Serge
(continued...)
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capitulation a way of life. They gave many reasons but
basically they boiled down to a) the mistaken impression that
the Opposition program was being implemented; b) the
rationalization that the USSR was in danger, or c) it was
preferable to capitulate and take part in building rather than
to be consigned to inactivity defending ideological purity.
Trotsky, in a letter to Rakovsky in July 1928, wrote that the
capitulationists imagined that "the Stalinist faction, having
moved leftwards, had only a 'rightist tail' behind it and should
be persuaded to rid itself of it." Doubting the truth of this,
Trotsky remarked, "an ape freed of its tail is not yet a human
being."49 Anton Giliga saw the capitulators ass
"intellectuals [who] cared very little about the fate 
of the working class. That was not the factor that 
decided their political attitude, it was the speeded- 
up industrialization and the offensive against the 
kulaks. Their attitude towards the horrible
oppression and exploitation under which the workers 
suffered was exactly the same as that of the 
Stalinists and Bukharinists. "50
In fact Ciliga admitted that many of them saw Stalin as
necessary, saw Russia as Asiatic and backward in need of a
dictatorship to save the revolution, and who dismissed Ciliga's
protestations as "Western illusions."51
48(.. .continued)
belonged to the group of ' irreconcilables' who were in general 
younger, less tied to the old Party and attracted to the 
revolution by the principles of proletarian democracy which 
were paramount. The left course of Stalin, devoid of any 
democratic content, had no appeal to this group.
49Trotsky to Rakovsky, July 13, 1928. Quoted in
Deutscher, Volume 2, p. 447n.
50Ciliga, The Russian Enigma, pp. 84-85.
51Ibid. A Soviet diplomat had told Ciliga that "the way 
of Genghis Khan and Stalin" suited Asiatic Russia better than 
"the European civilization of Leon Davidovitch." (p. 85) The
(continued.. .)
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Serge was both more profound and more kind. Though he was
not cut from the same cloth as the old Bolsheviks who debased
themselves by capitulating, he did not see them as opportunists.
In Serge's view,
These old Bolsheviks have no private life outside of 
their political activity; they attach little 
importance to what the bourgeoisie calls position, or 
even to happiness. Are they cowards? Ahead of them 
are nearly ten years of the most intolerable life, 
leading up to the most frightful end. Their attitude 
combines a great courage, an absolute devotion without 
phrases or gestures —  a courage which does not 
hesitate to cloak itself as pusillanimity, a devotion 
which does not shrink before the worst humiliations —  
with a very real intellectual and moral deficiency.
Too much attached to the party, they fear to see 
reality as it is. The party is finished. They shrink 
back before this final realization. They do not sense 
that in debasing themselves, they debase the 
Revolution; that it is better to remain erect and 
proud in error than to give an example of such 
abasement even for the best of causes. They aim to 
maneuver, in the belief that the main thing is to 
remain within the party until the day when 
spontaneously the decisive struggles break out which 
will make party reform possible.
Even comrades who understood the dynamic of capitulation later
succumbed to it. This phenomenon has been particularly
difficult for students, scholars and activists outside the
Soviet Union, to understand. We will return to this point when
we discuss the purges and confessions, about which Serge wrote
extensively.
51 (.. .continued)
Genghis Khan reference comes from Bukharin, who compared 
Stalin to Genghis Khan —  neither of whom had any scruples. 
Another Oppositionist said: "A workers' democracy is out of 
the guestion in Russia. Here the working class is so feeble 
and demoralized that to give it liberty would be to ruin the 
revolution once and for all. What may save it is an educated 
minority dictatorship . ... " ibid.
52 Serge, FLTS, pp. 53-54.
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4.4 "Soviets 1929"
In Leningrad (1927) Serge had met Panait Istrati53, the 
Rumanian novelist, and Nicos Kazantzakis, the Greek writer, 
while they were touring the Soviet Union. Serge was their 
political guide, and they made his flat their home base in the 
USSR.54 After Serge was released from his first Soviet arrest he 
and Istrati went to stay in a little dacha in the depths of the 
Bykovo woods55, where their friendship and collaboration grew. 
They spent three months in picturesque solitude in the fresh 
air, with plenty of time for discussion and reflection.56
Istrati had worked politically with Christian Rakovsky and 
was in the Soviet Union at Rakovsky's invitation. Istrati and 
Serge had visited a model prison colony in which the prisoners - 
- hardened criminals — ■ worked in freedom under their own 
supervision. Istrati commented ironically that in the Soviet 
Union one had to murder at least three people to live in comfort 
and under such a wonderful work system.57 Serge recalled that 
Istrati keenly observed and commented on many such ironies and 
injustices.
53Istrati, a man who came to writing after many varied 
experiences, was what Serge considered a true poet, "incapable 
of theoretical reasoning, and so could not fall into the trap 
of convenient sophistry." Serge heard people tell Panait: 
"Panait, one can't make an omelette without breaking eggs. 
Our revolution, ..." etc. He exclaimed, "All right, I can see 
the broken eggs. Where's this omelette of yours?" The phrase 
became famous as a description of the course of the Soviet 
Union. See Memoirs. p. 278.
54 Vlady recalled that Kazantzakis lived with them for six 
months in 1927-28. Taped interview, Mexico City, May "1987.
55Bykovo is about 40 kilometers from Moscow.
56Panait Istrati, Vers 1'autre flamme: Apres seize mois 
dans L'U.R.S.S 1927-1928, Union Generale d'Editions, 1980, 
pp. 113-114. Also in Serge, Memoirs, p. 277.
57Memoirs. p. 279.
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Istrati subsequently returned to France,58 heartbroken by
his experiences in the Soviet Union and resolved to write about
them. Still free in Leningrad, Serge wrote the second volume of
Istrati's trilogy on the Soviet Union, Vers L'Autre Flamme. In
fact, Istrati wrote only the first volume, Serge wrote the
second, and Boris Souvarine the third. As Victor Alba explains:
After long discussions with Souvarine, Istrati signed 
his own name to a second volume titled Soviets 1929 
and actually written by Victor Serge, then in 
Leningrad at liberty but still subject to harassment. 
Finally La Russie Nue (Russian Naked), a book of 
factual documentation, appeared signed by Istrati but 
written by Souvarine. Istrati signed the books with 
his name to aid their publicity: "I want the voices of 
my friends to be heard as widely as possible, to at 
least provoke the debate now prohibited in the USSR, 
and to try to save the Communist International."59
In the introduction to the 1980 edition of Panait Istrati's
Vers L 'autre Flamme, Marcel Mermoz recounts how Serge, in
Leningrad, managed to smuggle out the second volume of Istrati's
trilogy. Istrati's companion Bilili got past the police with
the manuscript hidden in her blouse. Mermoz confirms that
'Souvarine indeed wrote the well documented third volume of the
trilogy.60
58He had been in the Soviet Union twice: the first tour 
lasted three months until Dec. 1927; then he and Kazantzakis 
went to Athens, and after two months returned to tour the 
Soviet Union for a year. They went to Bykovo in the beginning 
of May 1928. Istrati left the USSR for France on 15 February 
1929. See Mermoz, p. 11, and Istrati, pp 199-202.
59"Boris Souvarine: Logic and Indignation," Journal of 
Contemporary Studies Vol. VIII, Number 4, Fall/Winter 1985, 
though appearing in Spring 1986. —  '
60Marcel Mermoz, Introduction, Vers 1' autre Flamme, 
Fondation Panait Istrati, 10/18, Union Generale d'Editions, 
Paris, 1980, pp.23-24. Richard Greeman, in his article 
"Victor Serge: Writer and Witness," New Politics, Vol. 1, No. 
2 (New. Series) Winter 1987, p. 214, confirms the story of 
Bilili carrying the manuscript in her bodice and cites Monique 
Jutrin-Klener, Panait Istrati. Paris, 1970, p. 9.
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The book is unquestionably penned by Serge, in his familiar 
style. While not of the calibre of his Year One of the Russian 
Revolution or of Destiny of a Revolution. Soviets 1929 resembles 
more his Portrait de Staline, directed to a mass audience. 
Written as the impressions and analysis of a political visitor 
from the West (Istrati from Rumania), the book clearly means to 
engage the reader's sympathy for the politics of Trotsky's Left
Opposition.61 Analyzing the Soviet situation in 1929, the year
62Stalin proclaimed "the Year of Great Change" , Serge's book 
renders the program of the Left Opposition, detailing the crisis 
in industry, agriculture, within the party, within the society, 
affecting the intellectual and moral life of the Soviet people 
and ending with the tragic situation of Soviet writers. The 
book follows the debates, from the twenties, between the right, 
centre and left, and presents them in clear, simple prose. It 
also lays out the kind of society created by Stalin's 'socialism 
in one country'; the rise of the bureaucracy, the mores and 
attitudes of the various sectors of society, their actual 
working and living conditions.
The work is polemical, taking the side of the Left 
Opposition while educating the reader on the positions of the 
other currents. Following the point of view of the Left
Clearly serge was never fooled/attracted, as other 
erstwhile Oppositionists were, to Stalin's apparent adoption 
of some of the Oppositions' programme in 1928-9 during the 
grain crisis and subsequent collectivizait5on and 
industrialization. Serge wrote in 1929 that Stalin 's 
policies were "une application caricaturale vouee a le'echec. 
Remarquez qu'il ne pose serieusement, ni la question ouvriere, 
ni celle du regime interieur du parti." Soviets 1929, p. 35.
62 Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, The Time of Stalin: Portrait 
of a Tyranny, Harper Colophon Books, 1981, p. 56. This memoir 
was first published as Stalinshchinas Portret tirana. Khronika 
Press, 1980.
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Opposition, Serge said that "nous sommes, au pays des ouvriers 
et des paysans, des reformistes et non des revolutionnaires'. "63 
This position was shared by Trotsky, and the reasoning was based 
on the collective ownership of property whose control had been 
usurped by the parasitic bureaucracy. In this case, they 
argued, what was necessary was not a revolution, but a reform of 
the society, uprooting the bureaucracy.64
The last chapter is a call to action for the proletariat of 
the West and the Soviet Unions "Tout est entre vos mains."65 
In it Serge declares that the future health or disease of the 
proletarian dictatorship depends entirely on the vigor with 
which the revolutionary proletariat fights against the 
'fossilization of Marxism' and uses Marxist method as a guide to 
creative action that inspires the world working class. 
"Camarades ... Vous etes encore les maitres de votre destin."66
63Translation: "We are, in the country of workers and
peasants, reformists, not revolutionaries." Istrati, Soviets 
1929. p. 139.
64It must be remembered that Serge was writing in 1929, 
as events unfolded. The Left Opposition argued that the 
nationalized means of production provided the base for 
socialized production, but that a new privileged stratum, 
thirsty for power and determined to rule, had strangled the 
proletarian state. Rakovsky, in his "Letter to Valentinov" 
had described the Soviet state as "a bureaucratic state with 
working-class remains" and was deeply anxious about working 
class apathy. Trotsky stuck closer to Lenin's formulation of 
a 'workers' state with bureaucratic distortions' and thought 
the indifference of the masses was temporary. The 
Opposition's program of "Soviet reform" and a return to 
revolutionary methods could be accomplished, they thought, by 
a secret ballot first in the Party, then in the trade Unions, 
and finally in the Soviets, ensuring that the leadership of 
all three was elected by a truly democratic poll. Victor 
Serge and Natalia Sedova Trotsky, The Life and Death of Leon 
Trotsky, pp. 167-169.
65 Istrati, Ibid. p. 203.
66 Soviets 29. p. 209.
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Serge outlined the ideas and 'spirit' of a program of reform for 
the Soviet Union, to includes
1) A call for the return of internal democracy in the Party;
2) A call for a profound reform of the press to make it more 
critical, less dependent on local authorities, guaranteeing the 
right of response (without reprisal) and the right of expression 
of the nuances of Soviet and communist opinion, all of which 
would aid in the return of democratic centralism in the Party;
3) The scientific, literary and theoretical domains must be 
free of official doctrines that impede serious intellectual 
inquiry;
4) The judicial system must defend the workers and peasants' 
state, and not be a tool of the counter-revolution. The accused 
must have the right of defense and security. The cheka must 
account for its acts in front of the regular justice of the
workers state.
5) In production, there should be a stimulation of the 
individual interests of the workers and a maximum of workers 
democracy.67
In calling for attention to individual worker's interests, 
Serge did not mean to pit one against the other; rather, he 
wanted to see the interests of the workers as human beings 
addressed. A return to democracy was called for within the 
Party, not society at large, in order to demonstrate the 
Opposition's loyalty to the Party. The Stalinist faction had 
accused the Opposition of trying to form a second Party, which 
it steadfastly refused to do. The Opposition wanted to 
challenge the power of the bureaucrats from within. It was a 
loyal opposition to reform the party-state, since Trotsky 
thought a second party would rally the "malcontents^ and ... 
become an unconscious tool of reaction."68 The position of the
67Istrati, Ibid. p. 205-7.
68Serge and Natalia Sedova Trotsky, op cit., p. 167.
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Left Opposition, defeated in the Soviet Union, evolved with 
events, so that by 1938 Trotsky and his followers founded a new 
international revolutionary organization, standing on the grave 
of the CPSU(B) and the Comintern.
Serge's remarkably astute insights are illustrated in the 
chapter "Le Gaspillage Bureaucratique Dans L ' Industrie.1 In many 
ways Serge's method of exposition here is typical. He does not 
begin with abstraction, but rather with the piling on of 
concrete detail and example in order to demonstrate that the 
human and financial resources for the development of industry 
existed in the Soviet Union, but these precious resources would 
be squandered if the problem of the bureaucracy wasn't solved.69 
Serge wrote this work in 1929; it is instructive to see that the 
wasteful nature of Soviet production, about which so much was 
written in the thirties and after, made itself evident right 
from the beginning, in the execution of the first five year 
plan. It was obvious to anyone living in the Soviet Union at 
the time, and is mentioned in nearly all the memoirs of the 
period. Few, however, attempted to explain the cause of the 
enormous waste.
Serge's method was to amass empirical detail, interspersed 
with pregnant observations, to suggest the consequences of the 
coercive nature of Stalinist society. In order to develop his 
point, Serge painted the whole picture; industry, agriculture, 
the political superstructure, the various political currents, 
the society at large with its social mores, and the rising 
bureaucracy. Serge's examination of agriculture, industry, 
social, intellectual and political life leaves the reader with 
the simple conclusion that the bureaucratic system had 
compromised the future of the U.S.S.R. This book is meant to 
be taken as the impressions of a foreign traveler to the Soviet
69Ibid. . p. 47, 59.
70 Soviets 1929. p. 55.
218
Union, yet its multi-layered presentation is rich in theoretical 
implications for even the informed scholar.
Serge's political analysis suggests itself in the 
organization of his material. In this particular chapter, Serge 
catalogued examples of wastes he discussed the construction in 
metallurgy that proceeded entirely without plans, squandering 
immense resources and years of effort to build an unusable 
factory. This particular factory, in Kertch in the Crimea, 
began at a cost of 20 million roubles and four years later had 
cost at least 66 million, "sans plans ni devis"; the problem at 
the end was how to get fuel to Kertch from Donetz. The 
responsibility, according to Serge, lay with the bureau of 
Glavmetal and the trust Yugostal. This particular example of 
waste was reported in the Pravda of 8 Sept. 1928, but Serge 
insists it was entirely typical.71 Lack of coordination meant 
factories were produced but could not function because there 
were no power stations to feed them. In other areas power 
stations were constructed where there were no factories to use 
the energy. Stalinist planning, or anti-planning, led to waste, 
high production costs, and useless construction.72
The point Serge made is that the examples he chose 
represented not the exception, but the rule. While waste 
mounted, in a number of instances, "les fonctionnaires des 
entreprises de l'Etat socialiste etaient en rapports d'affaires 
avec les nepmans qu'il leur etait facile d'enrichir."73 While 
precious resources were squandered (often to the benefit of the 
functionaries and NEPmen), Serge presented the reader with the
71See Istrati, Ibid. pps. 47-49.
72This theme will be taken up in Chapter 6 supra in the 
discussion of Serge's later writings on his perceptions of the 
Soviet version of a 'planned economy.'
73Translation: "The bureaucrats of the socialist state had 
a business understanding with the nepmen who found it easy to 
enrich themselves." Soviets 1929, p. 51.
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important contrasts: the construction of beautiful public
palaces for postal and telegraphic services and the famous 
Moscow subway —  which with all its glorious marble splendor, 
failed to provide even a single bench for a tired working woman 
waiting to go home to her 'other job'74. These 'monuments' of 
the 'workers state' presented an attractive facade, but masked 
the immense waste of resources consumed in their production. 
Serge asked if it would not have been better to spend some money 
to improve workers' lodgings which were a terrible disgrace? 
Serge demonstrated not only that workers needs were not taken 
into consideration, but that the parvenus, who owed their plum 
positions in the bureaucracy to their political loyalty, not 
technical expertise, were responsible for the staggering waste 
of precious resources.
Serge used another example to illustrate the way in which 
the bureaucratic system 'passed the buck' using endless
paperwork so that no one took the blame for waste. Encouraged by 
the long list of signatures, it became easy to add one more to 
rubberstamp even the most outrageous adventure. Privately, 
these bureaucrats would acknowledge the horrible wastage, but 
publicly they adopted the rule "pas d'histoires. "75 The 
particular scandal Serge used as an example involved the
importation and manufacture of 'tracteurs automobiles:'
On a importe des tracteurs de l'etranger, on en 
fabrique en Russie meme. L'agriculture en a le plus 
grand besoin. Mais on a neglige de fabrique des
pieces de rechange, si bien que des milliers de
tracteurs se trouvent hors d'usage une bonne partie de 
l'annee, faute d'une piece souvent peu importante par 
elle-meme. Le scandale est publie le 29 janvier 
dernier par la Prayda: 'Pendant deux ans et demi —  
ecrit ce journal —  les reclamations, les demandes,
As Serge ironically commented in the Memoirs: "We know 
how to build subterranean palaces but we forget that a 
working-class woman coming home from work would love to be
able to sit down beneath all these rich-hued stones." p. 321.
75Ibid. ,p.56.
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les avis autorises, les proces-verbaux de conferences 
ont grossi le dossier, sans que l'on fit rien 
d'effectif pour augmenter la fabrication des pieces 
necessaires aux tracteurs.' Les usines Poutilov en 
fabriquent, mais ne satis font que 15% de la 
demande..."
Serge has taken us inside the bureaucratic machine to try 
to comprehend its workings. As for the individual worker, what 
happens, Serge asked, when an energetic individual with 
innovative talent comes along? How does he fit into this system? 
According to Serge, his potential contributions will never 
surface because what gets rewarded is not critical initiative, 
but conformity to the Party and the bureaucracy. Adaptation to 
what is good spirit and zeal for the Party are all that count. 
The leaders of industry never had to prove themselves. They did 
not rise through the ranks of work by demonstrating their 
ability in their respective industries; on the contrary, their 
aptitude had been shown only in their capacity for political 
spirit. After 1923 anyone who disagreed with what was going on 
was relieved of his post, and usually arrested later.
What is remarkable about this work is not that it presents 
anything new, not available elsewhere,77 but that Serge's keen
76Translations "Tractors were imported from abroad and 
even produced in Russia. Agriculture had the greatest 
shortage, but replacement parts were not produced, so that 
thousands of tractors could be out of service a good part of 
the year due to the lack of a little part hardly important in 
itself. This scandal was made public by Pravda on last 
January 29th: 'For two and 1/2 years,' wrote the journal,
'claims, demands, official inquiries and conference reports 
have swollen the dossier without anything effective being done 
to increase the output of necessary parts for tractor repair. 
The Putilov works produces replacement parts but can satisfy 
only 15% of the demand.'" Istrati, ibid. p. 54-5.
77In fact, later memoirs and studies are more precise and 
factual; for example, Antonov-Ovseenko's 1980 Memoir. Reading 
this latter account, however, is like a filling in of the 
basic outline Serge provided in 1929. (This is not to say that 
the two authors held similar political stances; Antonov- 
Ovseenko is an anti-Stalinist who is also hostile to Trotsky.)
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powers of perception and description provide the reader with so 
vivid a picture of how the bureaucratic system worked on a grand 
scale. It is also unusual in the detail and number of examples 
of waste at such an early stage of the five year plan. Serge was 
not by himself in attacking this subject at that time. Rakovsky
78was grappling with the same theoretical questions . So was 
Trotsky. The value of Serge's work in this book and later in his 
From Lenin to Stalin and Destiny of a Revolution, is the unique 
and skillful way in which he employs by examples to indicate how 
economic events in this period occurred —  in a reactive fashion 
and according to any carefully developed plans. From this we 
can identify Serge's sympathy with Trotsky and Rakovsky, whose 
work he complemented and popularized, and with certain exiled 
leftwing Mensheviks writing in Sotsialisticheskv vestnik. 
Conditions of repression and clandestinity in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s meant that fruitful collaboration was impossible, 
yet working independently and apart from one another, these 
separate observers formed a current of thought emerged that 
criticized the nature of economic growth and the chaotic state 
of planning, or more accurately, the lack of socialist 
planning.79 They called it besplannovost (planlessness), and 
Serge's work in 1929 and later in the 40s clearly showed his 
identification and sympathy with this current.
4.5 "Build, build, build, export, shoot, builds" Serge's view 
of the First Five Year Plan
As has already been noted above, while the political 
superstructure was held in a chokehold, Stalin unleashed his
78See Rakovsky, Critique 13. ^
79This theoretical current is discussed in Donald 
Filtzer's afterword to Rakovsky's article, "The Five Year Plan 
in Crisis," published for the first time in English in 
Critique 13.(1981) pp. 13-54. Rakovsky's article "Na s'ezde 
i v strane" was originally published in Bvulleten' oppozitsii 
25/26 (1931), pp. 9-32.
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forced collectivization and the five-year plan in industry. His 
policies created a system, flowing from the logic of socialism 
in one country, which was opposed at every turn by the Left 
Opposition. Stalin's system was characterized by a nationalist 
foreign policy, a 'plan' administered from the center, vast 
corruption, an elaborate hierarchy of privilege, and atomization 
of the overworked and undernourished work force. The system was 
rigidly controlled from the center and maintained by brute force 
and terror. This was possible because the economy was at a low 
level of technique, being mainly agricultural with a small 
industrial output.
In production, Stalin's political decisions were all
important; when in 1929 he called for a higher rate of growth he
was responding to the desperate need for capital goods and
exports. He did not base his commands on actual economic
resources or the needs of the population. Stalin exhorted the
working class to work harder and harder, but exhibited no
consideration of how realistic these goals were or what their
cost would be in human terms. Outwardly (we are not privy to the
closed discussion and debate) Stalin appeared to have no policy,
shifting from 'right' to 'left.' Stalin incorporated
hierarchical trends manifested earlier in the period of War
Communism, and then under NEP into Soviet society after 1929.
The result, was what the Soviets now call an 'administrative
command system' and Ticktin calls an "administered nationalized
80economy with an hierarchical structure." Its consequences are 
still in evidence today. Trotsky and Rakovsky predicted the 
results; Serge described the conditions.
Serge's descriptions of this system, in his historical/ 
political works and in his fiction give us a sense of "a rigidly
regulated society and economic system that was also,
paradoxically, out of control. Commands issued from the top
80Hillel H. Ticktin, "The Contradictions of Soviet Society 
and Professor Bettelheim," Critique 6. pp. 17-44.
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were often impossible to fulfill, but could not be questioned,
so the impossible was attempted, resulting in an outcome often
quite different from what was planned. Serge presented a picture
of unrelenting gloom, with inhuman production line speeds and
working conditions, and severe penalties for a careless word, or
perceived sabotage (which could mean anything). In short,
conditions were "dismally, onerously primitive."81 While it is
clear that Serge's descriptions/analyses remain undeveloped,
they contain a hard kernel of truth which informed his thinking.
More often than not, Serge's views were apparent in his
questions. After carefully analyzing working conditions and
comparing them to conditions in the West and also to the
privileged position enjoyed by technocrats, Serge wrote:
"The management of the enterprises is in the hands of 
communists who merely carry out the instructions of 
the central organisms. Do these instructions prove to 
be inexecutable? Do they have unforeseen and 
vexatious consequences? Do low wages adversely affect 
the productivity of labour? Has the plan been 
discredited? Finally has the engineer permitted 
himself to formulate objections? Did he keep still, 
out of prudent complacency, on the eve of an 
experiment that turned out badly? In all these cases 
and in many others, the technical personnel, accused 
of incompetence, of negligence, of bad faith, even of 
the counter-revolutionary spirit or of conspiracy, is 
the object of mass punishments which always mean 
arrests and all too often end in executions...."82
Industrialization was carried out at the expense of the
worker and peasant who lived on the brink of starvation and
exhaustion. Serge wrote that when workers were asked (in 1936)
if they lived better before the revolution, those aged 40 and
over answered unanimously in the affirmative. Mothers
complained, Serge added, that no matter how poor they were
before the revolution, even the poorest enjoyed occasional good
times during old religious festivals when children could taste
81RTYA, p. 13.
82Serge referred to conditions in 1936. Ibid., p. 14.
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creams, preserves, and pastries, things no one could now
83obtain. Andrew Smith made a similar point in his I Was a 
Soviet Worker.
There isn't a political economy as such in Serge, but his 
facts speak boldly, and as he has assembled them, embody a 
logic, making them, in a sense, notes toward a theory. They are 
a treasure of data, impressions and analyses for students of the 
period. In his manner of exposition, it is clear that Serge, 
while describing the way the Soviet Union developed, presented 
history as a dynamic process which is dramatized with conflict 
and contradiction.
Serge's writing about the economy and society transformed 
empirical data into a moving, compelling chronicle. 
"Industrialization is directed like a march through conquered 
territory.1,84 During the first Five Year Plan, production was 
beset with bottlenecks which included constant breakdown of 
machinery because it wasn't used properly. There wasn't time, 
quotas had to be met as Stalin demanded the 5 year plan be 
fulfilled in 4 or even 3 years. Precious resources, needed 
elsewhere, had to be used increasingly to repair machinery 
exhausted by improper usage. Spare parts were in short supply 
and often got lost in delivery* Stalin's answer to every 
problem was to squeeze the workers more; make them work harder, 
consume less; hold up their pay, cut their wages.85
Although Stalin's political decisions were all important 
the kind of command he exerted did not result from any clear or 
consistent plans. Each economic move was a response to what had 
happened previously. Events followed their own demands and 
needs, beyond the reach of the center. The First Five Year Plan
83 Ibid., p. 8.
84Russia Twenty Years After, p. 166.
85See RTYA, Part II, chapter 3, "Industrialization and 
Collectivization (1928-1934), pp. 163-177, and chapter 4, "The 
Great Wretchedness (1931-1934), pp. 174-185.
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replaced the Marxist notion of planning —  conscious regulation 
of the economy by and in the interests of the associated 
producers —  with political exhortation and coercion to drive 
the economy forward. Balance and proportion gave way to a race 
to fulfill and overfulfill targets regardless of the 
dislocations or hardships.
One of the conditions produced by Stalin's policies was 
spontaneous labor turnover. Serge, quoting official statistics, 
pointed out such turnover was so widespread that in the Ukraine, 
whole factories were turned over in 3 months as workers moved on 
looking for food, housing and better working conditions.86 But 
mainly Serge noted, "you travel because wherever you are you 
feel bad. " To portray this human event, Serge added wryly that 
forecasts of transportation economists were exceeded, as more 
workers were on the move than during the California gold rush. 
Workers returned to the countryside because of famine at the 
same time as Stalin was introducing all manner of schemes to 
increase productivity.
Shock work brigades (udarnichestvo) and Stakhanovism were 
some of Stalin's schemes to speed up production. Serge pointed 
out they were doomed because they were basically a fraud, rigged 
by opportunist managers and workers in collusion to win bonuses
87for themselves. Selected workers, working in special 
conditions, produced very high quotas which were then 
established as norms. The 'ordinary' workers, working in normal 
conditions, couldn't possibly match this output, but in the 
process of trying, did manage to produce defective goods, 
exhaust expensive machinery, and wear themselves down working in 




88decent attention to basic human needs. The workers were 
treated as badly, or worse than the machines. Production, at 
any cost, was more important than anything else. The cost was 
high indeed.
Stalin introduced draconian labor laws, along with schemes 
to raise productivity, to impose control over a workforce on the 
move. Internal passports and severe penalties for violating 
work rules aimed to tie the worker to the factory, reducing the 
high turnover, while attempting to gain control over the 
individual worker.
4.6 RESISTANCE
Workers resistance to Stalin's draconian labor
policy was both individual and collective. Workers reacted
sharply, Serge wrote, to Stakhanovism and the creation of a
"numerically small, well-paid labour aristocracy."
"Stakhanovists had their heads smashed. Some were 
killed. The young communist who, in order to get a 
bonus or to quit the plant later on tried to beat the 
record was considered a traitor by his shopmates.
This resistance was broken by means of repression, and 
Stakhanovism was attenuated by generalizing it. The 
name was speedily worn down, in a few months, amidst 
abuse and even ridicule. The party committees were 
forced to react against the exaggerations of 
Stakhanovism.1,89
Serge conveyed the regime's contradictory response to 
resistance, showing graphically what happened to those who dared 
to protest collectively. Workers struck, and the youth were
88Andrew Smith, a black-listed American Communist worker 
who left depression-ridden USA in 1929 to join the 'porkers 
paradise' in the Soviet Union, wrote a remarkable memoir, I 
Was a Soviet Worker upon his return in 1936. It is replete 
with examples demonstrating how the forced tempos and 
conditions of production wasted both human and material 




often the most militant.90 Serge described a strike at the 
textile plant in Ivanovo-Voznessensk in April 1931, where the 
workers had but one slogan to express their demands: "We are
hungry!" The authorities yielded, blaming the local leadership. 
Food was sent in; work was resumed. Then the purge began 
quietly.91 The Trotskyists (among the strikers) were shot and
92 • •not a word was spoken, except abroad. In this one episode, 
Serge expressed the basic contradiction of the regime which 
manifestly feared the proletariat. Any protest action by however 
small a group was construed as a threat.
Strikes showed that the regime faced organized resistance 
from youth and a section of older workers who had somehow 
survived the Civil War, NEP, and famines. Stalin fought the 
workers and the peasants, while within the party the dry 
guillotine never let up. Serge reflected that Stalin must have 
at some point understood the magnitude of his crimes, feeling 
"the chill of death pass over his face."
The regime also had to cope with the results of it policy, 
all the while preparing for war. The result? Absenteeism, 
alcoholism, high turnover, general disruption of labor 
discipline which made it impossible to fulfill planned targets. 
The collectivization had created a situation of extreme
90Serge was careful to point out that the youth in general
were
"evolving towards a succinct realism. Smitten with 
technique, thirsting for well-being, supple in 
adaptation, hardened against pain and hunger. The 
word 'Americanism' still best expresses its spirit.
Few general ideas, no formulated ethics, no 
conscious idealism, an aversion to politics."
(RTYA. p. 34.) The militant youth were the non-conformists, 
and according to Serge, 'set the tone' in the struggles, camps 
and prisons.
91This became the standard pattern of response to workers 
resistance, still seen today.
92 *Destiny of a Revolution, p. 15-16. Sotsialisticheskii 
Vestnik places this strike in April-May 1932, not 1931.
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scarcity. Serge made the point simply and forcefully: an
underfed and malnourished workforce, living a joyless existence, 
could not be depended on to work well. What capitalist society 
had learned about slavery, was a lesson lost on the 
Stalinists.93
4.7 Stalin's system
Much of the revolutionary working class was killed 
fighting Civil War, famine and foreign intervention, leaving a 
raw mass of politically unschooled peasants. Exploitation of 
workers and peasants was accomplished by force and opposition 
was eliminated with terror. Serge summed up Stalin's policy: 
"build, build, build, export, shoot, build. This is what is 
called the epopee of the great plan."94 The best of what the 
workers produced was used for export, while they labored under 
cruel conditions, threatened with arrest, labor camp and death, 
if they resisted or even failed to push themselves to the 
extremes of their capacities.
Meanwhile, as peasants became workers, the Party absorbed 
the most opportunist, careerist elements, the 'parvenus' we meet 
in Serge's novels. His portraits of this parasitic, 
opportunistic caste, crudely adopting the worst traits of 
privilege and acquisitiveness border on the cruelly absurd. 
Serge's descriptions of the habits and attire of the cadres and 
functionaries, and of the former bourgeois women who flocked to 
their side, conjures up the sleaze and slime of an underworld 
suddenly in power. Rakovsky's discussion of the decomposition
In fact Serge was reminded of the pages of Capital where 
Marx described the "relentless mechanism of primitive 
capitalist accumulation." The present accumulation, Serge 
noted, was just as cruel, and "anti-socialist in its methods




of the French Jacobin party, drunk with power, uncannily fits
95Serge's description of the Soviet parvenus.
Stalin's system, then, could be recognized by these 
features: bureaucratic totalitarian rule through the mechanism 
of terror; forced collectivization of agriculture and rapid 
industrialization of the economy with goals decided by fiat; 
chaos and rampant misery; and the rise of a bureaucratic, 
privileged stratum derived from the old intelligentsia and the 
NEP educated people. To meet the urgent needs of the economy, 
Stalin forced a rapid growth which was costly and wasteful. The 
immediate causes of the waste were insufficient planning, too 
much construction undertaken too rapidly and haphazardly with an 
underfed, malnourished and disenfranchised work force. But an 
inner dynamic was also at work, which came from the particular 
social relations this system engendered. Serge's writings 
implicitly recognize the emerging social relations. His novels 
do particular justice to the temperament and behavior of the 
various sectors of Soviet society. His discussion of the 
consciousness of the bureaucracy, forged both by their origins 
and their functions, is especially insightful as portrayed in 
The Case of Comrade Tulavev.
4.8 The Trials Begin —  Even Silence is Suspect
"So Long as the man is in your hands, there is always
a way of framing him"
"So long as you have the neck, the rope will be found 
somewhere" 6
Stalin's policy had its critics, and Serge commended the 
brave agricultural technicians and experts who denounced "the
95Christian Rakovsky, "The 'Professional Dangers' of
Power," (letter to Valentinov), collected in Rakovsky,
Selected Writings on Opposition in the USSR 1923-30. Allison
& Busby, London, 1980, p.128.
95Well-known sayings in Russian revolutionary circles, 
quoted by Serge in RTYA, p. 64.
230
blunders and excesses; they were arrested in thousands and made 
to appear in huge sabotage-trials so that responsibility might 
be unloaded on somebody."97 This was the beginning of the hunt 
for enemies, which climaxed in a mighty crescendo in the years 
of the Great Terror of 1936-38. The need for scapegoats, to 
blame someone else for the mistakes and just the difficulties of 
life, would become even more desperate and frenzied as Stalin's 
'blunders and excesses' multiplied and grew worse.
Stalin's rule by edicts and commands, enforced with 
ruthless force and continual purges, eliminated real and
potential opponents, conveniently blaming them for the 
difficulties engendered by his breakneck policies. The 
accusation of sabotage was directed, as Serge noted, "at
thousands, or rather tens of thousands of technicians" which
"was in general a monstrous slander justified solely by the need 
to find culprits for an economic situation that was now
98insupportable." By 1930 those who hoarded silver coins were 
shot as the ruble disappeared; a crisis in the coal industry led
99to the execution of five Shakhty engineers ; the meat shortage 
caused by the peasants killing their livestock led to the
execution of Professor Karatygin (of the Department of Meat and 
Canned Goods) and his 47 co-defendants, for sabotage of the meat 
supply. Serge noted that on the day these 48 men were 
massacred, Stalin gave Rabindranath Tagore a splendid reception
97Memoirs, p. 248.
98 , . ,Ibid.
99In the Donbass region in May 1928, 53 engineers were 
accused of wrecking equipment, organizing accidents and having 
links with the former bourgeois owners of the coal mines. The 
misuse of equipment, due to the inexperience of the new 
workforce and the intolerable tempo of production, led to fire 
and explosions in the mines, giving the regime a pretext to 
repress* technicians, who were used as scapegoats to warn 
others.
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replete with speeches about the new humanism and abundance.100
From 1928-1931 a series of sensational and well 
publicized trials of specialists featured confessions to 
extravagant charges. The presiding judge was A. Ia. 
Vyshinskii.101 In November 1930 the so-called "Industrial 
Party" was on trial, and its leader Ramzin confessed to plotting 
military intervention from foreign capitals. Serge called it 
'raving madness.' Although the accused confessed to "infinitely 
more than can be believed" to escape execution, their 
confessions rarely saved them. Those who did not confess simply 
disappeared. Serge commented: "they are strange trials, in
which the accused accuse each other more than they are 
themselves accused, going to the point of flagrant enormities in 
their self-flagellatory zeal. "102
The so-called "Toiling Peasant Party," whose leaders 
Kondratiev and Makarov opposed total collectivization, was 
"liquidated off-stage " in 1930. They were accused of 
conspiring with kulaks to revive the Socialist Revolutionary 
Party and overthrow the Soviet system. There was a secret trial 
of bacteriologists in August 1930.103 Thirty-five leading 
figures in the Commissariat of Agriculture, many of whom were 
old Communists were executed in 1930. Secret trials of
100_. . ,Ibid.
101Serge wrote an unpublished sketch of Vishinsky which he 
titled "El Ciudano Vichinsky." Serge recounted how in the 
Lubianka in 1933 his cellmate Nesterov told him how Vishinsky 
had organized strikes in the Ukraine to paralyze the workings 
of the Soviets, and that Vichinsky was known as a 
counterrevolutionary. The paradox was that now Vishinsky 
presided over the courts which sent revolutionaries to their 
death, though this time at the behest of the Party and the 
regime of the Soviets! 'El Ciudano Vichinsky" (in Spanish), 
1947, 3pp, Serge archives, Mexico.
102Serge, RTYA. P. 174.
103Charged with organizing a horse epidemic. Conquest, 
The Great Terror, p. 733.
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historians (Tarle104, Platonov and Kare) took place in 1931. 
There were similar trials of geologists105, physicists, 
(Academician Lazarev), etc.106 Shortages and imbalances were 
now the result of deliberate and criminal sabotage —  allowing 
the regime a convenient if fantastic explanation for its own 
mistakes. Shooting 'saboterus' also gave the regime a way to 
get rid of an unreliable elite drawn from the revolutionary 
generation of Communists and former bourgeois specialists 
(unreliable because they had the capacity and inclination to 
think critically).
104Academician Tarle, according to Serge, the "only non- 
Marxist Soviet historian of repute, spent long months in 
prison and was deported to Alma-Ata; today [1942] he is the 
most official of all historians in the Soviet Union." Memoirs 
p. 250.
105The geologists were imprisoned for "having interpreted 
subsoil qualities differently from what was wanted in high 
places: ignorance of the natural wealth of the country, hence 
sabotage, hence treason...." Serge, RTYA, p. 53. In this 
work, Serge also described in detail what happened to Soviet 
literature, when intellectual freedom was completely 
extinguished, and to the masterful authors who were censored, 
banned and purged.
106Roy Medvedev, in his Let History Judge, describes these 
trials in detail, quoting verbatim testimony and defendant's 
depositions. Medvedev shows that not only were the charges 
'ridiculous' but gave the impression that the first Five Year 
Plan couldn't have been discussed in any detail at the XVIth 
Party Conference in April 1929, and that the people's 
commissariats were "not headed by communists, [but] that 
wreckers were in complete control of the economic and state 
machinery." Medvedev, pp. 111-139.
Robert Conquest, in The Great Terror. describes the 
trials in an appendix as the dress rehearsal for the great 
purge trials of 1936-1938, in which the system developed in 
the earlier trials was perfected. The technicians of the 
earlier trials, Conquest asserts, learned these lessons: the
number of accused was too high, and should be kept to around 
18; a complicated story that would baffle the ordinary 
observer/reader was necessary [leaving only a general effect]; 
and in Vyshinsky, "a man had been found capable of mastering 
such a complexity, and imposing it upon the witnesses . . . ." 
Conquest, p. 739.
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The planners came under especially extreme political 
pressure, as they predicted the disastrous consequences of 
particular governmental decisions. Groman, the old socialist 
with a Menshevik past was the principal exponent of equilibrium 
planning for optimum economic development. He and his whole 
working group were dismissed and criminally tried in a public 
show trial in March 1931, accused of the crime of deliberately 
retarding the country's industrial development. Serge wrote 
that Groman was arrested after quarreling with Miliutin at the 
Planning Commission. The very idea of balance between different
107sectors of the economy began to be politically suspect , and
Groman's exasperation under pressure led him to shout to
108Miliutin that the country was being led to the abyss. The
example of the Groman group's repression directly influenced the
development of the Soviet style of planning. The system became
one of command in which planners preferred, as the statistician
Strumilin said, "to stand for high growth rates rather than to
sit [be imprisoned] for low ones."109 The original plan figures
gave way to optimism and fantasy in terms of what could be
achieved,causing the imbalances which have become permanent
features of the Soviet economy.
Serge wrote in the Memoirs that the slander heaped on these
specialists could not withstand close scrutiny, although in RTYA
he admits that in some cases there was perhaps a smidgen of
truth at the core of the fantastic claims:
"Some, honest men, contest the value of hastily recast 
and militarily applied plans. They foresee disastrous 
results and sometimes they even refuse to comply with 
demands which they consider absurd but which are in 
reality only demagogic, whether it be for the purpose
107See G. Hosking's brief summary in The First Socialist 
Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within, chapter 6, 
esp. pp. 149-153 and 172-174.
108Serge, Memoirs, p. 249.
109Hosking, ibid, p. 151.
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of bluffing foreign opinion, of duping domestic 
opinion, or in the case of zealous administrators, of 
pulling the wool over the eyes of the government; 
Others follow the course of the-worse-the-better, 
thinking that 'this can't last.' Some of them 
sabotage, thinking that the hour has finally struck 
for the long awaited catastrophe of Bolshevism. And, 
indeed, never has the situation been so bad since the 
worst moments of the civil war and the blockade. Some 
engineers are subsidized by emigres whom they keep 
informed or by spies who flatter them. Above all, 
scapegoats are needed."110
The last line is the most significant, because it set a pattern
of response for decades to come: when things go badly, never
take responsibility, always blame someone else, someone less
powerful, usually local officials. Another harbinger of things
to come, noted by Serge, was the way "the patriotism of the
technicians was constantly appealed to in the course of wringing
confessions out of them. h111
Serge pointed out that industrialization proceeded amid
"such chaos and under an authoritarian system of such rigidity,
that it was possible to find 'sabotage' in any place, at any 
112moment." Serge added that in his own experience he had
observed the "whole mentality of the technician is quite 
antagonistic to sabotage, dominated as it is by love of 
technique and a job well done. ..All that there was in fact was 
a fairly widespread 'technocratic mentality'. Technicians saw 
themselves as indispensable and as distinctly superior to the 
men in the Government."113
Serge thought the trials were only used to manipulate 
public opinion, at home and abroad: the sentences, prescribed
110RTYA, p. 173.
111Memoirs, p. 248.
112t U  - ,Ibid.
113Ibid. . pp. 248-249.
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by the Politburo itself, were often rescinded, seemingly 
arbitrarily.114
During the Menshevik Center Trial Serge met with people 
every day who were connected with the accused and was thus in a 
position to "trace, line by line, the progression of the lie in 
their evidence." Later, when the old historian Sukhanov was 
incarcerated in the Isolator of Verkhne-Uralsk, Serge wrote that 
he had documents circulated among political prisoners detailing 
the methods used by the G.P.U. to extract confessions. Serge 
told how a combination of death threats and appeals to 
patriotism were used, Medvedev's citation of Iakobovitch and 
1.1. Rubin's115 deposition leaves no doubt that confessions were 
also extracted under physical and mental torture.116
Isaac Rubin was described by Serge as a protege of David 
Borisovich Riazonov, whom Serge met a number of times. Riazanov 
had created a "scientific establishment of noteworthy quality" 
at the Marx-Engels Institute. Riazonov, Sukhanov, Groman, Rubin 
and Ginsberg had a sort of salon in the Planning Commission 
where they freely discussed the 'utterly catastrophic' situation
114So that some of the accused, e.g. physicist Lazarev, 
were rehabilitated, while others (the 'pretended' Mensheviks) 
disappeared. Serge commented that he had dinner with one 
expert in energetics who had been condemned to death, 
pardoned, sent to a concentration camp, rehabilitated, and 
decorated, all in the space of 20 months. Memoirs. pp. 249- 
250.
115 Isaac Rubin's interpretive works on Marx's Capital and 
the history of the labor theory of value remain among the 
outstanding theoretical contributions of the 1920's. See 1.1. 
Rubin, The History of Economic Thought, edited and translated 
by Donald A. Filtzer, London, Ink Links Ltd., 1979.
116Medvedev, op. cit., pp. 125-137. Iakubovich's 
deposition was written in May 1967, while the account of 
Rubin's years in solitary confinement and horrible torture 
was written by his sister B.I. Rubina. These men, Sukhanov 
and Riazonov survived to be rearrested and shot in 1937.
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in the country in 1930. Serge greatly respected Riazonov for
his steadfast honor and independences he had never failed to
denounce the death penalty, and demanded stric limits on the
activities of the GPU, as he had with its predecessor, the
Cheka. Riazonov provided an intellectual haven at his institute
for 'heretics of all kinds' so long as they had a 'love of
knowledge.' During the trial of the Menshevik Center, Riazonov
went to each member of the Politburo to express his rage at such
fabrications and monstrosities. After a violent exchange with
Stalin, in which Riazonov accused the General Secretary of
concocting incriminating evidence against old Socialists, he was
arrested and deported. His books were removed from the
libraries, although he had just been officially recognized in a
celebration of his 60th birthday. Serge noted that he died
118"alone and captive, nobody knows where" sometime around 1940.
These tumultuous events which affected the lives of 
millions of people coincided with fierce inner-party struggle, 
even after the defeat of the Left and United Opposition, beaten 
in Serge's words, by the "hierarchy of secretaries, in a kind of 
interlocking directorate with the commissars of the GPU under 
the guidance of the General Secretary, the so-recently obscure
119Georgian, Stalin." Once the left was routed, Stalin turned 
his attention to defeating the Right. Bukharin, Tomsky and 
Rykov opposed Stalin on the policy of forced collectivization 
and what they saw as premature industrialization. Serge called 
the Right Opposition "more of a state of mind than an 
organization; at certain junctures it included the great 
majority of officials, and enjoyed the sympathy of the whole
117Serge, Memoirs, pp. 250-252.
118 ,Ibid.
119 'Serge, "Trente Ans Apres La Revolution russe" (TAALRR)
p. 20.
237
nation. "120 Henry Grigorievich Yagoda sympathized with the
Right, as did Kalinin and Voroshilov, but as Serge noted, for
"personal motives whose nature is still obscure" gave a majority
to Stalin and Molotov. In actual fact, the so-called right
121never created a clear cut faction, as Stalin himself admitted 
but remained loyal members of the Party who disagreed with 
Stalin's line.
Within the Party, the Right fought to save itself from 
expulsion, while the Zinoviev tendency, forces intact, was 
reinstated. Bukharin, the theoretician of 'socialism in one 
country' who in 1925 encouraged the peasants to enrich 
themselves, told Kamenev in a secret meeting, organized by
Sokolnikov in the summer of 1928s "He will slay us,... he is
122the new Genghis Khan." And, Bukharin added, "If the country
120 Memoirs, p. 253. The widespread support the Right 
Opposition enjoyed owed much to the improved situation 
following War Communism in agriculture and the arts. This was 
attributed to the NEP, widely identified with Bukharin.
121Stalin, Sochineniia, XI, p. 287, guoted in Medvedev, p.
68.
122Kamenev summarized the conversation which the Moscow 
Trotskyists then leaked abroad. Deutscher gives a full 
account in the second volume of his Trotsky trilogy, pp. 440- 
442.
This meeting took place as Bukharin attempted to block 
with the Left to defeat Stalin. Serge recounted how Trotsky 
wrote the Oppositionists from Alma-Ata that since the Right 
represented the danger of a slide toward capitalism, that they 
should support the Centre —  Stalin —  against it. While this 
may seem incredible, it follows because the Trotskyists 
refused to engage in 'unprincipled combinationism' that is, 
block with groupings whose politics are dissimilar with the 
purpose of getting rid of a leadership. Serge wrote that 
Stalin at this time sounded out the leaders of the imprisoned 
Left Opposition, promising rehabilitation if they supported 
him against the Right. Serge said his Opposition group 
discussed the issue "with uncertainty" and Boris Mikhailovich 
Eltsin, from his prison cell in Suzdal, demanded a conference 
of the Oppositionists (including Trotsky) to come to a 
resolution. The conference never took place. Serge, Memoirs, 
p. 253.
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perishes, we all perish [i.e. the Party]. If the country 
manages to recover, he twists around in time and we still 
perish." Serge's Opposition centre published the account of 
this secret meeting, and wrote that they —  "Our 'Centre' (B.M. 
Eltsin) may very well have much to answer for in publishing 
these documents."123 Yet as Stalin defeated the Right, they 
followed in Zinoviev and Kamenev's footsteps, recognizing the 
'errors of their ideas' and capitulating to stay within the 
Party.
As Stalin easily defeated the right, Serge commented on the
essential, 'overwhelming fact' of what had happened.
" ... by means of a 'coup de force' within the Party, 
the revolutionary Party-State becomes a bureaucratic 
police state, a state which is reactionary in every 
important way with respect to the ideals of the 
revolution. Ideological changes speed up brutally. A 
Marxism of dead slogans born in offices takes the 
place of a critical Marxism of thinking men. The cult 
of the leader begins. 'Socialism in one country' 
becomes the password of parvenus who intend no more 
than the protection of their new privileges. What 
opponents of the regime see with a kind of anguished 
myopia is the profile of a new, emerging state, a 
totalitarian regime. The majority of the old- 
Bolshevik opponents of Trotsky —  the Bukharins, 
Rykovs, Tomskis and Riutins — are horrified at the
sight, and pass over to the resistance. Too 
late."124
Bukharin's comments to Kamenev, followed by his
capitulation, perfectly illustrates the way Stalin's
totalitarian regime was able to use the old Bolsheviks against 
one another, because "it had a hold on their souls" through
Party patriotism. Stalin was thus able to confuse, humiliate,
123 •Memoirs p. 258. The Opposition published the two 
documents [Kamenev's confidential resume of his meeting with 
Bukharin, and Kamenev's notes for Zinoviev] abroad and 
illegally in Moscow in 1928. Serge quoted the essential 
passages in his From Lenin to Stalin, with comments, pp. 95- 
100.
124Serge, TAALRR, p. 20.
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and wear out the oppositions.125 A natural consequence of the
crushing of freedom of opinion within the Party meant that
duplicity prevailed. Serge said the 'capitulator comrades'
1,26still kept their ideas and met clandestinely. He met Smilga 
in 1929 who summarized the thinking of these men. "The
Opposition is all astray with its sterile bitterness. One's
duty is to work with and in the Party. .... What do our petty 
deportations amount to? Oughtn't we all to be walking around by 
now with our heads tucked underneath our arms?"127
In the remaining years of the First Five Year plan, Stalin 
continually uncovered 'plots' in the Party. The alleged 
'rightist-leftist' bloc of Syrtsov and Lominadze was attacked by 
the press. Their so-called group also included Yan Sten, the 
philosopher. Also known as the 'Young Stalinist Left,' they
were arrested and accused of opposition in 1930.128
The Riutin group, imprisoned in late 1932, was a more real 
threat to Stalin than the scapegoats and dissatisfied who were 
framed in the years after the defeat of the Right. Riutin, who 
Serge remembered for having organized "gangs of thugs against 
us," was close to intellectuals in the Bukharin tendency, all 
"Red Professors." His supporters in Moscow included the old 
Bolshevik worker Kayurov, and the Red Professors Slepkov, 
Maretskii, and others. Riutin, former Secretary of the Moscow
125_. - ,Ibid.
126Later, Andrew Smith recounted in his book I Was A 
Soviet Worker that in 1934, the clandestine Oppositionists in 
the factories were the most vociferous pro-Stalinists, railing 
against the Opposition to divert attention from themselves and 
their work. Smith, I Was A Soviet Worker. New Yorkr E.P. 
Dutton & Co., Inc., 1936, p. 268.
127Memoirs, p. 258.
128In reality, Syrtsov and co. had expressed doubts about 
the excessive growth targets (Stalin often doubled suggested 
targets) and the regime's disregard for the livestock 
disaster.
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129Committee, drew up a document of nearly 200 pages which 
amounted to a program of reform for the Party and the Nation. 
He distributed the document, according to Serge, to Zinoviev, 
Kamenev, and "several of us." The document called for 'peace 
with the peasants' in much the same vein as the politics of the 
Bukharinists. (An end to forced collectivization and a slowing 
of the pace of industrialization) Placing blame squarely on 
Stalin, Riutin's document called for the reinstatement of 
Trotsky and all the Oppositionists and for a 'fresh start.' An 
entire chapter was devoted to Stalin, "the evil genius of the 
Party and the revolution."130 Zinoviev was kicked out of the 
Party (again) for reading the document without informing on its 
authors.
The Riutin affair posed a serious threat to the regime and 
became a test of loyalty in the Politburo. The GPU and Stalin 
recommended the death penalty. This would have been the first 
execution of a Central Committee. A majority in the Politburo, 
led by Sergei Kirov, refused to go along with the death penalty 
and Riutin was exiled, rather than killed. What the Riutin 
affair demonstrated was that Stalin was still unable to control 
the Party in late 1932, years after the defeat of the Left and 
Right Oppositions. Kirov's obvious popularity as Party Chief in 
Leningrad (Zinoviev's old power base) and his ability to stymie 
Stalin's wishes marked him as a serious opponent to Stalin.
4.9 The Remaining Left Oppositionists Purged
By 1929 the core of the Opposition was reduced to three 
comrades in liberty: Serge and Alexandra Bronstein in Leningrad,
129The Riutin affair is discussed widely in the 
literature: see Ciliga, Serge, Trotsky, Deutscher, Conquest,
Hosking, Getty, etc. Ciliga summarizes the program, in his 
Russian Enigma, pp. 279-280. Ciliga's information is based on 
the members of Riutin's group who were sent to the Verkhne- 
Uralsk Isolator where Ciliga was imprisoned.
130 Ciliga, Ibid.
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and Andreu Nin in Moscow. The rest of the key members were in 
exile or jail, including Leon Sosnovsky, Eleazer Solnstsev, 
Vassily Pankratov and Grigory Yakovin in jail; Maria Mikhailovna 
Joffe131 in Central Asia; Fedor Dingelstedt in Central Siberia; 
Muralov in exile on the Irtysh in the Tara forests; Rakovsky in 
Central Siberia; and Trotsky in Alma Ata. The rest, numbering up 
to a thousand according to Serge, were in prison or deported, 
engaging in hunger strikes, and other possible forms of 
struggle. Serge wrote: "Our intellectual activity is
1.32prodigious, our political action nil." There was no contact 
between the remaining Left Oppositionists and the capitulators. 
The times were very difficult and would only get worse. 
Trotsky's secretary Georgi Butov died after a long hunger 
strike, during which he was tortured. Yakov Grigorievich Blumkin 
was killed. According to Serge Blumkin had been sent to 
Constantinople to spy on the Old Man, as Trotsky was called, but 
instead acted as a courier, bringing a message from Trotsky to 
Serge and the other Oppositionists. Blumkin was arrested and 
sentenced to death. Serge noted that between arrest and 
execution, Blumkin won a fortnight's reprieve to write his 
memoirs, which "made a first-rate book..."133 Blumkin's 
execution was the first of its kind, a Party member was executed 
for being in contact with Trotsky.134 Alexander Orlov wrote
131Adolf Joffe's second wife, who miraculously survived 
decades of hard labor and constant interrogation in the far 
north. See her memoir, One Long Night. New Park Publications, 
London, 1978.
132Memoirs, p. 254.
133Ibid., p. 257. Perhaps the new policy of candor in the 
Soviet Union could be used to find out if this book survived.
134 Deutscher presents an account of Blumkin's life and 
the episode which brought him the death sentence in the 
Prophet Outcast, pp. 84-91. Although he quoted Serge's 
account, it is different than Serge's on several counts. See 
Serge, Memoirs, pp. 255-257.
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that Blumkin shouted "Long live Trotsky" as the fatal bullets 
were fired. Serge recalled that it was still possible for the 
few survivors to assemble in the gardens of the Marx-Engels 
Institute to exchange scraps of information and lament the loss 
of comrades, such as Blumkin.
One of the things they discussed was whether to publish 
information abroad about the struggle. Serge was in favor of 
sending everything to their comrades in the West, beginning with 
the letters of Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1924 which describe 
Stalin's suggestion that they get rid of Trotsky 'by a 
Florentine technique.' Others were less open than Serge, afraid 
to wash dirty linen in public and discredit the regime!
Serge managed to send Trotsky in 1929 a voluminous 
correspondence smuggled out of the Verkhne-Uralsk Isolator 
written in microscopic characters on strips of paper -—  this was
135the last communication Trotsky received from his comrades. 
Trotsky's Bulletin of the Opposition reached Serge and his 
comrades in bits and pieces for a while and then not at all. 
Communication was cut off, but ironically Serge wrote that the 
one place Socialist inquiry continued was in the prison yards, 
where imprisoned officials talked freely of Trotsky's thoughts.
Serge said they were upset to learn that Trotsky defended 
In principle the death penalty, recently applied to Blumkin; and 
that he accepted the sabotage charges against the Mensheviks and 
technicians. Since the charges against the Mensheviks —  that 
the conspiracy was directed in agreement with the French General 
Staff —  was obviously outrageous at face value, how could 
Trotsky make such a mistake? What did it say about his attitude 
to opponents? Deutscher explained that Trotsky later regretted 
his mistake, that the element of truth in the charges, that 
Groman had sought to obstruct the First Five Year Plan
135Ibid.. p. 260.
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136explained, although it did not justify, Trotsky's mistake. 
Serge, again, proved more magnanimous: although clearly
distressed with the implications of Trotsky's position, Serge 
longed to inform him of the truth. Whereas Serge admitted that 
Trotsky "was grossly mistaken" and "under the unfortunate 
influence of his Party patriotism," he conceded that the 
monstrous lies of the Press seemed "sensible" and that Trotsky 
would have been "unable to imagine the state of inhumanity,
137cynicism, and mania that our police-apparatus had sunk to." 
One can only imagine the surviving Oppositionists' frustration - 
- cut off from communication, unable to tell the truth even to 
their own members, much less the world community.
Serge was able, because he and his writings survived, to 
make an important contribution to our understanding of the 
mechanism of repression, the advent of the bureaucratic 
totalitarian state, and the fate of the repressed. Serge's 
concern with the nameless and faceless victims lost to Stalinism 
was singular. His writings, in a sense, served as their voices.
Serge wrote pages and pages devoted to simply giving names 
and telling stories. The Memoirs, From Lenin to Stalin, and 
especially Destiny of a Revolution are living testaments of the 
men and women who struggled and resisted —  some more resolutely 
than others -—  the crushing of the revolution and its ideals by 
Stalin and his faction. All of Serge's books contain thumbnail 
sketches of many of the men and women who devoted their lives to
136Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, p. 163. Naum Jasny, 
who dedicated his Soviet Industrialization 1928-1952 to 
Vladimir Gustavovich Groman confirmed in a reminiscence of 
Groman that he had backed Stalin and Bukharin until 1928, 
opposing Trotsky on industrialization. When Stalin made his 
'left turn' the Mensheviks were brought to trial.
137Memoirs, p. 260.
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1.38 •the struggle for socialism s many turn to his Memoirs 
precisely for that reason, to find out what so and so said, how 
he looked, what he thought.
From Lenin to Stalin contains many sketches, as well as long 
quotes from Serge's personal correspondence with leading 
Bolsheviks, as well as ordinary citizens. Destiny of a 
Revolution devotes six chapters to outlining who filled what 
prisons, what individual and collective resistance took place
138To be more precise: FLTS quoted the fate and last
words of Trotsky's closest collaborators and of the 
Zinovievists, written with the passion of a committed 
journalist and historian, whose facts must stand up to 
scrutiny, and with the prose of a poet whose words sear the 
consciousness of the reader. The book is filled with long 
quotes from letters Serge received, while it was still 
possible to correspond. Later, Serge quoted from reports 
smuggled out of the prisons and camps. The contradictory 
character of many of the revolution's literati was revealed by 
Serge, who knew them all or had access to others who did. How 
else would we know Blumkin wrote a memoir, or how Solnstsev 
died, or that Muralov refused capitulation to the very end?
RTYA gives case histories of A. Tarov, Trotskyist, the 
SRs Abraham Gortz and Leo Ger stein, Boris Chernov, and 
Volkenstein; Social Democrats George Kuchin, Sommer, 
Goldenberg, Ramishvili, Eva Broido? Anarchists Rogdayev, 
Baron, Barmash, Gerassimchik, Inaun, Sandomirsky, the Tuscan 
syndicalist Gaggi, etc. Oppositionists Albert Heinrichsen, 
Vassili Chadev, Georg Butov, Yakov Blumkin, Silov, Rabinovich, 
Yoselevich, Blumenfeld, Sosnovsky, Leon Papermeister, Helen 
Tsulukidze, Old Bolshevik Kote Tsintasadze, Eleazar Solntsev, 
Trotsky, Alexandra Bronstein, Yakovin, Pankratov, Pevzner, 
Socrates Gayvorkian, Dvinsky, Man Nevelson (married to 
Trotsky's daughter Nina), Aaron, Paul and Samuel Papermeister, 
Anna Yankovskaya, Marie Ivanovna, Ida Lemelman, Boris 
Mikhailovich Eltsin, Victor Eltsin, Maria Mikhailovna Yoffe, 
Lado Dumbadze, Lado Yenukidze, Joseph Krasskin, Vladimir 
Kossior, Mikhail Andreyevich Polevoy, Trukhanov, Nicolai 
Muralov, Mikhail Bodrov, Dora Zack, Ida Shumskaya, Borra Ilych 
Lakhovitsky, Alexis Semenovich Santalov, Lyda Svalova, Yakov 
Belenky, Yakov Byk, Fanya Upstein, Leonid Girchek, Vassily 
Mikhailovich Chernykh ... the democratic centralist 
Oppositionists Vladimir Smirnov and Timothey Sapronov, the 
capitulators Zinoviev, Kamenev, Ivan Smirnov, Eismont, 
Tolmachev, Red Professors Sliepkov, Astrov, Maretsky, 
Eikhenwald, Worker-Bolshevik Kayurov, Worker Oppositionist 
Shliapnikov and Medvedyev, and more....
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there, the fate of workers, youth, peasants, scientists, 
writers, teachers, and tells us in great detail the fate of the 
anarchists, the socialists, the communists, the life and death 
of the Oppositionists, the Capitulators, and even of Stalin's 
coterie. The book is a living memorial to the actors and 
victims of the revolution, 20 years on. Every scholar should 
have recourse to this book, although it has been out of print 
for 50 years. There is no room in this study to repeat or
1.39verify Serge's histories and thumbnail sketches, although any 
study of the fate of Stalin's opponents that doesn't consult 
Serge is lacking a vital source. By naming names and telling 
what happened to the nameless and faceless Serge has in effect 
cemented the first bricks in the national Memorial to Stalin's 
dead that the Soviets have just agreed to build.140 Serge's 
artist son, Vlady, is drawing up a proposal to build a monument 
in the USSR141 which would feature a sculpture of Stalin 
standing on a heap of cadavers, surrounded by bricks with the 
names of victims engraved on them.142
139I have tried throughout to repeat only those activities 
of Serge's which illuminate our understanding of the 
functioning of the Opposition and Serge's role within, as well 
as to quote revealing passages of leading personalities that 
round out our perceptions of these characters.
14019th Party Conference Decision, 28 June 1988. The 
initiative was animated by the group 'Memoryal,' a band of 
scholars, lawyers and history buffs who took to the streets 
with a petition which earned them detention, fines, harassment 
and threats. The group has demanded a monument attached to a 
museum, an archive of repression that will allow people to 
trace a victim's arrest, the name of his interrogator, and the 
time and manner of his fate, or as much of this as is dcnown. 
New York Times. July 2, 1988.
141 Serge told his son Vlady shortly before he died that 
although he wouldn't live to see it, Vlady probably would —  
monuments to Trotsky and to Stalin in the public squares of 
Russian.cities. Memoirs, p. xxii.









4.10 Persecution comes home
Like all Oppositionists still at large, Serge was subjected 
to police surveillance. He lived in a communal apartment in 
Leningrad with his wife, son and 9 others,143 among them three 
GPU agents who spied on his comings and goings, opened his mail, 
and reported his conversations. Two more 'guardian angels' 
followed his every step outside his apartment. The agents made 
no attempt to hide their spying on Serge. Sometimes Serge was 
warned that he was about to be charged with treason for his 
foreign correspondence, that he should be more discreet. On his 
frequent trips to Moscow, Serge found he couldn't stay with 
friends, relatives or anyone without compromising them so he 
often squatted in houses which had just been emptied by the GPU. 
Serge noticed that his friends and acquaintances, including 
Bukharin, avoided him in the street. The Italian Angelo Tasca, 
on the Comintern Executive, warned Serge that every time there 
were "three of you together, one of you is an agent
144 ' rprovocateur." As Serge commented, his crime, the crime of 
the Opposition, was simply that he existed.
The torment went on for five years. Persecution descended 
on his entire family who suffered for their Serge connection. 
Serge's father-in-law, the old revolutionary Russakov145, was
143Serge mentioned conditions in his communal flat in 
various writings: see Memoirs, his article "Complots en
URSS," La Wallonie. and Twenty Years After, where Serge wrote 
that his in-laws (the Russakovs) lived in the same communal 
flat.
144Memoirs, p. 274.
145Russakov had fought in the 1905 Revolution in Rostov, 
had been Secretary to the Russian Seamen's Union in 
Marseilles, was expelled from France in 1918 for organizing a 
strike on ships loaded with munitions for the Whites. Serge 
was on the same boat bound for Russia in 1918 as the 
Russakovs. He married Russakov's daughter Liuba, and Pierre 
Pascal, the French Left Oppositionist married Russakov's 
daughter Jenny. In the Soviet Union Russakov was a dye- 
worker.
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driven from his factory and union, indicted along with his wife 
and daughter, Serge's wife, as suspected anti-semites, counter­
revolutionaries, capitalists, and terrorists; whole factories 
demanded they be put to death. Party faithful and GPU agents 
came to the communal apartment which Serge shared with his in­
laws to taunt him, once even slapping Serge's wife in her face. 
Serge was with Panait I strati in the Bykovo Woods while this 
went on, and Serge intimated that the GPU only went ahead with 
this persecution because they had lost sight of Serge. After 
two trials, and the intervention of Serge and Panait Istrati, 
(they went to see Kalinin and others) the inquiry fizzled out. 
But In 1932 the persecution was resumed. Russakov, out of work, 
was denied a bread card and an internal passport.146 He died 
from the privations. The affair devastated Panait Istrati, who 
subsequently returned to France and wrote about it widely.147
Serge's wife was driven mad by the constant persecution. 
Liuba Russakova endured nine years of terrible persecution 
against her entire family, bore a daughter while Serge and her 
son Vlady were deported to Orenburg, and even after their 
expulsion from the Soviet Union, continued to suffer persecution 
by the GPU, and live in fearful tension of the Gestapo. Serge 
took her from clinic to clinic while still in the Soviet Union, 
but said they were full of GPU agents who won the confidences of
146The only semi-bright spot in this sordid affair was 
when The Workers and Peasants' Inspectorate held their own 
trial and had Russakov reinstated in the union, although they 
couldn't find him a job. The investigator for the 
Inspectorate was a young man, "who displayed a singular 
honesty" named Nikolayev. Serge never found out if it was the 
same Nikolayev who shot Kirov in 1934. Memoirs. p. 27*8'.
147The story about Serge's family is found in the Memoirs. 
pp. 277-8, 294-5, 322; Destiny of a Revolution, p. 111-114, 
"Una Voce Dal Gulag: Lettere Inedite di Victor Serge," Revista 
di Storia Contemporanea, no.3, 1978, pp. 426-445, Panait
Istrati, Vers L'Autre Flamme, 149-194. and Pierre Pascal, Mon 
Journal de Russie. Tome troisieme: 1922-1926, and Tome
quatrieme: 1927.
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the patients while treating their problems! Liuba's nerves 
couldn't stand the strain and she withdrew to the world of 
insanity. Serge's letters in the first period of exile in 
Europe are filled with references to her condition and the 
difficulties they faced because of her illness. She entered 
into a mental institution in the South of France, where she 
remained until her death in 1985.
All the Oppositionists' families suffered similarly, the 
most devastated being Trotsky's, which was almost entirely wiped
148out. Serge survived the tension through work, deriving great 
pleasure translating the works of Vera Figner, who organized the 
attempts on the life of Tsar Alexander II that drove Serge's 
parents into exile. In this terrible atmosphere, Serge wrote: 
"...the ring closes in relentlessly. The value of human life 
continuously declines, the lie in the heart of all social 
relationships becomes even fouler, and oppression ever 
heavier..."149
Serge felt he had an excellent chance of disappearing. He 
petitioned Stalin for a passport. By way of response, Serge was
I
demoted from Deputy Commander of the Front Intelligence Service, 
a rank corresponding to Colonel or General, which he was 
surprised to still hold. (This later showed up in the 
intelligence files of the American FBI, released to this writer 
through the Freedom of Information Act.) The arrests of 
Oppositionists and their families continued unabated as the 
economic and political situation deteriorated. Stalin's wife
148His grandchild Vsevolod (Sieva) Volkov, the only child 
to leave the USSR, survives. Trotsky's son Seryozha had a 
daughter who survived, and Sieva's half-sister surfaced in 
1988, only to die three months later. Thirty-six members of 
the close family perished.
149Memoirs, pp. 279-280.
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Nadezhda Alliluyeva committed suicide150, and Serge only dared 
see other Oppositionists at great risk. He managed to see 
Alexandra Bronstein, and Preobrazhensky.151
4.11 Serge's Last Testament
152 -After many close calls , Serge could see in the eyes of 
the agents in his apartment that arrest was near. Feeling 
alone and in danger, Serge managed to smuggle a letter to his 
friends in Paris, Magdeleine and Maurice Paz, Jacques Mesnil and 
Marcel Martinet. He asked them to publish the letter in case he 
disappeared. Serge considered the letter his last testament. 
The letter was dated 1 February 1933, dateline Moscow. Six 
weeks later Serge was arrested. The testament, or last letter, 
titled "1933 —  Tout est mis en question" (Everything is put 
into question) was published in La Revolution proletarienne. May
150Alexander Orlov, former Soviet diplomat and counter­
intelligence chief, wrote that Alliluyeva was shocked by the 
real conditions her husband's policies had provoked in the 
country, especially the situation in Ukraine, where famine had 
caused people to revert to cannibalism. She fought with 
Stalin over this, and he accused her of "collecting Trotskyite 
rumors." He treated her with abuse, obscenities and torment, 
according to Pauker, the chief of Stalin's bodyguard. Orlov 
wrote that "death was for her the only deliverance from the 
vulgarity and caddishness . .. and from the rude blows [Stalin] 
inflicted to her human dignity." Orlov, The Secret History of 
Stalin's Crimes, New York. 1954, pp. 314-326.
151Serge said of his encounter with Preobrazhensky: ".. .we 
opened our hearts for a moment in a dark little yard beneath 
leafless trees. 'I do not know where we are going,' he said. 
'They are stopping me from breathing, I expect anything to 
happen.... ' Symptoms of moral treason were being uncovered in 
his economic works on the world crisis. Hands in his pockets, 
melancholy and hunched against the cold night air, he was, as 
I inexplicably sensed, a doomed man." Preobrazhensky 
subsequently disappeared. Memoirs, p. 281.
152Serge had missed the call inviting him to a party at 
which all the guests were arrested; twice Serge managed to 
escape from comrades' houses just as the GPU were raiding. 
Memoirs, p. 275.
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15325, 1933, with the headline "Victor-Serge Arrete."
Fearing his own demise, Serge wrote openly to his friends, 
asking them to fight for his release, and to take care of Liuba 
and his son Vlady, should he be killed. More importantly, Serge 
poured out his thoughts and feelings about the way in which life 
under totalitarian surveillance was choking him and indeed 
everyone else. It is in this document that Serge first 
identified the Soviet Union as a totalitarian State, before 
Trotsky and well before the 'totalitarian school.'
He also used the opportunity to put forward what he
considered essential points that must be guaranteed as intrinsic
to the socialist project. These three conditions were:
(1) Defense of Man: respect for the rights of every man, even
'class enemies.' Every man has certain rights, including the
right to a secure existence, without which there can be no
socialism. Serge spoke in particular against the use of the
death penalty, and against the practice of depriving men and
women of liberty for mere suspected dissent. (2) Defense of
truth: Serge was horrified at the falsification of history
already underway and the censorship of news. He said, ”1 hold
truth to be a precondition of intellectual and moral health. To
speak of truth is to speak of honesty. Both are the right of
men." (3) Defense of thought: Serge denounced the regime's
embezzlement of Marxist theory, which it was replacing it with
empty slogans. He explained:
"I hold that Socialism cannot develop in the 
intellectual sense except by the rivalry, scrutiny and 
struggle of ideas; that we should fear not error,
which is mended in time by life itself, but rather
stagnation and reaction; that respect for man implies 
his right to know everything and his freedom to think.
It is not against freedom of thought and againstr"man 
that Socialism can triumph, but on the contrary,
153Titled "La Profession de foi de Victor-Serge,” La 
Revolution proletarienne, Vol. 1933, No. 152, p. 193. 
Reprinted in Serge's 16 Fusilles. Ou va la Revolution Russe? 
Paris, Cahiers Spartacus, no. 1, serie nouvelle, 1936.
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through freedom of thought, and by improving man's 
condition."
The document evokes not only the paralysis of one of the 
hunted, but also the repugnance and daily fear of living in a 
totalitarian society.
Serge blended the political and personal, as he described 
the everyday existence which had driven his wife mad, in which 
privacy was impossible, in which every move was spied and 
reported on. Questioning the scope of the regime's fear —  it 
had gone to great lengths to prevent Serge from leaving —  Serge 
concluded that Stalin was terrified of witnesses, of ideological 
opponents, and what they would say. Stalin was bitter that 
Trotsky was out of his reach, and was afraid of another voice 
against him abroad.
Serge found continuity in Stalin's behavior with that of 
Ivan the Terrible: 'the same intolerance, the same incapacity to 
evolve, the same horror of freedom, the same governmental 
fanaticism and bureaucracy, the same arbitrariness..., the same 
implacable and gloomy coercion.' Serge concluded the revolution 
was in a phase of reaction, that the concentration of economic 
and political power in the hands of the regime had resulted "que 
l'individu est tenu par le pain, le vetement, le logement, le 
travail et mis totalement a la discretion de la machine, permet 
a celle-ci de negliger l'homme et def ne tenir compte que des 
grands nombres, a la longue."154
The regime, Serge asserted, was in absolute contradiction 
with everything stated, proclaimed, thought and intended by the 
revolution itself. Everything had changed since 1926: now, in 
1933, a member of the Party wouldn't even dream of asking a 
simple political question; the establishment of ...-internal
154"1933, Tout est mis en question," p. 47 (in 16 
Fusilles). Translation: the individual being held by bread, 
clothing, lodging, and work, and totally at the discretion of 
the machine, which neglects man and only counts large numbers 
in a line.
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passports, preventing the freedom of movement, would have been 
thought crazy even two years earlier, according to Serge.
How could this happen? Despite the objective conditions of 
backwardness and isolation, Serge insisted that the bureaucracy 
obstinately exercised all the wrong choices, paralyzed 
intelligent initiative, and set the whole world against it.
"The extreme concentration of power, in the presence 
of a profoundly embittered and disenchanted population 
who passively adapt and manage without illusions, 
increase to a large degree the importance of a handful 
of men who exercise ... an uncontrolled dictatorship, 
without even the ability to recognize public opinion. "
Even worse, Serge asked the unavoidable and difficult
question about the future: when the new men who are developing
today put their hands on the levers of totalitarian power
tomorrow, where will they take it? Reaction is accumulating,
Serge pointed out. When men must fight each other for bread
cards and information on scarce lodgings, when civic courage is
not tolerated, when the official ideology is so at odds with
harsh daily reality that it can only be scoffed at, what kind of
social consciousness can emerge? Already Serge bemoaned that the
youth were skeptical of ideas and in love with material things,
wanting an 'Americanization.' "The reaction at the heart of the
revolution puts everything in question, compromising the future,
the principles, ... creating an internal danger much more real
in the present hour than the external danger...." These are not
the words of a discouraged liberal, but of a genuine socialist
who saw the future clearly.
Although Serge claimed that he was not a pessimist, he
realized that the socialist project would need not only a
renewal, but that its name would be soiled because its first
experiment was so diseased. Serge wrote that socialism can only
win,
"not through imposing itself, but by showing itself 
superior to capitalism, not in the fabrication of 
tanks but in the organization of social life; if it 
offers to man a condition better than capitalism: more
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material well-being, more justice, more liberty and a 
higher dignity."
The duty of a revolutionist in these conditions, Serge 
concluded, "is a double duty: exterior defense, interior
defense." To serve the revolution, one must keep one's eyes 
open and resist, even if the resistance is only internal. To 
shut one's eyes 'to the bad' is to become an accomplice. The 
double duty then, is also to preserve your ideas and defend 
yourself from the corruption of the revolution.
Serge wrote of the Oppositionist's proposal for a reform, 
that "elle est impossible et ne pourra se realiser qu'avec le 
temps — de longues annees —  au prix de luttes longues et 
penibles. Et rien n'est moins certain que sa reussite. TOUT EST 
MIS EN QUESTION."
By 1933, then, Serge had made a definitive break with the 
politics of Party patriotism, and understood that the Party was 
finished as a vehicle of revolution and reform. Open to new 
collaborations, Serge wrote his friends,
"je sympathise avec tous ceux qui vont contre le 
courant, cherchent a sauver les idees, les principes,
1'esprit de la revolution d'Octobre. Je crois qui'il 
faut, por cela, tout revoir en commencant par 
instituer entre camarades des tendances les plus 
diverses, une collaboration reellement fraternelle 
dans la discussion et dans 1'action.1,155
Serge's last testament, which defines what amounts to three 
inalienable rights of man, is not the document of a libertarian 
anarchist, nor of liberal reformist. Serge explicitly 
wrote "Et je ne fais pas ici une apologie du liberalisme." 
Serge's testament penned from deep within the bowels of 
totalitarianism, is a rich expression of socialist goals. The
155Literal translation: I sympathize with all who go
against the current, looking to preserve the ideas, 
principles, and the spirit of the October Revolution. I think 
that to do that it is a must to review everything, so that we 
can begin to institute among comrades of the most diverse 
tendencies, a really fraternal collaboration in discussion and 
in action.
254
need for institutional guarantees of what are presumed basic 
rights has been amply demonstrated in the 55 years since Serge 
wrote these lines. Serge's testament is that of an authentic 
revolutionary whose life experience demonstrated intransigently 
that socialism without liberty and democracy is not and cannot 
be socialism; that socialism is a superior system which cannot 
be more retrograde than bourgeois society in terms of the rights 
of individuals in the sphere of the freedom to think, speak, and 
organize.
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Chapter Fours Section II ORENBURG 1933-19361
INTERROGATION AND DEPORTATION: DIGGING THE GRAVES OF THE 
REVOLUTION
II. 4.12 Crimes of Existence
Serge wrote his last testament letter to his friends in
France on 1 Feb. 1933. That same month Sergei Kirov, speaking
to Party activists in Leningrad said:
"We shall be pitiless, and not only against the
communists who engage in counterrevolutionary activity 
[that is to say, Oppositionists], but also those 
lacking in firmness in the factory and the villages 
and who fail to carry out the plan. Four hundred 
members of the party have already been sent to the 
Solovetski Islands."
In early March 1933 the People's Vice-Commissar for Agriculture,
Konor, and Wolfe and Kovarsky of the Council of the
Commissariat, along with thirty two other agronomists and
functionaries, were executed without trial, accused of having
had relations with Ukrainian nationalists in Poland.2
The mechanism of repression had swung into high gear.
Between 1928-1930 Serge estimated some four to five thousand
Oppositionists were arrested3. Socialists, anarchists,
Source material from Serge is weakest in this period as 
he mainly worked on four books which were confiscated upon his 
expulsion. For that reason, this chapter depends more on 
Serge's Memoirs for information on his activities, writings 
and state of mind.
2Serge, FLTS, pp. 68-69.
3 The data Serge quoted was 3000-4000 arrested in early 
1928; 1000 more arrested in October 1929; 300 arrested in 
Moscow in January 1930; another 400-500 arrested jon the 
occasion of the 16th Party Congress in Moscow in May 1930; in 
August 1930 'several hundreds' more arrested. Those arrested 
in 1928 ended their five year sentences in 1933-34 at which 
time their sentences were automatically doubled, usually after 
being rearrested and charged in connection with the Kirov 
affair. No more Oppositionists were at large after 1931-32, 
with the exception of Serge, Alexandra Bronstein and Andre
(continued...)
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syndicalists and communists were imprisoned or deportated. At 
this point nothing could save a suspects even silence.
Serge's period of precarious liberty drew to a close. In mid 
March, 1933, he was rearrested. Although arrests were still 
selective, the sweep of the Opposition was thorough. Rather 
than the customary 'knock on the door,' the GPU met Serge on the 
street while he was trying to buy medicine for his ailing wife. 
He was taken to the new GPU headquarters, a "spacious, stern and 
magnificent" building.
Serge was immediately taken to the investigating magistrate 
responsible for Party cases, 'Comrade' Karpovich. Karpovich 
interrogated Serge for more than 12 hours, using the fact that 
they were Party comrades to get Serge to understand what was 
required of him. Serge noted that he was able to get 
surreptitious information from Karpovich during the 'interview' 
about the fate of Christian Rakovsky, who had reputedly died in 
deportation.4 The interview covered Serge's views on everything 
point by point: agrarian policy, industrialization, Comintern, 
inner-Party regime. Serge stuck to his Oppositionist views, 
raising Marxist objections to all of Stalin's policies. 
Following the marathon interrogation, Serge was taken to the 
same House of Arrest that he had visited in 1928. Noting that 
prisons are "so durable as to prevail over revolutions and the 
fall of empires"5 Serge began his fourth captivity in the same
3(...continued)
Nin. 1932 marked the resumption of repression in the wake of 
famine and terror, and with the assassination of Kirov in 1934 
the terror escalated dramatically. Serge, RTYA pp. 105-115.
4 In fact Rakovsky was sick, not dead. Without any means 
of effective communication however, rumors circulated freely. 
Serge wrote in RTYA that for months comrades could not learn 
whether or not this particular rumor was true. RTYA p. 104.
Its also possible that rumors were deliberately planted to 
demoralize the surviving Oppositionists. This seems to be the 
case with Rakovsky.
5 Memoirs, p. 286.
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way as all the others: "Formalities of entry, a registration-
office, and a series of partitions through which a man passes 
like a grain on its way into some intricate milling mechanism. "6
Serge's first cellmate was another writer who had been 
cooped up in freezing solitary for months. Their cell was 
underground and very cold. Serge was quickly transferred to the 
infamous Lubianka in Moscow. Serge was disturbed and frightened, 
but "determined to resist unyieldingly" with dignity. He was 
put in a tiny windowless cell, six by six, used as a waiting 
cell for prisoners about to be executed. There were ten 
prisoners, two beds, constant bright light, and a cold tile 
floor. His cellmates were arrested for far-fetched offenses: 
one for hearing a 'counter-revolutionary leaflet read out among 
some friends without denouncing everybody immediately."7 With 
Serge in the same prison were Wolfe, Konar and Kovarsky, the 
agronomists about to be executed.
From there Serge was escorted to the "prison of prisons" of 
"noiseless, cell-divided secrecy" where Serge was "in the void, 
enveloped in a quite astonishing silence."8 He spent 85 days in 
total solitary, broken only by six interrogations. To withstand 
the tension Serge slept as much as possible and worked 
diligently. He wrote a play, short stories, poems, all in his 
head, since he wasn't allowed writing materials or reading 
matter. He gave himself courses, and admitted that his inner 
life was "most intense and rich." He was constantly hungry, 
except on May first, the International Workingman's Day, when 
Serge was fed a full meal and given cigarettes and matches.
The interrogations were a throwback to Tsarist traditions - 
-relentless and nocturnal. In an aggressive mood for his first, 
Serge congratulated his interrogator, Magistrate Bo^in, for
6 Ibid.
7 Memoirs, p. 288.
8 Ibid. p. 190.
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resuming this Tsarist ritual. Serge's account of this 
interrogation reveals the way in which the regime set traps for 
the Oppositionists, based on appealing to their sense of Party 
loyalty.
Magistrate Bogin's strategy was to get to Serge 
politically, as a fellow Party comrade, who should serve the 
Party by admitting the authority of the Central Committee. 
Serge understood immediately the trap and retorted that as an 
expelled member, he was no longer bound by party discipline. 
Serge was then accused of communicating with Oppositionists and 
keeping Oppositional documents. They also tried to link Serge 
to someone he didn't know, a certain 'Solovian.'
The interrogations proceeded thus, with Serge alert to the 
pitfalls from which he would not escape. Nevertheless, on the 
night that Konar, Wolfe and the agriculturalists were executed, 
passing down the same corridors as Serge, he sensed great 
danger. The next day he was summoned during the day to be 
interrogated by Rutkovsky, the examining magistrate for 'Serious 
Oppositional' cases, personal aide to the Head of the Department 
and a member of the secret Collegium.9 Serge recalled being 
terrified by the implications of Rutkovsky's vicious line of 
interrogation. Rutkovsky told Serge that this was his last 
chance to cooperate, and that if Serge didn't try he faced long 
years of confinement. He then presented Serge with a fantastic 
document containing wild assertions which had been extracted 
from Serge's young, apolitical sister-in-law Anita Russakova.10
9 The account of Serge's arrest and interrogations can be 
found in the Memoirs. pp.285-296.
10 Anita Russakova, Liuba Kibalchich's young sister had 
at times been Serge's secretary, taking dictation of his 
translation work. Serge described her as "an unpolitical girl 
whose only interest was in music, innocent in all things as a 
new-born baby." Memoirs p. 294. Serge refused to confirm the 
lies extorted from Anita under torture and demanded to see her 
to prove the confession was baseless. According to Serge in
(continued...)
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At least that is what Serge believed and wrote in the Memoirs.11
Serge's experience in the Lubianka, followed by three years 
of deportation in Orenburg, helped him understand how the great 
Trials were fabricated, how the confessions were dictated and 
manufactured, and how the accused were 'ripened' through ten 
years of persecution, demoralization, solitary and torture 
(including drugs and hypnosis) to sign the baseless documents. 
In Serge's case, as in others, false testimony was used as the 
basis for the charges against him. Serge went to his death 
believing this testimony had been extracted under torture from 
his apolitical young sister-in-law. It was only in 1989 that we 
discovered that the entire document had been concocted, without 
the help of Anita Russakova.12
The prepared charges were pure 'ravings' and it was clear 
that a trap had been set. Serge knew that one bit of wavering 
would ensure his doom. He said he felt utterly alone and
10(.. .continued)
the Memoirs, his persistence led the GPU to drop the case and 
release Anita, but she was rearrested in April 1936, just as 
Serge was released (to prevent their meeting and exposing the 
lies which had failed against Serge) and spent 25 years in the 
gulag. Her life was ruined simply because she was related to 
Serge. Memoirs pp. 293-296, RTYA p. 112, FLTS pp. 77-78, and 
interview with Vlady, Mexico City, May 1987.
11 In fact it was family lore. Vlady and I went to Moscow 
in March 1989 and made telephone contact with Anita, still 
alive, but were unable to procure the proper visa to visit her 
in Leningrad. Nonetheless in September 1989, two English
filmmakers, Les Smith and Roy Battersby, were able to follow 
up on our contact, and met with Anita who told them she was 
never arrested in 1933 as told in the Memoirs. She therefore 
could not have signed the supposed denunciation presented to 
Serge —  she hadn't even seen it. However, she recounted that 
when she was arrested in 1936, her interrogation by Rutkovsky 
was based on the contents of this document1 (Anita Russakova, 
interview with Les Smith and Roy Battersby, Leningrad, 
September 1989)
12See footnote 11 above.
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strangled in the dark. He understood that they intended to 
shoot him, and feeling lost, he was emboldened. He decided to 
have nothing to do with their lies: that he would never give in, 
never abandon his communist thought, never worship the 
gravedigger of the revolution, approve the rebirth of privilege 
and the boundless misery of workers and peasants.13
Serge's refusal to cooperate was more than a passive 
silence during interrogation. He took the offensive and wrote 
Rutkovsky every day demanding to confront Anita to expose the 
lies of the GPU. In so doing, Serge put his inquisitors on 
trial, rather than the reverse. It was a brave gamble, but it 
worked. Rutkovsky ended the investigation on the condition that 
Serge understand that the GPU attached no importance to Anita's 
evidence. (In fact their own invented evidence.) Serge was 
immediately granted books to read, one hour's exercise per day, 
news of his family, and a package from the Political Red Cross. 
This last was a signal to Serge that his disappearance was known 
to the international community and that his friends in Paris had 
been activated on the issue.14 More than Serge's aggressive 
behavior, the international attention drawn to his case probably 
influenced the GPU's decision to deport, rather than shoot
Serge, Memoirs, pp. 284-296, From Lenin to Stalin, p. 
77-78. In Serge's novel Midnight in the Century his 
characters Ryzhik and Elkin act in a similarly bold, 
forthright and almost reckless manner, attacking Stalin's 
politics from the year 1907 on, denouncing his crimes and his 
role as gravedigger. We assume this was Serge's stance during 
his interrogation. See MITC, pp.65, 143, & especially pp. 
165-167, 169-171.
14In fact his comrades acted immediately upon hearing of 
his arrest, to set up a Committee Victor-Serge to campaign for 
his release and raise money to support him while in 
deportation. Jacques Mesnil and Magdeleine Paz especially 
worked tirelessly for years on this issue, writing in La 
Revolution proletarienne and other left journals, attending 
meetings, badgering human rights committees, progressive 
lawyers in the Association Juridique Internationale, the 
Congress of writers, and so forth. The material relating to 
the campaign is voluminous. See RP, 1933-1936.
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Serge. Although it is clear that as a French author and 
Bolshevik Oppositionist militant, Serge's case was atypical —  
a Russian Oppositionist author would probably have disappeared 
forever —  nevertheless, we can learn a great deal about the 
conduct of the purges by examining Serge's experience.
Serge's comportment under interrogation was remarkable, 
but not unique. One aspect of the 'show trials' during the 
Great Purge of 1936-1938 was that the interrogation process 
seemed infallible and the GPU could get anyone to confess 
anything. Indeed, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs 
Zakovsky, "a former criminal who had been convicted of murder 
before the Revolution, boasted that he would have been able to 
make Marx himself confess to working for Bismarck."15 Yet 
contrary to Zakovsky and Orwell (who said a torture can be found 
to break anyone) and others, some, like Serge, were able to 
withstand physical and psychological torture and resist. For 
example, in the same Moscovskive novosti article, Ambartsumov 
cited the protocols of the Piatakov-Radek trial, in which 36 
cases were prepared but only 19 people were tried —  the 19 who 
'broke.' The remaining 17 defendants wouldn't confess.
From the Lubianka Serge was taken to the old Butyrki jail, 
where he was left alone for several days with books to read. 
There he was presented with a paper to signs 'Counter­
revolutionary conspiracy. Condemned by the Special Collegium to 
three years' deportation at Orenburg...'16 This was not a 
confession, but merely to acknowledge his charge and sentence.
15 Yevgeny Ambartsumov, "A Venomous Fog Lifts: Victims of 
the Moscow Trials Have Been Rehabilitated," Moscovskive 
novosti, June 19, 1988, p. 10. Appeared in the English edition 
of Moscow News. No. 25, June 26-July 3, 1988, as "The
Poisonous Mist Disperses," p. 10.
16 Memoirs, pp. 296-97.
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Serge signed, angry because he had no choice, and glad to be 
able to look forward at least to a life in the open air.17
In an ironic post-script to Serge's interrogations, Serge 
ran into the mysterious 'Solovian' —  the figure his 
interrogator tried to link to him in some conspiracy —  while 
waiting to be deported. Solovian introduced himself to all and 
sundry with the assurance that he was not in any Opposition and 
supported the 'General Line.' Serge wished him luck with the 
General Line.18
II. 4.13 Orenburg
Serge's journey to his destination of deportation was 
something of a wonder, especially compared to his stay in the 
Lubianka. He met other Oppositionists in transit and shared 
news, marveling at the thrill of being outdoors and viewing the 
great natural beauty of Soviet towns and countryside. In his 
novel about the Orenburg experience, Midnight in the Century, 
Serge explained how Left Oppositionist ideas were carried across 
borders, in trains leading to deportation and prison sites.19
Orenburg sits geographically on the line between Europe and 
Asia, though Serge wrote that it belongs to Asia. Formerly the 
capital of Kazakhstan (the capital is now Alma-Ata, where 
Trotsky was first exiled), the "metropolis of the steppes" had 
flourished as a wealthy market city in former times, even as 
recently as NEP. When Serge arrived in June 1933 however, the 
town was in decline and ruin, ravaged by famine.
In place of the lively bazaars of yesterday, Orenburg now 
featured mostly empty State retail-trade stores. Serge reported 
that in his three years there, no shoes were sent to Orenburg.20
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Serge, MITC, p. 102.
20 •Memoirs. p. 299.
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Serge's conditions of deportation were that he could not leave 
the town, save for fresh air walks in the woods, he could work 
and live where he found a job and lodgings, and he was to be 
issued a bread-card. Serge soon joined the hungry Kirghizians 
and Kazakhstanis of Orenburg —  and remained hungry till his 
expulsion from the Soviet Union.
Orenburg was a privileged place for deportation, reserved 
for leading figures. One tenth of the population were 
deportees, or 16,000. When Serge arrived there were 15 
political deportees, among them leading Mensheviks, anarchists, 
SRs, Zionists and Oppositional capitulators.21 Later the 
Oppositionist community swelled. Serge thought the GPU had 
allowed a certain homogeneity of political deportees to gather 
together in exile so that in the course of intellectual and 
political discourse, differences would arise, dividing the 
Opposition. It would then be easier for the GPU to separate and 
transfer the most irreconcilable to worse climes and prisons.22
The deportee was in a special class unto itself in the 
Stalinist system. While it is true that every Soviet citizen 
was almost entirely dependent on the State for survival, this 
was true to a more exaggerated degree for the deportee. First, 
he or she had to report constantly to the GPU, and was 
completely at the mercy of a few officials for such basics as 
mail from relatives, work, medical care, and so on. Then the 
interrogations were never finished either; the pressure to 
capitulate was incessant. The deportee could not fraternize with 
party members and was ostracized by the local population, who 
feared contact would jeopardize their own security.23
There was also a catch as far as employment was concerned: 
no one would hire Serge (or any deportee) unless he proclaimed
21 Memoirs. p. 303.
22 Ibid.
23 Serge, RTYA. P. 75.
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support for the 'general line.'24 Serge refused to capitulate, 
and thus got no work. He depended entirely on the mail for 
survival, since he could receive food parcels from his wife, and 
more importantly, money from the sale of his books in Paris. His 
first three novels, Men in Prison. Conquered City, and Birth of 
Our Power, as well as his history Year One of the Russian 
Revolution were now on sale in France. When the mail got 
through, Serge received 300 francs25 (about 15 rubles) per month 
to buy food at the local Torgsin shop, which even at the height 
of famine sold food in exchange for foreign currency. Serge was 
able to support some of his comrades as well. For a while, 
Serge also received food parcels from Magdeleine Paz in Paris —  
packages of rice, sugar, flour and olives. Vlady told Richard 
Greeman that he once divided a single olive among a group of 
schoolmates, who had never seen one.
In the winter of 1934, Serge's wife Liuba and son Vlady 
joined him in Orenburg, bringing with them Serge's typewriter 
and books. Liuba's mental health was not strong enough to bear 
the terrible instability of life in deportation, however, and
24 If the deportee was a worker, 'responsible employment' 
was denied him, if he was an intellectual, he was not allowed 
to teach or continue his studies. Any work of adequate 
compensation was also forbidden. His mail was often 
confiscated, and in general the deportee was deprived of civil 
rights. He was subject to arbitrary arrest and raids, living 
under the constant threat of the Secret Service. Serge, RTYA. 
p. 75-76. The deportee was destitute, spied on, deprived of 
private life, and administratively transferred from one remote 
region to another, usually without any knowledge of charges. 
Conditions in deportation, however terrible, were better than 
prison. Many memoirs corroborate and elaborate Serge's 
testimony: Anton Ciliga, El Campesino, Nicholas
Prychodka, Alexander Weissberg, etc. See bibliography.
25 The Comite Victor-Serge in Paris raised money for Serge 
through the journal La Revolution Proletarienne. The 
subscriptions obtained were published in each issue with the 
name of the contributor and amount donated. See La Revolution 
proletarienne. "Souscription pour Victor Serge," no. 122-2, 
[date].
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Serge finally decided that her presence would jeopardize the 
survival of all of them, and sent her back to Leningrad. Vlady 
remained with Serge throughout his period of exile, and he 
remembers the time as a combination of tranquility, study, and 
a fierce struggle to withstand starvation and exposure during 
the five months of harsh winter26, and hunger and disease during 
the five months of extremely hot summer.27
Apart from Vlady, Serge's 'family circle' in Orenburg 
consisted of ten deported Oppositionists, whose characters and 
travails are captured in Serge's novel of the Orenburg years, 
Midnight in the Century.28 The men and women who shared 
internal exile with Serge, most of them Civil War veterans, 
"incarnated an epoch" and Serge wrote that "most probably"29 
they all perished.30 They are described in detail in both the 
Memoirs and Russia Twenty Years After. The intensity of the 
experience brought these comrades very close together, and Serge 
strongly felt it was his duty, upon release, to ceaselessly 
campaign for their lives, and memorialize their struggles in his 
written works. The salient factor Serge was to stress, which in
26 In order to keep warm, the townspeople abandoned the 
well-made large houses which were in any case requisitioned by 
the GPU. They then built smaller, inferior homes, leaving the 
larger ones to rot. When the condition of the larger homes 
reached a certain stage of deterioration, permission would be 
granted to demolish them and sell the timber for firewood. In 
this way Serge and the other inhabitants were able to keep 
warm, while the housing stock diminished and the population 
increased. See Memoirs, pp. 306-307, and Midnight in the 
Century.
27 Information supplied by Vlady, interview in Mexico 
City, May 1987.
28 Translated by Richard Greeman and published by Readers 
and Writers.
29Memoirs, p. 309.
30In Moscow in 1989 Vlady and I discovered that Lisa 
Senyatskaya, Vassili Pankratov's wife, had survived.
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retrospect seems all the more remarkable, was that these men and 
women, "journeying ... from prison to prison, from exile to 
exile, tormented by privation, ... kept their revolutionary 
faith, their good spirits, their sparkling political 
intelligence."31
Serge's fiction serves to portray the struggles, hopes, 
goals and tragedies of his generation of revolutionaries, whose 
life experiences were unique. His writing is autobiographical 
though it is also a work of the imagination. Serge used the 
novel as his vehicle to get at the inner truth of the tumultuous 
political struggles in which he and his comrades participated. 
His fiction was meant to communicate that truth in a way that 
his histories couldn't.
For our purposes, his novel Midnight In The Century, while 
as a work of fiction cannot be used to verify historical detail, 
can be used to discover what he and his comrades were thinking, 
discussing and feeling. The novel reproduces many of the 
meetings and discussions of the Left Oppositionists in exile.32 
It is a work of optimism, despite the grim conditions it
31 Memoirs. p. 307.
32For example, by the river the group held discussions on 
the nature of the Soviet state and on Hegel and dialectics: 
pp. 67-71. Pp 71-72 discusses the report on the Left 
Oppositionists in the Verkhne-Uralsk Isolator and Central 
Prison in late 1933. On pp. 75-6 they discuss the situation in 
Germany and the need for a United Front, and the question of 
whether or not the time has come to form a new party in the 
USSR. This develops into a general theoretical discussion on 
the congruencies between Stalin and Hitler: "These grave­
diggers were born to understand each other. Enemies and 
brothers. In Germany, one is burying an aborted democracy, the 
child of an aborted revolution. In Russia, the other is 
burying a victorious revolution born of a weak proletariat and 
left on its own by the rest of the world, both of them are 
leading those they serve — the bourgeoisie in Germany, the 
bureaucracy here at home —  toward a catastrophe." There are 
many more useful discussions, including very useful portrayals 
of the interrogations and how some Oppositionists fought back 
and others caved in. (pp. 41-50, 165-167, 169-171.)
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describes and the implications of the title. In a central scene 
of the novel, the old Bolshevik Elkin and the young worker 
Rodion discuss the joy of sunshine —  feeling that they could be 
whisked into a cellar that evening. Querying what had become of 
thought in this period of the 'huge falsehood,' the old
Bolshevik Elkin answered Rodion: "Right now it's something of a 
midnight sun piercing the skull. Glacial. What's to be done, if 
it is midnight in the century?" Characteristically, the young 
Rodion, Serge's hope for a socialist future, answered
"Midnight's where we have to live then."33
Even in the worst conditions, while the genuine 
revolutionaries were being stabbed in the back by their own 
Party, while fascism reared its ugly head in Europe and 
capitalism was in the depths of depression and approaching war, 
Serge's novel reaffirms the revolutionary spirit and bright 
political intelligence of the comrades with whom he had the 
privilege of rubbing shoulders. Written from 1936-1938, the 
novel posits the living revolutionary flame kept alive in the 
creative dissent of imprisoned and deported Oppositionists, 
about to be crushed by the totalitarian machine. Even if it is 
midnight in the century, the morning dawns with the escape of 
the young Rodion, the representative of the new revolutionary 
worker about to germinate a new working class with revolutionary 
ideas learned from the old generation of Bolsheviks in 
deportation.
It has been suggested that Koestler' s famous novel of the
purges, Darkness at Noon, was influenced by Serge's Midnight in
The Century, and although the content is more frequently 
compared with The Case of Comrade Tulavev. the titles themselves 
have been the subject of an interesting analysis^ by Bill 
Marshall. While the titles seem to parallel each other, Marshall 
points to the subtle, if significant difference —  in Serge's 
novel light triumphs over dark, while Koestler's title, taken
33 Serge, Midnight in the Century, pp. 117-118.
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from Milton's Samson Agonistes, stresses dark obliterating 
light.34
* * * * * * * * * *
Who were these comrades? Among the well known, Boris 
Mikhailovich Yeltsin, the old Bolshevik comrade of Lenin, whose 
son Victor Borisovich (Yeltsin) was Trotsky's assistant; Lisa 
Senatskaya, pregnant wife of Vassili Pankratov, revolutionary 
leader in the Verkhne-Uralsk isolator; Lydia Svalova, young 
worker from Perm who had spent her youth in deportation; Fanya 
Epstein, Odessa intellectual and militant; Vassili Chernykh, 
former head of Ural Cheka, a 'revisionist' who thought all ideas 
now needed rethinking; the history Professor Yakov Belenky, the 
worker Ivan (Yakov?) Byk35 who had been a member of the Workers 
Opposition; the proletarian from the Putilov works, Alexei 
Santalov, arrested for calling Stalin the "gravedigger of the 
Revolution" in a bar. These comrades became the composite 
characters of Ryzhik36, Elkin, Varvara, Avelii, Kostrov and 
Rodion in Midnight in the Century. The novel reveals that their 
morale was excellent, despite the terrible conditions of 
deportation, that they were able to continue discussion and
34 W.J. Marshall, Ideology and Literary Expression in the 
Works of Victor Serge, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
Oxford University, 1984, pp 324-326.
35 Byk had been in the Solovietsky Islands concentration 
camp. A Civil War veteran and former Workers' Oppositionist, 
he had also been one of the organizers of the famous hunger 
strike at the Verkhne-Uralsk prison. The strike was against 
the automatic doubling of sentences. While on strike Byk was 
informed that Rakovsky had formulated a position of united 
front with the Central Committee against the war danger. Byk 
thought this reasonable and was flown to Moscow's Butyrki 
prison, and was asked to sign the article of conciliation he 
had been told Rakovsky had written. After reading the 
document, Byk asked to be returned to the concentration camp.
36Vlady insists that Ryzhik represents Serge in the 
novels.' Interviews, 1986 (Mexico), 1987 (Mexico), 1989 
(Moscow).
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receive information from Trotsky and the Oppositionists in the 
other prisons and camps, though certainly without regularity; 
how some held up under interrogation and others caved in; how 
they were all Oppositionists, but nevertheless held various 
positions.
On this last point, Serge was careful to show how in 
discussion, the Opposition maintained the revolutionary 
Bolshevik tradition of expressing sharp and conflicting views, 
in an attempt to achieve clarity. The Oppositionists were 
wholly different from the servile yes-men of Stalin's Party; 
they were thinking revolutionaries accustomed to debate. The 
Opposition was divided between capitulators, (in three drafts), 
the democratic centralists (led by V. Smirnov and T. Sapronov), 
revisionists, and doctrinaires, who were subdivided into 
orthodox, extreme Left, and State Capitalists. Ciliga37 also 
confirmed that the Opposition had moderate and far left 
currents, (as did Deutscher) and Boris Yeltsin confessed that 
what held them together was the GPU. "Our unity is the work of 
the GPU: in fact we have as many tendencies as there are
militants. I don't find this at all objectionable."38
Where was Victor Serge in this melange of Oppositionists? 
He stood on the left of the Trotskyists, sympathetic to the 
concerns of the extreme left-wing, but loyal to the ideas of the 
Old Man, with the outstanding difference that Serge proclaimed
Anton Ciliga belonged to the 'extreme Left-wing 
Opposition' which distinguished itself from the Trotskyists in 
calling the Soviet Union a new exploitative class society, as 
opposed to Trotsky's characterization of the USSR as a 
degenerated workers' state. Ciliga belonged to the camp of 
Oppositionists which included 'democratic Centralism',
'workers' Opposition,' 'workers group.' They shared a concern 
that Trotsky was battling Stalin over the Party and that the 
proletariat and its condition was but a passive object in the 
struggle. See The Russian Enigma. Anton Ciliga, especially 
Book III, chapter VIII, pp. 261-274.
38 Memoirs, p.307.
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the death of the Bolshevik Party much earlier than Trotsky.39 
It was easier for Serge, the former anarchist, to break with the 
moribund and counter-revolutionary practices of Stalin's Party 
than for many of the Bolshevik Party's founders and fighters. 
Serge, it must be remembered, favored a multi-party system as 
early as 1921. In 1923 he wrote that a coalition government, 
though fraught with danger, would be less dangerous for the 
Soviet and international proletariat than the one-party state 
dictatorship which emerged. This realization came later, if at 
all, to other members of the revolutionary generation of 
Bolsheviks.40
II. 4.14 The Crossroads
During the terrible winter of 1934, Serge fell deathly ill
due to the appalling conditions. In the country at large, the
famine was ending and the ruble had stabilized, pegging it to a
kilo of bread. But in deportation, Serge had no work, and the
GPU cut off his mail, his only source of food. Serge thought the
9 Serge never defined the class nature of the Soviet 
Union as State Capitalist as did many of the extreme left­
wingers. His own conclusions about the class character of the 
Soviet State are taken up in the chapter on his final writings 
below.
40 The so-called "Right" Opposition only discovered the 
dangers of the one-party anti-democratic system when it turned 
against them. In 1927, Bukharin wrote in an ironic tone: 
"under the dictatorship of the proletariat, two, three or four 
parties may exist, but on the single condition that^-one of 
them is in power and the others in prison." (Trud, Nov. 13, 
1927) His fellow comrade Tomsky echoed Bukharin in the Pravda 
of Nov, 19, 1927. Serge commented: "the corollary of this
monstrous theory is: a single opinion in the single party and 
it soon becomes the opinion of a single one. Tomsky, 
Bukharin, and their friends did not have long to wait before 
experiencing at their own expense the virtues of the prison 
state.
271
GPU was choking him off because of the success of the 
international campaign for his release, conducted from Paris. 
This knowledge boosted his morale, but didn't save his health. 
Yet Serge continued to give talks to his comrades in the 
surrounding woods, about the impending Spanish revolution and 
its impact on the West and the Soviet Union. Even the news of 
Rakovsky's capitulation did not dampen their morale, since they 
were all aware of Rakovsky's age and condition, and how the GPU 
had tricked him with 'secret documents' about impending war. 
Their comrade Ivan Byk (see fn 29 above) confirmed this.
Yet with no money and no food, Serge and Vlady nearly 
starved to death.41 In a conversation that took place in Mexico 
in May 1987, Vlady recounted his experiences in Orenburg: the
worst was the isolation, he said, the horrible hunger they 
suffered, and having to witness children "dying like flies." 
Yet he remembers the wonder and tranquility, the political 
discussions, the freezing nights. He felt like a young monk 
with his father his teacher in surroundings like a spartan 
convent. Vlady sketched, and managed to send a picture to 
Trotsky. He said of Serge:
"My father was very sad, and deathly hungry, though 
he never lost his senses. He had a firm character and 
worked incessantly. Even in Orenburg he always 
managed to wear a clean shirt and to keep clean-and 
dignified. I sketched, read dictionaries and studied 
the history of Greece and Russia. We cooked together, 
more often than not it was a cabbage soup made of
Serge and Vlady survived on a little black bread and 
a soup made of sorrel and one egg that had to last two days. 
Memoirs. p. 311.
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cabbage, water and salt. We always sat down to eat, 
and after 'dinner' we read poetry, even itr^ father's 
verses. Then my father went back to work."
Serge was plagued by boils, which began to abscess, leading
to an infected tumour in his left breast. No medical treatment
was allowed until the "GPU woke up, since they had to answer for
us to the Central Collegium. "43 Serge was finally taken to
hospital, probably in late December 1934, just after Kirov's
assassination. Serge wondered if this hospitalization saved him
from being rearrested for Kirov's assassination, as had his
comrades Pevzner, Pankratov and others. However, Pevzner was
every bit as ill as Serge with scarlet fever, and was taken to
the same hospital. Perhaps the international attention Serge's
case attracted, or some arbitrary inattention, was the reason.
Serge's description of the conditions in the hospital in 
Orenburg could have come right out of some medieval hell. Serge 
owed his survival to the GPU's allowing him to receive one 
dispatch, containing money from the sale of his books, with 
which he could buy food.
Serge received word from Pankratov, newly interned at 
Verkhne-Uralsk with Kamenev and Zinoviev, that the new terror 
was far worse than anything previous, and that Serge and his 
comrades should prepare themselves.44 Both of Serge's Orenburg 
comrades Pankratov and Pevzner were charged with new terms of 
five years' imprisonment for Kirov's assassination.
The assassination took them by surprise, since Serge and 
his comrades were convinced just at the moment that Kirov was 
murdered that the situation was achieving a degree of 
normalization. The famine was ending, the Kolkhoz system had
been modified to allow the kolkhozniki a private plcjt on the
42Taped interview I conducted with Vlady in Mexico, May
1987.
43 Memoirs, 311.
44 Ibid., p. 312.
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collective farm, and the Soviet Union was trying to present an 
improved world image in order to win a better position in the 
League of Nations.
Serge's perceptive powers did not fail him. The Soviet 
Union was at crossroads at the end of 1934. Stalin could have 
retreated and revived NEP in a modified form, wound down the 
concentration camps, increased real wages, and given the 
peasants more breathing space —  all of which would have 
immeasurably increased his popularity. Serge wrote that 
Bukharin's work on the Constitution seemed also to indicate that 
Stalin would choose that road.45 The Oppositionists at 
Orenburg, having thus analyzed the situation, spent the next 
year (1935), while the Politburo was torn between "contrary 
inclinations," in illusive serenity.
II. 4.15 Underestimating the fire of the dragon
The assassination of Kirov on December 1, 1934,46 has
rightly been called the "keystone of the entire edifice of
47terror" . The assassination "ushered in an era of panic and 
savagery48" beginning with the immediate execution of 128 
people, the arrest and imprisonment of the entire Zinoviev and 
Kamenev tendency (Serge estimated 3000 people); the mass
45 Memoirs, p. 315.
46 Sergei Kirov was shot in the back by a young embittered 
communist, Leonid Nikolayev, at the Smolny in Leningrad. When 
questioned by Stalin, Nikolayev pointed to the NKVD guards and 
confessed they "made me do it" and had given him four months 
of target practice. Witness Filipp Medved, head of Leningrad 
NKVD, told his friends in the camps about the scene of 
Nikolayev's questioning, in which he stressed Nikolayevls cry: 
"They kept at me for four months. They said it was necessary 
for the party." Antonov-Ovseyenko, ibid.. pp. 90-93. The full 
story of Kirov's assassination is also recounted in Medvedev, 
op. cit.. pp. 157-166.
47 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, p. 73.
48 Serge, Memoirs, p. 313.
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deportation of tens of thousands of Leningraders;49 arrests 
among the deportees and secret trials within the prisons 
themselves. In many cases Oppositionists charged with the 
killing of Kirov had already been in prison two years when the 
assassination took place. This event became the starting point 
for the "great terror" discussed below. It is also the 
centerpiece of Serge's authentic novel of the purges and 
Stalinism, The Case of Comrade Tulavev, Tulayev being Serge's 
fictional Kirov.
The Kirov assassination has been the subject of historical 
controversy.50 Although at the time, the assassination had been
49 Serge estimated that as many as 100,000 people were 
deported from Leningrad to the regions of the Volga, the 
Urals, Central Asia and Siberia. He quoted Berger, a French 
technician living in Leningrad who wrote about the mass 
deportations in "USSR 1935," La Revolution Proletarienne, 
September 25, 1935. Serge confirmed that between 1200 and 1500 
of the deported Leningraders came to Orenburg, among them many 
women, children and old folk. RTYA. pp. 200-201. Serge added 
in From Lenin to Stalin, p. 81, that the 100,000 Leningraders 
were deported in a single year, 1935, the year of economic 
recovery. Serge attributed this action to the bureaucracy's 
awareness of its unpopularity, which along with fear, 
dominated its actions.
50 Alexander Orlov first implicated Stalin in his book 
The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes (1953) and his version 
was corroborated by Boris Nicolaevsky's 1956 essays, compiled 
in his Power and the Soviet Elites "The Letter of an Old 
Bolshevik" and Other Essays (1965) Alexander Barmine concurred 
with Nicolaevsky and wrote that Stalin alone profited from 
Kirov's death. Barmine, One Who Survived. pp. 251-253. 
Khrushchev gave many of the facts in the 22nd Party Congress, 
and the story has since been confirmed and elaborated by Roy 
Medvedev in Let History Judge, and by Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko 
in The Time of Stalin. Recently the Kirov affair has generated 
new interest and controversy in the wake of Gorbachev's'policy 
of glasnost: Robert Conquest's new book Stalin and the Kirov 
Murder (Oxford University Press,1989) and Adam Ulam's novel 
The Kirov Affair. J. Arch Getty asserts that the evidence 
implicating Stalin in the assassination is biased and writes 
that Nikolayev acted possibly in concert with the police, but 
without the involvement of higher-ups, including Stalin, in 
Origins of the Great Purges. Ulam and Getty both reject the
(continued...)
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blamed on the Zinoviev-Kamenev Oppositionists and the Left 
Oppositionists, Khrushchev's official investigation, soon 
suppressed, implicated Stalin. Trotsky, in exile, immediately 
wrote in the Bulletin of the Opposition, that the GPU was 
involved, and that communists of the Zinoviev, Kamenev and 
Trotskyist stamp rejected individual terror.51
Kirov had replaced Zinoviev as the head of the Leningrad 
party organization. He was widely popular, according to one 
writer, due to his leading the opposition to the execution of 
Riutin in 1932.52 At the 17th Party Congress in late January 
1934, the so-called "Congress of Victors," there was a move to 
replace Stalin as General Secretary with Kirov, and in the vote
50(.. .continued)
sources implicating Stalin's role in ordering Kirov's murder. 
For his part, Getty restricts himself to official sources, 
which in the Soviet context have to be treated carefully given 
that the practice of falsification was institutionalized, and 
Getty equally rejects Memoirs as a source material, as well as 
personal accounts. The subject is now open in the Soviet Union 
with the publication of Anatoly Rybakov's Deti Arbata and the 
article in February 1988 Nedelva charging Genrik Yagoda as 
"one of the central figures in arranging the assassination of 
S. M. Kirov" and in December 1987's Qqonvok which published 
previously suppressed sections of the memoirs of Anastas I. 
Mikoyan, describing how Kirov almost replaced Stalin as 
General Secretary in 1934. Lastly, in the Soviet Union the 
playwright Mikhail F. Shatrov' s " Onward.. . Onward.. . Onward " 
accuses Stalin of plotting Kirov's murder. The interest in 
uncovering the real facts is growing as the assassination was 
a turning point in Soviet history because of everything that 
followed from it, using that event as an arbitrary point of 
departure for massive repression.
The CPSU has established a Politburo Commission headed by 
Mikhail Solomentsev and including KGB chief V. Chebrikov, 
Propaganda chief A. Yakovlev and Politburo members G. 
Razumovsky and P. Demichev, who have created a speciai' sub­
commission to examine the Kirov case. Prayda, August 19, 1988.
51 Byulleten Oppozitzii, no. 41 (January 1935).
52 Boris Nicolaevsky, "The Murder of Kirov," 
Sotsialisticheskv Vestnik. May, Oct. and Dec. 1956, collected 
in the same author's Power and The Soviet Elite. Praeger, New 
York, 1965, p. 71.
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for the Central Committee, Stalin received fewer votes than any 
other candidate. Significantly, Kirov received only three votes 
against him, while Stalin had 292 votes cast against him.53 
Boris Nicolaevsky has interpreted the official documents of the 
Congress by what was missing: the phrase, in use since the 13th 
Party Congress, about the 'confirmation' by the Plenum of 
Stalin's appointment as General Secretary of the Central 
Committee. Since this formula was missing, Nicolaevsky took it 
to mean that Stalin ceased to be General Secretary of the 
Central Committee after the 17th Congress.54
Stalin had to remove this new threat to his power. Kirov's 
death came in very handy for him, both in eliminating a serious 
rival and providing a pretext for repression against all those 
he saw as obstructing his policies and/or threatening his power. 
Nikolayev fired the shot that killed Kirov, but the NKVD allowed 
him access, did not obstruct him, got rid of inconvenient 
witnesses (e.g. Borisov), and executed Nikolayev. Stalin quickly 
passed a decree —  "The Law of December 1, 1934" —  which
mandated that cases be concluded in not more than ten days, and 
that the indictment be handed over to the accused only one day 
before the trial.55 No defense lawyers were allowed for the 
accused, and the death sentences were to be executed immediately
53 Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko puts the number of votes cast 
against Stalin at 292, or one-fourth of the Congress 
delegates. The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny, p. 80. 
Antonov-Ovseyenko's source was the records of the elections 
commission of the 17th Party Congress, which had been locked 
away until 1957, when a special commission of the Politburo 
was established after the XXth Party Congress to examine the 
archives. Roy Medvedev, in reporting the same incident, put 
the number of votes cast against Stalin at 270. Medvedey, Let 
History Judge, pp. 154-157.
54 Boris Nicolaevsky, ibid.. p. 92. Nicolaevsky indicated 
that his analysis of the 17th Party Congress was shared by
Bukharin, and later by L.S. Shaumian in an article in Pravda 
of February 7, 1964.
55 Medvedev, p. 159-160.
277
after the announcement of the verdict. This modification of 
penal procedure on the day of the attentat was applied 
retroactively to 114 persons who were quickly liquidated for the 
crime.56 Kirov was replaced in the Secretariat by Yezhov, and 
in Leningrad by Zhdanov.
Victor Serge was convinced that Nikolayev's act was "almost 
certainly an individual act committed by an enraged young 
Communist."57 Serge's intimate association with the Leningrad 
Party Organization and the Leningrad Oppositionists, both 
Trotskyists and Zinovievists, led him to reject as impossible 
their role in the assassination. In fact, the only Left 
Oppositionist left in Leningrad in 1934 was Alexandra Bronstein, 
Trotsky's first wife. Serge affirmed that the Oppositionists in 
1934 were still partisans of 'Soviet Reform' and "reform 
excluded any appeal to violence." Serge wrote that the murder 
confronted the Politbureau with a problem: "not only their own 
responsibility for the years of darkness, but also the existence 
of a reserve team of government in the persecuted Opposition 
who, for all the abuse directed so incessantly against them,
56 __
Serge, RTYA. p. 197.
57 Memoirs, p. 314. Other writers shared Serge's view that 
Nikolayev acted alone: Hryhory Kostiuk and Victor Kravchenko 
both wrote that Nikolayev was a lone assassin and that his act 
was not political, but the result of jealous rage. Rumor had 
it that Kirov had an affair with Nikolayev's wife. Kostiuk, 
Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine. Munich 1960. Kravchenko 
repeated the same love triangle murder motive, but added that 
students in Leningrad were filled with romantic hope that the 
assassination was an expression of terror by a new popular 
movement. The students began to disappear from his institute, 
and Kravchenko wrote that thousands of students were arrested 
and hundreds shot following the Kirov murder. Kravchenko, I 
Chose Freedom, pp. 168-69. As to workers' reactions, Andrew 
Smith wrote that in the Electrazavod factory where he worked, 
the news of the Kirov assassination shocked the workers, but 
some "smiled significantly to each other, when they were sure 
they were not being observed by the propagandists. ...A 
machine hand named Vassili even went so far as to say to me, 
'It would have been much better if it had been Stalin instead 
of Kirov.'" Smith, I Was a Soviet Worker, p. 265.
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were more popular among the informed sections of the population 
than the leaders of the State."58 Clearly, Serge was implying 
that Nikolayev's bullet aimed at a Party leader to express 
outrage at Stalin's policies. Serge did not see Stalin behind 
Nikolayev.
In fact Serge's novel The Case of Comrade Tulavev is 
centered around the lone individual assassin, whose act created 
a vortex of repressions. The book was serialized in the 
provincial literary journal Ural, published in Sverdlovsk, in 
the first three issues of 1989. While in Moscow I was told by 
Sergei Zavarotnyi, an editor of Komsomolskava Pravda. that 
Serge's thesis of the lone assassin played into the hands of the 
Stalinists, who wished to absolve Stalin of complicity in the 
murder. At the present writing, a commission of inquiry into 
this question has not yet presented its findings.
Much has been learned about the Kirov murder in the forty 
plus years that have passed since Nikolayev fired the fatal 
shot. At the time, Trotsky and the Left Opposition directed 
their energy to absolving the Zinovievists and themselves from 
blame, pointing to the incompatibility of individual acts of 
terror with Marxist views of historical agents for social 
change.59 They were correct to do so, but given the tremendous 
social upheavals and political intrigues of the years 1928-1934,
58 Serge, ibid. , p. 314.
59 Trotsky's pamphlet, "The Kirov Assassination and the 
Soviet Bureaucracy" (1935), his article in the Feb. 1935 
Bulletin of the Opposition (No. 42), and his account in The 
Case of Leon Trotsky (pp. 495-498) all clear the accused and 
put the responsibility for the crime on the GPU, which Trotsky 
admitted in the last work cited, "could not have acted in so 
serious a matter without direct orders from Stalin." (p. 
495.) Trotsky's assertion that Stalin had to have ordered the 
murder came out in the thirteenth session of the Dewey 
Hearings, April 17, 1937, during the period of the Moscow 
Trials and two and a half years after the Kirov murder. Two 
and a half years earlier, Trotsky and the oppositionists 
underestimated Stalin's capacity for mass political murder, 
whereas in April 1937, it had been amply demonstrated.
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their defensiveness betrayed their weakness, and in a certain 
sense their lack of understanding of the hidden processes at 
work. They were, after all, defeated and had no access to the 
masses to express an alternative viewpoint, even a contradictory 
one. Nor were they privy to internal Party intrigues-, and 
apparently didn't know about (or disregarded) Kirov's divergence 
with Stalin and his path of reconciliation and relaxation, which 
came to an abrupt end with his assassination. In view of this, 
Serge's remarks above concerning the 'reserve team' were aimed 
at the wrong 'reserve team.'
Trotsky smelled the hands of the GPU in the assassination, 
but Serge believed that the assassination was the work of "an 
isolated individual. At the very most the terrorist gave a few 
confidences to his two or three closest comrades, among whom the 
G.P.U. acknowledged there was an informer."60 Both Serge and 
Trotsky displayed a measure of ingenuousness in relation to how 
far Stalin was willing to go to achieve his ends.
The profound significance of the assassination was not lost 
on the Oppositionists, however naive they may have been in 
relation to Stalin's guilt in the affair. Serge wrote that the 
attentat revealed an "inward-driven crisis" that showed
"the blind alley into which led the tactic of 
disavowal and apostasy, adopted more out of cynicism 
than cowardice by the oppositional elements readmitted 
into the party after Zinoviev and Kamenev. 
Revolutionary action cannot be suited to such 
recantations, undoubtedly dictated by a sort of 
Inquisition but agreed to out of sordid motives 
foreign to true socialist courage. Woe to those who 
forget that the proletariat cannot be served by 
cowardly manoeuvres, by abdications of conscience, by 
mental reservations, by capitulations and 
impostures.... Let us not be astonished that a youth 
should reach the point, in this suffocating 
atmosphere, of despairing of everything save his own 
despair. Let us not be astonished, either, that the 
bureaucracy should seize upon this occasion to rid 
itself of its hidden adversaries. The madness and the
60 Serge, RTYA. p. 203.
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cruelty which make it lose all sense of moderation are 
amazing as a confession of tremendous moral weakness; 
but the political calculations, which result in the 
measures taken against the Zinoviev tendency, are 
wretchedly, sordidly correct. Such an opportunity to 
bury these men will not present itself again."6
In other words, Serge credited the Stalinist bureaucracy with
understanding and acting in its own self-interest. He continued
by quoting Trotsky:
"If the bureaucrats, in their self-adoration, imagine 
that they are making history, we do not share their 
illusion. It is not Stalin who has created the 
bureaucratic apparatus, but the apparatus that has 
created Stalin in its own image. The replacement of 
Kirov by Zhdanov has changed nothing....The 
replacement of Stalin by some Kaganovich would produce 
no greater change..."62
The assassination of Kirov on December 1, 1934 was the
first act of the 'great terror' but it took two years to pick up 
steam. In the interim, the inner circles of the Party were 
battling the road ahead.63 Serge thought the year 1935 was one 
in which the Politburo was "torn between contrary inclinations, 
towards normalization on the one hand, towards terror on the 
other. "64 It appeared that the stabilizing tendency would win:
61 RTYA, p. 203-4.
62 Leon Trotsky, "The Terrorism of Bureaucratic Self- 
Defence," Bulletin of the Opposition. September 1935.
63 Barmine discussed the choices as between 'conciliation' 
and 'totalitarian counterrevolution.' He further wrote that 
while Stalin was destroying the ruling elite, a measure of 
conciliation was achieved in the country at large in the form 
of withdrawal of bread cards and an improved food situation. 
Barmine saw the Stalin cult and the improved food situation as 
Stalin's maneuvering for support by the 'politically 
unconscious masses' while he unleashed his terror. Alexander 
Barmine, One Who Survived, pp. 249-255.
64 Memoirs, p. 315.
281
the abolition of bread-rationing was popular,65 and Serge 
thought that Stalin was at a cross-roads. He could be eternally 
popular if he would raise real wages, end the concentration 
camps, give a breathing space to the peasants and pardon 
political opponents. Serge thought the work Bukharin was doing 
on the new Soviet Constitution meant that Stalin was opting for 
normalization.66
Normalization in the context of 1934-35 meant a partial 
return to NEP. The question is whether that was still a real 
option, given that NEP itself had been a failure, accomplishing 
no measurable gains in industrialization and leading to a grain 
crisis in agriculture.
Stalin did not go for 'normalization' nor was he able to, 
as the processes set in motion by his policies of 
industrialization and collectivization, and the class relations 
these engendered, created an inexorable logic, leading to 
terror. In order to get the masses of workers and peasants to 
comply with impossible working conditions, their collective 
resistance had to be broken, and this was done by atomization 
through terror. Serge clearly couldn't yet discern the dynamic 
of Stalin's system, though it would all become clear in the next 
two hellish years.
Serge also wasn't able to follow through on some of his own 
keen observations. He realized that in 1934 the regime was at 
a crossroads, which is what he meant by "torn by contrary 
inclinations' and the talk of a return to normalization, or NEP.
65 Serge also observed that the pegging of the ruble to 
a kilo of bread, an immense relief to the workers, had another 
effect: the "rebirth of Soviet trading in the form o£~-s tores 
opened by the state in increasing number, and an activization 
of the free market." Serge noted further, "Where are the 
mysteries of the exploitation of labour? At one stroke you 
perceive one of the great advantages of the bureaucratic 
mechanism and of managed economy: exploitation there is
visible at first glance." Russia 20 Years After, p. 193.
66 Ibid.
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The murder of Kirov represented Stalin's elimination of the 
'normalizing' alternative.
II. 4.16 Writings to Nowhere: Paid
Serge was unable to work in Orenburg without agreeing to 
the 'general line.' Nevertheless he was able to support himself 
and his son, and occasionally other comrades with his writings, 
and from the donations gathered by the Comite Victor-Serge in 
Paris. Serge took advantage of the relative tranquility 
deportation afforded (excluding the harrowing struggle to not 
starve or freeze to death) to write in profusion. Despite the 
isolation and uncertainty, Serge persevered and produced four 
books.
The arrangement Serge managed to make with Romain Rolland 
kept Serge in food. He made several copies of his manuscripts 
and sent them to Rolland in Paris, who then forwarded them to 
publishers. Rolland was not sympathetic to Serge's politics, but 
opposed repression in the USSR, and agreed to be the 
intermediary for Serge, to receive his letters and
67manuscripts. Despite the precautions Serge took, including 
registering the manuscripts with the GPU and sending them by 
registered post, the first four packages were lost. Serge 
complained to the head of the secret police, who apologized and 
used the event to proclaim sabotage in the postal service and 
justify repression. Serge gave him another set of manuscripts to 
send to Rolland, which also went astray,68 as did the next. The 
irony was that the Post Office was required to compensate Serge 
for each loss, and at the rate of five per month, Serge earned
67 ^The arrangement was explained in a letter Magdeleine 
Paz wrote to Marcel Willard of the Association Juridique 
Internationale, 19 November 1934, published in RP p. 12-13, 
Nov. 1934.
68There is some discussion now as to whether Rolland 
received the manuscripts and did nothing with them, a 
possibility raised by Richard Greeman. Interview, May 1989.
283
'hundreds of rubles' or the equivalent income of a well paid 
technician.69
The books Serge wrote in Orenburg included Les Hommes 
perdus. an autobiographical piece on the pre-war French 
Anarchists, a sequel to Conquered City called La Tourmente, set 
in the year 1920, 'the zenith of the revolution.' He also wrote 
a collection of poems, Resistance, and was working on Yp»a-r Two 
of The Russian Revolution. Serge said these were the only books
70he ever had the time to revise and polish.
II. 4.17 L'Affair Victor Serge71
Serge had written letters to his friends in Paris prior to 
exile and from Orenburg, and these letters were published in the 
French journal La Revolution proletarienne. Supporters of Serge 
waged a campaign for his release which grew to such proportions 
that it became an embarrassment for both the French CP and its 
fellow travelers in the intellectual community, and thus for the 
Soviet Union itself.
The tireles.s work on behalf of Serge by the 'Comite Victor- 
Serge', and especially Magdeleine Paz, Charles Plisnier and 
Jacques Mesnil turned Serge's case into a cause celebre. 
Communist Party front organizations of lawyers (L'Association
69 Serge, Memoirs, pp. 313-314.
70 Ibid. . p. 315.
71The events surrounding the Victor Serge Affair and the 
1935 Congress of Writers are discussed, inter alia, in the 
Memoirs. pp. 317-319, William Marshall, "Ideology and Literary 
Expression in the Works of Victor Serge," pp. 228-9 and 
twenty-six articles published in La Revolution proletarienne 
from 1933 to 1936. Two letters to Magdeleine Paz datelined 
Brussels, May 1936, were also published in 16 Fusilles. Ou va 
la Revolucion Russe?. pp. 51-58, and Jacques Mesnil published 
"Pour Victor Serge" in Les Nouvelles Litteraires. 22 juillet 
1933, where Magdeleine also published a response. The affair 
is also treated in Herbert R. Lottman, The Left Bank: Writers. 
Artists; and Politics from the Popular Front to the Cold War.
Boston, 1982.
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juridique internationale), the Socialist Lawyers Group, and 
writers organizations such as the prestigious Congress of 
Writers became involved in raising the issue of Serge's plight. 
Moreover, Serge's case was ideals it was a perfect example of 
the choking of free thought. A writer's life was in mortal 
danger, as well as the lives of his immediate family, simply 
because he dared to exhibit an independence of thought, 
expressed in writing. This is the stuff human rights campaigns 
are made of . Paz, Mesnil, Leon Werth, Marcel Martinet, Georges 
Duhamel, Charles Vildrac, Maurice Parijanine, Boris Souvarine 
and others raised the issue constantly. Their demand was 
simple: Free Victor Serge! Subscriptions were pouring into the 
Revolution proletarienne72 not only from individuals, but from 
organizations and trade unions such as the United Teachers 
Federation. The appeal spread to Holland (Henriette Roland- 
Holst), Belgium (Charles Plisnier) and Switzerland (Fritz 
Brupbacher.) The French Teachers Union demanded Serge's 
release or some justification for his imprisonment at their 
annual conference: they alerted the Soviet teachers delegation 
to the case. The League for the Rights of Man published 
Magdeleine Paz's documentation, after prodigious prodding on her 
part (see RP) . Apart from RP, the case splashed across the 
pages of other French journals such as L'Ecole Emancipee, Le 
Combat Marxiste. Les Humbles, etc.73
The affair reached its zenith in the 1935 CP organized 
"International Congress of Writers for the Defense of Culture" 
sponsored officially by Andre Malraux, Andre Gide, Henri 
Barbusse, Victor Margueritte, Romain Rolland, Elie Faure, and 
Alain, noted leftists of various persuasions. The 'Comite
72See for example the list of contributors in La 
Revolution proletarienne. 122-2. NB: The copies of RP articles 
I received (from the London School of Economics Library) are 
generally not dated, (unless there is a date on the page.)
73 Memoirs, p. 317.
285
Victor-Serge' were there in force,74 trying desperately to be
heard,75 to the chagrin of the prominent French intellectuals.
Serge noted that Gide was particularly embarrassed and insisted
the matter be heard,76 at which point Malraux agreed to let Paz
speak. She was supported by Plisnier and Henry Poulaille. A
delegation of Soviet writers, including Boris Pasternak and
Nikolai Tikhonov and the official journalist Mikhail Koltsov77
and Ehrenberg and others were present. They were colleagues of
Serge and knew him well. Yet only Pasternak kept in the
background, while the others
"fulfilled instructions and declared without a blink 
that they knew nothing of the writer Victor Serge—  
these, my good colleagues of the Soviet Writer's 
Union! All they knew of was a 'Soviet citizen, a 
confessed counter-revolutionary, who had been a meiriber 
of the conspiracy which had ended in the murder of 
Kirov.'"
These writers soon were repressed themselves in the years 
of the Great Terror of 1936-39. The appalling statement that 
linked Serge to Kirov's murder aroused Andre Gide who went 
straight to the Soviet Ambassador on behalf of Serge, to no 
avail.78
74Salvemini, Magdeleine Paz, H. Poulaille, Plisnier. 
I Carnets, p. 31)
75Except Andre Breton, who "elegantly skirted" the issue. 
Carnets. p. 31.
76 Serge had written to Andre Gide from Orenburg in 
January 1935 about their shared conceptions of pluralism and 
freedom in literature. It was this contact that led to Gide's 
insistence that Paz and Plisnier were allowed to address the 
Congress on the Serge affair. The letter was published in 
Esprit, 45, (juin 1936), pp. 435-40.
77Serge says he was a man noted for his "pliant docility. " 
Memoirs, p. 318.
7fi •Gide was particularly angry at the behavior of the 
Soviet delegation who tried to stifle discussion of the Serge 
case at the Congress. William Marshall, in his doctoral
(continued...)
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The event was to be a formative one for Gide, who changed
his thinking about the Soviet Union as a result. The treatment
of the Victor Serge affair at the Congress made it evident that
the Congress was "entirely controlled, with perfect dishonesty,
by the agents of the CP. He felt maneuvered with, saw the moral
ugliness of it.79" Gide later went to the Soviet Union to see
if his moral reservations would be confirmed by Soviet reality.
Rolland, it appears, finally interceded on Serge's behalf
when he went to the Soviet Union in 1935. He was not the first
to press the Serge case in Moscow. Earlier a delegation from
the organization Serge belonged to in his youth, the 'Jeunes
Gardes Socialistes' of Belgium, had raised the issue in the
Soviet Union and were told that Serge was in Orenburg
80translating and living very well.
As we already noted above, Rolland had no particular
affinity with Serge the political man, but Serge the persecuted
• 81 writer spurred Rolland to action. Rolland met with Stalin,
78(...continued)
dissertation "Ideology and Literary Expression in the Works of 
Victor Serge," p. 228-29, noted that Mme van Rysselberghe 
later wrote that Gide's intervention with the Soviet 
Ambassador figured importantly in Serge's eventual release. M. 
van Rysselberghe, Les Cahiers de la petite dame 1929-1937, 
Cahiers Andre Gide no. 5 (Paris, Gallimard, 1974), pp. 462- 
471.
79Serge, ibid (Carnets) .
80Jacques Mesnil, "Au Pays de la dictature bureaucratique: 
Les menteurs officiels contre Victor Serge, " in La Revolution 
proletarienne. 5-365, 1933? and Magdeleine Paz, "L'Affair 
Victor Serge n'interesse pas 1'Association juridique 
intemationale," in La Revolution proletarienne, p. 12-13, 
1934.
81Serge also had mixed feelings about Rolland: he detested 
Rolland's writings on Ghandi because they "contained the most 
exact, the most prophetic insights on the stifling character 
of dictatorship— all the while misunderstanding the terrible 
reality.of a spontaneous revolution alive only by virtue of 
unceasing miracles of implacable activity." Nevertheless,
(continued...)
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and simply asked that the Victor Serge affair be resolved one
way or another, as it had become an impediment to the work of
'friends of the Soviet Union' in France.82 Andre Gide and Andre
Malraux also made similar requests.
In 1988, Moscow News published an account of Rolland's
meeting with Stalin:
"During the three weeks Rolland spent in the Soviet 
Union he met with Stalin and talked to him frankly.
He expressed his concern about the repressions and 
tried to show how detrimental they were to the Soviet 
Union's prestige abroad. In reply Stalin painted a
sinister picture: conspirators against Soviet power 
everywhere, new plots being constantly exposed... 
Rolland could neither disbelieve what he was told, nor 
suppress his doubts. The only concession he managed 
to get as a result of that conversation was Stalin's 
consent to allow the exiled French anarchist Victor 
Serge [sic, my emphasis] to leave the country. 
Rolland didn't sympathize with Serge at all, 
incidentally. "83
This article contains the first public mention of Victor Serge's 
name in the Soviet press in more than 50 years.
Miraculously, the Serge case was resolved. Stalin called 
Yagoda to find out what Serge had confessed to, and found that 
Serge had not confessed, and therefore had not agreed to be
(...continued)
Serge recognized that Rolland intervened for Francesco Ghezzi 
in Suzdal, and "moderately for me." Carnet. Published in 
English as "The Tragedy of Romain Rolland, From the Diary of 
Victor Serge —  Part IV" in New International. May-June 1950, 
p. 177.
82Serge wrote in the Pages of his Diary: "He came to see 
Stalin in '35 and asked that a period be put to "1'affaire 
Victor Serge," that I be either sentenced or freed. Stalin 
said he was "not up on the matter" and promised my liberty if 
it was at all possible, it was to this request in particular 
that I owe my life, it seems to me." Serge, New International. 
May-June 1950, ("The Tragedy of Romain Rolland: Pages from the 
Diary of Victor Serge— IV," p. 178.
83Tamara Motylyova, "Romain Rolland: I am defending the 
USSR, not Stalin," Moscow News weekly No. 13, 1988, March 22, 
1988, p. 16.
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complicit in anything. Stalin assured Rolland that Serge and 
his family would be able to leave the Soviet Union.84
II. 4.18 Expulsion and Theft
The GPU gave Serge orders to leave Orenburg in three days 
for Moscow, where he should report to the GPU and then be sent 
on to an unknown destination. Serge entertained the notion that 
this meant his first term of exile was finished and another 
would be added on, as was generally the case. He thought, "Je 
savais seulement que la deportation politique ne finissait 
jamais pour les convictions fermes."85
Given the possibility of leaving the USSR, Serge had to find 
a place to go. His friends in the West had already taken the 
bureaucratic steps to obtain visas for Serge, should he be 
released. Finding a visa was not easy, however, and doors were 
closed to Serge in France, where he had been imprisoned twice, 
Holland, and Great Britain. Finally, the Ambassador from the 
country of Serge's birth, Belgium, came through with a visa for 
three years, and Ekaterina Peshkova, the director of the 
Political Red Cross, sent Serge the Belgian visa forms to fill 
out.
His comrades in exile, Yeltsin and Bobrov, debated the 
meaning of Serge's departure, certain that he would end up in 
some dark prison or cold deportation. Serge, however, while 
uncertain, had some grounds for optimism. He knew of the
At least according to Serge in his Memoirs, p.319. 
Later Trotsky and others speculated that Stalin had let Serge 
go only because he thought Serge could be of use to hifft. See 
Trotsky letter to Lola Estrine Dallin, April 1936, Boris 
Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Archives, and Elsa Poretsky, 
Our Own People, pp.245-246.
85Serge, Memoirs d'un revolutionnaire 1901-1941. Editions 
du Seuil., Paris, 1951, p. 337. This particular passage is not 
in the English edition, which is shorter than the original by 
an eighth.
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campaign in the West, thanks to a very brave Italian 
Bordighist/syndicalist, Francesco Ghezzi, who dared the GPU and 
travelled to Orenburg to let Serge know he should hang on, his 
friends and comrades in Europe were working on his behalf. Serge 
had also seen the photo in Pravda in 1935 of Stalin shaking 
hands with Romain Rolland, and told Vlady that this could mean 
they were saved.86
Ghezzi's courageous act of solidarity and friendship was 
enormously risky: as a foreigner he was visible, and he had 
already been imprisoned at Suzdal, and therefore was likely to 
be watched. To travel by train from Moscow to Orenburg, a place 
of exile, was to court disaster. Once there he had to lay low, 
remaining in the house by day and only going out at night. 
Vlady and Serge were astonished by his bravery, and his
87 88'madness' for risking so much. Ghezzi disappeared in 1937.
86Vlady said that his father's expression, at seeing the 
photo in the newspaper, remains engraved in his memory, and 
there was a kind of deja-vu in Brussels some months later, 
when Serge again read the newspaper and saw the announcement 
of the Moscow Trials. On both occasions, Vlady recalled, Serge 
uttered breathlessly: "we have been saved!" Tape-recorded
interview with Vlady conducted by John Eden and Les Smith, 
June 3, 1989, Mexico City.
87Taped interview with Vlady, Moscow, March 1989.
88In March 1989 Vlady and I learned of Ghezzi's death from 
Irina Gogua, Serge's cousin, while in Moscow. Ghezzi died in 
Viatka spent, starved and wasted. The camp director at Viatka 
told Serge's sister-in-law Anita Russakova, who was also at 
Viatka, what had happened to Ghezzi. Russakova, still alive in 
Leningrad after 25 years in camps, was the housemaid in the 
camp director's house. He chose her because she was educated 
and spoke French. He asked her one day if she knew Ghezzi, and 
she said 'yes, he is a marvelous character!' The camp director 
then said that this 'marvelous character' just died of 
'exhaustion and starvation.' Anita also recounted that in 
1935, when she was in prison because of Serge, Ghezzi managed 
to visit her to tell her that Serge and Vlady had been 
deported to 'a city in the provinces' and that she should hang 
on because there were people who cared for her.
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The day came to leave Orenburg: April 12, 1936. Despite 
the horrendous conditions of Serge's sojourn in this exile, he 
found it very difficult to leave, to break the kind of bonds 
that are created through solidarity in the face of repression 
and adversity. Serge wrote that his "heart was ravaged." In 
fact his own experience was the driving force for his tireless 
work on behalf of his imprisoned comrades once Serge was in the 
West. What made this particular leaving even harder was knowing 
that he would never see his comrades again, and not knowing what 
would become of himself and his family. Serge took the 
precaution of giving away his belongings (household goods) on 
the proviso that should he be sent to some other harsh clime 
that he could reclaim them. Serge packed his books, manuscripts 
and some personal memorabilia, and he and Vlady set off to 
Moscow, with two policemen watching them from a few seats away.
In Moscow Serge and Vlady were met by Ekaterina Pavlona 
Peshkova, Gorky's first wife, who was the Director of the 
Political Red Cross. She was a courageous woman who had founded 
the relief organization for political prisoners during the Red 
Terror. Both the Cheka and the GPU tolerated her organization 
and its work, because of who she was and her connections. The 
office of the Political Red Cross was on Kuznetski bridge, just 
across from GPU headquarters. Serge's reminiscence of his last 
day in Moscow and his encounter with Peshkova, the GPU and the 
bureaucratic errands to be performed in order to obtain exit 
permits for his manuscripts differ from Vlady's. It is worth 
recounting both, since every piece of information is valuable in 
the hunt for Serge's 'missing' manuscripts. Vlady's story is 
more dramatic, while Serge characteristically minimizes the 
personal drama but provides somewhat more information on the 
workings of the GPU.
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Serge wrote in the Memoirs89 that he was met by Peshkova, 
that he was able to reunite with his wife and meet his infant 
daughter Jeanine, who was born while he was in the hospital in 
Orenburg. He was not able to see his sister-in-law Anita 
Russakova and resolve the question of her lying confessions in 
1933, as she had recently been arrested and exiled to Viatka for 
five years. Serge was certain that she had been rounded up 
precisely to keep them from meeting and discovering the truth.
Serge then recounted that he asked Peshkova to request a 24 
hour delay in leaving, so that he could obtain an exit permit 
for his manuscripts from Glavlit, the Censorship office. 
Peshkova returned and told Serge to leave immediately as "The 
secret police officer just told me that you were not out of the 
country yet, and that he was sending Yagoda a fresh memorandum
90about you..." Although Glavlit had authorized the exit visa 
for the manuscripts, Serge could not wait to pick them up, and 
left. The rest of his copies of the manuscripts were stolen by 
the GPU. This is Serge's account.
Vlady's version fills in more detail and is more dramatic.
Firstly he says that he and his father were met by Peshkova and 
Julia, Serge's older sister who was Peshkova's friend, and who 
was very close to Serge. This omission in itself is quite 
.interesting, but not uncharacteristic of Serge, whose family is 
scarcely mentioned in the Memoirs. Vlady remembers that
89Serge's account of his last days in the USSR can be 
found on pages 321-322.
90Ibid, p. 322.
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Julia,91 a dominant personality, began to organize the day and 
the errands to be completed.
Julia and Peshkova were close friends, a fact Serge
92confirms in his Carnets . Peshkova could perform her work 
because she was Gorky's wife, and had won the confidence of 
Lenin. Julia was protected because she was very friendly with 
Stalin's wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva,93 and perhaps because she 
herself was the object of Stalin's affection back in Baku in 
1902.94
These two women met Serge and Vlady and were preoccupied 
with the task ahead. Serge had an order to present himself to 
the GPU in Moscow, and Julia and Ekaterina wanted at all costs 
to avoid this meeting. They were worried that should Serge be 
obliged to speak, he would speak honestly about his political
91Serge finally mentions 'Julie' in connection with 
Peshkova in the "Pages of his Diary," Part III, New 
International. March-April 1950 in the section "In a Time of 
Duplicity" p. 119,. In fact what Serge said is quite misleading 
—  he mentions Julie and Ekaterina as old friends of Gorky. 
That's correct, but Peshkova was also Gorky's wife! As to 
Julie, or Julia, according to Vlady she was Serge's half- 
sister, or perhaps his first cousin. Irina Gogua spoke of 
Julia: she was Serge's older sister from his mother,
Paderewski. The Paderewski family were Polish aristocracy, or 
gentry as Serge put it, from Nizhni-Novgorod. Serge's mother 
Vera Paderewski was married in Petersburg and abandoned her 
family to study in Geneva. In Carnets, p. 25, Serge wrote of 
a sister named Vera Vladimirovna Frolova: Either that is 
Julia, or another sister. Julia went to Paris in 1910 to meet 
Serge, who was already translating Russian writers. When she 
returned she told Irina that Serge's spoken Russian was poor! 
Conversation with Vlady and Irina Gogua, March 10, 1989,
Moscow.
92"In a Time of Duplicity," in the selections from Serge's 
Carnets published in New International, March-April 1950, p. 
119.
93Interview with Vlady, March 1989.
94According to her cousin Irina Gogua. Interview, March 
10, 1989, Moscow.
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analysis, and would very likely not be allowed to leave GPU 
headquarters.
But how could Serge miss this meeting and still comply with 
his expulsion order? They had his passport, his suitcases, and 
his visa ready. They knew that if Serge went to the GPU all 
would be lost. The two women cooked up a plan. Peshkova called 
the GPU on the telephone. With Julia listening next to Peshkova 
as she spoke, and Vlady and Serge listening on the extension 
earpiece, Ekaterina Peshkova spoke directly to Yagoda, the head 
of the NKVD. Peshkova said, "Genrikh, Victor Lvovich's wife is 
having a nervous crisis, so Victor Lvovich wants permission to 
spend the night here in Moscow and leave tomorrow." Yagoda 
answered, "Tell Victor Lvovich to leave immediately I But im­
mediately 1 (nemyedlenno!) " It was an order. They hung up, and 
Peshkova said, "well, you don't have to present yourself to the 
GPU. If you are asked, say that Yagoda gave you an order to 
leave immediately. "
Before going to the Russakov's apartment where Serge and 
Vlady were reunited with Liuba and met Serge's infant daughter 
Jeanine, Serge and Vlady had time to go to Glavlit, and to try 
to sell some of Serge's expensive books.95 Without mentioning 
the uniquely Soviet situation of having an exit visa for the 
person but not his works, Vlady recalls the trip to the 
censorship office (Glavlit) where Serge took his manuscripts to 
be censored so they could be taken with him out of the country. 
The woman they encountered at Glavlit took the manuscripts and
95I have left out the encounter Serge and Vlady had with 
Dr. Nikolayenko in the bookstore, an old anarchist who had 
travelled to Russia from France with Serge in 1919. Sinde then 
he had survived by living far from the capital, and 
occasionally visited the Serge family, bringing exquisite 
animal skins and other treasures to Liuba from his 
geographical expeditions. Vlady remembers this encounter as 
the big episode of the day. Since Serge had been unable to 
sell his valuable books he had saved for 20 years, he was able 
to present his old friend with a gift, a remembrance.
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didn't give them back. Serge had seen her before various times, 
and Vlady also remembered her: her name was Zvyeryeva and she 
appears in several of the novels. In Serge's The Case of 
Comrade Tulavev she was the GPU examiner in charge of Ryzhik,96 
the character representing Serge himself. Vlady interjected that 
in Russian her name comes from Zvernyi, which means 'beastly, 
brutal, atrocious.' When she took the manuscripts from Serge, 
she said, "huh! Viktor Lvovich, so you're leaving — in order to 
betray, ... you are betraying us!" Serge answered, "I don't know 
who is betraying, I do not believe it is me. I am continuing. 
One should know who is betraying. Good-bye. I hope all goes well 
with you." Vlady never forgot this acrimonious meeting, and 
Zvyeryeva's bitterness.
Serge was given a receipt for the completed manuscript 
copies of his Les Homines Perdus. La Tourmente, Resistance, and 
L'An II de la Revolution russe, and told to come back the next 
day. The receipt is still in Vlady's possession.
Then according to Vlady, Serge entrusted to Peshkova copies 
of his manuscripts, documents, notes, photographs and 
memorabilia so that she could pick up the exit visa and send 
them on to Serge.
That evening Serge and his family met at the station to say 
.their good-byes and leave the Soviet Union. Liuba's mother 
(Vlady's grandmother Russakova) and Francesco Ghezzi were both 
there. Vlady remembers the tearful farewell:
"My grandmother was crying, my mother was in a 
crisis. My baby sister, swaddled in my mother's 
yellow and green sweater, was in my mother's arms. It 
was April 14, 1936, —  springtime. Ghezzi accompanied 
us to the station and our last intimate words were
9 Zvyeryeva appears in both Conquered City pp. 103-105, 
and The Case of Comrade Tulavev. Penguin Books Ltd, London, 
1968 edition, pp. 245-246. Vlady remembered seeing her 
various.times in his childhood, and said she was just like the 
novelistic Zvyeryeva who judged Ryzhik in The Case of Comrade 
Tulavev.
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with this dear friend. He asked us to do everything 
to get him out, once we were in the West."97
What is missing in both Serge's and Vlady's accounts, but
98what I have pieced together from various sources and simple 
deduction, is the following: Serge had multiple copies of the
work he had completed in Orenburg. He had at least 8 copies of 
Les Hommes perdus. at least five copies of La Tourmente, and 
unknown quantities of the historical L'An II de la Revolution 
russe and the poetry collection Resistance. Serge deposited the 
manuscript copies with 1) The Censor of the People's 
Commissariat for Public Education, 2) the Assistant Director of 
the Foreign Literature Section of Glavlit: 3) the Political Red 
Cross Director, Ekaterina Pavlona Peshkova, and 4) Francesco 
Ghezzi. 5) Serge had sent three copies of the novel about the 
French anarchist movement to Romain Rolland, and all had been
99seized in the post and Serge was compensated for their loss, 
and 6) Serge kept the other copies to take with him out of the 
country. They were stolen by the GPU at the station in 
Negoreloye.
The final episode in Serge's sojourn of 17 years in the 
Soviet "victorious revolution" is perhaps the most dramatic. At 
the last station on the Soviet frontier, Negoreloye, Serge and 
his family were made to disembark for a final 'search. ' Liuba 
and baby Jeanine (14 months old) were led off in one direction, 
Serge and Vlady in another. They were ordered to undress for a
97As told to John Eden and Les Smith, Mexico City, June 
3, 1989.
98Serge's writings, Richard Greeman's unpublished paper 
"Liberation," and Vlady's recollection.
99The official permission order to send these copies to 
Rolland was signed by Bogrov, head of the Foreign Literature 
Section of Glavlit, and is recorded in Bogrov's registered 
letter of Sept. 29, 1934, #949. See Richard Greeman,
"Liberation," unpublished manuscript, p. 6fn. Serge 
corroborated the above in a statement of June 9, 1936, held in 
the Mexico archive.
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strip search. Vlady recalled that he was still in his 
underwear, with his trousers around his boots. The GPU agent 
prodded him to hurry and asked what was he was hiding in his 
socks? Vlady retorted, "a submarine!" At that moment the 
whistle blew and the train started to pull away from the 
station. Serge and Vlady broke into a run, pulling their clothes 
up at the same time. They couldn't see Liuba and Jeanine, and 
Serge was horrified, thinking they would be left behind. Vlady 
jumped on the train and caught sight of his mother and sister. 
Serge was screaming "Mama, mama, I won't leave without you !" and 
Vlady shouted to him, "they're here, see for yourself!" Just 
before it was too late. Serge saw Liuba and jumped on the moving 
train. He looked back and saw the GPU agents pointing to Serge's 
suitcases, containing his manuscripts, photos, and personal 
belongings. Gone forever. Stolen by the GPU?
When the train passed the Soviet border, Vlady remembers 
his father going into the corridor and sighing with relief. 
Then he was tranquil.
Was this final humiliation pimply harassment, a memento of 
his years in the USSR, or had an elaborate trap been prepared? 
If the latter, were these same manuscripts which were sent on 
three occasions to Romain Rolland, though never received, part 
of the scheme? Richard Greeman believes that the GPU 
deliberately stole the manuscripts while appearing to have let 
them go (the exit visa was issued, after all) in order to 
prevent any future protest over them.100 I concur. Thus, the 
bureaucratic state could declare it had complied, that the loss 
of the manuscripts was inexplicable, or even unavoidable, but 
they had fulfilled their obligations, and even compensated Serge 
for those lost in the post.
II. 4.18 The Hunt for the Missing Manuscripts
100Greeman, "Liberation," unpublished paper, pp. 7-8.
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Serge was permitted to leave, but not his writings. We are 
still trying to find them. Once in Belgium, Serge received a 
letter from Peshkova, in mid-May 1936, stating that permission 
to send the manuscripts had been granted, but she was awaiting 
formal authorization.
Andre Gide went to the Soviet Union in 1936. Prior to his
departure, Serge wrote him an open letter, published in La
Revolution proletarienne101 in which he thanked Gide for his
role in the International Congress of Writers on Serge's behalf.
He then wrote of the actual conditions in the Soviet Union and
implored Gide to keep his eyes wide open while there.
Magdeleine Paz, who was very impressed with the letter,
nonetheless felt it was a mistake to publish it openly, since it
102seemed "like an ultimatum." Serge said he had too much regard 
for Gide not to publish it. Upon his return, Gide told Serge he 
had tried to save his manuscripts, but saw that it was 
futile.103
Since 1936 there have been several efforts to retrieve the 
manuscripts. Of the four, Serge was only able to reproduce the 
collection of poems which he had committed to memory. They were 
published in 1938 by Cahiers les Humbles.104 The novels and the 
history remain 'lost'. In 1945-46 George Orwell tried to find 
an English publisher for Serge's Memoirs and expressed interest 
in the missing manuscripts.105 In 1972 the French publisher
101"Lettre a Andre Gide," Bruxelles, mai 1936, La 
Revolution proletarienne, 13-157, 14-158.
102Serge, Carnets. p. 21.
103_. . .Ibrd.
104The first English translation of Serge's poems, 
Resistance was just published by City Lights Books, translated 
by James Brook.
105George Orwell to Dwight MacDonald, 4.4.45, and 14 Feb. 
1946. Thanks to David Cotterill for sending me these letters.
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Francois Maspero wrote to Brezhnev respectfuly requesting that 
Serge's papers be returned to his family. The letter was never 
answered.
In Oct. 1986 I began a letter writing campaign to attempt 
anew to retrieve the papers. The time was right. Mikhail 
Gorbachev was in power and his policy of openness or 'glasnost' 
had as a specific plank the reexamination of the hidden history 
of the USSR. Gorbachev himself declared there should be no 
blank pages in Soviet history. I wrote to Gorbachev, 
interviewed Andrei Vosnessensky in March 1987 (who professed 
ignorance of Victor Serge and yet had spent a night at Vlady's 
in Mexico during which they stayed up reading The Case of 
Comrade Tulavev aloud in Russian), Yevgeny Yevtushenko in April 
1987, to whom I gave copies of Serge's novels and asked for 
help. I also interviewed Vladimir Karpov, the head of the 
Soviet Union of Writers and a man close to Gorbachev, Georgii 
Andzhaparidze, the director of the Publishing house of Foreign 
Literature (Khudozhestvennaya Literatura). I gave Karpov a copy 
of Midnight in the Century and the letter sent to Gorbachev. He 
personally expressed great interest for several reasons: he was 
born in Orenburg and had never heard of Serge; he knew I had 
asked Yevtushenko for help and apparently wanted to 'one-up' 
him, or so his translator told me.
Yevtushenko was the first to answer my request. In a 
letter of 18 June 1987 he told me a new organization had been 
set up to deal with hidden and lost treasures of the Stalin 
period. The Soviet foundation of Culture was this new 
organization and it was headed by Georg Myasnikov. I wrote to 
Myasnikov right away and again on June 26, 1988. I was finally 
answered by V. Aksyonov on 22 September 1988. Encouraged, I 
quickly rewrote others including Yuri Afanasiev, Yuri Kuriakin 
(Vlady gave him my letter, which is appended) V. Bondarenko, 
Ogonek, Moscow News Editor Yegor Yakovlev, film director Alexei 
German. Everyone seemed interested, and ignorant of Serge. It 
was time to go to the Soviet Union and press the case.
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In March 1989 I went to Moscow, joined by Vlady Kibalchich. 
We succeeded in 'planting the seeds' to generate interest in 
Victor Serge among writers, filmmakers, activists and 
historians. We met Sergei Zavarotnyi, an assistant editor of 
Komsomolskava Pravda who is the Soviet Sergian if such exists. 
Sergei Zavarotnyi had published an article about Serge and Vlady 
in Komsomolskava Pravda in November 1988 and wrote a large 
article to be published in "Almanac Parus" in 1990. Through his 
article he came into contact with Irina Gogua and through her, 
Anita Russakova. Vlady, Sergei and I tried to map the trail of 
lost manuscripts. With Ghezzi's death, we could only look to 
Glavlit/the KGB or Peshkova's papers. We began with the latter.
When Peshkova died, her personal papers became a part of 
the Gorky Museum in Moscow. Her granddaughter Marfa Peshkova is 
the curator of the Gorky archive in the Gorky museum. We were 
not able to see her, but found out that soon after Peshkova's 
papers were deposited in the museum, the Central Committee sent 
someone to look through them. He removed a large portion of the 
papers. Another archivist at the museum remembered seeing 
"papers written in French."106 As we left the Soviet Union, 
Zavarotnyi planned a trip to Orenburg to continue the search.107
II. 4.19 Postscript, 1991: More News of the Manuscript Hunt
In the aftermath of my trip with Vlady to find the missing 
manuscripts, Sergei Zavarotnyi found out that Oppositionist 
Vassili Pankratov's wife Lisa Senatskaya was still alive, and 
her grandson of the same name, Vassili Pankratov, wanted to help
10STelephone conversation between Vlady and archivist,
Moscow, March 1989.
107Later, Sergei Zavarotnyi met Lisa Senyatskaya and her 
grandson, Vassili Pankratov (named for his grandfather.) 
Vassili Pankratov has agreed to continue knocking on doors 
from within the Soviet Union, while the Victor Serge 
Association (I am the US representative) makes as much noise 
from abroad to continue the campaign.
find the manuscripts. At the same time, I passed on the 
information about the search to an English film maker, Jon Eden, 
who went to the Soviet Union and made a trip to Orenburg with 
Sergei Zavarotnyi. They did not turn up any leads, but Sergei's 
newspaper, Komsomolskava Pravda was persuaded to fund Vassili 
Pankratov, so that he might investigate systematically. Young 
Pankratov knew Marfa Peshkova personally and was led to the 
closed archive of Ekaterina Peshkova's Political Red Cross. He 
did not find the manuscripts, but did turn up a letter Serge 
wrote to Peshkova from Warsaw, dated 16 April 1936, and
___ 1QO
Peshkova's letter to the NKVD requesting the return of the 
manuscripts and permission to despatch them abroad. The search 
continues....
108Both letters were printed in the Victor Serge Centenary 
Group Newsletter, January 1991, p. 9. See also Murray 
Armstrong, "The Searchers," The Guardian Weekly. Saturday- 
Sunday, Sept. 22-23, 1990, for an account of the search.
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II. 4.20 Appendix
Appended is a copy of the letter sent in search of Serge's 
stolen manuscripts.
4454 Van Noord Ave.








Dear Georg V. Myasnikov,
Please forgive me for writing in English. Yevgeny 
Yevtushenko kindly sent me your address and told me to write 
you. First, please let me tell you how excited I am by your 
work. You are on the cutting edge of 'glasnost' and your work is 
greatly appreciated.
I particularly am interested in the attempts to come to terms 
with the periods in Soviet history which have been 'forbidden' 
until recently. In this respect I would like to ask your help 
in deepening our understanding of that period of Soviet history.
I am working on a book on Victor Serge, born Victor Lvovich 
Kibalchich. Serge is known in the West principally as a 
revolutionary French novelist. Serge wrote more than 40 books, 
which include 7 novels, 2 volumes of poetry, three novellas and 
a collection of short stories, and more than 30 works of history 
and politics, hundreds of articles and essays on diverse themes, 
biographies of Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky, a diary, his own 
Memoirs, and translations of the works of Lenin, Trotsky, 
Zinoviev, Figner, Gladkov, Mayakovsky and various others. His 
Memoirs of a Revolutionary is particularly well known, as is his 
history, Year One of the Russian Revolution, and his novel of 
the purges, The Case Of Comrade Tulavev.
As I am sure you know, Serge was the son of exiled Russian 
revolutionary populists of the group Narodnaya Volya, who was 
raised in Belgium and France. Serge entered revolutionary 
Russia in February 1919, as the result of a prisoner exchange in 
which captured French officers were exchanged for a group of 
suspected Bolsheviks held in a French concentration camp during 
the First World War. Serge entered Russia with thirteen years of 
political activity behind him, more than six of them in 
captivity. Serge joined the Bolshevik Party, fought in the Civil 
War, and worked with Zinoviev on the Executive Committee of the 
Communist International. Serge was a Commissar in charge of the 
archives of the Okhrana, out of which came the book What Every 
Revolutionary Should Know About State Repression. Serge 
translated the works of Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and others into
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French, was the editor of the French edition of Inprecor, and 
wrote most of his articles using the name R. Albert. He joined 
the Left Opposition in 1923 while on assignment in Germany. He 
was arrested in 1928 and released, but rearrested in 1933.
When Victor Serge was expelled from the Soviet Union in 
April 1936, he was deprived of his suitcase filled with 
manuscripts he had written in deportation in Orenburg. (He spent 
the years 1933-36 in Orenburg, accompanied by his young son 
Vlady who is now a famous painter living in Mexico.) These 
manuscripts included the novel Les Homines perdus, an 
autobiographical account of the French anarchist movement around 
1910-1913; La Tourmente. a novel painting an epic picture of the 
Russian revolution in 1920 and a sequel to his novel published 
in the West. Conquered City: a collection of poems entitled 
Resistance. which he reconstructed from memory once in Europe; 
and his history of War Communism, L'An II de la Revolution 
russe, an unfinished work. He had multiple copies of the 
four books he had written, which were deposited with various 
agencies: 1) the Censor of the People's Commissariat for Public
Education, 2) the Assistant director of the Foreign Literature 
Section of Glavlit; 3) the Political Red Cross Directress, 
Ekaterina Poblona Peshkova, Gorky's first wife, 4) with the 
Italian syndicalist Francesco Ghezzi, in the Soviet Union since 
1921, 5) three copies of the novel about the French anarchist 
movement had been sent to Romain Rolland in France and had all 
been seized in the post —  Serge was compensated for their loss; 
6) Serge kept the other copies to take with him, which were 
stolen by the GPU at the station in Negoreloye.
Peshkova wrote to Serge in May of 1936 in Belgium 4 stating 
that permission to send the manuscripts had been granted (they 
had an 'exit visa') but formal authorization for actually 
posting them to Serge never came through.
Vlady, Serge's surviving son, has attempted to retrieve the 
manuscripts with no luck. Francois Maspero, the French left- 
wing publisher, wrote to Brezhnev in 1972 requesting that 
Serge's
papers be released to his family: his letter was never
answered.
If these lost manuscripts do exist, they will enrich our 
understanding of the early history of the Soviet Union, as well 
as the pre-war French anarchist movement. They will also add to 
our perception of Victor Serge the writer and activist. Finally, 
Serge's novels are the work of an extremely sensitive and 
politically astute eyewitness and participant of the Russian 
revolution and Bolshevik movement; their effect, as lessons in 
politics and history cannot be overstated.
109 8 copies of the French novel, 5 of the Russian novel.
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Gorbachev has stated that there should be "no blank pages in 
the history of the Soviet Union." Many historians/ journalists 
and magazine editors today in the USSR are doing superlative 
work in uncovering the 'blank spots' of Soviet history, and are 
to be commended. With every new story from the forbidden years, 
I am filled with enthusiasm and excitement 1 These lost 
manuscripts of Victor Serge's are part of the blank pages. If 
you can help in any way —  to make enquiries as to the survival 
of these manuscripts, to do anything to help return them to 
Serge's family —  it will be a great service to history, to 




Similar letters sent to: Mikhail Gorbachev, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, 
Yuri Afanasiev, Ogonyek, Yuri Kariakin, Vladimir Karpov, Yegor 
Yakovlev, Moscow News, Sergei Zavarotnyi, Alexei German, V. 
Bondarenko.
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The searchers
►publisher Francois Maspero wrote to 
Leonid Brezhnev “respectfully request­
ing" that the papers be returned. His 
letter was never answered.
TODAY'S search for the missing manuscripts begins in Mexico with a Russian journalist , and a local, strangely dressed painter. Sergei 
Zavarotnyi was the Mexico correspon­
dent for Komsomolskaya Pravda. the 
Russian CPs youth paper.
"In the time of perestroika," he 
recalls, "our embassy was inviting 
more and more Russians and people of 
Russian origin in Mexico — and there 
are a lot of them. Once, Vlady came; he 
was dressed like a  Russian, you know 
the style, Russian shirts, and he looked 
like an old fashioned Russian man. Of 
course I was interested in him. Some­
one told me be was a  Mexican painter of 
Russian origin."
It tu rned  out - 
that this painter 
was called Vladi­
m ir Kibalchich, 
son of Victor Ki­
balchich  a lia s  
Victor Serge.
“Later, I made __ 
friends w ith  #
Vlady" Zavarot- ' 
nyi remembers,
“ visiting  h is 
house, speaking 
about Mexico, his 
paintings, about 
Russia — and his L- 
lather, of course.
Here I began to 
understand the 
tragedy of Victor....
Serge and for me, 
as a journalist, it 
was impossible to neglect 
this."
So Zavarotnyi found out 
all that he could, wrote a 
piece for his paper and 
filed it to Moscow. Then 
the phone calls 
came. “ They 
asked me 'who 
was Victor Serge 
because nobody 
cnows'. His books 
vere never pub- 
ished, his name 
vas never men- 
ioned; as if he 
lidn’t exist at all, 
s if he wasn't 
om. You know 
hat a lot of people 
ad the sam e 
usfortune.”
N evertheless 
ie a rtic le  was 
ublished, and 
ten came more 
lone calls and 
tters — but this
Tie of a different sort. The first was 
ora Irina Gogua. a cousin of Serge, 
rina was first of all very glad to know 
at Vlady is alive, that he has a good 
id interesting life in Mexico, and that 
ctor Serge didn't die in any camp.” 
rhen more calls from family friends, 
cpxaintances and distant relatives. 
ie information mounted. Zavarotnyi 
nt home to Russia on holiday and 
iked up Irina. By this time he had 
id Serge’s Memoirs and he asked her 
jut others mentioned in the book, 
s remembered Lisa Senatskaya. a 
a»d of Serge's in exile in Orenburg,
0 was also married to his opposition- 
comrade Vasslli Pankratov. “She
1 me that she is still alive — the wife
Vassiii Panlrrot/w  ...— - -
Cheka!” Irina gave him the address and 
telephone number of Lisa and of Ada 
Voitolovskaya, wife of N.I. Karpov, an­
other Bolshevik oppositionist 
Unsure of what to do next, Zavarotnyi 
filed away his new knowledge, waiting 
for the right time to go into print again. 
Then it happened. American Suzi 
Weiss man, who had also met Vlady in 
Mexico, arrived at the Komsomolskya 
Pravda office — with Vlady. The three 
attended the first public meeting for the 
reinstatement of Trotsky. “It was the 
p ak of perestroika,” says Zavarotnyi 
“We were tasting the freedom, the right 
to write without fear, and it was like the 
taste of alcohoL”
Suzi Weiss man passed on information 
to John Eden, an English film producer 
with a personal interest in Serge who 
had already raised development cash 
from Channel 4 for the TV movie to 
celebrate the centenary of Serge's birth.
"In a  short time two men came to 
me," continues Zavarotnyi, "energetic 
and with large quantities of whisky and 
with gigantic plans to make the film and 
gather material." The three travelled 
around Russia to 
meet those who 
knew the Serge 
< fam ily and. in
* Leningrad, met 
4 ano ther Vassili
P an k ra to v  —
* grandson of the 
old Bolshevik.
Vassili Pankra­
tov is a 27-year- 
old physicist 
from Leningrad.
■ He had heard of 
Victor Serge from 
his grandmother, 
Lisa. Serge’s 
novel The Case 
Of Comrade Tu- 
layev, was pub­
lished for the first 
tim e in Russia 
ON THE TRAIL: last spring in small-circu-
P an k ra tov (ab ove) lation magazine called
and  Zavarotnyi, Ural,
w tioae p ap er la “When this novel ap-
b a d t in g th e S a r g *  peared in U ral," says
p roject. Pankratov, “my grand­
mother came to 
me and told me 
that she knew 
the author. She 
told me the story 
of Orenburg, and 
how they were 
close friends 
with Victor 
Serge, and about 
Romain Rolland, 
who came to the 
Soviet Union and 
asked Stalin to 








ment in the project was now imminent: 
“My grandmother called me and told 
me — very excitedly — that two English 
producers were coming to ask her about 
her past, about grandfather, everything. 
Of course it was great for her. 1 decided 
to come and listen, and so . . . "
And so Vassili Pankratov met Sergei 
Zavarotnyi “And we agreed,” say Za­
varotnyi, “that our paper will cover my 
expenses. . .  and that we would set up a 
fund to pay Vassili for research in his 
free time."
Zavarotnyi knew someone called 
Marfa Peshkova, who is the curator of 
the Gorky Archive in the Gorky Mu­
seum in Moscow. She is the grand 
daughter of Ekaterina, who ran the
‘After 1917tragedy came and Sei




m ade h is f irs t 
contact there. No 
manuscripts were 
found but be did 
discover letters 
from Romain Rol­
land to Maxim 
Gorky concern­
ing the campaign 
to release Serge.
These are shortly 
to be published.
P ankra tov ’s 
search next led to 
the Central Ar­
chive of Literature and Art where the 
director, Natalia Volkova, led him to . 
files held in Serge’s family name. Kibal­
chich. where he found a few letters but 
no clue to the manuscripts.
Next stop was the Institute of World 
Literature, where the Peshkova files are . 
held. Nothing. Then, pfter a Hew days, *■ 
says Pankratov, "the director told me? 
there is a second part of Peshkova'a ar-. 
chives, a part which deals with her', 
work in the Red Cross. He told me that 
these documents were held somewhere 
In secret in the KGB, but he now has 
Information that these archives were — 
not long ago, maybe a month ago —
THEN ANO NOWi T he M u m  a t  M  
C ava lry  ' I t r M l ,  O rv o k u rs , (•bovaS 
d raw n  b y  S * r« a’« saw, V lady i s  M e 
I m m  a n d  (HgM) M  N h  ta d a y .
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transferred to the Central Archives 
f  the October Revolution."
Pankratov obtained permission - to 
-'open the Red Cross files and found fwo 
..letters; one from Serge to Peshkova ex­
plaining what happened on the train, 
and another from Peshkova to the KGB 
asking that the copies he left with the 
censor be sent on to him. "I asked her 
(the director) where she thought the
manuscripts could be, and she «<ua she 
thought all of them, all the copies, were 
in one place somewhere in the KGB ar­
chives. She thought Peshkova gave 
theih to the KGB because they were too 
dangerous to keep. If they were found 
the whole Red Cross would be in 
danger."
Sergei Zavarotnyi intervened at this 
point and wrote, on his paper’s headed
epaper, to tne aeputy head of the 
KGIL V. Pirozhkov. “We got an answer 
after about two months," said Zavarot­
ny i "saying they had made a thorough 
search and had found nothing.”
But Zavarotnyi Is not convinced, nor 
Is he finished. “Maybe another place we 
didn't cover well Is I<enlngrad. lie was 
arrested there, he lived there. Maybe 
we can find some mention of Victor 
Serge there and maybe his case is 
there."
And Pankratov is following the same 
trail He was advised to go to Pushkin 
House, Leningrad. "This Is the archive 
for nineteenth century writers but the 
documents of Immigrant writers were 
also sent there. I’ll go to Pushkin House 
in October. Another track Is back to the 
Central Archives of Literature and Art. 
[1 have been toldj there Is a special 
closed department connected with Im­
migrant writers there too. The director 
didn't say a word about it to me. Maybe 
It is closed and maybe it is open. I will 
try to get permission.”
And what pushes Pankratov on in his 
literary sleuthing? “No matter where 
your sympathies lie — to socialism or 
not — it is a fact that just after 1917 
tragedy eame and Victor Serge thought 
the same because he saw the evil, the 
black side of the revolution. All the doc­
uments of this terrible period must be 
known.”
And Zavarotnyi has dearly got his 
teeth into a good story. “We'll write a 
letter to the chief of Leningrad's KGB 
and Vassili can look there. It's a long 
road of course, but In any case we re 
coming near the real truth of what has 
happened to the manuscripts: were they 
destroyed and if so was it on purpose or 
by chance?" O
The Victor Serge Centenary Group is at 120 
Amhurst Road. London E8 2AG.
IT’S A LIVING
Filling BR san d w ich es
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V. Another Exile and Two Mores the Final Years
5.1 Introduction
"Row, Vassili, row. Let's pull together 
we are brothers 
in defeat and hard times—  
our defeat is prouder and greater 
than their lying victory ...
It's good to go up the rivers 
as long as your back' s not broken ... 
We'll hold on as long as we can."1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
"O rain of stars in the darkness, 
constellation of dead brothers!
I owe you my blackest silence, 
my resolve, my indulgence 
for all these empty-seeming days, 
and whatever is left me of pride 
for a blaze in the desert.
But let there be silence 
on these lofty figureheads!
The ardent voyage continues, 
the course is set on hope.
When will it be your turn, when mine?
The course is set on hope."2
Excerpted from "Boat on the Ural River," a poem Serge wrote 
in Orenburg on May 20, 1935 about a boat ride that he took with 
five other deported communists. It is from the collection 
Resistance, (pp. 25-27), poems by Victor Serge written in 
Orenburg, confiscated by the GPU and reconstructed from memory 
in the West. First published in 1938 by Cahiers Les Humbles, 
and translated into English by James Brooks, published by City 
Lights Books, San Francisco, 1989.
2Excerpted from Serge's 1935 poem, "Constellation of Dead 
Brothers," Orenburg, published in Resistance, pp. 34-35.
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These poems, written in Orenburg speak to the state of mind 
of the defeated oppositionists, who notwithstanding unspeakable 
suffering and betrayal, managed to retain their socialist 
optimism for the future. This was not a religious conviction, 
but a Marxist one, based on the certainty that future progress 
belonged to the working class, despite fascism, despite 
Stalinism. In a real sense they serve to introduce this last 
chapter on Serge's political voyage, which brought him face to 
face with fascism, Stalinism in the USSR and abroad, war, 
political isolation and defeats. In the last part of this 
period, when Serge was exiled to Mexico, he began a period of 
intense writing and reflection. Cut off from his friends, 
comrades, language and politics, his writings reflect his 
deepest thoughts about the fate of socialism in the wake of 
Stalin's crimes in its name.
His political cohorts in the Fourth International also 
rejected Serge3 in this final exile, due more to the.efforts of 
the GPU than to real political differences. Although there were 
some political differences, others were invented, and we will 
seek to refute the charge often leveled against Serge by both 
Trotskyists and social democrats that Serge had abandoned 
Marxism and had become a professional anti-Stalinist a la New 
Leader, the American right-Menshevik paper that frequently
3For example, see inter alia, Leon Trotsky, "Victor Serge 
and the Fourth International, Dec. 2, 1938," "Intellectual Ex- 
Radicals and World Reaction, Feb. 17, 1939." Pierre Frank,
Introduction to Kronstadt by Lenin and Trotsky, Monad Press 
1979, and in the revue Ouatrieme Internationale. Nov-Dee. 1947, 
Paris, an obit for Serge stated: "Serge soutint la politique
centriste .... on regrettera que ce militant 
revolutionnaire....degage de son experience personnell du 
stalinisme, certes cruelle et deprimante, que des doutes sans 
fondements serieux sur le marxisme revolutionnaire."
Trotsky himself told James Cannon in a letter of 24 Dec. 1937, 
[ "Les 'lecons d'Espagne' et le Menchevisme dans les rangs des 
Partisans de la IV Internationale"] that Serge held absolute 
menshevik ideas on Spain, ['idees absolument mencheviques.'] I 
found this letter in the Serge archives in Mexico; it was not 
printed in the English edition of Trotsky's Writings.
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carried Serge's byline. As Serge wrote in a letter to Hryhory
Kostiuk in his final month of life:
"Ya ostaius —  neopokolebimo — • sotsialistom, 
storonnikom demokraticheskogo sotsializma. Sistemu 
protiv kotorii ya borolsya i borius —  i kot. [sic] 
vui znaete po opuitu, —  ya rassmatrivuyo kak 
raznovidnost totalitarisma t.d. nechto novoe, po 
kraine beschelovechnoe i antisotsialisticheskoe.4
Serge's numerous essays from his final exile address his
mature thinking about socialism, anarchism, the political
economy and social structure of the USSR and its impact on the
international political struggle, his understanding of WWII and
its aftermath, the new cold war and the nuclear age, the role of
the vanguard party, and broader questions of art, anthropology,
psychology, philosophy, and politics.
He was active for a period in Mexico in a political group
(Socialismo y Libertad) which published a few issues of Mundo
and then split due to differences. For the most part, Serge was
a fish out of water in Mexico: he was writing in French and his
audience was in Europe and North America. He couldn't publish
his work, was very poor, and often hungry. Domestically, he was
having problems with his young wife Laurette Sejourne, and his
son Vlady, trying to find his own way politically, often opposed
Serge in the group, trying to minimize Serge's giant influence.5
The Mexico that opened its doors to Trotsky in 1937, had
changed by 1941 when Serge was invited to live there, among many
refugees from the Spanish Civil War. The government of Lazaro
Cardenas, which Trotsky had characterized in a letter to Alfred
Victor Serge to Podoliak [pseudonym for Hryhory Kostiuk] 
June 22, 1947. Pseudonym established by Kostiuk, who gave me 
this letter, during an interview in November 1985. Translation: 
"I remain —  intransigently [unwaveringly] —  a socialist, a 
partisan of socialist democracy. The system against which I 
fought and continue to fight —  you know from experience — I 
view as a kind of totalitarianism, i.e. as something new, but 
extremely inhuman and anti-socialist.”
5Taped interviews with Vlady, 20 August 1990, and Laurette 
Sejourne, 6 September 1990, Mexico City.
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Rosmer as "the only honest government in the world" was gone, 
and the act of Trotsky's assassination had deeply affected 
Mexican politics.6 The assassination of Trotsky on Mexican soil 
was a direct affront to Cardenas, who wrote that the Stalinist 
thugs had violated the sanctity and generosity of the country's 
giving Trotsky a home and betrayed the ideals .of Mexico.7 
Though Mexico continued to give refuge to those escaping the 
Nazified regimes overtaking Europe, the country's internal 
atmosphere changed during the government of Avila Camacho. It 
was to this changed atmosphere that Serge and Vlady came in 
September 1941, followed by Laurette and Jeanine in March 19428.
Serge was out of his element in Mexico: his command of the 
language was less than adequate, especially for a man who earned 
his living by writing; He was dizzy with the defeats he had just 
survived, and the pain caused by the deaths of his comrades at 
Stalin's hand in the gulag and in Spain, and at the gestapo's 
hands in Europe. Mexico was exotic and fascinating to Serge, 
but he was truly isolated there, and desperately poor.9
Yet in Mexico there was one other person to whom Serge 
could relate: Natalia Sedova, Trotsky's widow. Vlady
6Cardenas' son Cuauhtemoc quoted his father: "The blood of 
Trotsky fertilized the soil of our country." Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas, Inaugural remarks at Colloquium, "Trotsky, Revelador 
Politico del Mexico Cardenista," Mexico City, May 18, 1987.
7Letter quoted Adolfo Gilly's talk "Espana, Mexico: 
esperanza y tragedia de los anos 30" Panel title, "El Planeta, 
El Pais, El Huesped," May 18, 1987, Mexico City.
8RCA Radiogram to Nancy MacDonald, March 6, 1942, from Laura 
and Victor Serge, announcing arrival in Veracruz of 'Laura' and 
Jeannine. MacDonald Papers, Yale Collection.
9Dwight and Nancy Macdonald continued to support Serge 
financially occasionally, until Laurette could get work, and 
Serge could publish a few articles in the American left 
journals. See various letters and cablegrams detailing sending 
and receiving of monies, MacDonald Papers, Yale Collection.
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remembered the day that he and Serge first went to visit 
Natalia, approaching Avenida Viena by Rio Churubusco in 
Coyoacan. They had just arrived in Mexico, a miracle in itself, 
and Serge was eager to see Natalia. Serge had last seen Trotsky 
in 1927; though they corresponded while they were both in exile 
in Europe, their paths never crossed again. Having lived most of 
his adult political life in /the tail of the comet of Trotsky10' 
and having arrived finally in Mexico where Trotsky's life ended, 
Serge immediately gravitated toward Avenida Viena. Walking 
along Rio Churubusco, Vlady recounted, "my father saw the wall 
around Trotsky's house, where the Old Man was killed. He began 
to weep, and then broke into sobs."11 It was the first time 
Vlady had seen Serge really lose his composure. Inside, Serge 
and Natalia greeted each other with affection, and immediately 
established a rapport. Later Serge was to write that he and 
Natalia were the only ones left, "who knew what the Russian 
Revolution was really like, what the Bolsheviks were really 
like."12 They were the last survivors of the revolutionary 
generation of Left Oppositionist Bolsheviks.13
No one else understood this international revolutionary who 
was at once Belgian and Russian, an anarcho-Bolshevik and 
committed anti-Stalinist. Gradually he associated with the
10The phrase is Vlady' s.
nPrivate conversation with Vlady in Coyoacan, August 20, 
1990. Vlady and I took the same walk that he and his father had 
in 1941. We were there to speak at a commemoration of the 50th 
anniversary of Trotsky's assassination and the inauguration of 
the Museo Leon Trotsky.
12Carnets, 15 Jan. 1944. Serge's daughter ^ Jeannine 
Kibalchich also fondly remembered the weekly visits with her 
father to Natalia Trotsky's house. Jeannine Kibalchich, "Victor 
Serge, Mi Padre," Unpublished essay, October 1990, p. 15.
13In 1988 other survivors in the Soviet Union came forward, 
like Nadezhda Joffe, who spent the years 1929-1957 in Kolyma for 
her participation in the Left Opposition. Her stepmother Maria 
Joffe also survived and lives in Israel.
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14Spanish and European exile community, including Julian Gorkin 
who had been instrumental in getting Serge his Mexican visa, the 
French socialist leader Marceau Pivert,15 Gustav Regler, a 
political commissar with the International Brigades in Spain, 
the French novelist Jean Malaquais,16 Herbert Lenhof, a 
psychoanalyst of the Freudian school, with whom Serge had 
fascinating discussions about the human social psyche, and 
others. Manuel Alvarado, an orthodox Trotskyist, lived near 
Serge and stopped by there frequently to discuss politics. They 
had disagreements on the nature of fascisms Alvarado felt Serge 
was too taken with fascism's similarities with Stalinism17.
Apart from interviews with survivors of the time, material 
from Serge's archive in Mexico, and his articles in the American 
left papers the New Leader and Politics, an important source 
about this period of Serge's life has been the now declassified 
documents of the FBI which this author received through the 
Freedom of Information Act. The FBI kept close tabs on all the 
exiles in Mexico, and an unwitting but important source for them 
was Victor Serge, who himself kept abreast of the activities of 
the various exile communities, writing details to American
14Former International Secretary of the Spanish POUM 
(Partido Obrero Unificado Marxista, author of books on Spain, 
Trotsky's assassination.
15Leader of the pre-war French PSOP who Trotsky had 
polemicized against in 1939 as centrist, an associate of Leon 
Blum in the Popular Front.
16The French author of Planet Without a Visa and other 
works, with whom Serge had a falling out, see inter alia 
Carnets, "Malaquais, 17 Oct. 44," p. 133.
17I interviewed Manuel Alvarado twice, once in May 1987 and 
again in August 1990, both times in Mexico City. Vlady 
remembers Manuel as a 'rigid, dogmatic Trotskyist, but with a 
theoretical rigor." Alvarado was a full time militant in the 
Mexican section of the Fourth International, with a keen 
interest in political economy. After Trotsky's assassination, 
he went to work as an economist in Mexico's banking system.
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friends in letters (and articles to American left periodicals)
that were intercepted by the FBI.18
Serge was not spared persecution in his final exile. Mexico
had been a hotbed of GPU activity during Trotsky's stay. The
Mexican Communist Party had allowed itself to be used in
Stalin's service in 1940 in the first attempt on Trotsky's life
led by the painter David Alfaro Siquieros. Laurette Sejourne
recalled that Serge was sometimes followed19, and Vlady
remembered one day walking with his father in Coyoacan, when a
car suddenly appeared and gunmen inside opened fire. Serge
20grabbed Vlady and pushed him behind a tree. Serge's group was 
threatened by the GPU's terror tactics, culminating in the 
physical attack by the GPU and 200 armed Mexican CP thugs
(called a brawl by the FBI) on Serge's group at a memorial
The FOIA files have deleted the addressee and most of the 
names (at least of those who are still living) but have left in 
Serge's name and address as writer of the various letters. FOIA, 
Office of Censorship, USA, Registered No. 125, Serial No. 5967, 
letter postmarked April 2, 1943, (unphotographed, but
distributed to stations ONI, SDC, MID, DR, examined on date 
April 5, 1943, 3 pages; letter from VS to ? (deleted),
postmarked March 16, 1944 and intercepted and examined March 20, 
1944, entitled (by FBI) "Russian Author in Mexico Discusses 
European Political emigrations to Mexico," 4 pages. In this 
document we learn that the Russian emigration consists of 
Natalia Sedova, Serge, and the widow of Andreu Nin, that the 
Bund is active in the Jewish emigration, that the Romanian and 
Czech emigration are actively promoting democracy and anti- 
antisemitic ideas, and of the activities of the representatives 
of the Comintern in Mexico.
As a result of these communications J. Edgar Hoover addressed 
a letter to Birch D. O'Neal at the American Embassy in Mexico 
(May 25, 1944, FBI file 100-36676-20), about Serge, a.k.a.
"Victor Napoleon Kibaltchiche, Victor Napoleon Lvovitch; Victor 
Kibaltchiche, Victor Serge, V. Paderewski [Serge's mother's 
maiden name] - Espionage-R."
19Interview with Laurette Sejourne, Sept. 6, 1990, Mexico
City.
20Vlady took me to the spot and showed me the tree they hid 
behind, Coyoacan, August 1990.
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meeting for Henryk Erlich, Victor Alter and Carlo Tresca.21 
Serge's articles in the New Leader, written as the paper's 
Mexican Correspondent, highlighted their persecution, which in 
this case resulted in the stabbing of Gorkin. The attacks were 
not only physical. Serge and Gorkin were slandered, maligned, 
and boycotted.22 They were called Nazi agents, sinarquistas
21See "Paul Castelar, "GPU Terror Starts in Mexico, Former 
Agent Killed, Opponents in Peril, New Leader. Jan. 24, 1942, p. 
1, in which Castelar related that the 'strong-arm squad' have 
turned on Serge, Gorkin, and Pivert, trying to get them expelled 
from Mexico and repatriated to their various countries where 
they would be shot. Serge has a letter in the same issue of NL 
and on April 17, 1943, the front page article in the New Leader 
is by Serge, entitled "Gorkin Stabbed as Mexican CP wrecks 
Erlich, Tresca Meeting." The FBI paid particular attention to 
these activities, noting that Gorkin was seriously wounded, 
though Serge was not harmed, and Vlady kept his cool.
The Militant also carried an account of the meeting, quoting 
from Victor Serge: "At eight o'clock, says Serge, the company of 
about 100 Communists laid siege to the hall, broke down the iron 
door and burst into the center looking for the speakers to beat 
them up. Armed with clubs of bits of broken furniture, as well 
as knives and guns, they formed a strong-arm squad, evidently 
recruited off the streets, probably hired, and led by some 
Communist Party members who kept shouting, 'They are Germans, 
enemies of Mexico.' The thugs were led by Antonio Mije, Juan 
Comorera, Julian Carillo and Carlos Contreras. Contreras is a 
notorious Stalin G.P.U. hatchet-man who was an active leader in 
the terror against anti-Stalinist workers in Spain during the 
Civil War." FBI file, NY 100-31551 (declassified on 8/1/73), 
carrying page no. 13.
Jeannine Kibalchich was also at this meeting, and remembers 
that the thugs entered just as Serge was speaking. Serge shouted 
for her to take cover and Enrique Gironella grabbed her and 
protected her with his body. She felt his warm blood run on her 
hair, (he had been stabbed) and was frightened into silence. 
Jeannine Kibalchich, op.cit., p. 14.
22The story is worth telling because of the incredible 
intrigue involved, and the way the Soviets, the Cps and the 
international press were drawn in. Serge, Pivert, Gorkin, Regler 
and Muniz were labeled 'Fifth Columnists' and the slander was 
picked up and ferreted back and forth between Spanish, Mexican 
and American Communist, liberal and conservative papers. The 
slander was initiated by the Mexican Communist Paper Mundo 




Daily Worker, then cabled back to Mexico as a story to the 
effect that 'the American Press' was denouncing these men as 
Fifth Columnists.
An American campaign to protect Serge and the others was 
formed and a letter was addressed to Avila Camacho, President of 
Mexico and Freda Kirchway, editor of The Nation, signed by Roger 
Baldwin, John Dewey, John Dos Passos, James T. Farrell, Sidney 
Hook, Quincy Howe, Freda Kirchway, Reinhold Niebuhr, David 
Dubinsky, Adam Clayton Powell Jr., and 170 other prominent 
figures, calling on the Mexican government to protect these 
anti-fascists from the 'reign of terror against refugees whose 
only crime is that they have been more intransigeant [sic] and 
more consistent enemies of totalitarianism than their accusors 
[sic]." (Copy of letter to Avila Camacho) [See also Dwight 
MacDonald to Serge, Feb. 10, 1942, Yale Collection]
The affair was by no means finished. After Serge, Gorkin and 
Pivert published a letter in The Nation of Feb. 7, 1942, a
mysterious 'Washington Dispatch' appeared headed "Labor Con junta 
Contra Espias [Common Labor Against Spies]" in the conservative 
Mexico City Daily, Excelsior. The dispatch made it appear that 
the 'American Police' and FBI were interested in the suppression 
of the Fifth Columnists, thereby implicating the Secret Service 
and the State Department (FBI Memorandum 57958, Feb. 1, 1942). 
The article described Serge, for example,
"one Balkisti ... direct successor of Leon Trotzky.
This individual . .. involved in the trial of the band 
of apaches of Bonnot in 1909, in France. He managed 
to flee from French justice and later took refuge in 
Russia, where he was convicted of common crimes; 
finally he appeared in Paris at the service of Otto 
Abetz in 1938, when this German was the chief of the 
secret agents of Hitler, which enabled him to become 
today Hitler's ambassador in Paris." [FBI Memorandum 
57955]
At this point, the name of the American FBI was used as a 
source and thus their interest in the affair grew. Then, 
perhaps worse, it was picked up by the New Masses, March 24, 
1942, p. 15, in a 'background' article which chided The Nation 
for coming to the defense of the 'Fifth Columnists. ' On Feb. 28, 
The Nation published a letter by seven Mexican Deputies, plus 
Lombardo Toledano, Ludwig Renn and Pablo Neruda (the last three 
known Stalinists) who "restated the feeling of the Mexican 
people about the Trotskyists in their midst." "As a result, The 
Nation's editors retreated considerably in so far as Victor 
Serge and his partners were concerned." rNew Masses. March 24, 
1942, reprinted in FBI file 161-9182-1, April 16, 1942.]
Dwight MacDonald continued to campaign on behalf of Serge and 
his comrades, and the New York Times published an account of the
(continued...)
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(Mexican fascists), Trotskyites, enemies of the United Nations. 
In one press dispatch picked up in the US, Serge was named as 
one of the instigators of the railway strikes in Mexico23. The 
slander campaign was organized by a man representing himself as 
a French journalist named Andre Simon, who came to Mexico from 
the United States. However, as an article in the British ILP 
paper New Leader revealed, Simon's real identity was Otto Katz, 
an OGPU agent assigned to
"stir up public sentiment against Regler, Serge, 
Pivert, Gorkin and Muniz. Having started an 
inflammatory press attack upon them, Katz has now 
organized 'vigilante committees' to deal with these 
men, whom he calls 'the leaders of the Nazi fifth 
column in Latin America.'”24
Mexican publications closed their doors to Serge. Miguel Aleman,
future president of the republic, admitted that there was
intense Soviet pressure to deny Serge any means of public
expression.25
22(.. .continued)
slander campaign (Feb. 1942). A number *'of the signers of the 
appeal to Camacho brought the matter to the attention of the 
State Department, MacDonald told Serge "the State Department 
takes the view that the attack ... confuses the issue of 
attacking the real fifth columnists and so —  Roosevelt has 
asked his personal representative in Mexico to intervene with 
Camacho and ask that the attacks cease, the request being of 
course unofficial." (Nancy MacDonald to Victor Serge, March 6, 
1942, MacDonald Papers, Yale Collection.)
230wen, Roche, (ALN), "Mexico Trotzkyites Peril Rail 
Transport," datelined Mexico City. This article appeared in the 
FBI file on Serge, document file 100— 36676 (Victor Serge,) 
indexed May 21, 1944, declassified June 1, 1984. Unfortunately 
the FBI deleted the published [!] source of this article. It 
appears that the clipping is from page 3, sectional of the 
WORKER, (deletions make exact source unclear.)
24"0GPU Threatens French and Spanish Socialists" and "The 
OGPU in Mexico," (Unsigned articles), New Leader. Saturday, 
February 27, 1943, pp. 4-5. This paper is not to be confused 
with the American paper of the same name.
25MacDonald Papers, 1942, Yale Collection.
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Once World War Two was underway and the Soviet Union was 
seen as the 'bulwark' against fascism, anti-Stalinist views 
became less palatable in the progressive press. All over Europe 
and the Americas, Trotskyists found their audience reduced. For 
a maverick like Serge, a public audience was becoming an elusive 
butterfly. Serge was not only an ardent anti-Stalinist and anti­
capitalist, he was also out of favor with the Trotskyists who 
thought him a centrist on his way to becoming a social democrat.
Serge was now unpublishable by any press — one publishing 
house was ruined after publishing his book on the character of 
the Second World War, called Hitler Contra Stalin.26 
Politically isolated and deprived of a livelihood, Serge wrote 
mostly for the desk drawer, producing some of his best works 
Memoirs of a Revolutionary (written from 1942-1943, published 
first in 1951); what is arguably the finest novel about the 
purges, The Case of Comrade Tulaev. (1940-1942, published in 
1948); his novel of the fall of France The Long Dusk, (1943- 
1945, published in Canada in 1946); and his novel about the 
experience of defeat and exile called Les Annees Sans Pardon 
(1946, published in 1971). He also kept a voluminous and 
fascinating journal, later published in France as Carnets 
(published in 1952). His book[lets] included La GPU prepara un 
nuevo crimen, signed by Serge, Gorkin, Pivert and Regler, 
published first in the journal Analisis in 1942, another by the 
same four entitled Los Problemas del Socialismo en nuestro 
tiempo, (1944, first published in Mundo), La Traaedie des
ecrivains sovietiques (1947), La Nouvel Imperialisme russe, 
(1947), Vie et Mort de Leon Trotski. (with Natalia Sedova, 
published in 1951.) As well, he wrote a large collection of 
essays, correspondence, articles on the war, the Jewish 
Question, psychology, literature, the future of socialism, 
Mexican archaeology, and the evolution and nature of the Soviet
26Julian Gorkin, biographical sketch of Serge, Mexico 
archive.
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system. He was preoccupied with the character of the world which 
would emerge from the war, which he thought was transformative 
and would give rise to new collectivist societies with a 
technocratic elite in power, and worried about the totalitarian 
tendencies of these new formations. Should Stalin survive the 
war, Serge feared he would start World War III.
The end of the war found Serge in a weakened physical 
condition, his head brimming with writing projects. Vlady 
encouraged him to return to France, where he could write and 
publish. His marriage was on the rocks, and Serge despaired of 
finding an audience in his lifetime for his ideas. It was Vlady 
who urged him to write the 'infamous' letter to Andre Malraux, 
which Malraux excerpted and published to show that Serge had 
become a Gaullist. Nonetheless, before any concrete plans were 
made to return to France, Serge was stopped by a fatal heart 
attack,27 in November 1947. He died just after hailing a taxi, 
before he could tell the driver where to go. His clothes were
27In Moscow in 1989, I was told by Sergei Zavarotnyi that an 
Italian biographer of Tina Modotti had raised the possibility 
that Serge did not die of natural causes, but had been poisoned 
by the GPU with something that would make it appear that he had 
had a heart attack. I asked Vlady, who replied: "Yes, it is 
possible he was poisoned, but if anyone poisoned him, it was 
Laurette." Vlady raised other concerns about Laurette, who 
appeared out of nowhere in the thirties to become Serge's 
companion, who according to Vlady was never emotionally 
committed to Serge, and who months after his death married a 
prominent Mexican Communist, Arnaldo Orfila and joined the 
Communist Party herself.
In an interview with Laurette Sejourne in September 1990, I 
asked her if Serge could have been poisoned: she thought it 
possible, but did not believe it so. She considered her marriage 
to him "an error," that she had been too young, and his life too 
full of tragedy and darkness for her to understand. As well, she 
took on the task of supporting Serge, while typing his 
manuscripts in the morning before going to work, returning in 
the evening to study (she was getting a degree in Anthropology 
and later became a renowned Mexican anthropologist).
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threadbare, he had holes in his shoes28; the driver thought he 
had picked up a pauper. Later, Laurette, Vlady and his wife 
Isabel were summoned to the morgue to identify Serge's body. 
Jeanine was not told for several days. Serge was buried in a 
cemetery for Spanish exiles, in an unmarked grave. Today, 43 
years after Serge's death, Isabel Diaz, Serge's daughter-in-law, 
is putting up a headstone to this valiant revolutionary.
* * * * *
The final decade of Serge's life was one of the century's 
most tumultuous and barbaric. From the time of Serge's release 
from Orenburg in April 1936 until his death in Mexico in 1947, 
millions were to die unnatural deaths in Stalin's camps and 
prison basements, millions more in Hitler's camps, and even more 
in the cities and on the blood soaked battlefields of Europe. A 
hideous postscript to the slaughter was written by the United
29States with the dropping 'fat man' and 'little boy' over 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the final act of World 
War II, and the first act of the Cold War. Serge experienced 
first hand the twin horrors of Stalinism and Nazism (in Vichy 
France). In fact, Serge's life was practically unique in that he 
personally witnessed or participated in most of the major 
struggles and ensuing maelstrom of the first half of the 
twentieth century.
Serge died without an 'estate,' but he left behind him a 
lifetime of struggle, a commitment to the truth no matter how 
uncomfortable, "a victorious revolution and massacres in so 
great a number as to inspire a certain dizziness," and a certain 
confidence, born of his critical intelligence, in the 
possibilities of the future.
28Vlady later captured the moment of Serge's death in the 
second of the trilogy he painted on the assassination of 
Trotsky. In the famous study of Trotsky's where he was felled 
with an icepick, there are a pair of shoes floating overhead, 
with holes in them, over the open pages of a book.
29Code names for the atomic bombs used at the end of WWII.
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Thus far we haye selectively examined Serge's experiences 
and the writings that came from them, concentrating on those 
which came directly from the Russian revolution and the 
development of the Stalinist system. One could argue that Soviet 
development continued to be the centerpiece of world history and 
intimately affected all important historical events in the 30's 
and 40's, and thus all Serge's subsequent activities and 
writings bear on the subject under examination —  but for 
reasons of space and thematic unity, this chapter will not deal 
with all of Serge's important activities in Europe and Mexico, 
except in summary form. The rest of this chapter will examine 
selective instances and writings then, which round out the 
narrative and analysis developed in the dissertation thus far.
5.2 A Question of Style
The subject of this dissertation has been focused on 
Serge's Soviet years. The final decade of his life was in many 
respects just like the rest: filled with writing, politics,
danger, hunger, and struggle both political and personal. What 
has been implicitly shown so far in this dissertation without 
being stated is that Serge's life experience was so unique and 
integral to the development of his political thought, that at 
times it is difficult to separate the two. Serge himself 
commented, “Events continued to overwhelm us. Even where they 
took place at a distance I find it hard to separate them from my 
personal memories."30
There is a paucity of scholarship on Victor Serge, though 
that situation appears to be changing.31 The two Serge scholars
30Memoirs, p. 177.
31Recent works on Serge include this dissertation and 
several articles I have published in the last 2 years; Richard 
Greeman's projected book on Serge, the film "Victor," in 
production by Jon Eden, an Italian collection edited by Attilio 
Chitarin, the work of Sergei Zavarotnyi in the USSR, Jon Eden,
(continued...)
318
in the English language, Peter Sedgwick (who translated Year One 
of the Russian Revolution. Memoirs of a Revolutionary, and wrote 
several analytical articles on Serge) and Richard Greeman (who 
translated four novels and has sustained a scholarly effort for 
the past twenty years) both examine Serge's thought in relation 
to his political activity. Serge himself intertwines his 
writings with his life experiences. This is partly because 
Serge, to a large degree, was more engaged than many other 
writers and observers of the Soviet Union. His writings reflect 
his experiences in an immediate sense, in all the literary forms 
he used to express his ideas: fiction, poetry, history,
political essays. It is also because Serge does not write in a 
customary 'scientific' style, but in a literary- 
autobiographical-political one that transcends the boundaries of 
both traditional social science and conventional literature.
I have also chosen to demonstrate the evolution of Serge's 
political thought (about the USSR) through both his experiences 
and his writings. This chapter breaks somewhat with that style 
because it treats the period in Serge's life after expulsion
I
from the Soviet Union. While his experiences are very important 
in revealing the activities and thoughts of the Left Opposition 
in Europe and the course of international communism, the subject 
is too broad for the focus of this dissertation. Serge watched 
the horrendous blood purges and the consolidation of the 
Stalinist system from abroad, and thus the sequence of political 
events in this Soviet process are no longer written about from 
the point of view of the eyewitness/ participant, but from the 
vantage of the observer/analyst. Nevertheless, the GPU 
continued to track down voices of opposition in Europe and the 
Americas, threatening Serge more than once. These "instances 
will be highlighted.
31 (.. .continued)
David Cotterill, Bill Marshall, and John Manson in Britain, the 
Victor Serge Centenary Colloquium in Brussells in 1991.
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5.3 Spring 1936: Belgian socialists are fat
Serge's return to the West after more than a decade of 
severe deprivation in "our Russia of revolutions" brought with 
it more than a bit of culture shock. Serge summed it up 
describing the ample meal he shared with an unemployed 
syndicalist militant — "Back home over there, this is the kind 
of meal that a high Party official would eat!"32 —  and the 
observation on a May Day demonstration that Belgian workers were 
both well dressed and fat. Serge had seen it before, though it 
had receded in his memory, but the whole scene was astonishing 
to young Vlady, who had real difficulty understanding the 
concept of private property. How could all this be owned by some 
man? And for what purpose? Serge noted Vlady's incredulity and 
remarked, "it all seemed mad to my Soviet adolescent."33
Serge became politically active immediately, even though he 
was restricted through the terms of his visa from open political 
activity. The unfolding events in the USSR with their 
repercussions in Europe and Spain prevented Serge from sitting 
back simply relieved to be 'free.'
i
Serge began to write about what he had just experienced and 
witnessed in the Soviet Union. He was surprised that many of his 
'European' political friends, with the exception of Boris 
Souvarine, preferred he remain silent, since for them "Russia 
was still an unsullied star" and Serge was "too bitter" after 
his experience.34 Serge did not refrain from writing the truth 
in the face of what Souvarine called "an epidemic of highly 
dangerous stupidity!"35 Suddenly the reverberations of the 
beginning purges in Moscow hit Serge in Belgium: a rain of 
denunciations began, inspired by the Belgian CP which led the
32Memoirs. p. 324.
33 Ibid.
34Ibid. . p. 326.
35Ibid.
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authorities to revoke Serge and his family's passports. More was 
to come. Letters went missing36, agents approached Serge in the 
street, and Serge had to give up his "well-paid work on Leon 
Blum's Le Populaire due to pressures influencing the editorial 
staff."37 Communist Party influence in journals and publishing 
houses made it practically impossible for Serge to publish, and 
where he had already published (house of Rieder), Serge found 
his books put on the back shelf, and mention of them deleted 
from the catalogues. Earning a living was becoming well-nigh 
impossible.
The long arm of the GPU, later to reach Sedov in Paris, 
Reiss in Lausanne, the POUM in Spain and Trotsky in Mexico, was 
stretching its tentacles toward Serge.
Stalin soon realized that Serge's release, like Trotsky's 
forced expulsion, was probably a mistake. In the West it was 
more difficult to silence their voices. Still, pressure could be 
brought to bear. On July 11, 1936, Serge was stripped of his
38passport and Soviet nationality. On July 13, 1936 Serge wrote 
to Leon Sedov, Trotsky's son, that he had been informed by the 
Soviet Embassy that a decree of the VTsIK revoked his 
passport.39 Serge was the victim of police harassment provoked
36A letter from Sedov to Serge, warning him about Sobel 
never arrived, see VS to LLS, "Piatnitsa, 1936," Nikolaevsky 
Collection, Hoover Archive, Stanford University.
37Memoirs, p. 328.
38 From Uccles, Belgium, Serge wrote Sedov in Paris on 1 
July 1936, that he had a French visa. (Serge to Sedov, July 11, 
1936, Hoover Archives) A French visa was not a travel document, 
however. Soviet consular officials in Belgium would not let 
Serge know of his changed status, and made it impossible for him 
to obtain travel documents (letter from Victor Serge to Leon 
Trotsky, Aug. 10, 1936) so he couldn't go to Paris, where his 
political activities on behalf of his comrades left behind in 
the Soviet Union would have been more effective.
39"Vuikhozhy iz Sov. Posol'stva; Tam mne soobshchili shto na 
postan ovleniem VTSiK'a, ya lishon Sov. Grazhdanstva." Serge to
(continued...)
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by GPU-inspired denunciations. He was accused of agitation among
striking miners, hiding arms for the Spanish Republicans, and
preparing to assassinate the King of Belgium. In the Soviet
Union, Serge's relatives were arrested and disappeared, never to
be heard from again.40
The Belgian Communist press demanded Serge's expulsion from
the country, and Serge's former friend, Jacques Sadoul began a
campaign of despicable slander against him. In two articles
published in L 'Humanite, Sadoul called Serge a "common
criminal," the "brains behind the Bonnot gang of 1911," .... who
was now using "political to camouflage his complicity in the
crimes of Trotsky and the defendants at the Moscow Trial."41
Sadoul pressed for a boycott of Serge, and was largely
successful. His invective was so vile that it led Trotsky to
write Serge, at a time when their relations were strained
because of their differences on the nature of the Spanish POUM:
.. .To pick up a copy of 1 'Humanite is always to injure 
one's own feelings. My young friends drew my 
attention to Jacques Sadoul's article against you, an 
exceptional article even for that prostituted 
publication.< ... Jacques Sadoul judges you and
excommunicates you in the name of the revolution. ...
He places himself between you and Lenin as Lenin's 
right-hand man.... How could I not feel it necessary 
to express my sympathy and solidarity with you, and at
39(.. .continued)
Sedov, Uccles ^ to Paris, 13, July 1936, Hoover Archive, 
Nikolaevsky Collection.
40Serge's family in the USSR consisted of his older sister, 
mother-in-law, two sisters-in-law and two brothers-in-law, their 
offspring, and cousins. They were all apolitical. Other 
Oppositionists' families suffered similarly. Serge wrote of the 
fate of wives and children of Oppositionists who disappeared 
into the gulag in his personal diary, Carnets. In his diary 
entry for July 6, 1946, he recounted the fate of Kamenev's wife 
(Trotsky's sister), and Rakovsky's daughter, both of whom 
disappeared into the most wretched of the camps. See Serge, 
"Pages of a Journal," New International. Nov. Dec. 1950, p. 369.
41L ' Humanite. Feb 2 and 14, 1937. Discussed in the 
correspondence between Serge and Trotsky.
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the same time say to the French workers: Jacques
Sadoul is lying! .... But the slanderer reached the 
depth of ignominy in the lines where he speaks of your 
careerism, of your concern for 'material advantages,' 
and where he, Jacques Sadoul, calls you, Victor Serge, 
a literary servant of others. Nothing is more 
repugnant than a servile philistine who has been told 
by powerful masters: 'You can do anything.' Victor
Serge, you remained in the ranks of the Opposition 
without wavering, in the midst of an unprecedented 
repression, when less steadfast persons were 
capitulating one after the other. In prison and in 
exile, you belonged to the band of those whom the 
Thermidorean hangmen could not break. You chose, my 
dear friend, a very bad route to ensure your 'career 
and material advantages.' Why did you not follow 
Jacques Sadoul's example? He moved around the Soviet 
revolution until he could return to France, where he 
became a correspondent for Izvestia. From Paris, he 
sent insipid scribblings, dictated by GPU agents. What 
a courageous, valorous heroic post! .... Dear Victor 
Serge! We know how to have contempt for these people, 
as you do. ... A single article by Sadoul permits an 
infallible diagnosis: 'Stalinism is the syphilis of
the labor movement.' The Comintern is doomed to 
destruction. The Sadouls will desert the sinking ship 
like rats. They will betray the Soviet Union five 
minutes before serious danger. So let us teach the 
youth to have contempt for this human fungus. A few 
more years and the vanguard of the proletariat will 
pass over not only the servants but also their 
masters. You will be among those whose names will be 
linked to the revival of the liberation struggle of 
the working class!"42
Serge left Brussels for Paris on Oct. 26, 193643, ostensibly for
two weeks, but apparently remained. Thanks to Sadoul and the
Soviets, Serge had no access to the mainstream Parisian press.
42Lev Davidovich Trotsky to Victor Serge, "On the Subject of 
Jacques Sadoul," March 5, 1937, first published in Le Mouvement 
Communiste en France (1919-1939^. edited by Pierre Broue 
(Minuit, 1967). In Writings of Leon Trotsky (193601937^ , pp. 
218-220.
43Serge to Sedov, 18 Oct. 1936, " I'll be there [Paris] on 
the 26th..." [Budu 26vo i khotel bui Vas bidet v gorode 27vo ili 
28vo nepremenno.] Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Archives, 
Stanford, CA.
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Certain Oppositionists were distrustful of Serge upon his 
release, reasoning that Stalin would only have let him go if he 
thought Serge would be of use to him44. Nonetheless, once in 
exile Serge set to work protesting publicly against the Moscow 
Trials and campaign of terror. The campaign of slander 
emanating from the Communist Party press against Serge 
effectively cut his access to the so-called left, and pressure 
from Moscow accomplished the same with the mainstream press. 
Only the Belgian daily La Wallonie carried his articles, and far 
left journals with a tiny circulation.
Despite the boycott, Serge began the nightmarish task of 
unravelling the labyrinth of these tragedies. Working with 
Trotsky, Sedov, Fritz Adler, Boris Nikolaevsky and others, Serge 
combed the Soviet press and took the testimony of Ciliga, Reiss, 
Krivitsky, and Barmine.45 In Belgium, France and later Mexico, 
Serge and a few others waged a long battle for the truth. In 
dozens of articles published from 1936-1939,46 Serge exposed the 
lies behind the charges in the Moscow Trials. He set up a 
"Committee for Inquiry into the Moscow Trials and the Defence of 
Free Opinion in the Revolution" in Paris, including many French 
intellectuals and artists,"47 and Serge himself testified on 
conditions in Russian prisons and the situation of the families 
of the victims.48
Ignace Reiss, whose real name was Walter Poretsky was wary 
of Serge, as was Walter Krivitsky. See Poretsky's wife's 
remarkable Memoir, Our Own People. Oxford University Press, 
1969, p. 244-246.
45Serge ghosted Barmine's book.
46In La Wallonie. Socialist Call. Revolution Proletarienne.
etc.
47Memoirs p. 331.
48The Case of Leon Trotsky. Merit Press, 1937, pp. 43-44. 
See also Serge's entries in Carnets for the fate of prominent 
Bolshevik relatives, such as Kamenev's wife Olga (Trotsky's 
sister), Rakovsky's family, etc.
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5.4 Trotsky-Serge and Serge-Sedov Correspondence of Spring and 
Summer 1936: Reunion of Left Oppositionist Exiles
The summer of 1936 was dramatic: In June the Popular Front 
of Leon Blum was elected into power and there was an immediate 
general strike; July saw the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, 
followed by the earthshaking49 bombshell of August —  the Trial 
of the Sixteen in Moscow. All of these struggles were fervently 
discussed and evaluated by the exiled Left Oppositionists in 
Europe.
The Left Oppositionists in question were groups of expelled 
Communists and young recruits to the politics of the Left 
Opposition of Leon Trotsky in most of the countries of Western 
Europe. Trotsky and Sedov were the only Russians, and now Serge 
joined them in the West. Serge had stood with Trotsky formally 
since 1923, when Serge joined the Opposition. They had 
struggled against Stalin openly in the Soviet Union until 1927, 
when they were both expelled from the Party, and clandestinely 
since 1928. They had not seen each other since 1927, and were 
now free to correspond, hopefully to meet again face to face. 
That these two survived at all whs serendipitous, that they now 
had the chance to work together fantastic.
Serge began his correspondence with both Trotsky and his 
son Lev Lvovich Sedov as soon as he arrived in Belgium. His 
first letter to Sedov was written three days after his arrival, 
his first to Trotsky on his fourth day in Belgium. They 
corresponded frequently throughout the summer of 1936, despite 
the interference of the secret police and subsequent losses and
Serge's original working title for his novel of the show 
trials and purges, The Case of Comrade Tulavev. was "The Earth 
Was Beginning to Shake," l~La Terre Commencait a Trembler. 1 His 
undated manuscript of the same title which serves as the 
author's prospectus can be found in the Serge archive, Mexico 
City.
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50delays of letters. Much of the Trotsky-Serge correspondence 
has been published in French (1977)51, but the correspondence 
between Serge and Sedov was undiscovered until the summer of 
1988.52 Unfortunately I have only been able to consult the
letters from Serge to Sedov (the correspondence from Sedov to 
Serge is not yet available) so the subject of his letters to 
Serge can only be guessed from the Serge letters to him.53
The correspondence in 1936 is introductory in character, a 
very warm and enthusiastic reunion of Left Oppositionist 
comrades who had survived Stalin's terror only because they were 
expelled from the Soviet Union, and who now in exile had the 
opportunity to begin a rich collaboration. Thus the tone of the 
correspondence is warm and the letters are full of concern as 
well as information.
50There are 16 letters from Serge to Trotsky, 16 letters 
from Trotsky to Serge, and 25 letters from Serge to Sedov for 
1936.
51An English volume is in preparation by Pluto Press.
52The Hoover Institution of Stanford University announced in 
1988 that they had discovered a previously unknown collection of 
Trotsky's papers within the Boris Nikolaevsky collection which 
was sealed until 1982. Jean Van Heijenoort and Pierre Broue 
were allowed access to the collection, and Broue informed me of 
some Serge letters he had seen in the collection. I contacted 
the library, and with the generous assistance of Dr. Danielson 
and Dr. Leadenham, I was able to retrieve photocopies of 77 
letters Serge wrote to Sedov in 1936-37. No one knew of their 
existence prior to this. I am very thankful to Robert E. Wahl 
for his transcriptions of the poor photostatic copies of the 
handwritten Russian letters.
53The Sedov letters to Serge are not in the Serge archive in 
Mexico. They may have been left behind or destroyed^in Paris, 
or they may be in the possession of Laurette Sejourne, Serge's 
third wife who lives in Mexico City. Although I have spoken and 
written to her, I have not yet been given access to the trunk of 
Serge material she has, which she dismisses as "unimportant." 
No one has seen the material she has. Laurette Sejourne married 
Arnaldo Orfila, publisher of Siglo 21 and a prominent Mexican 
Communist, after Serge's death, and subsequently became hostile 
to Serge the man and his politics.
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Serge wrote first to Sedov to establish contact, to find 
out how to write to Trotsky without the letters being 
"intercepted by some intelligence service.1,54 He asked Sedov to 
send "affectionate and loyal fraternal greetings to Lev 
Davidovich" and to bring the sad news of Lev Solntsev's death 
from hunger strike. He also warned them about 
Senin/Sobolevicius55, and cautioned: "I've acquired the
conviction that agents provocateurs have penetrated the circles 
of Communist Opposition in the West very deeply, even in Lev 
Davidovich's immediate circle in 1932-33."56
54Serge to Sedov, in French, Brussels, April 21, 1936.
55A1 though Serge already suspected Senin as indicated in the 
letter, Sedov wrote a letter warning about Senin to Serge which 
Serge never received. Memoirs, p. 328. Adolph Senin and Roman 
Well were the pseudonyms of the brothers Abraham and Ruvin 
Sobolevicius, born in Lithuania. Senin visited Trotsky in 
Copenhagen in 1932, shortly before he and his brother split some 
members away from the German section of the Left Opposition and 
led them into the German Communist Party. Senin-Sobolevicius 
was tried as a Soviet spy in the United States and admitted that 
he and his brother had been operating as GPU agents since 1931. 
In 1940 Senin was sent to the United States, and adopted the 
name Jack Soble. His first job was "to investigate and report 
on the Trotskyites, and on Jewish and Zionist organizations." 
He was told there were three "Trotskyite" groups in New York and 
a Russian agent was planted in each. Later he was put in charge 
of supervising and recruiting espionage agents. See "Exhibit 
No. 528," (entered as testimony) by Jack Soble, written with 
Jack Lotto, "How I spied on U.S. for the Reds," [New York 
Journal-American, Nov. 10-20, 1957], Scope of Soviet Activity in 
the United States, pp. 4875-4891.
56Ibid. In a later letter to Sedov, dated only "Piatnitsa" 
(1936), Serge elaborated on Senin: "0 Senine —  Sob., moye
mnenie nye ustanobleno: ili provokator ili kaptulyant (pod
arestom) txelikom razyugrannim provokatrami. Chto s nim 
stalos' ? — Opobestit' o nyom —  mozhno, no menva upominat' ne 
nado. Iz Sibiri mne pisali chto on —  provok., prichyom ochen' 
ybeditel'no argumentirya." Serge to Sedov, "Piatnitsa" 1936, 
Boris Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Archives, Stanford, 
[trans. "About Senin, Personally, my mind isn't made up: whether 
he's an agent provacateur or a capitulator (under arrest) 
entirely tricked by provocateurs. What happened to him? It
(continued...)
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The next day Serge wrote his first letter to Trotsky. He 
had a mass of information to get to Trotsky: he began with news 
of his situation, and news of comrades left behind in the gulag. 
First he extended a "fraternal salute, the warmest, truest and 
sincerest possible, from a handful of deported and imprisoned 
comrades who are heroes and whose entire thought is still tender 
towards you —  you of whom for years we have known almost 
nothing."57 He informed Trotsky of Solntsev's death in
Novisibirsk of hunger strike, and of Dumbadze's grave situation 
in Sarapul. He passed on heartfelt greetings from Boris Eltsin 
who had been with Serge in Orenburg, and his son Victor Eltsin 
in Archangel.
Serge told Trotsky how in deportation our "thoughts turned
constantly to you from the abyss of these black years." The
authorities tried everything to destroy Trotsky's influence, as
is well known, including officially leaked rumors and falsehoods
to demoralize and confuse Trotsky's erstwhile supporters. Thus,
Serge wrote Trotsky:
"at the time of Rakovsky's capitulation, the N.K.V.D. 
officers in private 'chats' with followers of the 
'general line' put out the rumour that LD had applied 
or was going to apply for permission to return to the 
USSR on certain conditions. ...1,58
The NKVD ploy had no success whatsoever. The subtext was to
communicate to Trotsky the importance of his continued
principled struggle abroad, news of which reached the prisoners
56(.. .continued)
might be possible to inform on him, but don't mention me. They 
wrote me from Siberia that he's a provocateur, which is arguing 
pretty convincingly."
57Serge to Trotsky, April 22, 1936. (All letters will be 
quoted by date since I am not working from the French published 
edition, but from copies made for me from Peter Sedgwick's 
private collection, now held by Pluto Press.)
58Serge to Trotsky, in Russian, April 29, 1936. (Most of 
Serge's letters were in French, Trotsky's in Russian.) Letter 
no. 6, my collection.
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sporadically. It boosted their morale and kept them on course.
Interestingly this even affected those who had capitulated and
now regretted it, as Serge portrayed in the figure of Kostrov in
his Midnight in the Century. Finally, to convey to Trotsky the
mood of these comrades, Serge related how
"joyfully the comrades who remained under the GPU's 
heel saw me off ... The mere thought that someone was 
going to give their fraternal greetings to you meant 
so much to them. Deportation and prison have already 
steeled remarkable dedicated and staunch 
revolutionaries, who face their systematic suffocation 
with extraordinary fortitude. All the comrades I've 
mentioned are like that."59
This account is unique and in marked contrast to other prison
Memoirs like that of Evgenia Ginzburg or Maria Joffe,60 whose
portraits of isolation, confusion and despair heavily overshadow
the occasional tiny glimpses of human solidarity, human
kindness, conviction and fortitude that Serge emphasizes. This
probably is due both to the time and the people each came into
contact with: both Ginzburg and Joffe deal with the general
terror of 1937 and after, while Serge is confined in exile with
committed oppositionists, imprisoned and exiled before the mass
terror of 1936-1939. Those arrested before Kirov's assassination
were committed politicos; after 1936 anyone could be arrested,
on the slightest pretext.
Serge eagerly read the published copies of the Bulletin of
the Left Opposition once he arrived in the West, and was
relieved to find he was in broad agreement. Serge had worried
that "we in deportation, cut off from the comrades who can
breathe freely, might accumulate considerable disagreements with
59Ibid.
60The obvious reason is that Serge's experience is pre 1937, 
the year of massive arrests and massive bloodletting, and 
because Serge was relatively privileged to be in deportation 
with other left oppositionists. Both Ginzburg in Kolyma and 
Joffe in Vorkuta had little comfort of political solidarity.
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them61" but was pleased to find virtually no differences with 
what he read in the Jan. 1935 Bvulleten, no. 42.
Serge also told Trotsky about his own arrests and 
deportation, which Trotsky published in the Bulletin, repeating 
the story Serge believed was true about his young sister-in-laws 
that the NKVD attempted to base their charge against Serge on 
"false testimony extracted from his young sister-in-law Anita 
Russakova." Serge firmly believed that Anita was subsequently 
sentenced to five years in Vyatka in 1936 "in order to hide the 
disgusting concoction of my case, formally for 'technical aid to 
the Trotskyites.' "62
The first letters from Trotsky to Serge are very warm, with 
Trotsky particularly concerned with the state of Liuba's mental 
health, and Serge's precarious political situation. In response 
to Serge's news, Trotsky wrote he was "deeply affected by the 
news of Solntsev's death,"63 one more in a long line of close 
associates who died or were killed. Trotsky implored Serge for 
detailed information, even if brief, and for Serge to write in 
the Bulletin (under a pseudonym or unsigned to protect him from 
the GPU.) Trotsky promised to be an "indefatigable letter- 
writer" to Serge.
He also offered to help Serge materially, by citing Serge's 
work a few times in the long introduction Trotsky was preparing 
for the second edition of The History of the Russian
61Victor Serge to Lev D. Trotsky, April 29, 1936.
62Victor Serge to Trotsky, April 29, 1936. Anita Roussakova
survived 21 years in the camps and was interviewed in Moscow in 
Sept. 1989 by Les Smith and Roy Battersby (for a film on Serge): 
she told them that she was never arrested until 1936. This 
undercuts Serge's understanding for the basis of his arrest, 
although it did become the basis for Anita's arrest. When she 
was taken and interrogated by Rutkovsky, she was presented with 
the same confession Serge had been confronted with three years 
earlier. Taped interview, Moscow, Sept. 1989.
63Trotsky to Serge, April 24, 1936. (in Russian)
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Revolution. which would help publicize Serge's name.64 Trotsky 
encouraged Serge to write, in fact to consider writing his 
political work, and to publish in America, where compensation 
was the most generous. Trotsky was trying to convince Serge that 
writing was a way to get around the political restrictions 
imposed on Serge by the conditions of his stay in Belgium65, and 
that the writing itself was a way to put bread on his table. 
Further, Trotsky added, "If you write a book with the talent 
that is yours and that I only discovered while abroad, you will 
be more useful to the movement than in any other way."66 Trotsky 
also asked Serge for news of his son Seryozha67, his first wife 
Alexandra Lvovna, her sister Maria Lvovna Sokolavskaya and his 
grandchildren in their care.68
Serge's letter to Trotksy of April 25, 1936, was published 
in part in the Bvulleten' oppozitsii (Paris), No. 50, May 1936. 
Serge's was the first live information from the Gulag, and the 
information was not good. The news was of imprisoned 
oppositionists who were, nonetheless, defiant, combative, and in
64LDT to VS, May 8, 1936. Trotsky then wrote a dispatch to 
AP on the Stalin constitution and the treatment of the 
oppositionists "Political Persecution in the USSR," May 22, 
1936, (found in LDT Writings, 1935-1936). He used Serge's 
material en toto, without mentioning Serge's name, in order to 
protect him politically. The dispatch was sent to thousands of 
American papers. LDT to VS, postscript May 20, 1936 in letter 
of May 19, 1936.
65Especially if Serge published in French publications while 
living in Belgium. LDT to VS, May 8, 1936
66LDT to VS, June 3, 1936.
67LDT to VS, April 24, 1936.
68LDT to VS, April 29, 1936. Eleven of the letters Trotsky 
wrote to Serge are collected in volume Writings of Leon Trotsky: 
Supplement (1934-1940), Pathfinder Press, New York, pp. 657-683. 
Trotsky's grandchildren left in Alexandra's care were Zina's 
daughter, Nina's two children, and Lyova's son (Liulik). See 
Pierre Broue, Trotsky. Paris, Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1988, 
pp. 551, 691, 804.
331
good spirits. But their physical condition was quite critical in 
certain cases,69 and Serge openly campaigned for something to be 
done.
Serge became Trotsky's French translator, working on 
Revolution Betrayed. This work was important for Serge in both 
a political and material sense, and Trotsky trusted Serge's
70translations without checking. Once Trotsky was in Norway, 
the conditions of his house arrest interrupted his 
correspondence. It appears that at this point Lev (Lyova) L. 
Sedov became the most trustworthy conduit of information between 
Trotsky and Serge. Any problem Serge had with Trotsky's 
translations, including suggestions to make the text stronger 
were written to Sedov, who then passed the information to 
Trotsky.71
Serge translated very quickly and was generally pleased 
with Trotsky's "ochen khoroshei i poleznoi knigi. Rad tomy chto 
vo mnogikh mestakh, moi vyuivodui sovershenno sovpali s evo
69For example, Dumbadze was in Sarapul, paralyzed in both 
arms, unable to even dress himself, "with no medical attention, 
trying to exist on 30 rubles per month.
70Trotsky happily wrote Serge, "I cannot dream of a more 
qualified translator than you." LDT to VS, June 3, 1936. Later 
Trotsky told Serge' "Your comments about the translation of my 
book prove that you are extremely conscientious about this task. 
You are such a good stylist that there is no need at all for you 
to check with me on the 'freeness' of your translation; I fully 
endorse your formulations in advance." LDT to VS, August 18, 
1936.
71For example, Serge to Sedov, p. 21 (undated letter, 
partially typed in French with handwritten note on bottom of 
page in Russian), also Serge to Sedov, 13 July 1936 and 31 July 
1936. Serge was paid for the translations, greatly alleviating 
his material condition.
Serge was both translator and editor at times. He wrote to 
Lyova Sedov (no date other than 'mercredi' with text in Russian) 
that he has shortened the text of the Hippodrome speech which 
Serge feels really shouldn't be included in the book as it is 
repetitive. Serge criticizes the structure of the book which is 
simply a collection of speeches and notes, and its repetition, 
saying it will kill the book.
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vuivodami, tak chto, pokamest', b obshchikh chertakh obe knigi 
strelyayut tochno v odno napravlenie! "72 Serge was writing his 
own Destiny of the Revolution at the same time as Trotsky was 
writing his Revolution Betrayed, which Trotsky wrote he was 
"impatiently awaiting" to read. Clearly the two Oppositionists 
were on the same 'wave length' and responded similarly to the 
new world conjunctures it wasn't the first time. There is a 
certain correspondence of the subjects they undertook at various 
conjunctures: Serge's Year One of the Russian Revolution and 
Trotsky' s History of the Russian Revolution; both on Literature 
and Revolution; both wrote biographies of Stalin in 1940, both 
wrote biographies of Lenin, and both wrote their memoirs. The 
comparison could be continued throughout the two bibliographies, 
with Trotsky writing more, but not taking on the novel form, to 
which Serge turned in order to better convey the atmosphere of 
the times.
Trotsky tried to orient Serge politically to Western 
Europe, and specifically to the various groups, grouplets and 
individuals with whom Serge was in contact. Trotsky warned 
Serge about the Paz couple; he said Magdeleine's work to gain 
Serge's release was "the only praiseworthy thing she has done in 
her life," and he found her husband to be "a bourgeois 
conservative, harsh, narrow-minded and profoundly repulsive."73 
He characterized Boris Souvarine as "a journalist not a 
revolutionary," with "a purely analytical intellect" "negative" 
with a character that makes him poisonous in a group but also 
incapable of independent work.74 Trotsky discussed these mutual
72Serge to Sedov, 18 August 1936, postscript. Translation: 
"wonderful and useful book. I'm happy that in many pLaces, my 
conclusions completely coincide with his, while overall both 
books shoot in exactly the same direction."
73LDT to VS, April 29, 1936.
74LDT to Serge, April 29, 1936. Trotsky wrote that
Souvarine's book on Stalin, which he only skimmed, is "from a 
theoretical and political point of view ... worthless."
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friends and comrades in the context of the role of the 
Mensheviks in the USSR, who were now accommodating to the 
Stalinist regime and thus aiding the persecution of "our 
friends. " Trotsky believed that social democrats internationally 
were drawing closer to the Stalinists, and hence the line 
between the social democrats and themselves must be clearly 
drawn. Trotsky wrote that their problem was not how to protect 
those Mensheviks who were suffering from the Stalinist regime, 
but how to "protect our own selves from low blows by Menshevism 
and Stalinism internationally, while conducting a pitiless 
campaign to unmask them. " In that light Trotsky attacked the 
Menshevik 'deviations' of both Ante Ciliga and Boris Souvarine. 
Of all the comrades they knew in common, Trotsky wrote 
approvingly only of Alfred and Marguerite Rosmer, whom despite 
disagreements, "remain in esteem and sympathy."
Trotsky's evaluations were harsh, and Serge defended his 
associations, stressing the importance of getting to as wide an 
audience as possible. Trotsky was obviously quite determined to 
bring Serge firmly within the framework of the International 
Left Opposition, and its conceptions about what kind of work and 
with whom it was to be done in Europe.
Thus the correspondence in the summer of 1936 was warm and 
comradely, while clarifying points of agreement and departure. 
This began over individuals, those with whom Trotsky felt 
collaboration was possible, and those who Trotsky felt would end 
up on the other side of the important battles. Serge on the 
other hand, felt he owed a personal debt to his friends who had 
struggled for his release, and had by no means consigned to the 
dustbin of reform or reaction those comrades who were 
revolutionary syndicalists or supporters of the POUM^(e.g. the 
comrades in the journal La Revolution Proletarienne.I75 Serge
75According to Trotsky's biographer, Pierre Broue, Trotsky 
was indignant that Serge had written in La Revolution 
Proletarienne. because its editors believed that Stalinism was
(continued...)
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stressed to Trotsky in his letter of May 23, 1936 that he was
NOT a syndicalist, but that revolutionary syndicalists could be
considered allies and that an "amicable and non-sectarian
debate" should be carried out with them. Trotsky did write in
response that he was glad of Serge's efforts to influence these
comrades, but did not change his essential appreciation of them.
Already dismayed by the atmosphere in which internal
squabbling impeded the effectiveness of political work, Serge
wrote to his friend Marcel Martinet, on May 15, 1936, about his
distaste for the divisions in the French left and how he hoped
his work could bring them together again "by a sort of
disarmament of antipathies." Serge was pained by what he
considered petty divisions and his own position within this
left, all the more since he felt he owed all of them something
for their work to release him. Serge worried that
"I'll end up full of resentment or sectarian hostility 
or all ready for an action that's flashy but 
defendable after all ... I'm in reality a curious 
mixture of moderation and austerity, it's not my fault 
if austerity tends to prevail right now. In short I 
refuse all action that's loud or sectarian.*."76
Serge's correspondence with Trotsky revealed that Trotsky 
wanted very much to have Serge as a close political ally. 
Still, Trotsky harbored some suspicions about Serge's release, 
as did other Soviet exiles. While writing to Serge with 
incredible warmth and camaraderie, he wrote at the same time to 
Lola Estrine, aka Paulsen, aka Lilia Dallin, and warned her that 
if Stalin had released Serge, then he must have thought he could
75(. . .continued)
the continuation of Bolshevism. Trotsky would have -preferred 
Serge's collaboration with the bourgeois press to RP. The 
editors of RP in this period were Monatte and Louzon, not the 
same figures who had struggled for Serge's release. Interview 
with Pierre Broue, May 22, 1987, Mexico City.
76VS to Marcel Martinet, 15 May 1936, in Victor Serge & Leon 
Trotsky: La lutte contre le Stalinisme. textes 1936-1939 
presente par Michel Dreyfus, Maspero, Paris, 1977, pp. 157-159.
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use him. Poretsky also wrote this in her memoir, Our Own 
People.77 Trotsky did not believe that Serge's release was due
78to the pressure exerted at the International Writers Congress, 
but that Stalin felt he could use Serge, or perhaps worse, 
Trotsky feared a deal had been made. Trotsky warned 
Estrine/Dallin to watch Serge very closely: watch his body 
language, his style, any suggestion that he was acting as an
. 7 9agent.
As it turned out, Serge was incorruptible, a tireless and 
honest campaigner to reveal the truth about the Stalinist 
counterrevolution. Perhaps more than anyone else in Europe, 
Serge's chief occupation became to campaign for his comrades 
left behind, and to expose the lies of the trials. Sedov was 
also entirely preoccupied in this effort, but because of the 
split in the French section and the internal squabbling between 
Trotsky and the two groups in France and the Belgians, much time 
was devoted to internal matters, leaving less for the necessary 
public campaign, which Serge picked up. In fact in Serge's 
letter to Trotsky of May 27, 1936, Serge laid out the broad 
outlines of what he thought would be effective political
77Poretsky doubted that the campaign or even Gorky's 
intervention was responsible for Serge's release, and raised the 
possibility that the Soviets may have instigated the campaign 
themselves. She remembered sitting with her husband and 
Krivitsky at the Cafe des Deux Magots when they read of Serge's 
release. She at first took it to mean a turn for the better in 
the Soviet Union, but both Ludwik and Krivitsky told her that 
"no one leaves the Soviet Union unless the NKVD can use him" and 
Ludwik thought Serge's contacts with opposition groups would be 
invaluable to Moscow. Poretsky, Our Own People, p. 245.
78See Orenburg chapter infra, pp. 36-40.
79Leon D. Trotsky to Lilia Estrine-Dallin, May 1936, Boris 
Nikolaevsky Collection, Hoover Archives. I was not able to 
locate this letter [my access to the collection is through the 
archivists] but its content was summarized for me by Pierre 
Broue, who had first access with Jean Van Heijenoort to the 
Nikolaevsky collection at Stanford's Hoover Archive. Access is 
still restricted, until the collection is properly indexed.
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campaigning in Europe on behalf of those languishing in the
gulag and equally important, "to raise in a particular manner
the issue of proletarian democracy —  in the shape of freedom
for Socialist opinion in the Soviet Union." Serge added that "to
be a success, our campaigning must avoid being sectarian" and in
this vein Serge disagreed with Trotsky on the Mensheviks today -
- whereas in the Civil War they were counter-revolutionaries,
today seventeen years later
"there is no other question of public emergency except 
that of making up our minds whether we, in the midst 
of persecution and imprisonment, are going to deny to 
our cell-mates the rights of speech and thought which 
the bureaucracy is denying to all of us. Any such 
attitude of denial would be indefensible, and amount 
to our political suicide. Alternatively, while 
recanting none of the traditions of October, we can 
and must engage in a practical re-discovery of what 
workers' democracy means, proving that we fear neither 
debate nor rivalry and that we are not in anyway the 
kind of people who build an enormous prison for anyone 
who disagrees with us. — - I'm writing all this to you 
because I've been told that you oppose collaboration 
with all parties and groupings in this particular 
matter. " 80
It appeared that Trotsky attacked politically all those who 
did not join him in the project to found the FI. In fact, 
Trotsky became indignant when Serge wrote for La Revolution 
Proletarienne. which Trotsky considered an act hostile to the 
Fourth International. Trotsky had hoped Serge would play a 
leading role in the young International, as an older comrade 
with Russian experience. Serge's contributions to non-FI 
journals seemed to Trotsky a confirmation of hostility.81 Serge
80VS to LDT, Brussels, May 27, 1936, 8 pp.
81 Trotsky saw a letter Serge had written to the editors of 
La Revolution proletarienne in the May 16, 1936 issue of 
L 'Action socialiste-revolutionnaire. In his letter to Serge of 
May 19, 1936 he admitted it bothered him that Serge wrote
exclusively to a syndicalist group and added: "if you feel you 
are politically closer to syndicalism than Marxism, then it 
remains only for me to take note of this profound difference 
between us."
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was not at all hostile to Trotsky, but principally concerned
with publishing wherever he could, in order to raise the issue
of the imprisoned revolutionary generation in the Soviet Union.
Trotsky told Serge that he [Serge] did not yet have a feel
of "the real mechanics of the struggle as it has been carried
out these last few years." He warned that the crowd around La
Revolution proletarienne and the Pazes have "acted like
liberals," whereas rour' own comrades have done real work.
Trotsky cited the work of their comrades during Bukharin's
famous visit to Paris in 1936:
"the bolshevik-leninists burst into his conference and 
launched an appeal on behalf of the political prisoners of 
the USSR. Of course they were thrown out of the hall. It 
is only because of this kind of revolutionary action that 
the liberals could score a certain victory: 'reforms' (such 
as your release) are always a by-product of revolutionary 
struggle."82
What is rather strange about this demonstration of 
'revolutionary struggle' on the part of the Trotskyist 
'Bolshevik-Leninists' which Trotsky implied was more effective 
than the struggle around Serge's release, is that it is no 
different than the struggle Magdeleine Paz and the Revolution 
proletarienne group waged to secure Serge's freedom. They
interrupted the International Congress of Writers, intervened 
constantly in meetings of intellectual fellow travellers, until 
Stalin became aware that the Serge affair was making life 
uncomfortable for his erstwhile supporters in Europe. Does the 
act of 'bursting' into the conference make the action more 
revolutionary than already being in the conference and
constantly interrupting on the question of Serge? It appears 
that what made the action in question revolutionary, was that it 
was carried out by the 'Bolshevik-Leninists.' Despite the self- 
congratulatory tone of Trotsky on behalf of his French co­
thinkers, the 'revolutionary-ness' of the action is not
convincing.
82LDT to VS, May 19, 1936.
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Trotsky continued in the same vein on the Rev-prol group; 
he wrote that they were on excellent terms with the reformist 
faction of the trade union bureaucracy, which in turn was allied 
to the Stalinists. He called them "a conservative sect, not at 
all combative, and lacking any political significance....The 
revolutionary spirit left them a long time ago."83 .While there 
was most likely some truth to what Trotsky was saying, he 
arrogantly implied that everyone else's work was worthless 
compared to the political intervention of his own comrades, 
whose work was doing more for the liberation of prisoners.
Serge's appreciation of the work of the French comrades in 
the FI was less sanguine. He was often frustrated that their 
squabbles kept them from doing the vital public work that must 
be done. In a letter to Lev Lyovich Sedov on 5 August 1936 he 
complained:
Neumenie rabotat' nashikh Tov. Frants, chrezvuichaino 
menya ogorchaet i sklonyaet k dovol'no pessimist. 
Otsenke ikh perspektiv. tak ne nastroit' organizatsii, 
tak nel'zya zavoevat' avtoritetui, skolotit' kadrui, 
viliyat' na zhizn'. Takaya slabaya i bezdarnaya 
kratkovidina vryad-li kuda vuidet. Pishu eto posle 
chtenia gazetui i biulletenui (na Fr.) Net dazhe 
nikakoi okhotui obrashchat'sya k Tov. c kritikoi, do 
togo ona kazhetsya bezpoleznoi, kogda vremeni tak malo 
dlya poleznoi rabotui.
Napishu eshchyo ob etom [ ? ] —  i bol' she ne budu 
vozvr[ashchat']sya ko vsemu etomu; —  otstranius' v 
liter, rabotu. Takaya adskaya gruiznya i takaya 
bezpomoshchnaya agitatsiya! —  Moloduie tov. i 
simpatichnui i tsennui, no v etoi atmosfere iz nikh 
nichego ne vuiidet. Prostiteza za vse eti
predlozheniya, Vui blizhe i vsyo eto uzhe znaete.84
83Ibid.
84 ^VS to LLS, 5 Avg. 1936, Nikolaevsky Papers, Hoover 
Institute, Stanford. Translation: "our French comrades'
inability to work distresses me extremely and inclines me toward 
a rather pessimistic estimation of their perspectives. That's 
no way to build an organization, it'll never win over the 
authorities, assemble a cadre, or achieve lasting influence. 
Such feeble and bungling shortsightedness will hardly get you
(continued...)
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There is an interruption in the correspondence after 
September 1936, due to Trotsky/s conditions of house arrest in 
Norway, and the letters continue sporadically through 1939. We 
will take up the subsequent letters below in terms of the areas 
of contention between Serge and Trotsky. The correspondence 
reveals what Adolfo Gilly described as Trotsky's Universalism85; 
Trotsky was very warm and generous with potential cothinkers, 
but with his political collaborators he was sharp, to the point, 
and did not mince words. The pattern of warmth but political 
sharpness is evident in Trotsky's correspondence with Andreu 
Nin, Boris Souvarine and Victor Serge.
5.5 Unraveling the Labyrinth (of Madness) : Victor Serge and the 
Purges
Two events hit like thunderbolts the summer of Serge's 
expulsion to the West. European skies were darkening with 
impending fascism and war, when suddenly revolution erupted in 
Spain with the July days in Barcelona. Scarcely a month later, 
the boom dropped in Moscow, with the first of the Moscow Show 
Trials. Vlady remembers Serge's comments at the breakfast table
84(.. .continued)
anywhere. I write this after reading the newspapers and
bulletins (in French). There's not even the least desire to 
address the comrades with criticism, until it appears useless, 
with so little time left for useful work.
I [won't] write more about it —  and I won't return to all 
that again; —  I'll distance myself in literary work. Such 
infernal squabbling and unhelpful agitation! —  The younger 
comrades are both sympathetic and valuable, but in that 
atmosphere nothing will come of them. Forgive me for these 
pronouncements; you're closer to it and already know all this."
85Adolfo Gilly, "El Jefe de la IV Internacionals Apuntes y 
Reflexiones," conference paper in panel titled "Tres Analisis 
Marxistas del Socialismo de Cardenas," 22 May 1987, UNAM, Mexico 
City. [Conference titled "Trotsky' revelador Politico del Mexico 
Cardenista (1937-1987)]. The same point about Trotsky's 
treatment of his daily political collaborators compared to 
potential comrades, workers, etc, was made to me by Pierre Broue 
in conversation at the aforementioned conference.
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that August mornings Serge was reading the morning paper and
86gasped, "we have been saved!" The realization that he had got 
out in the nick of time impressed him greatly, and made him feel 
his duty to his still imprisoned comrades more acutely. Serge 
swung into high gear and began to write incessantly. His output 
on the purges alone is staggering: dozens of journalistic
articles published in the Belgian daily La Wallonie, far left 
journals in France and the United States, the books Sixteen Who 
Were Shot (Sept 1936), From Lenin to Stalin (Dec. 1936), 29 Shot 
and the End of Yaaoda (April 1937), For the Truth About the 
Moscow Trials! 18 Questions —  18 Answers (Paris brochure,
1937). He also wrote books on Soviet political developments and 
the workings of the GPU, biographies, memoirs and novels 
reporting, analyzing and describing the establishment of the 
Stalinist system and its significance, such as Destiny of a 
Revolution. (July 1937), The Assassination of Icmace Reiss, 
(April 1938), Portrait of Stalin, (February 1940), Pages of a 
Journal 1936-1938, 1944-1947, his Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 
and his two novels of the purges, Midnight in the Century (1936-
1938), and The Case of Comrade Tulavev (1940-42).
While undertaking this monumental task of untangling the 
lies spewing forth from Moscow, Serge's domestic problems were 
acutes his wife was in constant nervous peril, they had no money 
and no work, and Liuba could barely keep things together. Serge 
was faced with earning their daily bread, maintaining the home, 
taking care of baby Jeanine and sickly Liuba (along with Vlady), 
and writing, and campaigning for his comrades left behind, now 
certain to die.
Despite the tremendous obstacles, Serge's voice was not 
silenced. In Mexico, Trotsky defended himself against the most
86Interview with Vlady, June 1989, conducted by John Eden 
and Les Smith.
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colossal calumnies,87 while in Europe, Serge became the chief 
lawyer for the falsely accused.88 Their audience was limited, 
their reach —  the world community. The task of defending the 
truth fell to these lone voices. At a time when all of Europe 
was in danger of being crushed, Stalin blamed all social ills on 
Trotsky, his son Lev Sedov, and fellow Oppositionists. Those 
who upheld the ideals of October were now held responsible for 
everything gone wrong! Serge noted wryly, in a letter to Dwight 
Macdonald of 16.1.40, that the Soviet press "has never published
89a line against the Nazi-fascists and anti-semitism.'
Serge's committee in Paris and Trotsky's Dewey Commission 
in Mexico managed, with precious few resources at hand, to 
publish irrefutable analyses of the three lying show trials that
87See The Case of Leon Trotsky, (Verbatim Transcript of 
Trotsky's Testimony before the Dewey Commission, Coyoacan, 
Mexico, April 10-17, 1937, Merit Publishers, New York, 1937. 
Trotsky proposed Serge as a witness, to testify in Paris, p. 43.
88Serge wrote to Lyova Sedov in a letter of 4 September 
1936, that they must set up everywhere (Paris, Amsterdam, 
Brussels) a "commission for a permanent fight against 
repressions (save our own!) with the anarchists, Revolution 
proletarienne. left socialists (Pivert), various others and 
ours." Serge also called on Sedov to help immediately establish 
a parallel non-partisan commission for the investigation of the 
Moscow Trials, recommending prominent intellectuals for the 
French Commission. (VS to LLS, Sept 4, 1936, BNC at Hoover) . 
This became the Paris Committee for Inquiry into the Moscow 
Trials and Defence of Free Opinion in the Revolution, with the 
participation of French intellectuals such as Andre Breton, 
Felicien Challaye, Marcel Martinet, Magdeleine Paz, Andre 
Philip, Henry Poulaille, Jean Galtier-Bossiere, Pierre Monatte, 
Alfred Rosmer, Georges Pioch, Maurice Wullens. Serge recommended 
that other French intellectuals participate, such as Malraux, 
Gide, etc., but they would not. The long title of the-eommittee 
was insisted upon by Serge so that they would also have the task 
of "defending, within the Spanish Revolution, those whom Soviet 
totalitarianism would attempt to liquidate in Madrid and 
Barcelona by the same methods of lying and murder." Memoirs p. 
331.
89 •Victor Serge to Dwight MacDonald, Jan. 16, 1940, MacDonald 
Papers, Yale University Collection.
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passed for truth in Moscow and the world. Twenty years before 
Khrushchev's Secret Speech about Stalin's crimes, Victor Serge 
was trying to alert the world to what was happening in Stalin' s 
Russia. His words fell largely on deaf ears in a Europe where 
the reality of fascism and the impending war —  whose first 
battles were being fought in Spain —  blinded many.communists' 
eyes to what was happening in the Soviet Union. 50 years later, 
Gorbachev's Commission of Inquiry has had to admit that the 
trials were rigged, the charges fabricated and the accused 
innocent. But in 1936, Victor Serge refuted the lies and 
foretold the end of the revolutionary generation, though he felt 
his foresight 'was absolutely worthless.'90 Julian Gorkin wrote 
that this was probably the most bitter period of Serge's life, 
when "en libertad, sentia la tragica agonia de sus companeros, 
de sus hermanos. Y sentia como la revolucion, que constituyo un 
gran esperanza, se devoraba a si misma."91
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
"To choose the victim, to prepare the blow 
with care, to sate an implacable vengeance, 
and then to go to bed ... There is. nothing 
sweeter in the world1"
Gorkin wrote that Stalin probably regretted letting Serge 
go just four months before his Moscow Show Trials.93 A
90Memoirs, p. 333.
91 Julian Gorkin, "Adios A Victor Serge," in Mundo # 15, 
Enero-febrero 1948, Santiago de Chile, p. 6. Translations "At 
liberty [Serge] felt the tragic agony of his comrades and his 
brothers. And he felt that the revolution, which had constituted 
a great hope, was devouring itself."
92Stalin, to Dzerzhinski and Kamenev, one summer night, 
1923. Cited by Serge in Portrait de Staline. Paris, Grasset, p. 
177, but Serge noted in a footnote that Souvarine also cited it 
on p. 446 of his own biography of Stalin, and that Trotsky also 




threatening voice thus slipped from his grip, and would now 
require efforts abroad to be silenced.
Serge's voice was limited to a restricted public, but it 
was not silenced. His task was not simply to refute the lies, 
but to understand the need for the lies, which meant to 
understand the role of terror in the creation of Stalin's system 
of rule. Serge did this unevenly as the following discussion 
demonstrates. Writing at the time, Serge could not have 
precisely discerned the social, economic and political system 
still in the process of formation. To his credit, Serge
realized that the purges could not be understood in isolation, 
and that new social relations were being created.
Serge wrote in the pamphlet Sixteen Who were Shot that the 
first trial marked the beginning of the extermination of the old 
revolutionary generation. In La Revolution proletarienne Serge 
wrote that the massacre was due to the need to wipe out all 
reserve teams of government on the eve of a war now considered
• 94imminent. By 1937 the threat of a 'reserve' team was not 
really credible, since most of the Old Guard were already in 
prison, exile, or dead, and many had capitulated. Furthermore, 
the newer Bukharinist challenges to Stalin of Riutin (1932) and 
Kirov (1934) had also been largely eliminated. However it was 
still important for Stalin to eliminate the resonance of the 
ideas of the Old Guard and this partially explains the fantastic 
fabrications and outrageous charges. This was difficult to see 
at the time, and one cannot blame Serge, writing in 1937, for 
not yet forming a precise picture of what was unfolding in the 
Soviet Union. Serge was more on track when he wrote that Stalin 
needed to eliminate all witnesses to his betrayal of the 
revolution —  the critical thinking old Bolsheviks who even in 
prison would be silently critical.
94La Revolution Proletarienne, March 1937.
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Serge was convinced that the purges were not planned far in 
advance,95 and his own release was living proofs Serge had left 
the USSR in mid-April (1936) when the accused were already in 
prison; he had worked closely with Zinoviev and Trotsky, was a 
close acquaintance of many of those who later disappeared and 
were shot, had been one of the leaders of the Left Opposition in 
Leningrad and one of its spokesmen abroad, and had never 
capitulated. With his skill and renown as a writer coupled with 
his capacity as a witness with irrefutable facts, Serge would 
simply be too dangerous abroad, unless at this late date of 
April 1936, the trials had not been prepared. Serge attributed 
the fact that he was never accused during the trials as proof 
that lies were only spread about those who had no means to 
defend themselves, except in the case of Trotsky, whose stature 
and astuteness made him an enemy Stalin had to eliminate.96
Serge was among a handful of writers at the time who tried 
to make sense of the madness emanating from Moscow. His 
analyses and perceptions of the wave of terror which accompanied 
the establishment of the Stalinist system, were written in the 
heat of the moment, in multiple form and were meant to be 
motivational as well as informative, to move people into action 
to protect the revolution and the revolutionists from Stalin's 
terror machine. Serge's account, however, is not simply one of 
an outside observer, but one who experienced Stalin's terror 
first hand.
Making sense of the terror several years later, Serge was 
compelled to also make sense of the man behind it, recognizing
95Which is not to say that the great purge trials were not 
premeditated, in the sense of being prepared and rehearsed.
96Memoirs, pp. 330-331. Although Serge described the 
unplanned nature of the purges in the Memoirs, in his pamphlet 
Seize Fusilees, Serge discussed the premeditated nature of the 
show trials, that their outcome was decided in advance, prepared 
and rehearsed. Seize Fusilles; Qu va la Revolution Russe?, 
Paris, Spartacus Cahiers Mensuels, Serie Nouvelle, No. 1, pp. 4- 
5.
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that "in a tyranny, too many things depend on the tyrant.97" He 
wrote a biography of Stalin in 1940, and then one of the finest 
existing fictional accounts of the terror machine, The Case of 
Comrade Tulavev. in which even Stalin appears as a thoroughly 
human character, albeit commiting monstrous acts. The point 
Serge stressed in all his characterizations of Stalin, both 
fictional and all too real, was that the man (in power), was 
formed by the policies he practiced, reacting and conforming, as 
it were, to the mandates and logic of the situation: the man 
became the tool of the rising bureaucracy "going from one 
expedient to another, receiving failures as a boxer receives 
blows: without blinking, but humiliated in his heart of hearts,
• 98returning with fury against his instruments...." Serge saw 
Stalin dialectically: agreeing with Trotsky and the Left
Opposition that Stalin became the instrument of the bureaucracy, 
Serge added "Stalinism incarnates the bureaucracy, is beginning 
to suffocate it; ... it is defined by fear ... by a frenetic 
determination to endure...."99 Stalin and his group
destroyed the old intelligentsia, wiped out the revolutionary 
generation, and subjected the new elite to terror. In the 
process Stalin became the encapsulation of the elite and then 
reformed it to become the ruling layer. Serge was correct to 
see that Stalin had to destroy all the witnesses, above all the 
revolutionary generation who were trained to be critical, 
because Stalin could not even bear silent witnesses who 
understood his betrayal. Serge also understood that the process
97Victor Serge, Unpublished manuscript, "Le dernier livre de 
Trotsky: Staline," 1946, Serge Archive, Mexico City.
98Serge, Portrait of Staline, p. 175 (and Spanish Retrato de 
Stalin, p. 153): "II va d'expedient en expedient, encaissant les 
echecs comme un boxeur encaisse un swing, sans ciller, mais 
humilie en son for interieur, et se retournant avec haine contre 
ses instruments,...."
"Serge, RTYA, pp. 297-298.
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which he saw as a betrayal was unconscious100, proceeding step 
by step.
While Serge was trying to comprehend the transmutation of 
the revolution, others, especially in the West, were stymied by 
the spectacle of Old Bolshevik revolutionaries confessing to 
unimaginable crimes. Everyone Serge met in Paris asked him to 
explain the 'mystery of the confessions.' He himself wondered 
about the mystery of their disbelief!101 Yet Serge realized 
that these people were unable to understand how human conscience 
was twisted by Stalin's methods of rule. His own experience 
helped him fathom how the great Trials were fabricated, how the 
confessions were dictated and manufactured, and how the accused 
were 'ripened' through ten years of persecution, demoralization, 
solitary and torture (including drugs and hypnosis) to sign the 
baseless documents.
5.6 The Confessions: Why?
Much has been written about the enigma of the confessions, 
the seemingly inexplicable sight of a Rakovsky, a Bukharin, a 
Zinoviev confessing to preposterous misdeeds. To Serge there was 
not one answer or one reason, but many reasons, representing a 
complex of exhausted revolutionaries succumbing to twisted 
logic, perverted ideals, misdirected loyalty, fear, and torture. 
To express these points of view Serge used various forms: 
essays, articles, polemics and books; and multiple voices, in 
his fiction and poetry.102 In his poem "Confessions," Serge
In an article Serge wrote in Mexico, published in Rumbo, 
titled "Balance de la Reaccion Staliniana," Octubre y Noviembre 
de 1941, pp. 9 & 30.
101Memgirs, p. 333.
102This is quite unlike Koestler's approach in Darkness at 
Noon, where the thought processes leading to confession are seen 
through the mental gymnastics of Rubashov, the single character 
who discovers the single truth that indeed the Party cannot make
(continued...)
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portrays the misery of men who gave everything to the Party that 
demanded everything from them, not only their lives, but their 
integrity and human dignity:
We have never been what we are,
the faces of our lives are not our own,
the voices that you hear, the voices that have spoken so loudly 
above the storm 
are not our own, 
nothing you have seen is true, 
nothing we have done is true, 
we are entirely different.
We have never thought our thoughts, 
believed our faith, 
willed our will,
today our only truth is despair, 
this confession of a mad degeneration, 
this fall into blackness
where faith is renounced and recovered one last time.
We have neither faces nor names, neither strength nor past 
— for everything is over and done with 
We should never have existed 
— for everything is devastated
And it is we who are the guilty, we the unforgivable, 
we the most miserable, we the most ruined, 
it is we ... know that 
— and be saved!
Believe our confessions, join in our vow 
of complete obedience: scorn our disavowals.
Once put down, the old revolt is nothing but obedience.
102(.. .continued)
mistakes, and thus he must comply by confessing, since that is 
what the Party requires. Koestler's view is monolithic, falling 
entirely in line with stance adopted by the cold warriors that 
puts an equation between Marxism=Leninism=Bolshevism=Stalinism. 
In this view, lacking nuance and subtlety, Communism^-is anti­
human, it is the Party versus the people, there is no thinking, 
only obedience, revolutionaries are incapable of compassion, 
etc. It is easy to see why Koestler, once he rejected the Soviet 
Union, became one of the "god that failed" anti-communists. His 
book is a pure statement of Stalinist thinking. Koestler comes 
across as quite limited when contrasted to the richness of the 
voices in Serge's Tulayev.
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May those who are less devoted be proud, 
may those who have forgiven themselves be proud, 
may those who are more devoted be proud, 
may those who have not given up be proud.
If we roused the peoples and made the continents quake, 
shot the powerful, destroyed the old armies, the old cities, the 
old ideas,
began to make everything anew with these dirty old stones, 
these tired hands, and the meager souls that were left us, 
it was not in order to haggle with you now, 
sad revolution, our mother, our child, our flesh, 
our decapitated dawn, our night with its stars askew, 
with its inexplicable Milky Way torn to pieces.
If you betray yourself, what can we do but betray ourselves with 
you?
After lives such as these, what possible death could there be, 
if not, in this betrayal, to die for you?
What more could we have done than kneel before you 
in this shame and agony,
if in serving you we have called down upon you such darkness?
If others find in your heart stabbed a thousand times 
the means to live on and to resist you in order to save you in 
twenty years, 
a hundred years,
blessed are they by we who have never believed in benedictions,
blessed are they in our secret hearts 
by we who can do nothing more.
We no longer belong to the future, we belong entirely to this 
age:
it is bloody and vile in its love for mankind, 
we are bloody and vile like the men of this time.
Trample on us, insult us, spit on us, 
vomit us, 
massacre us,
our love is greater than this humiliation, 
this suffering, 
this massacre,
your iniquitous mouths are just, your mouths are our mouths, 
we are in you,
your bullets are ours, and our mortal agony, our death, our 
infamy are yours, 
and your vast life on these fields worked for centuries is 
forever ours!
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Paris, October 12, 1938103
The purge trials were based on confessions obtained under 
mental and physical duress. Serge was on intimate terms with 
many of the accused in the dock; he was able to bring both flesh 
and nuance to their published confessions, by knowing how these 
people responded in normal circumstances, how they felt about 
the Party and the general political situation. Because of 
Serge's intimate knowledge and descriptive skills, he was able 
to refute the confessions and explain how and why the accused 
agreed to participate in slandering themselves. Serge insisted 
that the mystery of the confession was only an enigma in the 
West; for anyone who knew the psychology of the Old Bolshevik
• 104party, it was no mystery.
The confessions to heinous yet preposterous crimes, to 
complicity with the Gestapo, to individual terror, and to 
Kirov's murder (many had been imprisoned two years before the 
murder), were no different in essence from the capitulations to 
which many oppositionists had been subjected in the decade 
between 27 and 37: both capitulation and confession were made in 
the name of the Party. The confessions, said Serge, were made
out of utter devotion. Serge quoted Smilga, an oppositionist
capitulator, who said "We must retreat, surrender for the 
present, and when the masses awaken, we shall put ourselves at 
their head...." and Zinoviev, who often said, "we must remain 
within the Party, even flat on our belly in the mud, in order to
103This is the third section, called 'Confessions' of Serge's 
long poem, "The History of Russia," collected in Resistance, pp. 
18-24.
104Serge explained the enigma of the confession in various 
writings: From Lenin to Stalin p. 86, Portrait de Staline
(Chapter XXI), "Le troisieme proces de Moscou," in La Revolution 
Proletarienne. March 10, 1938, Seize fusilees. p. 19, 31-34, 
Life and Death of Leon Trotsky (with Natalia Sedova), pp. 233- 
239, and Memoirs, pp. 333-334.
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be there on the day of the great awakening of the working 
masses."
They were done in by their party patriotism. They fell 
into the trap of believing there was no life outside the Party, 
and that by acting outside the Party they would play into the 
hands of counter-revolution. They did not see the counter­
revolution within their beloved Party. Their error, which Serge 
did not commit, was that their attachment to the past prevented 
them from seeing that the Party was dead and that "no longer 
with it, but in spite it and against it —  the toiling masses
105will one day awaken and renew the fight for socialism." 
Serge, a newcomer to the Party in 1919 with an anarchist past, 
held no institution so sacred in such a timeless fashion. The 
lies depended on the defendants' consent, out of attachment for 
the Party, to sacrifice their consciences and their dignity. 
Besides, as Krivitsky pointed out in his discussion,105 the 
interrogators used the magic words 'socialist,' 'proletarian,' 
and 'revolutionary,' words that evoked concepts that offered a 
glimmer of hope in a dark world, concepts to which these men had 
devoted their lives. In some twisted way these men were led to 
believe that their confessions would help the concepts behind 
the words come to fruition, even out of Stalin's bloody tyranny. 
But not everyone consented, and Serge pointed out that the 
trials selected from a larger number of accused only those who 
were compliant, who would sacrifice themselves at the Party's 
instructions. Serge held no rancor for those who dishonored 
themselves, as they were Stalin's victims107, and his poetic ode
105From Lenin to Stalin, p. 86.
105Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service. New York and 
London, Harper Brothers, 1939, p. 190.
107In an article published in La Wallonie. "Complots en 
URSS," March 20, 1938, Serge spoke of the great attachment to 
'socialism in march' by men who would 'step over their own 
corpses' in order to serve their party, which still represented 
to them, though in a distorted way, the vision of socialism.
351
to them in "Confessions" is characterized by a generous attitude 
of disapproving understanding. But he remembered those who never 
gave in, sketching them in his books and articles, so that their 
memory would be preserved.
5.7 The Revolution In Reaction
Serge's analysis of the significance of Stalin's blood 
purges, written at the time and without the benefit of hindsight 
connects Stalin's terror to his chaotic industrial and agrarian 
policy. He wrote his most complete analysis of Stalin's rule in 
1936-1937 in the book Destiny of a Revolution, published as 
Russia. Twenty Years After in the United States. The books, 
pamphlets and articles which he poured out in the period up to 
1940 extend his basic analysis, but do not contradict his 
earlier work, except on the question of planning, where Serge 
vacillates. Russia Twenty Year After, written in his most 
Trotskyist period, redeems the plan as the one element proving 
the superiority of the system to capitalism. Later, after 
Trotsky's death, Serge continued to grapple with the difficult 
theoretical problems thrown up by the continuing evolution of 
Soviet society. Writing as a solitary Left Oppositionist 
correcting the record and upholding the principles of the 
revolution, Serge was often better able to evoke the atmosphere 
of Soviet society, than to systematically and consistently 
define it theoretically.
Serge's ideas can be summarized: the purges, while
unplanned and proceeding from an internal dynamic set in motion 
by Stalin's methods of industrialization and rule, created new 
social relations and a new, unstable society based on coercion 
and terror. None of the basic problems of the society were 
resolved at the end of the blood purges, but millions paid with 
their lives. A needlessly costly and wasteful industrial 
infrastructure was constructed, with the help of a massive slave 
labor sector in the camps. All forms of collective resistance 
were broken and any residual resistance was atomized, as the
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weary population concerned itself with survival, not politics.
What Serge called the ten dark years, from 1927 to 1937, 
represented the struggle of the revolutionary generation against 
totalitarianism; the struggle was uneven and the regime was able
to use them one against the other, all the more .efficiently
108since "it had a hold on their souls" through party 
patriotism. Despite this, the "resistance of the revolutionary 
generation headed by the old socialist Bolsheviks was so 
tenacious that in 1936-1939 it was necessary for the entire 
generation to be eliminated, in order that the new regime could 
consolidate itself."109
Serge viewed Stalin's accession to power as a counter­
revolution, that is a betrayal of everything the revolution 
stood for, and one of the bloodiest in history, at that. In 
order to maintain power, Stalin had to change the regime, 
eliminating entirely the revolutionary generation of Bolshevik 
militants. The old Bolsheviks of the revolutionary generation, 
after all, were not managers of production, but critics and 
revolutionaries. The new conditions required organizers and 
controllers, men who could repress but not think independently. 
As Serge's character Rublev wrote in his final thoughts before 
being shot:
"We were an exceptional human accomplishment, and that 
is why we are going under. A half century unique in 
history was required to form our generation. Just as 
a great creative mind is a unique biological and 
social accomplishment, caused by innumerable 
interferences, the formation of our few thousand minds 
is to be explained by interferences that were 
unique.... We grew up amid struggle, escaping two 
profound captivities, that of the old 'Holy Russia,' 
and that of the bourgeois West,.. .we perpetually 
questioned ourselves about the meaning of life and we
1.08Serge, "Trente Ans Apres La Revolution Russe" La 
Revolution Proletarienne, Nov. 1947, p. 28.
109Ibid. . p. 29.
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worked to transform the world.... We acquired a degree 
of lucidity and disinterestedness which made both the 
old and the new interests uneasy. It was impossible 
for us to adapt ourselves to a phase of reaction [my 
emphasis]; and as we were in power, surrounded by a 
legend that was true, born of our deeds, we were so 
dangerous that we had to be destroyed beyond physical 
destruction, our corpses had to be surrounded by 
legend of treachery... "110
Stalin broke resistance through artificial famine, super­
exploitation of the work force through crash industrialization, 
the employment of what Serge estimated as 15 -20 million slaves 
in labor camps, and political persecution for any form of 
protest, real or imagined. The new society, dubbed a 
'concentration camp universe' by Serge had the following social 
structure: a 'sub-proletariat in rags' of about 15% of the
adult population in the camps, and a new privileged elite 
representing about 7-8% of the adult population.111 Serge 
repeated these new facts throughout his works, as traits 
pointing to the anti-socialist nature of the new society.
The process was unconscious, but followed a logic. Serge 
often described the bureaucracy's inability to dominate the 
forces it evoked against itself, noting the absence of control 
which resulted in abuses going too far. Serge attributed this 
partially to Stalin's lack of real contact with the situation 
and because of this, his inclination to panic.112
Serge explained in From Lenin to Stalin, that the 
consequences of a policy cannot be evaded: Stalin found himself 
in a blind alley with the peasants because he rejected the 
suggestions for early and gradual industrialization. When the 
peasant refused to sell his grain under disadvantageous 
conditions, Stalin resorted to taking it from him by force.
110Victor Serge, The Case of Comrade Tulavev. London, Penguin
Books, 1968, pp. 360-361.
lxlSerge, Carnets. entry for Nov. 15, 1946.
112RTYA, Part III, chapter 7.
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This led to peasant resistance which led to forced 
collectivization, expropriation and deportation of millions of 
peasant families. Collectivization changed the plan for 
industrialization to the detriment of the latter. Hungry 
workers labored inefficiently and left work in search of food; 
thus draconian laws were passed to force them to work, internal 
passports issued to prevent free movement, etc, etc. The fifth 
year of the plan found the country ravaged by famine. The point 
of Serge's analysis was to show, step by step, how policy was 
reactive to events, unplanned, and improvised, but produced a 
system resting on coercion and force.
Serge's works begin and end with the life and conditions of 
the masses of people affected by Stalin's policies. He 
described how the methods employed in industrialization in the 
context of hunger, scarcity and speedup caused the workers to 
resist in ways that were to become characteristic of the Soviet 
work process. In the early 30s workers simply walked off the 
job in search of food and better conditions; at work they 
produced poorly due to the frantic pace, their weakened physical 
state and political alienation. Repression was the ultimate work 
incentive. The conditions Serge portrayed in the first five year 
plan became permanent features of Soviet economic life; workers 
responded to the cruel conditions by becoming hostile and
113resisting in an atomized and individualized manner. Serge 
described the new working class in formation and the new elite 
who gained political control over the population through force, 
but not over economic events, hard though it tried. Throughout 
his examples Serge returned to the self interest of the 
bureaucracy as the only logic of the system, taking precedence
113Serge discussed this in Soviets 29. Russia Twenty Years 
After, and in essays from the Mexico archive.
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over the needs of agriculture, industry and the needs of the 
population.114
While examining the effects of Stalin's policies on town, 
country and factory, Serge evoked the conditions of life for the 
masses, contrasting it to the privileges enjoyed by the 
'parvenus.' Economic growth was accompanied by pilfering, 
sabotage, misery, famine, passport laws, repression and terror. 
Stalin's methods, according to Serge were anti-socialist, but 
officially justified by using an 'amoral vulgar Marxism.'
Terror and misery left the population with nothing to think 
about but their own survival, their own self-interest. In 1937 
Serge wrote:
"The inexorable logic that necessitates the 
disappearance of those who hold the worst State 
secrets places the gifted leader in a blind alley. ...
He himself feels sure of nobody .... the party is 
destroyed, governmental circles decimated, the 
political police decimated, the army decapitated., 
purgings everywhere ... repressions in sphere of 
production ... there is disorder, panic, terror, mute 
reproval, passive resistance, atomic as it were. Not 
being sure of the morrow nobody dares to assume 
responsibility. All the statistics, all the balances, 
all the figures are false because nobody ever dares 
tell the truth ... every text is falsified.. the 
problem is to repeat the words of yesterday while 
killing yesterday's ideas."115
Here Serge describes with unusual clarity the effect of terror
on the behavior and functioning of the new system fashioned by
Stalin's methods of rule. Terror was at the heart of the
system of coercion in the 30s, which created a particular form
of class relations. As the quote of Serge's reveals, the
atmosphere of terror meant that no one wanted to assume
responsibility, nor did they later want to risk the uneven
results of innovation and creativity. Past successes were
114 •Victor Serge, Soviets 1929, Destiny of a Revolution, and 
From Lenin to Stalin. Serge also wrote extensively on the 
effects of Stalin's policies on science, art and literature.
U5RTYA. pp. 297-298.
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repeated and new thinking avoided. Lying became a way of life,
a necessary part of the system provoked by the purges. This was
to have permanent and reproducible consequences in economic
functioning. From Stalin's vantage point, he could only see
sabotage and hence continually tightened the screws in order to
gain better control of the economic mechanism which
paradoxically eluded the reins of control. The sabotage Stalin
saw everywhere was inadvertent, as his directives were often
humanly impossible to meet. In this atmosphere, the demand from
the top was to get everyone to knuckle under, and thus the
denunciations began, to uncover the 'saboteurs.' Again in
Serge's fiction Stalin appears to explain:
"Everyone lies and lies and lies! From top to bottom 
they all lie, it's diabolical ... Nauseating ... I 
live on the summit of an edifice of lies —  do you 
know that? The statistics lie, of course. They are 
the sum total of the stupidities of the little
officials at the base, the intrigues of the middle 
stratum of administrators, the imaginings, the 
servility, the sabotage, the immense stupidity of our 
leading cadres. ... The plans lie, because nine times 
out of ten they are based on false data; the Plan 
executives lie because they haven't the courage to say 
what they can do and what they can't do; the most 
expert economists lie because they live in the moon, 
they're lunatics, I tell you .... Old Russia is a 
swamp —  the farther you go, the more the ground
gives... And the human rubbish I . . . To remake the
hopeless human animal will take centuries. I haven't 
got centuries to work with, not I..."116
What happened to the ordinary 'human rubbish' in these
times, as Stalin sought to accomplish in a few short years what
would normally take decades, if not centuries? Serge evoked the
life of the individual in these circumstances:
"hemmed in by police, by poverty, by lies... [the] 
worker is preoccupied with obtaining, stamping, 
checking and re-registering a bread card which is
refused half the workers on various pretexts; his wife 
runs from one empty store to another, registering in 
a queue at doors of fishstalls in the evening in order
116Serge, Tulayev, pp. 167-168.
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to wrangle the next morning over a ration of salt fish
.. .exposed to spying in the shop .. coming home to
tell who was arrested last night..."117
Dominated by fear and panic, the bureaucracy must defend 
itself. The significance of its actions was that it was not 
pursuing the interests of the working class, but acting in its
iig
own interests. In this light, Serge was able to’ admit that 
the Stalin and the bureaucracy were correct to seize the moment, 
which would not present itself again, to rid themselves of their 
adversaries. The necessity of resorting to such cruel and 
seemingly mad methods pointed not only to a "tremendous moral
iig
weakness" but also revealed an "inward-driven crisis."
Politically Stalin needed to blame and punish someone else 
for the difficulties of life caused by his own policies. Behind 
every obstacle could be found a conspiracy, someone Stalin could 
blame and execute. The dynamic of denunciation in an atmosphere 
of fear was like a snowball rolling downhill. In Serge' s 
dialectical novel of the purges, The Case of Comrade Tulavev, 
one character after another fell victim to the terror which 
spread in concentric circles radiating outward from the 
cataclysm of the shot that killed his fictional Kirov.120 The 
bureaucracy, Serge said defended itself and its mistakes by 
blaming more and more on others.121 Suppression of freedom of 
expression, criticism, initiative and popular control increased 
the costs of Stalinist 'planning' horribly and often led to 
major failures and a kind of involuntary sabotage against which 
the regime had no remedy except a reign of terror directed at
117RTYA, p. 185.
l i f tSerge, FLTS, p. 61.
11 Q
Serge, RTYA, p. 204.
120An excellent discussion of this novel can be found in the 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation "Ideology and Literary Expression 
in the Works of Victor Serge" by Bill Marshall, pp. 323-361.
121FLTS p. 61.
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122technicians, workers, peasants. To find the guilty, an order 
went out to the GPU who arrest and obtain confessions, followed 
by deportations and executions. The Comintern could be depended 
on to defend the regime abroad against the saboteurs.
5.8 Intellectual Impotence, Moral Complicity: The Role of 
Communists and Fellow Travelers in the West
The purges were not confined to the Soviet Union. 
International Communists were lured into the web, either as 
victims or co-conspirators. Communists from Poland, Germany, 
Hungary, Finland, Iran, China, France, Czechoslovakia, Holland, 
Spain, Italy and the Balkan Cps were drawn into Stalin's 
constellation of camps, and Soviet agents abroad dreaded the
123ominous 'recall' to Moscow. They knew that 'recall' was 
synonymous with arrest, arrest synonymous, for the most part, 
with death. Apart from the infamous activities of the NKVD in 
the Spanish Civil War, international revolutionaries sympathetic 
to Trotsky began to 'disappear' or be assassinated. This was the 
fate of Rudolf Klement in France, and Ignace Reiss in 
Switzerland, Georgi Agabekov124 in Belgium, and in Spain, Andres
122Victor Serge, "Russia," unpublished manuscript, no date, 
Serge Archives, Mexico.
123See Poretsky, Our Own People. Krivitsky, In Stalin's 
Secret Service on the fate of Soviets abroad and his own narrow 
escape from being 'recalled', and Roy Medvedev, Let History 
Judge on the repression of foreign communists. Alexander Orlov, 
in The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes wrote that 40 agents 
were recalled during the summer of 1937, out of which only 5 
refused to return. ^
124Agabekov was a top functionary of the secret service of 
the NKVD in Turkey who broke with Moscow in 1929, and published 
a book that Serge called "a very extraordinary document of 
betrayal and informing" in 1935. He had belonged to the 
Opposition in 1923. He was murdered in Belgium, and according 
to Orlov, was one of those who "were liquidated in silence on
(continued...)
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Nin, Marc Rhein (the Russian Menshevik Rafael Abramovich's son),
Kurt Landau, Erwin Wolf125, and Tioli are among the victims we 
126know about. Even the suspicious suicide of Walter Krivitsky 
in the United States has been attributed to the work of the
 127NKVD. Before the U.S. Senate Hearings in 1957 to which both
Zborowski and Orlov testified to the hand of the NKVD in
Krivitsky's demise, Serge wrote a diary entry for 31 March 1944,
entitled "GUEPEOU" that
"X arrived from N.Y. assures me in confidence that 
the name of the OGPU agent who murdered Walter 
Krivitsky in a Washington hotel (winter 40-41) is
124(.. .continued)
the basis of a mere suspicion that they intended to break with 
Stalin's dictatorship and remain abroad." His assassination 
passed unnoticed, quite unlike that of Reiss and Krivitsky, 
until an alarm was raised. His case showed that it didn't 
matter "how much time had elapsed since the refusal of an NKVD 
officer to return to the USSR, Stalin's men would sooner or 
later catch up with him and destroy him." A. Orlov, The Secret 
History of Stalin's Crimes, pp. 227-228, and Serge, "The Diary 
of Victor Serge" entry for Feb. 20, 1938, in The New
International. Jan-Feb, 1950, pp. 54-55.
125Erwin Wolf was one of Trotsky's secretaries in Norway. 
He had visited Serge in Brussels just prior to going to Spain. 
He told Serge he couldn't bear studying Marxism in comfort while 
a revolution was fighting for its life. Serge warned him he 
would be murdered. Wolf went anyway (Serges "he had all the 
pugnacious confidence of youth"), was arrested, released and 
then kidnapped off the streets and disappeared. Serge, Memoirs, 
p. 337, and Victor Serge and Natalia Sedova Trotsky, The Life 
and Death of Leon Trotsky. New York, Basic Books, 1975, p. 225.
126An excellent account of the murderous role of the NKVD in 
Spain can be found in Victor Alba and Stephen Schwartz, Spanish 
Marxism versus Soviet Communisms A History of the P.O.U.M.. 
Transaction Books, New Brunswick and Oxford, 1988, especially 
chapters 6 & 7.
127See Marc Zborowsky's [Etienne] testimony before Senator 
Eastland's Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 85th 
Congress, in the Session held on February 14 and 15, 1957, part 
51, and Alexander Orlov's testimony before the same Committeee, 
especially p. 3464.
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known as well as all the details of the affair... The
128'suicide' version however remains quasi-official."
The role of the Comintern, the Communist Parties and their 
press, and fellow travelers in this period is notorious. For 
most of the people in and around the Communist Parties, the 
official line on the purges emanating from Moscow became an 
article of faiths the camps didn't exist, only counter­
revolutionaries were being killed, the Moscow Trials were not 
fabrications, Trotsky and the Oppositionists really were
129counter-revolutionary agents of the Gestapo, the Mikado, the 
OVRA, the Okhrana, labeled 'super-Judas', 'lubricious viper,' 
'bloodthirsty dogs130' and worse. Krivitsky wrote that the 
"Western world never quite realized that Soviet show trials were 
no trials at all, and were nothing but weapons of political 
warfare."131 Serge nonetheless undertook with Sedov the task of 
refutation. He commented that he and Sedov "often felt like
128Serge, Carnets, p. 89. French originals "X. arrive de N.Y. 
m'assure confidentiellement que le nom de 1'agent du Guepeou qui 
assassina Walter Krivitsky dans un hotel de Washington (hiver 
40-41) est con nu de meme que tous les details de l'affaire... 
La version du 'suicide' demeure cependant quasi officielle." 
English translation by John Manson, forthcoming.
129Serge quoted a telegraph communication from old Chinese 
workers in China declaring, "Trotsky is a dog! .... We love 
great Stalin as our first born, as our dear father, wipe out 
these monsters!" Victor Serge, Seize Fusilles: Ou va la 
Revolution Russe?, Spartacus, Paris, p. 24. Original French: 
"... on communique que les vieux ouvriers chinois Chi-Gang-Li et 
Dzian-Liang-Siay declarent: 'Trotsky est un chien! ... Nous
aimons notre grand Staline comme un fils premier-ne, comme un 
pere cheri... ecrasez ces monstres!'"
130No charge was too fantastic for Izvestia or Pravda to 
print, and these were duly repeated in Communist Party organs in
the West. In a long article "La Troisieme proces de Moscou," 
Serge listed the charges against Trotsky and the Oppositionists, 
and the reaction to these by the Stalinists in France. 
Published in La Revolution proletarienne. March 10, 1938.
131Krivitsky, pp. 187-188.
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voices crying in the wilderness. "132 Prominent intellectual 
leftists who had access to the truth chose to ignore it: Serge 
wrote to Romain Rolland, who had interceded on his behalf just 
months before. Rolland had promised Serge he would intervene if 
blood were shed, yet he chose to remain silent, as did Georges
133Duhamel and Henri Sellie. These same men asked Serge to
explain the mystery of the confession, and Serge shouted back,
"You then, give me an explanation of the conscience 
shown by the famous intellectuals and Western party- 
leaders who swallow it all —  the killing, the 
nonsense, the cult of the Leader, the democratic 
Constitution whose authors are promptly shot!"134
Serge visited Andre Gide after he returned from his famous
visit to Russia to discuss the current situation and the fate of
socialism. Before Gide went to Russia, Serge had published an
open letter addressed to Gide in La Revolution proletarienne
(May 19 3 6),135 which was an appeal for Gide to keep his eyes
wide open in Moscow. This open letter had caused a lot of
consternation in France, and may have been the reason that
Serge's relatives in the USSR were locked up.
Gide was profoundly saddened by what he saw in the Soviet 
Union and somewhat cast adrift politically. He was no longer the 
man who appeased Malraux at the International Writers Congress 
in Paris in 1935, speaking of the importance of demonstrating 
confidence and love for the Soviet Union and making its security 
the most important task for European intellectuals.136 Serge
132Memoirs, p.331.
133Ibid. . p. 333-334.
134-, . .Ibid.
135Also published as "Pismo Viktora Serzha Andre Zhidu" in 
Byulleten' Qppozitzii. No. 51, 1936, pp. 9-11.
136The account of Gide's actions at the Congress can be found 
in Herbert Lottman, The Left Bank: Writers. Artists, and
Politics from the Popular Front to the Cold War. (Boston, 1982) 
p. 95.
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wrote in his Diary (entry for end of November 1936) after his 
visit with Gide that he had just learned that his sister, 
sister-in-law and brother-in-law were arrested on September 6, 
the day after the execution of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Smirnov, 
and Serge believed they were arrested because of Serge's 
writings, especially his open letters. Serge discussed the 
meaning of the wave of terror in the Soviet Union with Gide, and 
the "impotence of intellectuals." He stressed: "A person can 
free himself, however, from moral complicity. "137 Few did.
As the wave of terror intensified in Moscow and spread to 
Spain, the 'progressive' press outdid itself in doublespeak and 
outright calumny. Serge watched his Spanish comrades being shot 
in the back as they faced Franco's army, while the Communist 
press denounced the POUMistas as "Trotskyists, spies, agents of 
Franco-Hitler-Mussolini, enemies of the people." How was it 
possible? According to Serge:
"The average man, who cannot conceive that lying on 
this scale is possible, is taken unawares by 
stupendous, unexpected assertions. Outrageous language 
intimidates him and goes some way to excuse his 
deception: reeling under the shock, he is tempted to 
tell himself that there must, after all, be some 
justification of a higher order passing his own 
understanding. Success is possible for these 
techniques, it seems clear, only in epochs of 
confusion, and only if the brave minorities who embody 
the critical spirit are effectively gagged or reduced 
to impotence through reasons of State and their own 
lack of material resources.
In any case, it was not a matter of persuasion: it 
was, fundamentally, a matter of murder, [my emphasis]
One of the intentions behind the campaign of drivel 
initiated in the Moscow Trials was to make any 
discussion between official and oppositional 
Communists quite impossible. Totalitarianism has no 
more dangerous enemy than the spirit of criticism,
137"Pages from the Diary of Victor Serge," in The New 
International. September 1949, pp. 214-216. As to the relatives 
Serge mentioned, his brother-in-law Paul Marcel spent six years 
in prison, and his sister-in-law Esther Russakova died in a 
camp. (Interview with Irina Gogua, Moscow, March 1989.) Nothing 
is known about his sister Vera Vladimirovna Frolova.
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which it bends every effort to exterminate. Any 
reasonable objection is bundled away with shouts, and 
the objector himself, if he persists, is bundled off 
* on a stretcher to the mortuary. I have met my 
assailants face to face in public meetings, offering 
to answer any question they raised. Instead they 
always strove to drown my voice in storms of insults, 
delivered at the tops of their voices. My books, 
rigorously documented, and written with the sole 
passionate aim of uncovering the truth, have been 
translated for publication in Poland, Britain the US, 
Argentina, Chile, and Spain. In none of these places 
has a single line ever been contested, or a single 
argument adduced in reply: only abuse, denunciation 
and threats. Both in Paris and in Mexico there were 
moments when in certain cafes people discussed my 
forthcoming assassination quite as a matter of 
course."
Talk of Serge's assassination was not idle chatter. Etienne, 
(Marc Zborowski) the NKVD agent in the Paris Left Opposition 
circles, who was complicit in the deaths of Trotskyists in 
Europe, also had plans for Serge that were interrupted by the
5.9 . The tentacles of the NKVD in Europe: Serge and Reiss,
Krivitsky, Barmine, Sedov, Zborowsky —  The Web of Blackness 
Extends
By 1937, the 'Great Terror' was in full force and a truly 
enormous witchhunt engulfed the Soviet Union. The atmosphere of 
sheer terror spread beyond the borders and reached a fanatical 
intensity in the circles of Soviet agents abroad, as well as in 
Oppositionist circles. Elsa Poretsky captured the atmosphere in 
Moscow 1937 in the chilling account of her winter visit. All
138Serge, Memoirs, p. 338.
139Alba and Schwartz, loc. cit. p. 221. Schwartz has written 
a series of controversial articles in the New York Review of 
Books and elsewhere on 'Stalin's Killerati' and said he found 
evidence that there was an NKVD 'hit list' and after Sedov's 
name was that of Sneevliet and Serge. Interview with Stephen 
Schwartz, April 1989, San Francisco. Sneevliet was killed by the 
Nazis in 1942. Serge's son Vlady still questions the 'natural 
causes' that took his father at age 57.
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real contact with friends and neighbors was reduced to a 
superficial minimum, to avoid possible denunciation from others 
recently repressed. Whenever the phone rang, everyone froze. 
People took myriad precautions to avoid attention and 
association with others whose position, marital connections or 
former political experience marked them for repression. 
Poretsky wrote that "Stalin had succeeded in doing something the 
Tsars had never done. The terror had destroyed the bonds of 
humanity and had made those who were directly affected go on 
living in a void, accept this void, and create it around 
themselves. "140
The atmosphere of anxiety and dread, of distrust and fear 
is captured only too well in both Krivitsky's and Serge's 
accounts. Serge wrote "Black was the spring of 1937 .... the 
tragedies of Russia once more cast their peculiar stupor over 
the world. "141 Agents were everywhere, and even agents were in 
danger. Both Reiss and Krivitsky belonged to a group of NKVD 
agents who were dedicated Communists, who were sickened by the 
murders and crimes committed in the name of socialism.142 Reiss 
resolved to break with the NKVD and tried to convince his 
boyhood friend Walter Krivitsky to break with him. The NKVD 
decided to test Krivitsky's loyalty: knowing in advance of
Reiss' defection, they assigned to Krivitsky the liquidation of
140Elisabeth Poretsky, Our Own People, pp. 183-203.
141Serge, Memoirs, p. 340.
142Their stories are well documented in Elsa Poretsky, Our 
Own People, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1969, 
Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service (Published in 
Britain under the title I Was Stalin's Agent), Hafper and 
Brothers, New York and London, 1939, Isaac Deutscher, The 
Prophet Outcast, Trotsky: 1929-1940. Victor Serge, Memoirs,
Carnets, L'Assassinat d'lcmace Reiss (With Rosmer and Wullens), 
Alba and Schwartz, Spanish Marxism versus Soviet Communism, 
Pierre Broue, Trotsky (pp. 868-), Zborowsky, Lola Dallin, and 
Alexander Orlov, Scope of Soviet Activities in the US, Hearings, 
Kyril Khenkin, [Soviet agent in Paris and Spain] author of 
L'Espionnaqe sovieticrue, Paris, 1981.
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his close friend. Krivitsky refused and was from that day 
forward a marked man.
Ludwik had been mulling over the break for some time. He 
"clung to his job, the only one he considered worth doing, of 
supplying republican Spain with weapons.143" He met his friend 
Louis Fischer, and told him of his revulsion with the Stalinist 
regime, which was destroying the old revolutionists and with 
them, the revolution.144 He tried to warn the Oppositionists 
in Paris that their actions were being monitored and that they 
were in danger. Ludwik let them know that "a decision to use 
terror against the opposition abroad —  against us —  has been 
taken.145 Serge published the "Ludwig Warning" in an article of 
the same name. At the same time, Sneevliet, Serge and Sedov 
wanted a public statement from Reiss that would "permit us to 
have confidence in him and [would] put him under the protection 
of public opinion. "14S
Krivitsky met with Ludwik, and surreptitiously let him know 
that his new mission, the reason he was allowed to leave Moscow, 
was to bring Ludwik back. Ludwik decided it was time to break, 
but was not able to persuade Krivitsky to break with him. 
Ludwik-Poretsky-Reiss147 contacted Sneevliet, because according 
to Elsa Poretsky, he could trust him completely. They arranged
143Poretsky, p. 210.
144Louis Fischer, Men and Politics: An Autobiography, 
Jonathan Cape, London, 1941. pp. 479-482.
145Serge, "Reiss, Krivitsky, Bastich Others, Dec. 1937, in 
"The Diary of Victor Serge," The New International, January- 
February 1950, p. 51.
146t , . ,Ibid.
147Ludwik was Ignace S. Poretsky's pseudonym. Reiss was a 
remote family name he used once he broke with the NKVD because 
his wife Elsa was certain the name was unknown in Moscow. She 
and Sneevliet then decided to use this name for the body of 
'Hans Eberhard' and it is by this name that Ignace Poretsky has 
since been known. Poretsky, p. 241.
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to meet, in order to prepare the publicity of Ludwik's break. 
Sneevliet tried to persuade Ludwik to make his break public, 
before letting the Soviets know, but Ludwik-Poretsky-Reiss 
believed he should first notify the CC of the CPSU. This was his 
mistake, because it gave the NKVD time to assassinate him before 
the story broke in the West. The Trotskyists were right that 
Reiss' only protection would be to ask the police for 
protection, and to go for maximum publicity.148 Nonetheless 
Poretsky delayed making public his open letter for one week, 
time enough to let the Soviets know first. He ended his letter
149by declaring for the Fourth International.
148Later Trotsky would write that Reiss' death was "not only 
a loss, but a lesson": Reiss should have gone public, but so too 
should the Left Oppositionists in Europe have established 
connections with him in time so that Reiss would not have had to 
break alone with Stalin's enormous spy apparatus. Trotsky again 
stressed that "the sole serious defense against the hired 
murderers of Stalin is complete publicity." Leon Trotsky, "A 
Tragic Lesson," September 21, 1937, in Trotsky, Writings r 19 3 6 - 
19371 . pp. 448-451.
149Poretsky-Reiss sent his open letter to the CC of the CPSU 
via the Soviet Embassy in Paris. The letter was wrapped in the 
Order of the Red Banner he had earned in 1927. Of course one 
does not resign from the Soviet Secret Police, as he well knew. 
His open letter declared:
"Up to this moment I marched alongside you. Now I will 
not take another step. Our paths diverge I He who now 
keeps quiet becomes Stalin's accomplice, betrays the 
working class, betrays socialism. I have been
fighting for socialism since my twentieth year. Now 
on the threshold of my fortieth I do not want to live
off the favours of a Yezhov....... The day when
international socialism will judge the crimes 
committed in the past ten years is not far off. 
Nothing will be forgotten and nothing will be 
forgiven. History is harsh. 'The leader of genius,' 
the 'Father of the People,' the 'Sun of socialism' 
will have to account for what he has done. He will 
have to account for the defeated Chinese revolution, 
for the red plebiscite in Germany, for the defeat of 
the German proletariat, for social fascism.... the 
international workers' movement will rehabilitate ... 
the Kamenevs, the Mrachkovskys, the Smirnovs, ...
(continued...)
367
Poretsky's wife insisted in her book that Sneevliet told 
Ludwik he would meet him alone. Serge wrote in his Memoirs that 
Reiss "asked to see us ... we arranged to meet him in Rheims on 
5 September 1937.1,150 In his Diary entry for Dec. 1937, Serge 
wrote that at first the meeting was to be between Ludwik, 
Sneevliet, Sedov and Serge. Sedov was sick and could not attend 
the meeting. Serge and Sneevliet went to Rheims on the appointed 
day, waited at the station buffet, but Reiss did not appear. 
They wandered through the town, still did not find Ludwik, and 
after two days decided to return to Paris. Waiting for the 
return train. Serge read in a newspaper that the previous day a 
Czech by the name of Eberhard's151 bullet ridden body had been 
picked up on the road to Chamblandes, in the pocket was a 
railway ticket to Rheims. He had a clump of grey hair in his 
hands, belonging to the pathetic Gertrude Schildbach, a woman 
Ludwik had befriended and recruited, and who was now used by the 
NKVD to murder "the only friend she ever had, a man she
149(.. .continued)
Okudzhavas, Rakovskys and Andreas Nins —  the spies 
and enemy agents the saboteurs and the Gestapo 
agents.! ....what is needed today is a fight without 
mercy against Stalinism! [For] The class struggle and 
not the popular front, workers' intervention in the
Spanish revolution as opposed to the action of
committees. Down with the lie of socialism in one 
country! Return to Lenin's international! .... I
intend to devote my feeble forces to the cause of 
Lenin. I want to continue the fight, for only our 
victory —  that of the proletarian revolution —  will 
free humanity of capitalism and the USSR of Stalinism. 
Forward to new struggle! For the Fourth
International!"
Poretsky, Our Own People, pp. 1-3.
150Serge, Memoirs, p. 342.
151 ‘One of the identities Reiss-Poretsky used in Europe was 
of the Czech Hans Eberhard. Poretsky, p. 235-236.
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worshipped, respected and obeyed,"152 "the only human being who 
had shown her consideration."153
Serge and Sneevliet immediately understood that Eberhard 
was Reiss, and drew up a press release giving his real identity. 
The French press chose to remain silent. The story was finally 
published after Serge paid a visit to Gaston Bergery154 of La 
Fleche who broke the story.155 Reiss' murder was subsequently 
splashed all over the European press. Krivitsky wrote that "it 
had become a celebrated case in Europe and reverberated in the 
press of America and throughout the world. "156 The Swiss and 
French investigation team were assisted by Sneevliet, Serge and 
Elsa Poretsky. Renata Steiner, a Swiss NKVD agent who had 
earlier infiltrated the Left Oppositionist circle in Paris, also 
gave the French police all the information needed to investigate 
Ludwik's death.
The record of the investigation was published by Pierre 
Tesne in Paris in a book entitled L'Assassinat d'Ignace Reiss. 
The authors were Victor Serge, Maurice Wullens, and Alfred
157Rosmer. The identity of the assassins was finally
established to be a group of people who were members of the 
Society for the Repatriation of Russian Emigres in Paris, a 
group sponsored by the Soviet Embassy. The assistant chief of 
the Foreign Division of the OGPU-NKVD, Mikhail Spiegelglass, had 
organized the crime, assisted by Beletsky, Grozovsky and Lydia 




154Serge, Memoirs, p. 343.




157 ■L'Assassinat d'Ignace Reiss. Serge, Wullens and Rosmer, 
Les Humbles. avril 1938, Paris, 97 pages.
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Paris.158 The GPU agents operating in the Russian Emigre 
society had been spying on Leon Sedov and the Left 
Oppositionists in Paris, and had twice attempted to snare Sedov. 
One of their agents, a man named Semirensky, had taken a room 
next to Sedov's and was working with Renata Steiner to trap
159Trotsky's son and collaborator.
The investigation of Reiss' murder lasted many months and 
led to the arrest of Renata Steiner, Etienne Martignat and 
Abbiat-Rossi, all Paris agents of the NKVD. In a rather bizarre 
incongruity, the Soviets made use of an organization founded by 
former Tsarist officers and other white Russian emigres as a 
center for its espionage activity in Europe.160 That group was 
the Union of Repatriation of Russians Abroad, and it was to this 
group that Mordka Marc Zborowski, a young Polish medical student 
at Grenoble was recruited.
Zborowski, alias "Etienne," turned out to be the 'other' 
agent in the Paris Left Oppositionist circle who knew that 
Sneevliet and Serge were going to meet Ludwik-Reiss in Rheims. 
He notified the NKVD who used the information to circumvent the 
meeting by killing Reiss. They recruited Gertrude Schildbach, 
Renata Steiner et al to lure Reiss to his death in Lausanne,
158Serge and Sedova Trotsky, op.cit. pp. 226.
159Serge and Sedova, ibid.
160General Alexander Orlov's secret letter to Trotsky warning 
him of the spy Zborowski in the Paris Left Opposition circle, 
reprinted in toto in Orlov's sworn testimony at the "Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the 
Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 85th-€ongress, 
First Session on Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, 
Feb. 14-15, 1957", part 51, pp. 3425-3426. Poretsky described 
the White Russian emigration as consisting of several groups who 
quarreled among themselves but were united in their aim of 
overthrowing Communism in Russia. It was an easy group for the 
NKVD to recruit from, and all the White Russian groups were 
delighted with Stalin's "liquidation of the revolution." 
Poretsky, op.cit. pp. 237-238.
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while a second team of assassins was reserved for Rheims in case
the first team failed.161 His family was also meant to be
killed, but at the last minute, Schildbach proved incapable of
162giving strychnine-laced chocolates to Poretsky's child. The 
box of poisoned candy was later found in the Lausanne hotel room 
occupied by Schildbach and her companion Rossi.
Reiss left behind notes that Serge analyzed in the book 
Serge wrote with Rosmer and Wullens on the assassination. The 
important pieces of information, which also later showed up in 
Krivitsky's book, were that Stalin had been attempting secret 
negotiations with Hitler since at least 1934, and on the eve of 
agreement with Hitler in 1937, Stalin executed his general 
staff. He also found evidence that despite the defeat of the 
Left Opposition and the ascent of Stalin's murderous policies, 
Leningrad Communists had gone to their death shouting "Long Live 
Leon Davidovich! "163/ and that Stalin was attempting to get a 
trial against Trotsky going in Western Europe (the attempted 
Grylewicz frameup164 in Czechoslovakia), and yet another in 
North America.165
161Lilia Dallin's testimony to the Hearing before the 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal 
Security Act and other Internal Security laws of the Committee 
on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 84th Congress, Second Session on 
Scope of Soviet Activity in the U.S., Feb. 29, 1956, Part 4. 
Mrs. Dallin cited her source as the French and Swiss police 
reports.
162Poretsky, p. 234.
163Rosmer, Serge, Wullens, p. 19.
164Anton Grylewicz was a former Reichstag deputy who set up 
a committee in Prague to investigate the Moscow Trials-. After a 
GPU intrigue in which Stalin is reported to have taken a 
personal interest, Grylewicz, a political refugee from Nazi 
Germany, was arrested and deported from Czechoslovakia as an 
undesirable alien. Serge and Sedova, p. 220.
165Rosmer. Serge, Wullens, L'Assassinat d'Ignace Reiss, Les 
Humbles, Paris, Avril 1938. Everyone of Serge's findings after
(continued...)
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A few weeks after Reiss's death two more agents came out of 
the closet: Alexander Barmine, and Walter Krivitsky. Zborowski 
was assigned to report on both of them to the NKVD.166 Barmine 
was an NKVD agent stationed in Athens. He had fought in the 
Civil War and belonged to the revolutionary generation of 
Bolsheviks. In Moscow Barmine was married to Irina Gogua, the 
daughter of Serge's half-sister Julia.167
Like Reiss and Krivitsky, Barmine was utterly sickened by 
Stalin's murderous activities. He handed in his resignation
165(.. .continued)
examining Reiss' notes were confirmed in Krivitsky's book I Was 
Stalin's Agent, p. 151, pp. 168-173.
Krivitsky had heard about the Grylewicz affair as part 
of an attempt by the GPU to convince the world of the truth of 
the Moscow trials by getting similar trials going in Spain, 
Czechoslovakia and the United States. The idea was to link the 
POUM in Spain, and Grylewicz (a Trotskyist) in Czechoslovakia, 
to Franco and Hitler. The attempt failed. In New York the OGPU 
laid plans for a "Trotskyist-Fascist" trial through an intrigue 
that would prove American anti-Stalinists were agents of 
Hitler's Gestapo. This effort led to the disappearance of 
American Communist Julia Poyntz and the arrest of the American 
Soviet agents Donald Robinson-Rubens and his wife in Moscow, but 
the effort fell flat, and not much more is known. The real story 
won't emerge until the KGB archives are opened. Krivitsky, pp. 
168-172.
166Zborowski' s testimony on the Scope of Soviet Activity in 
the United States, March 2, 1956, Washington D.C., United States 
Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the 
Internal Security Act. Zborowski was accompanied by his 
attorney, Herman A. Greenberg, and this was the first question 
he answered in this session.
167Interview with Irina Gogua, March 1989, Moscow. Gogua's 
mother Julia had been the object of Stalin's affection in 1902 
in Georgia, and later married Kalistrat Gogua, a prominent 
Menshevik, and early friend of Djugashvili. Irina was-Barmine's 
first wife, and they remained friends until Irina's arrest in 
1934. Barmine described Irina, Julia, Gorky's wife Ekaterina 
Peshkova, (Julia's best friend —  see Orenburg chapter infra), 
but failed to admit he married Irina and only described them as 
close friends. Was he trying to protect her in the gulag? 
(Barmine, pp. 265-266.) He lost contact of her after her arrest, 
and she learned of his death in 1987 from me in Moscow, March 
1989. Irina Gogua died over New Year, 1989-90, in Moscow.
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from the NKVD, and ironically it arrived in Moscow in the same
post as Reiss' open letter. Thus, according to Barmine, the GPU
agents in Europe were
"simultaneously confronted with a double job of 
'liquidation.' They could not find me, and so they 
dealt with the Reiss case first, an accident that 
probably saved my life. For their organization was now 
temporarily disrupted, and they were compelled to send 
the compromised agents into hiding and assemble a new 
gang."1
Barmine was still pursued, but managed to survive. In fact, he 
was the only NKVD agent in Europe to openly break with Stalin 
who died a natural death, in the United States in 1987.169 His 
book, aptly titled One Who Survived. is a remarkable memoir, 
which Max Eastman described as "the most important that could be
170written on the socialist experiment in Russia."
The book was actually ghost-written by Victor Serge. Every 
night Serge met Barmine at the police-guarded home of the French 
Socialist Marceau Pivert and took down his story. There is no 
indication in the published version that it was in fact written 
by Serge, but Serge's son Vlady has confirmed it, and was
168,Alexander Barmine, One Who Survived: The Life Story of a 
Russian under the Soviets, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1945.
169I learned of his death from the obituary in the New York 
Times. Barmine lived in Connecticut, and had worked for the CIA 
in the 50s and 60s. Alexander Orlov, another NKVD agent marked 
for 'recall' eluded his executioners and made it to the US, 
where he wrote a letter to Stalin, detailing all Stalin's crimes 
and telling Stalin that if he (Orlov) were murdered, his lawyer 
would publish Orlov's testimony. Although Orlov was pursued for
14 years, he survived and died naturally in 1973. Zborowski was 
a European NKVD agent who died a natural death in 1989, but he 
never broke with Stalin, though he asserted that after-*l'945, he 
took no assignments from the NKVD. See Alexander Orlov, The 
Secret History of Stalin's Crimesr Random House, 1953, pp.x-xvi, 
and Zborowski's testimony to the Senate Committee on the Scope 
of Soviet Activities in the United States, Feb. 29, 1956, Part 
4.
170 -Max Eastman, Introduction to Barmine's book, op. cit., p.
xi.
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present for some of the sessions. Barmine dictated his 
experience, and Serge gave it literary form. Serge reviewed the 
book in an article entitled "Le temoignage d'Alexandre Barmine" 
published in La Wallonie, 4-5 mars 1939. In this review Serge 
proclaimed that "there is no man in the world who will stand up
171and say: 'This is not true.'" Barmine later confessed to Max 
Eastman that during these writing sessions, he felt as though he 
were "walking in a graveyard. All my friends and life 
associates have been shot. It seems to be some kind of a
172mistake that I am alive."
What is also incredible is how small the circle of the 
surviving revolutionary generation really was. Serge knew all 
of them in the Soviet Union and abroad, and wrote their 
remarkable stories in his book on Reiss, and Barmine's memoir. 
That he was also related by marriage to Barmine, that at 
meetings in Paris Krivitsky and Elsa Poretsky could remember 
meetings with Serge in Moscow, attests to the small size of what 
Joseph Berger called the 'shipwrecked generation.'
The other agent to break was Walter Krivitsky and it is 
here that we pick up the story of Serge, Sneevliet, Sedov, 
Poretsky, Krivitsky and Etienne/Zborowsky. After her husband's 
murder, Elsa Poretsky went to Amsterdam to stay with the 
Sneevliets. She traveled with them to Paris, where Sneevliet had 
arranged several interviews with her. When Serge came to 
interview Poretsky, Sneevliet told her she would be glad to meet 
him. She wrote that "Serge was the last person in the world I 
wanted to see" and worse, he did not come alone. He brought a 
young friend of Sedov's with him, who introduced himself as
171"Personne ne se levera dans le monde pour dire a ce 
temoin: 'Ceci n'est pas vrai.'" Serge, "Le temoignage
d'Alexandre Barmine," La Wallonie. 4-5 Mars 1939, p. 14. 
Barmine's book was first published in France and Britain, under 
the title Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat.
172Max Eastman, Introduction to Barmine, op. cit., p. xi.
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Friedman, but who in reality was Marc Zborowsky. Zborowsky was 
known as "Etienne" to the Trotskyists and was Sedov's secretary 
and assistant. According to Poretsky, Sneevliet was furious with 
Serge, and Serge was 'visibly embarrassed." Poretsky wrote:
"The fact that [Serge] had passed on to Etienne the 
highly confidential word that I was in Paris, and 
worse, had brought Etienne with him to the hotel, gave 
Sneevliet a shock that never wore off. ... Serge's 
natural curiosity had made him keep seeing all kinds 
of people, party members, ex-party members, former 
anarchists, every kind of oppositionist, until the 
very day he was arrested, in Leningrad in 1933. Some 
considered this showed courage, others 
irresponsibility. It was probably a bit of both, but 
carrying on as he did exposed others as well as 
himself to danger. ... More baffling still was the 
fact that Serge had managed to come out of the Soviet 
Union in 1936. .... We continued to have doubts about 
him."173
Poretsky added that Serge's account of this meeting was
different than her own, and in a quite vicious sleight of hand,
explained that Serge himself "was not a professional
conspirator, he was essentially a writer." She then quoted
cpmpletely out of context something Serge had written in the
Memoirs about Soviet "writers in uniform" in the period in which
writers were increasingly constrained. Poretsky took it as a
self description for Serge:
"Poets and novelists are not political beings, because 
they are not essentially rational .... The artist ... 
is always delving for his raw material in the 
subconscious ... If the novelist's characters are 
truly alive...they eventually take their author by 
surprise."174
Serge was to commit one further error in Elsa Poretsky's 
mind to cement her impression of him as a careless, if 
courageous, non-professional. This involved a letter Elsa 
Poretsky received in October 1937 signed 'Krusia,' and 
thereafter known as the 'Krusia letter. ' Krusia was the name of
173Poretsky, pp. 244-246.
174Poretsky, p. 246, quoting from Serge, Memoirs, p. 265.
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a woman both Ludwik and Krivitsky had known in their young days 
as Bolshevik revolutionaries. Elsa Poretsky immediately knew 
that this meant Krivitsky had broken with the NKVD and was
trying to reach her. Elsa did not want to meet or help
Krivitsky, as she felt "Ludwik's blood" was between them now.
But Sneevliet persuaded her that Krivitsky was important and she 
was the link to their meeting him.
According to Poretsky, the meeting took place at Gerard 
Rosenthal's office (he was Trotsky's French lawyer and has 
written a book, Avocat de Trotsky) with Poretsky, Krivitsky, 
Sedov, Sneevliet, Rosenthal, and Pierre Naville. Serge was not 
there according to Poretsky, though in the Memoirs and his 
diary, Carnets, Serge placed himself at the meeting which he 
described as taking place on the 11th of November at Gerard's 
law office which adjoins his father's doctor's office near the 
Gare St.-Lazare, with himself, Sneevliet, Elsa Poretsky, Sedov, 
Gerard Rosenthal and Krivitsky. Serge did not name Naville at 
the meeting.
During the meeting Krivitsky repeated Reiss' warning to
Sedov, Sneevliet and Serge, that there was an agent in their
midst and assassinations were planned. He would not name the
agent, which infuriated Sneevliet. He did cast suspicion on
Victor Serge, and later, in a report drawn up for Trotsky,
Krivitsky flatly accused Serge of being the agent, while
Poretsky reported to Trotsky that she believed Serge had acted
irresponsibly and had been used by an agent. The accusation that
Serge was the agent led Isaac Deutscher to write:
"No one was, of course, less suited to act such a part 
than Serge. He was one of Trotsky's early adherents, 
a gifted and generous, though politically ingenuous, 
man of letters. The worst that might be said of"him 
was that he had a foible for vainglorious chatter and 
that this was a grave fault in a member of an 
organization which had to guard its secrets from the 
GPU. In any case suspicion began to cling 
indiscriminately to anyone, even to Lyova himself, 
while the actual agent provocateur went on collecting 
and reading Trotsky's mail, shared all of Lyova's
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secrets, and used his wiles to keep his own reputation 
clear by casting distrust upon others."15
Sneevliet was enraged that Krivitsky refused to name the agent
in their midst, certain that Krivitsky was lying when he
insisted he did not know the agent's name. It is probable that
Krivitsky spoke the truth about not knowing the agent's name,
because as Zborowsky himself later attested, "an agent is never
told about another unless they are supposed to work
together. "176 After the meeting, Krivitsky was assigned a
177bodyguard by Sedov, none other than Marc Zborowsky. Had he 
known Zborowsky was the agent, Krivitsky would most likely have 
exposed him then and there, to save his own skin. Krivitsky went
178on meeting Sedov nearly every day, and met Serge several 
times as well.
At the meeting held in Gerard Rosenthal's office, Krivitsky 
told Elsa Poretsky that the 'Krusia letter, ' which he had sent 
her care of Rosenthal, had been shown him by the NKVD who had it 
in their hands before it reached Amsterdam. This convinced 
Krivitsky that there was a dangerous agent in Sedov's circle, 
and that Krivitsky had to go into hiding. When Krivitsky then 
demanded to know how this letter got into the hands of the NKVD, 
Rosenthal answered, "I gave it to Victor Serge to post to
179Amsterdam." Krivitsky could not understand why Rosenthal 
would show this letter to Serge, and Elsa Poretsky could not
175Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast Trotsky: 1929-1940, 
pp. 391-392. Deutscher cited Lyova's letters to his father of 
19 November 1937 and Trotsky's letter to Lyova on 22 January 
1938, and Etienne's correspondence to Trotsky in the Harvard 
Archives.
176Poretsky, p. 274.
177Zborowsky's sworn testimony to Senator Eastland's 
Committee on the Scope of Soviet Activities in the United 




understand why Serge would have shown it to someone else before 
posting it. Poretsky believed that Sneevliet went straight from 
that meeting and confronted Serge with showing the 'Krusia 
letter' to someone else, and that is how Serge was able to so 
vividly describe the meeting, as if he were there. Serge's 
account mentions nothing of the 'Krusia letter.'
For Sneevliet, this discovery confirmed in his mind that
Etienne-Zborowsky —  "that little Polish Jew" —  was the agent,
that is that the secretary and right-hand man of Sedov's was the
NKVD agent. Although suspicion was now cast on Etienne, it took
another 20 years for him to be exposed. Poretsky also believed
that Sneevliet did not mention Serge's indiscretion further in
order to shield him, and protect himself from Trotsky's ire, no
doubt because he was thinking of "the things he had told Serge
180and the careless way Serge bandied everything about." 
Sneevliet and the other Dutch Trotskyists, as well as Serge, 
were already becoming distanced from Trotsky and the French 
Trotskyists, and this too probably prevented his pressing the 
investigation of Etienne-Zborowsky.
According to Zborowsky, Serge thought the agent in their
midst was Sedov's female secretary Lola Paulsen/Lilia Ginzburg
Estrine, and Zborowsky himself threatened to break Serge's neck
if he didn't stop spreading that rumor, even though it deflected
181attention from himself. Zborowsky informed Serge that the 
French Left Oppositionists refused to discuss the substance of 
the allegations against Lola, and from then on Serge was
practically excluded from the group.
180Poretsky, p. 255.
181Poretsky, p. 274. Serge himself did not write of his
suspicions. Deutscher, op cit, p.408, wrote that following
Klement's death, Serge openly voiced his suspicion of Etienne as 
the NKVD agent in their midst, and Etienne worriedly asked 
Trotsky what to do about it. Trotsky replied that Serge and 
Sneevliet should lay their charges before a competent
commission, but Deutscher continued, Trotsky himself did not 
believe the accusation.
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Serge was not the only one to raise the possibility that 
Lola Dallin, nee Lilia Ginzburg, was an agent. The FBI file I 
obtained on Victor Serge through the FOIA has appended to it 
several pages on Lola Dallin, Marc Zborowsky, and Boris 
Nicolaevsky, as if to say the FBI connects them to Serge. So 
much is deleted from the files that it is not clear why they are 
appended, though in the case of Lola Dallin, the FBI has only 
partially deleted a section entitled "Suspicions Directed 
Towards Subject as Possible NKVD Agent."182
Further, Gen. Alexander Orlov tried to warn Trotsky 
through a letter he wrote pretending to be a Russian Jew with a 
close relative in the GPU. He sent the letter on 28 Dec. 1938, 
and warned Trotsky of the agent in their circle in Paris, whose 
name was Marc. He gave other details that unmistakably 
identified Zborowsky.183 Lola Dallin was visiting Trotsky in 
Mexico when he received Orlov's unsigned letter, and she was 
made uncomfortable by the wealth of unpleasant detail in the 
letter. She told Trotsky,
"'That is certainly a definitely dirty job of the 
NKVD, who ‘ wants to deprive you of your few 
collaborators that you have in France.' And at the 
same time, he had another letter from another unnamed 
agent, telling him that a woman, meaning me, is coming 
to visit him, and will poison him. So we both 
decided, 'See how they work? They want that you shall 
break with the only people that are left, over in 
France, Russians, let us say, in France in Paris.'
And we decided that it isn't to be taken seriously, 
but it was a hoax of the NKVD." .
1 go
FBI Secret Files, Internal Security Act of 1950, titled 
"Lydia Dallin, aka: Mrs. David J. Dallin, nee Lilia Ginzberg, 
was: Lilia Estrin, Lilly Estrin, Lola Estrin, Mrs. Samuel
Estrin, 5/23/56, 3 pages, #240, 376.
X83Orlov's Testimony to Senate Committee on Scope of Soviet 
Activities, pp. 3423-3429.
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And, Lilia Dallin, added, the first thing she did upon her 
return to Paris was tell Zborowski everything.184 Trotsky wrote 
an extremely confidential letter to the Paris comrades repeating 
Orlov's allegations, and demanding that they investigate the
185allegations and shadow the 'stool pigeon's' movements. 
Trotsky did hypothesize that the letter he received could have
been planted by the GPU to" spread demoralization" through their
186ranks. Did Lilia Dallin circumvent the investigation by what 
she told Zborowski and the comrades? Finally, when Sedov was 
taken ill, it was Lilia Dallin that suggested Sedov go to the 
Mirabeau clinic run by White Russian emigres, as she had a 
sister-in-law physician working there.187 The evidence on Lilia 
Dallin is not conclusive. It appears that she was a loyal friend 
to Zborowsky until she discovered he was an agent in 1954, 
rather than an agent herself.
The atmosphere of suspicion was such that it provoked 
even more divisiveness among groups that were already rife with 
political discord. They were not paranoid to be on guard for 
agents since they were actually being infiltrated, and comrades 
were being murdered. However, agent-baiting in a small 
organization through casting suspicion on anyone could be just 
as ruinous to political effectiveness as actually planting an
Testimony of Lilia Dallin, Senator Eastland's 
Subcommittee on the Scope of Soviet Activities in the United 
States, Feb. 29, 1956, Part 4.
185 There is no evidence this inquiry was ever carried out, 
and Georges Vereeken, a Belgian Trotskyist close to Sneevliet 
and Serge at the time has since written a book attacking the 
Fourth International for not having carried out the 
investigation which could have unmasked Zborowsky l>efore he 
completed his murderous work. See Georges Vereeken, The GPU in 
the Trotskyist Movement. London, New Park Publications 1976.
186Leon Trotsky, "A GPU Stool Pigeon in Paris," January 1,
1939, signed "Van," in Leon Trotsky, Writings, Supplement 1934-
1940, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1979, pp. 818-819.
187Broue, Trotsky, p. 876.
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agent in their midst. This was an added boon for Stalin. The 
result was that the Left Opposition in Paris was hopelessly 
divided and so consumed with their internal problems that their 
political influence was compromised.
Even though Krivitsky believed Serge was the agent, he 
continued to meet him in Paris, and Serge noted how nervous, 
shriveled, and frightened he was. Others also described 
Krivitsky in similar terms, and he was probably on guard in 
Serge's presence, since he believed Serge was an agent. Serge 
was also nervous s he wrote that whenever Krivitsky put his hand
in his pocket to get a cigarette, Serge likewise put his hand in
188his own pocket.
There has never been any confirmation that Serge shared the 
'Krusia letter' with Zborowski. Poretsky asked Zborowski in 1954 
if Serge had showed it to him, and he simply shrugged his 
shoulders, neither confirmation nor denial. I repeatedly tried 
to ask Zborowski that question, by letter, telephone, and a 
personal visit, in the years 1986-1988, without any success.189 
I did ask Pierre Broue, who knew Elsa Bernaut (Poretsky) and who 
was responsible for convincing her to write her memoir, why she 
was so hard on Serge. He answered that as an agent herself she 
was naturally suspicious of Serge, who tended to be open and 
generous, and as an embittered woman, she was probably offended
188Serge described his meetings with Krivitsky in the 
Memoirs, pp.343-345, Carnet, entry for Dec. 1937, in The New 
International. Jan-Feb. 1950, pp. 51-55.
189SW to MZ, Oct. 22, 1986, July 26, 1987, April-2, 1988; 
numerous phone calls from Jan 1986 through September 1988. He 
never spoke more than three words to me, and then hung up. I 
went to his house In San Francisco on March 19, 1988 and was not 
allowed in. His wife Regina Zborowski was more cordial, and 
encouraged me to keep trying. According to Stephen Schwartz, 
however, she "watched over Zborowsky carefully, and prevented 
him from speaking to anyone." (Interview, Oct. 1989) Zborowski 
died in April 1989 at the age of 81.
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by Serge's manner.190 The truth will not be known until the KGB 
files on Stalin's most precious agent, Marc Zborowski, are 
opened to public scrutiny. I have obtained the FBI and American 
Intelligence agencies' enormously thick files on Zborowski 
through the Freedom of Information Act, but so much information 
has been 'legally' deleted by the FBI, that no new information 
can be ascertained.
This whole affair made the relations between Serge and 
Sedov more strained, while Zborowski continued his deadly work. 
Three months later, on February 16, 1938, Lyova Sedov died in 
Paris just eight days short of his 32nd birthday. The official 
cause of death was peritonitis following the removal of his 
appendix. He was taken to an unknown hospital by Zborowski and 
the whereabouts were kept secret. The hospital was run by White 
Russians, the surgeon, a former Chekist,191 had a record of 
several fatalities after relatively simple operations.
The circumstances of Sedov's death suggest ample 
opportunity for foul play. The inquest did not yield any 
evidence, however, and attributed Sedov's death to post- 
operational complications. The family demanded a new inquest, 
but again could not prove Sedov was killed by the GPU, which 
they all assumed. Right after calling the ambulance, Zborowski 
informed the GPU which hospital Sedov was going to,192 meaning 
the only ones who knew were the GPU, Zborowski and Jeanne 
Martin, Sedov's wife.
190Interviews with Pierre Broue, Mexico City, May 1987, and 
Los Angeles, October 1989.
191The surgeon's name was Dr. Boris Girmounski. (Broue, p.
876.)
192Deutscher, pp. 396-397. In Zborowski's testimony to the 
US Senate, he remembered informing the GPU, but was uncertain he 
had called the ambulance. He stated he that there were 
mysterious circumstances surrounding Sedov's death but he 
concurred with the final autopsy and post-mortem, which gave the 
cause of death as peritonitis. Scope of Soviet Activities, 
Zborowski testimony, Feb. 29, 1956, part 4.
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Stephen Schwartz, the author of a controversial set of 
articles published in the New York Times Book Review. The New 
York Review of Books. Commentary and elsewhere on Stalin's 
"killerati," has attempted to trace the links between the NKVD 
assassins and prominent European intellectuals, specifically Max 
Eitingon, in Freud's inner circle. Schwartz also has 
connections in the CIA and was told by an agent "strictly off 
the record" that they had information that Sedov had been given
193 •a poisoned orange by Zborowski. Another American
intelligence officer, Guenther Reinhardt, FBI covert agent who 
posed as a journalist and was involved in the secret mission 
'red stealth' to uncover Soviet secret work in the US, also 
wrote that the GPU "poisoned Sedov in Paris" in his book Crime 
Without Punishment.194 Pierre Broue, in his recent biography of 
Trotsky, repeats the 'poisoned orange' story.195 The whole 
story of Sedov's death cannot be told until the KGB archives are 
opened to public scrutiny.
Sedov's death was a terrible blow to the Trotskyist 
movement. Serge described the circumstances yet thought it 
possible he died of 'culpable negligence.'196 Serge wrote an 
elegy to Sedov, the third of Trotsky's children to die, —  the 
fourth had disappeared in the gulag, —  in La Wallonie. "Mort 
d'un ami" (Feb. 26, 1938) in which he described Sedov's funeral, 
where the French Trotskyists, still divided, stood apart under 
separate banners. In the Memoirs. Serge sketched Sedov thus:
"Young, energetic, of a temperament at once gentle and
resolute, he had live a hellish life. From his father
193Interview with Stephen Schwartz, October 1989, San 
Francisco. The same information is cited in Schwartz' book, 
Spanish Marxism versus Soviet Communism, p.221.
194Reinhardt, Crime Without Punishment: The Secret Soviet 
Terror Against America, Hermitage House, New York, 1952, p. 58n.
195Pierre Broue, Trotsky, p. 876.
196Serge, Memoirs, p. 345.
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he inherited an eager intelligence, an absolute faith 
in revolution, and the utilitarian, intolerant 
political mentality of the Bolshevik generation that 
was now disappearing. More than once we had lingered 
until dawn in the streets of Montparnasse, labouring 
together to comb out the mad tangle of the Moscow 
Trials, pausing from time to time under a street lamp 
for one or other of us to exclaim aloud: 'We are in a 
labyrinth of utter madness 1' Overworked, penniless, 
anxious for his father, he passed his whole life in 
that labyrinth."197
Serge remembered shaking Rudolf Klement's hand at the funeral.
Klement was a fanatically dedicated secretary of the Fourth
International. Five months later, on July 13, 1938, he became
the next victim of the NKVD. He was kidnapped from his
igo
apartment in Paris, with the meal still on the table.
Klement's decapitated torso was fished at out of the Seine at 
Meulan, his body cut to bits to prevent recognition.199
The NKVD sponsored killings did not stop there, but grew 
monstrously in Spain during the civil war. Serge knew from 
Krivitsky and Reiss that the NKVD considered Spain their
territory where they could act with impunity. Along with his 
old friends and Trotskyist comrades from the Dutch section, 
Serge mobilized to prevent the coming bloodbath, "scattering my 
futile warnings in the left-wing Socialist Press, as far as the 
United States itself."200 When his friend Andreu Nin fell into 
Soviet hands, Serge and the others did all they could to rescue 
him. A delegation of Serge's Spanish committee went to Spain to 
find Nin and were able to trace his last days before he was
197Serge, Ibid., p. 344.
198Serge, Carnet, p.44.
199 • ^Pierre Broue described Klement's disappearance in his 
Trotsky, p. 878. Georges Vereeken raised the possibility that 
Klement was killed because he knew who the agent was, or perhaps 
was an agent himself. See Vereeken, The GPU in the Trotskyist 
Movement, Chapter 17, "Rudolf Klement: an agent? Certainly a 
coward," New Park Publications, London, 1976, pp. 238-318.
200Serge, Memoirs, p. 336.
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kidnapped by the GPU. The trail stopped at an isolated villa
201next to an airfield occupied by Soviet planes. Serge wrote 
and published where he could on Spain. Unfortunately, there is 
no space in this study of Serge and the Soviet Union for an 
examination of his writings on that subject, except as they 
relate to his rupture with Trotsky, which will be taken up 
below.
5.10 Etienne, Serge and Trotsky: Between Two Left 
Oppositionists, the NKVD?
Etienne, or Zborowski, was assigned to spy on the
202Trotskyists in the West. He gained Sedov's confidence to the 
point that he collected and read his mail, and was sometimes 
editor of the Bulletin of the Left Opposition. He was often the 
mediator of communications between Trotsky and Sedov, and 
between Trotsky and Serge. His objective was also to diminish 
the effectiveness of the Oppositionists and therefore any 
divisions which he could foster or strengthen would serve the 
interests of his employer. Etienne performed his tasks so well, 
that he became Stalin's most precious agent, and Stalin
203personally read all his reports.
The Left Opposition in exile was in constant, real danger 
of physical liquidation. But this was not their only problem. 
While their comrades in the USSR were all being killed, the 
French Trotskyists worked in an milieu of suspicion,
201Serge, Memoirs, p. 337.
202In his testimony to the US Senate, Zborowski reported that 
among his assignments, he was to inform the NKVD of the 
activities of the French Trotskyists, to get close to^Sedov and 
lure him to a place where the NKVD would kidnap him (with 
Zborowski) and send them both back to Russia, to plant documents 
on the Trotskyists, to get information on their connection with 
Hitler, and later, as Krivitsky's bodyguard, to witness anything 
that might happen to him.
203 ‘Zborowski testimony, U.S. Senate Hearings, Feb. 29, 1956, 
Part 4, pp. 88-89.
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demoralization and despair. This led to unhealthy internal 
discord, and division. The role of the NKVD cannot be overlooked 
in this regard, though it would be equally incorrect to 
overstate their influence, since real political differences 
emerged in an atmosphere that was not always conducive to the 
free expression of critical thought, especially, unorthodox 
thought.
This was particularly discouraging to Serge, who was 
wrestling with the contradictions he had begun to consider 
inherent in 'guided organizations.' He often quoted Rosa 
Luxemburg's dictum that 'liberty is the liberty of the man who 
thinks otherwise,' a principle more easily expressed than 
practiced in the far left, peopled by "the best-disposed men, 
professing in principle respect for free thought, the critical 
mind, objective analysis . . . [who] in reality do not know how to 
tolerate thought which is different from their own."204 From 
Paris to Mexico, Serge continually associated with refugee 
revolutionaries who embodied intolerance, with all the 
concomitant consequences of expulsions, inquisitions, etc. More 
than simply discouraged, Serge sought to understand the problem 
which surely undermined their effectiveness. He also noted that 
back in the USSR, the bureaucracy knew how to mobilize these 
feelings against the Opposition, and yet the Opposition itself 
exhibited the same qualities.
The problem, Serge wrote, lay in the inability to reconcile 
intransigence, a necessary quality of being, with respect for 
the different being. In Russia, socialist politics failed 
because the social struggles led to socialists treating Marxism 
as a "faith, then a regime, a double intolerance in
205consequence." Serge's solution to the dilemma was "fighting 
intransigence, controlled by as objective a rigor as possible
204Serge, Carnets, 2 October 1944 entry titled
"Intransigence, Intolerance, Conflicts," p. 145.
205Ibid., p. 146.
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and by an absolute rule of respect for others, respect for the 
206enemy even.” These are noble sentiments, but challenged even 
Serge in practice. In a letter to Hryhory Kostiuk in the final 
year of Serge's life, he remarked that he remained
207'intransigently socialist.' Always aware of the difficulty, 
Serge remarked "Respect for the enemy, the Totalitarians make it 
difficult, if not impossible.208”
Though Serge himself fell victim to the dirty divisive work 
done by agents, he was conscious that political differences and 
organizational practices were also responsible for his worsening 
relations with Trotsky from 1937 on. Serge and Trotsky began to 
disagree with each other in late 1936, and this grew to a 
practical rupture by 1939. While Kronstadt and Serge's support 
of the POUM were the public issues of contention, what angered 
Trotsky most was Serge's attitude to the Fourth International.
On Dec. 2, 1938, Trotsky wrote a short piece that was
published in January 1939 in the Bvulleten' Qppozitsii No. 73, 
entitled "Viktor Serzh i IV Internatsional" which stated that
209Serge, now a member of the centrist P.O.U.M. , was an opponent
210to the FI. Serge wrote to Trotsky on March 18, 1939:
"I've decided not to react at all to the article in 
the Bulletin. You are too inaccurate, too unjust and 
unnecessarily offensive. I don't know who keeps you 
informed and how, but sadly believe me, there exists 
a whole nest of intrigues here (which has played its 
part in the death of Lev Lvovich, and before that, in 
the death of Reiss, as well as in the failure of the 
whole Fourth International movement in France."211
206 i _ • jIbid.
207Serge to Kostiuk, June 22, 1947.
208Serge, Carnets, p. 146.
209Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista (Workers Party of 
Marxist Unification).
210Bvulleten' Qppozitsii. No. 73, Jan. 1939, p. 16.
211Serge to Trotsky (in Russian), Paris, March 18, 1939.
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In a postscript to this letter, Serge told Trotsky that his 
rupture with the French Bolshevik-Leninists occurred because he 
had been told by a 'comrade' that there were serious suspicions 
about Lola Ya. Ginsburg [See pp. 76-79 above]. Serge thought 
this should be investigated and confided to Rosmer, Wullens and 
Elsa Reiss. Elsa told the group, who "refused to look into the 
substance of the affair, or so I was informed through comrade 
Etienne. Instead —  it 'brought an action' against me." While 
it appears that Lilia Ginsberg, known personally as Lola and 
politically as Paulsen or Yakovlev, was not the NKVD agent, she 
protected and vouched for the reliability of Etienne/Zborowski 
the real agent. Zborowski was apparently successful in turning 
Serge into a political pariah for the group. Trotsky fell right 
in, and subjected Serge to a horrendous offensive of vitriolic 
prose. Many political issues were involved, but one of the 
worst was over Serge's translation of Trotsky's Their Morals and 
Ours and the prospectus that accompanied its French publication.
5.11 The 'Priere d'Inserer's Who wrote it and to what
end?
Serge translated no less than six of Trotsky's books into 
French, and as already noted, Trotsky was very pleased to have 
such a talent as Serge to bring his work to French readers. 
Serge's translation of Trotsky's polemic on means and ends, 
Their Morals and Ours. (February 1938), brought unwarranted 
controversy to their relationship. Unfortunately the controversy 
was not over the content of the book, which Serge thought 
contained "many fine pages at the end."
The book was subtitled "Marxist Versus Liberal Views on 
Morality" and provoked a debate between Trotsky and John Dewey, 
among others. Trotsky was at his polemical best in this book, 
utilizing colorful and truculent language to paint his 
opponents. He set out to distinguish revolutionary morality, 
which is rooted in concrete historical circumstances and has as 
its goal the liberation of humankind, from the abstract and
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timeless morality argued by liberals, social democrats and 
others Trotsky labeled in vintage descriptive terms. The 'fine 
pages at the end' of Trotsky's book that Serge referred to 
contain a discussion of the "Dialectic Interdependence of End 
and Means. " Here Trotsky insisted that base means lead to base 
ends, that "organically the means are subordinated to the 
end"212 or in other words, the product could only be as pure as 
the process.
Serge chose not to reply to Trotsky's work, as he explained 
in a letter to Marcel Martinet on 30 mars 1939:
"Je t'envoi la trad, de "Notre Morale et la Leur"
[sic] de L.T. que j'ai faite. C'est energique et tres 
bien pense d'un point de vue etroit, historiquement 
deplasse, qui fausse tout, fanatiquement [?]. Je 
crois que je ne vais pas —  en tout cas en ce moment - 
- traiter ce sujet et repondre au Vieux, sinon d'un 
tres strict minimum, pour ne pas faire le mort sur ses
attaques son intransigeance est devenue raideur
mortelle et tuante..."
In any case the dispute with Trotsky was not over Serge's 
translation, or any unspoken disagreements about the ideas 
Trotsky expressed, but over the promotional prospectus in the 
French edition, which crudely attacked Trotsky. Without 
checking with the publisher, Trotsky assumed Serge wrote this 
invective:
"For Trotsky, there is no such thing as morality per 
se, no ideal or eternal morality. Morals are relative 
to each society, to each epoch, relative especially to 
the interests of social classes. ... True morality
must defend the interests of humanity itself, 
represented by the proletariat. Trotsky thinks that 
his party, once in power, today in the opposition 
always represented the real proletariat; and he 
himself, the real morality. From this he concludes,
..that shooting hostages takes on different meanings 
depending on whether the order is given by Stalin or 
by Trotsky or by the bourgeoisie. ... Trotsky, basing 
himself on Lenin, declares that the end justifies the 
means (on condition that the means are effective: for 
example, individual terrorism is generally
212Trotsky, Their Morals and Ours, p. 37.
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ineffective.) There is no cynicism in this attitude, 
declares the author, merely a statement of the facts.
And it is to these facts that Trotsky says he owes his 
acute conscience, which constitutes his moral
ii 213sense."
It is inconceivable that Serge could have penned or inspired 
these thoughts, so out of character with the body of his 
published work. Trotsky immediately presumed this, however. 
Instead of verifying the facts with Serge or Les Editions du 
Sagittaire, Trotsky lifted his pen and wrote a furious addendum 
to Their Morals and Ours on June 9, 1939, the essay called "The 
Moralists and Sycophants Against Marxism: Peddlers of
Indulgences and their Socialist Allies, or the Cuckoo in a 
Strange Nest". He wrote,
"..some 'friend,' ... contrived to slip into a strange 
nest and deposit there his little egg —  oh! it is of 
course a very tiny egg, an almost virginal egg. Who 
is the author of this prospectus? Victor Serge, who 
is at the same time its severest critic, can easily 
supply the information. I should not be surprised if 
it turned out that the prospectus was written ... 
naturally not by Victor Serge but by one of his 
disciples who imitates both his master's ideas and his 
style. But, maybe after all, it is the master 
himself, that is, Victor Serge in his capacity of 
'friend' of the author?"214
The piece exudes Trotsky's vexation with the 'independents'
loosely associated with the Left Opposition. One can detect his
obvious frustration at being an ocean away from the discussion,
an ocean away from reining in the dissidence. The essay is
devoted to a scathing attack against Victor Serge (the moralist)
and Boris Souvarine (the sycophant) in language memorable for
its viciousness. Trotsky sustained some seven pages of tirade,
213Priere d'inserer, 1939 edition of Their Morals and Ours, 
Editions du Sagittaire, Appendix C of 1969 (English) Merit 
edition.
214Leon Trotsky, "The Moralists and Sycophants Against 
Marxism," in Their Morals and Ours. Merit Publishers, New York, 
1969, p. 41.
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accusing Serge of "Hottentot Morality," of publicly becoming a
member of the POUM, of being a "petty bourgeois moralist" who
"thinks episodically, in fragments, in clumps," of wanting "to
purge human history of civil war." Further, Trotsky berated
Serge for dating the degeneration of the revolution from the
moment the Cheka began secret trials. Trotsky wrote vSerge plays
with the concept of revolution, writes poems about it, but is
incapable of understanding it as it is." Apparently one of
Serge's worst attributes was that he wrote lyrically, even
poetically about revolution; Trotsky returned to this in several
articles.215 More to the point, Trotsky got to the heart of his
animosity to Serge:
"...when we evaluate from the Marxian standpoint the 
vacillations of a disillusioned petty-bourgeois 
intellectual, that seems to him an assault upon his 
individuality. He then enters into an alliance with 
all the confusionists for a crusade against our 
despotism and our sectarianism. . .. Victor Serge 
demanded of the Fourth International that it give 
freedom of action to all confusionists, sectarians and 
centrists of the P.O.U.M., Vereecken, Marceau Pivert 
types, to conservative bureaucrats of the Sneevliet 
type or mere adventurers of the R. Molinier type. On 
the other hand, Victor Serge has systematically helped 
centrist organizations drive from their ranks the 
partisans of the Fourth International."216
215In a particularly vicious attack on Serge, Trotsky replied 
to Serge's letter criticizing the creation of the Fourth 
International: "When the Fourth International becomes 'worthy
of the name' in the eyes of Messrs. Literatteurs, dilettantes, 
and Sceptics, then it will not be difficult to adhere to it. A 
Victor Serge (this one, or another) will then write &  book in 
which he will prove (with lyricism and with tears!) that the 
best, the most heroic period of the Fourth International was the 
time, when bereft of forces, it waged a struggle against 
innumerable enemies, including petty-bourgeois sceptics." (Leon 
Trotsky, "'Trotskyism' and the PSOP," Writings of Leon Trotsky 
(1938-9), New York, Merit Publishers, 1969, p. 134.
216Trotsky, Ibid. p. 45.
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He ended his diatribe with "the moralism of V. Serge and his
217compeers is a bridge from revolution to reaction." The essay
seeks to lump Serge with other anti-Bolsheviks and anti-
Leninists , those who see Stalin as the heir to Lenin. It is
remarkable for its obvious ignorance of Serge's writings, from
his Year One. to his Lenin, his civil war writings, his From
Lenin to Stalin, his novels, not to mention his articles.
How did Serge react to this vicious onslaught of ad hominem
attack? He was heartbroken by what it represented. In the
Memoirs Serge lamented:
"Deplorably misinformed by his acolytes, he wrote a 
long polemical essay against me —  imputing to me an 
article of which I was not the author and which was 
totally at variance with my frequently expressed 
opinions. The Trotskyist journals refused to publish 
my corrections. In the hearts of the persecuted I 
encountered the same attitudes as in their 
persecutors. ... Trotskyism was displaying symptoms of 
an outlook in harmony with that of the very Stalinism 
against which it had taken its stand, and by which it 
was being ground into powder... I was heartbroken by 
it all, because it is my firm belief that the tenacity 
and will-power of some men can, despite all odds, 
break with the traditions that suffocate, and 
withstand the contagions that bring death. It is 
painful, it is difficult, but it must be possible. I 
abstained from any counter-polemic."218
Serge was denied access to Trotskyist journals, but nonetheless
attempted to internally refute the charges, to clear the air and
his name. Publicly Serge refused to break solidarity with
Trotsky. Serge wrote to Dwight Macdonald:
"Leon Davidovitch, dans ses recentes attaques contre 
moi a use de si mauvais procedes que je suis presque 
content de n'avoir plus le moyen de lui reponde. II a 
commence par me critiquer sans me lire et continue en 
m'imputant un article que je n'ai pas ecrit et a ,la 
redaction duquel je n'ai pris aucune part. Tout"*son 
papier intitule Moralistes et svcophantes et costera 
porte ainsi a faux, car il m'impute des arguments et
217Trotsky, ibid., p. 50.
218Serge, Memoirs, p. 349.
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des idees qui m'ont jamais ete les miens. J'ai 
pourtant beaucoup ecrit en une vingtaine d'annees sur 
ces sujets et il pourrait le savoir! II aurait pu 
aussi se renseigner sur 1'auteur du papier qu'iil 
m'impute avec ce bizarre sans-gene! tout cela est fort 
attristant. J'ai envoye a The New International —  et 
a Leon Davidovitch lui-meme —  des rectifications dont 
j'ignore encore le sort. En Europe, les feuilles qui 
m'ont attaque de cette facon n'ont jamais publie mes 
reponses. Alors j'ai cesse de repondre. Je suis 
fixe. "219
Serge then penned a reply to Trotsky which he did not publish.
It was discovered among Serge's papers by Peter Sedgwick, who
translated and published the essay in Peace News. Dec. 27, 1963
(p. 5) under the title "Secrecy and Revolutions a reply to
Trotsky." In a letter Serge wrote to Angelica Balabanova on
Oct. 23, 1941, Serge explained why he refrained from a public
debate with the Old Man, who was engaged in a resolute fight
against Stalinism, and whose ideas Serge still deeply respected:
"...in all this painful argument with the Old Man, I 
kept such esteem and affection for him that, even 
though he wrote a long polemical attack accusing me of 
writing an article which was never mine and of 
advocating ideas which were never mine, I first sent 
a powerful rebuttal to the printers of La Revolution 
Proletarienne (Paris) and then took it back from them, 
preferring to suffer this unjust attack in silence.
And I still think I was quite right: truth can work
219Serge to MacDonald, 22 October 1939, MacDonald Papers, 
Yale University archive. Translation: "In his recent attacks on 
me, Leon Davidovich has so disabused me that I'm almost glad I 
no longer have the means to answer him. He began by criticizing 
me without having read what I wrote, and continues to attribute 
to me an article that I did not write in a journal with which I 
have no association. His entire article entitled "Moralists and 
Sychophants" is thus entirely falsely based, since he—ascribes 
ideas and arguments to me that were never mine. However, I have 
written a great deal in the last twenty years on these subjects 
and he should know this! He would also do well to find out who 
wrote the article he attributes to me without so much as a care. 
All this is terribly sad. I sent NI and LD himself some 
corrections, the fate of which are unknown. In Europe the
publications that attacked me in this way never published my 
replies. So I stopped replying. I am adamant."
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its way out in different ways than by offensive 
polemics."220
Serge also wrote to Trotsky (Aug. 9, 1939) denying any
connection to the odious prospectus. Trotsky replied on
September 7, 1939 in Bvulleten' Qppozitsii. no. 79-80,
221"Ocherednoe Oproverzhenie Viktora Serzha," that he "willingly
accept[ed] his declaration," and then proceeded to attack Serge
for having "a confused mood of uncertainty, disillusionment,
dissatisfaction, and repulsion from Marxism and proletarian
revolution." As to the authorship of the prospectus, Trotsky
wrote "if not he personally, then one of his
disciples or cothinkers. The supposition
that the prospectus was written by Victor
Serge occurred to various comrades,
independently of one another. And not by
chance: the blurb constitutes a simple
resume of Victor Serge's latest 
• • 222 sermomzings. "
Which comrades? Etienne? Pierre Frank? Whether or not 
Etienne directly raised the issue with Trotsky, or incited 
others to do so, he could be justly proud of accomplishing his 
objective, of dividing the two surviving Left Oppositionists and 
occupying them with incessant internal intrigue. Yet Trotsky 
seemed to dismiss the possibility of the hand of the NKVD. In a 
letter to Serge published in the Writings as "Victor Serge's 
Crisis" Trotsky wrote:
220 •Victor Serge to Angelica Balabanova, Oct. 23, 1941, Serge 
Archive, Mexico.
221
Trotsky, BO, No. 79-80, August-September, 1939, p. 31. The 
English translation, "Another Refutation by Victor Serge," is 
published as Appendix B in the Merit edition of Their Morals and 
Ours.
222L.D. Trotsky, Bvulleten'Qppozitsii, no. 79-80, p. 31, 
"esli ne on lichno, to kto-libo iz ego uchenikov ili 
edinomuishlennikov. Predpolozhenie o tom, chto prospekt napisan 
Viktorom Serzhem, vozniklo u raznuikh tovarishchei, nezavisimo 
drug ot druga. I ne mudreno: prospekt predstavlyaet prostoe 
rezyume noveishikh propovedei Viktora Serzha!
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"you are passing through a protracted ideological 
crisis and ... you are turning your dissatisfaction 
with yourself into dissatisfaction with others. You 
write about intrigues, false information, etc. I
don't know about any of that. ...I do not lose the
hope of seeing you return to the road of the Fourth 
International. But at present you are an adversary, 
and a hostile one at that, who demands nonetheless to
223be treated as a political friend."
Serge was categorical that he "never published a single 
line concerning that work rTheir Morals and Oursl of his, in any 
publication or in any shape or form.1,224 Serge continued, "I 
am not the author of this prospectus: I have had no part, direct 
or indirect, in composing it: I have no idea who its author is: 
and I do not care either. Is that clear enough?"225 The real
author of the prospectus is still unknown. Vlady believes
226Zborowski wrote it, and I put that question to him several 
times, without ever being graced with a reply.227 Pierre Broue 
believes an editor wrote it228, which could have been done under 
Zborowski's guidance.
Despite Serge's denial, the issue of his authorship refused 
to die. Pierre Frank rehashed the rumor that Serge had written 
the prospectus in the introduction to the second French edition 
of Their Morals and Ours in 1966, three years after Peter 
Sedgwick published Serge's refutation in Peace News. 19 years 
after Serge's death. In his introduction, Frank not only 
repeated that Serge wrote the prospectus, he grouped Serge with
223Trotsky to Serge, May 6, 1939. Published in Writings of 
Leon Trotsky: Supplement 1934-1940. p. 836.
224 •Victor Serge, "Secrecy and Revolution —  a reply to 
Trotsky," Peace News. London, Dec. 27, 1963, p. 5.
225Serge, ibid.
226Private conversation, Mexico City, January 1986.
227See pp.80 and fn 190 above.
228Private conversation, Los Angeles, October 1989.
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Max Eastman and Sidney Hook, two former Marxists turned cold 
warriors. How was it possible to ignore both Serge's refutation 
and Trotsky's acknowledgement of Serge's denial? It appears 
that Pierre Frank held Serge in particular contempt and had an
229undue influence over official Trotskyist thought about Serge. 
Finally, under Pierre Broue's direction (but proclaimed 
dissatisfaction with the result230) Michel Dreyfus published, 
in 1977, the Serge-Trotsky correspondence La Lutte contre le 
Stalinisme (Maspero) and again repeated the assertion that Serge 
was the author of the prospectus, without so much as 
acknowledging that Serge had refuted that charge, and Trotsky 
accepted his refutation.
The rupture over the prospectus was really the culmination 
of disagreements over several issues, specifically Serge's 
support of the POUM, and his attitude to the Fourth 
International. Trotsky was offended by this 'defection' and the 
intransigent and excessive tone of his polemic reflected his 
anger.
Defection notwithstanding, Serge still functioned in the
orbit of Trotskyism and held the Old Man in great esteem; and he
was considered a 'Trotskyist' by the larger political public. He
later wrote in his diary:
"I went on translating the Old Man's books, La 
Revolution trahie. Les Crimes de Staline, Leur Morale 
et la Notre and to defend him. I remained in the eyes 
of the general public the best-known "Trotskyist" 
writer —  while the "b-1" disparaged me as far as they 
could. I had become for them a "petit-bourgeois 
intellectual" of whom they had to "make use of the
229In 1974 I was told by leading members of the British 
section of the Fourth International that Serge was a 'centrist' 
and (therefore) wasn't worth reading. Ernest Mandel, the 
recognized international leader of the Fourth International 
today, told me in Mexico in August 1990 that he 'would drop a 
bomb' at the Serge Centenary Colloquium by publicly clearing 
Serge's name.
230Interviews with Pierre Broue, Mexico 1987, Los Angeles
1989.
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influence"' and the "questionable sympathy." —  The 
sense of possession of the truth, the intolerance and 
the aggressiveness devoid of critical sense of Leur 
Morale made me furious although there are fine, 
worthwhile pages at the end of this essay. I said so 
to some Trotskyists who wrote and told the Old Man and 
that at once brought fresh attacks upon me. The 
saddest thing was that they were always insulting and 
always based on inaccurate data. It would have been 
so simple to states We're at considerable variance on 
such and such a point ,— but the Old Man and his 
followers had become completely incapable of holding 
such a straightforward dialogue. The frightening 
atmosphere of persecution in which they lived -- like 
me —  made them inclined to a persecution complex and 
to the practice of persecution. "23i
5.12 The Fourth International, Kronstadt Debate, the POUM
Trotsky's mission, once the Great Purge was underway in the 
Soviet Union and the Stalinists were killing the left in Spain, 
was to create a world party of revolution, a revolutionary pole 
of attraction for workers the world over who were repulsed by 
Stalinism and disgusted by the parliamentary reformism of the 
social democrats. He devoted most of his energy to the Fourth 
International, and naturally wanted all revolutionary Marxists 
to share his vision of this world revolutionary organization. 
Victor Serge, as an exiled Russian Left Oppositionist with 
intellectual standing in Europe would be an asset to the Fourth 
International.
Trotsky sent Serge a draft which was adopted by the July 
1936 Conference for the Fourth International, entitled "The New 
Revolutionary Upsurge and the tasks of the Fourth
232International." Serge dispatched his comments to Trotsky on 
July 19, 1936, titled "A New Revolutionary Upturn?" Firstly
231Serge, "My rupture with Trotsky" July 1936, Carnets, pp.
44-47.
232 ’Published in LDT, Writings 1935-1936. New York, 1970, pp.
32-35.
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Serge disagreed on LDT's assessment of the readiness of the 
workers in Europe for revolutionary struggle. Trotsky viewed 
the French Popular Front and the Spanish Civil War as signs that 
the revolutionary upsurge was beginning. Serge countered 
Trotsky's thesis, saying that workers were just "emerging, 
awakening out of a long period of depression;, it is the 
beginning of a process," that was a product of ten years of 
exhaustion brought on by the war and the post-war defeats. This 
is no minor differences a revolutionary conjuncture demands a 
revolutionary practice quite distinct from the tasks of a period 
of recovery.
With regard to the Second International, Serge wrote it was 
wrong to consider it homogeneous, and "our criticism and 
pressure ... [can] help them in a more positive direction. " The 
different perception of the nature of the conjuncture also led 
to different attitudes toward the Popular Front, which Serge 
thought of as an arena of struggle for revolutionary working 
class demands. Serge wrote that their task was to "exert enough 
pressure on the Popular Front.. [it could] be a useful 
transitional from which will allow the workers to enter later 
phases of the struggle with greater possibilities." Serge's 
slogan was "transform the Popular Front from an instrument of 
class-collaboration into an instrument of class-struggle" which 
obviously implied a split with bourgeois and bourgeois-dominated 
elements and the re-grouping of the working class forces around 
a revolutionary programme which can assure them of the support 
of the middle classes."233
A.J. Muste, an American minister whose American Workers 
Party fused with the Communist League to form the American 
section of the Fourth International (the SocialistT Workers
233Victor Serges Observations on the Theses of the July 
Conference of the Fourth International, Sections 1,5,and 9." 
July 19, 1936, Serge archives.
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Party),234 visited Serge in Brussels in late July 1936, on 
behalf of Trotsky and the Bureau for the Fourth International, 
in order "to convey Leon Davidovich's proposal that I join this
235Bureau as a co-opted member. I accepted."
After discussing with Muste, Serge wrote a letter to 
Trotsky (July 27, 1936) in which he put forward his ideas on how 
the organization could reach and recruit as many people as 
possible. Serge envisioned a broad revolutionary party with a 
truly professional and quality press that encouraged open debate 
in a fraternal style. "Our ideological intransigence must be 
expressed and developed in an atmosphere of free collaboration,
236without anxiety about secondary differences." Serge 
emphasized that the organization while being ideologically firm, 
remain open and non-sectarian, trying to unify non-Stalinist 
forces. He also wrote that the question of the "nature of the 
Soviet State and of the defence of the USSR —  matters on which 
enormous confusion reigns among the rank and file," be left 
open, since it was an important educational question but not one 
of principle.
Trotsky replied to Serge on July 30, 1936, stating that he 
couldn't agree, and moreover, criticized Serge for his 'artistic 
and psychological' approach which was insufficiently
237political. Trotsky was more concrete than Serge and showed 
how various people in practice would not be suitable to the 
organization since they were "petty bourgeois through and 
through; their little houses, little gardens and cars are a 
thousand times dearer to them than the fate of the proletariat."
234For an insiders account of this process, see-James P. 
Cannon, The History of American Trotskyism. Pathfinder Press, 
New York, 1972.
235Serge, "My Break With Trotsky," Carnets, p. 44.
236VS to LDT, Brussels, July 27, 1936.
237LDT to VS, July 30, 1936.
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Serge simply did not share Trotsky's view of these anti-
Stalinist activists.
By mid 1937/ Serge and Trotsky began to have serious
disagreements. In 1938 Serge entered into a polemic over
Kronstadt which was splashed across the pages of The New
International. Lutte Ouvriere, La Revolution proletarienne.
Bvulleten Qppozitsii and elsewhere. The Kronstadt debate came in
the wake of the Spanish Civil War, and had everything to do with
the role of the anarchists and POUM. Serge wrote in his diary:
"About this time, I had a correspondence with Trotsky 
on the subject of the Spanish anarchists whom Leon 
Sedov dismissed as "destined to stab the Revolution in 
the heart." I thought they would play a key role in 
the Civil War and advised Trotsky and the Fourth 
International to publish a declaration of sympathy 
with them, in which the revolutionary Marxists would 
pledge themselves to struggle for liberty. L.D. said 
I was right and promised that something on these lines 
would be done, but it never was.
In January 37, I attended an international 
conference of the Fourth in Amsterdam. It was held at 
Sneevliet's place: he lived at Overtoom and had a
comfortable meeting-room in the attic. Already the 
Trotskyists were directing all their fire at the POUM.
I took the floor to justify the POUM's participation 
in the Catalan Generalitat, on the grounds of the need 
to control and influence the Government from within 
and to facilitate the arming of the masses. With 
Vereecken and Sneevliet, I proposed a resolution of 
solidarity with the POUM, which ended with an appeal 
to the Spanish militants to preserve the unity of 
their party. Pierre Naville, Gerard Rosenthal and 
Rudolf Klement protested against these formulations: 
it became obvious that even while addressing 
diplomatic compliments to the POUM, they were 
organizing a split in its ranks. Two English
delegates to Amsterdam told me that the movement of 
the Fourth International numbered less than a hundred 
members in England —  and split into two rival 
organizations, as in France.
I came back from Amsterdam sore at heart: the
impression of a sectarian movement, controlled by 
manoeuvres from on high, afflicted by all the mental 
depravities which we had struggled against in Russia: 
authoritarianism, factionalism, intrigues, schemes, 
narrow-mindedness, intolerance. Sneevliet and his 
party had enough, finding the atmosphere unbreathable;
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they were honest, sober Dutch proletarians, used to 
fraternal norms of conduct. Vereecken, who idolized 
the Old Man, said to me: "I give you less than six
months to fall out with him. He doesn't tolerate any
238opposition. "
Serge took part in the Fourth International, including its 
founding conference, and worked with its members until he 
developed disagreements with them over their attitude to the 
POUM, the stifling internal atmosphere and his conviction that 
within the Fourth International Serge
"could not detect the hope of the Left Opposition in 
Russia for a renewal of the ideology, morals and 
institutions of Socialism. In the countries I knew at 
first hand, Belgium, Holland, France and Spain, the 
tiny parties of the 'Fourth International,' ravaged 
by frequent splits and, in Paris, by deplorable 
feuding, amounted only to a feeble and sectarian 
movement out of which, I judged, no fresh thinking 
could emerge. The life of these groups was maintained 
by nothing but the prestige of the Old Man and his 
great, unceasing efforts; and both his prestige and 
the quality of his efforts deteriorated in the 
process. The very idea of starting an International at 
the moment when all international socialist 
organizations were dying, when reaction was in full 
flood, and without support of any kind, seemed quite 
senseless to me."239
In the FI Serge found a crude caricature of Trotsky's
intransigence, here translated into simple inflexibility. Their
shallow dogmatic and sectarian thinking was all very
discouraging to Serge.
Further, Serge came to believe that the timing was all 
wrong: the creation of a Party of world revolution during a 
period of defeat (fascism, war, Soviet totalitarianism) was 
futile, if not pretentious. Thus the correspondence between 
Serge and Trotsky reveals a conflict of objectives: Trot sky 
wanted Serge to play a leading role in the Fourth International, 
and Serge was dubious of the project from the start.
VS, "My Break With Trotsky," Carnets, pp. 44-47.
239Serge, Memoirs. p. 348.
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Serge was certain that a non-Stalinist federation would
have been better suited the new world situation. Serge was less
specific than Trotsky on the actual character of the non-
Stalinist organizations he hoped would come together in this
federation, nor did Serge address the issue of their
revolutionary capabilities, or their commitment to socialist
revolution. In a sense there is a parallelity to the situation
in 1921, when Serge reluctantly supported the Party against the
Kronstadt rebels. At the time, Serge reasoned that every
political worker who was actively engaged in the Socialist
project was already inside the Party, and indeed it was the
Lenin levy that destroyed this instrument of communist
conviction by diluting it, thereby easing the victory of the
bureaucracy. Similarly, the various shades of revolutionary
consciousness found in Europe in 1936-39 did not indicate
homogeneous professional revolutionaries united in their task of
seizing power. Trotsky was probably correct that this mix of
syndicalists, anarchists and Mensheviks could not be depended on
and probably were on a social democratic trajectory. Serge on
the other hand, was interested in uniting the left around
solidarity with the POUM, campaigns on behalf of the imprisoned
revolution in Russia, and where possible, injecting
revolutionary politics in existing struggles. He was also
certain that the Trotskyists would assume a leadership position
within the larger non-Stalinist international federation.
While Trotsky's misgivings about the non-Stalinist-but-non-
Trotskyist left were important, Serge thought the Trotskyist
left "spent most of their strength and ...their time in 
intriguing against each other and in running each 
other down in whole books. I reproached them bitterly 
for squandering their resources like this when* no 
publicity was being given to our imprisoned comrades 
in Russia. I refused to listen to ... their 
contemptible bickerings, saying to Rous: "if I was a
member of one of your two groups, this atmosphere
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would make me resign at once. You are sick 
sectarians.1’240
Serge cut himself off from the Fourth International in 
1937, tried to avoid controversy, and ’made every effort to do 
the militants and LD all the good turns I could.”241 Serge did 
not refrain, in 1938, from his polemic with Trotsky over 
Kronstadt and other vital issues. After all, there was an entire 
generation of political militants who would benefit from an
airing of the issues surrounding the suppression of the
Kronstadt rebels. He was subjected to a torrent of abuse from 
LDT's pen in this same period. Yet even as Trotsky attacked 
Serge publicly, he privately wrote him:
"I am still ready to do everything to create 
conditions for collaboration ... but only on one 
condition: if you yourself decide that you belong to 
the camp of the Fourth International and not to the 
camp of its adversaries."242
In a letter to Trotsky in Russian, datelined Paris, March 18,
1939, Serge defended his activities and once again laid bare his
differences with the Old Man on the question of the
International:
"I can assure you personally that I took no part in 
any groupings 'opposed to the Fourth.' Of course I 
feel closer to comrades-heretics, because I believe 
they are right: it's time to follow a new road, not to 
stick to the well-trodden paths of the late Comintern. 
Nevertheless, not only did I not participate in any 
' factional activities', but tried whenever I could to 
soften the inevitable split. You will hardly find 
another person in existing groups as alien to any kind 
of 'intrigue' as myself. But enough about that, the 
same thing all over again: one cannot say honestly, 
calmly and with dignity, 'Yes, we have serious 
disagreements' —  one must always discredit or even 
slightly slander the other side.
Our disagreements are very great indeed...J  am 
convinced that one cannot build an international while
240Serge, ”Ma Rupture avec Trotski," Carnets, p. 48.
241-, . ,Ibid.
242LDT to VS [in Russian], April 15, 1938.
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there are no parties... One should not play with the 
words 'party' and 'International.' But there are no 
parties here. It is a dead end. Only small groups 
manage to hold out somehow in this deadlock, but they 
have no dynamism, no influence, nor even a common 
language with the working-class movement. One cannot 
build an international organization on intolerance and 
the Bolshevik-Leninist doctrine, for in the whole 
world there are no more than two hundred - people 
(except the surviving inmates of Stalin, perhaps) who 
are in a position to understand what Bolshevism- 
Leninism is. ... For the time being, no one in the 
Fourth International groups thinks except through your 
head.
What should be done? The solution, I believe, lies 
in an alliance with all the left-wing currents of the 
workers' movement (its platforms the class struggle 
and internationalism; in free, comradely discussion of 
every issue, without abuse and mutual recriminations; 
in the creation of an International Bureau of 
committees and similar bodies —  such a Bureau to be 
composed of the representatives of local movements and 
to work towards concrete goals; one must abandon the 
idea of Bolshevist-Leninist hegemony in the left-wing 
workers' movement and create an international 
alliance, which would reflect the real ideological 
tendencies of the most advanced sections of the 
working class (I am convinced that in such an alliance 
the Bolshevik-Leninists would have a greater influence 
than in their own high and mighty International).1,243
Serge's attitude to the POUM, the French Popular Front, and 
the Fourth International were based on his concern that the 
revolutionary Marxists not be cut off from the political arena 
that held the attention of the working class. His position was 
not one of purist intransigence, as he saw the Flers —  in 
principled opposition to centrist and 'class collaborationists. ' 
Serge was neither a centrist (between reform and revolution) nor 
a class collaborationist but he strongly felt that the 
Bolshevik-Leninists could have a positive influence _on these 
groupings which in both cases had boosted the confidence and 
increased the combativity of the working class. Trotsky's 
position of no class collaboration led him to counterpose the
243VS to LDT, March 18, 1939, 5 pps.
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United Front to the Popular Front, which was correct in
principle, but simply not on the agenda in either Spain or
France, in Serge's view, and therefore cut the Trotskyists from
the main arena of struggle. Though Serge was perhaps overly
enthusiastic about what could be achieved with the Popular
Front244 and the POUM, he also saw that the Trotskyists would
be seen as sectarian, which would lead to their isolation in a
struggle too important not to have some influence over.
Furthermore, the behavior of the Fourth International over the
Spanish events was disturbing: Serge wrote Sedov that they
"schitayut sebya prizvannuimi svuisoka i s krikami
rukovodit' revolutsiee v drugoi strane i vidyat
edinstvennii svoi put' v sozdanii fraktsii a la 
Komintern i perspekive raskola. Etot put' nikuda 
ochevidno ne vedyot esli ne k diskreditatsii
245Ivgo. "
Serge's disdain for the Fourth International's tactics in Spain 
and his insistence on solidarity with the POUM was seen as a
capitulation to reformism by the Trotskyists and Serge was
forever more labeled a Centrist.
The stamp 'Moralist' came from Serge's renewal of the debate 
on Kronstadt. This debate took place in late 1937 and throughout
244But Serge's enthusiasm was less than Trotsky's in 1936 
when Trotsky wrote Serge in envy that Serge would be off to 
Paris where the "birth-pangs of the French Revolution" had begun 
with a massive strike. LDT to VS [in Russian], June 9, 1936. 
Serge replied with a cautionary note, "The wonderful strikes in 
France and here show clearly that the working class is 
recovering after its phase of depression and extreme fatigue, 
and is entering a new period of struggle. In such a situation 
one may hope for anything, so long as one does not expect an 
immediate all-round upsurge." VS to LDT [in Russian]-Brussels, 
June 16, 1936.
245VS to LLS, 21 January 1937. Translation: [They] consider 
themselves called from above... to lead the revolution in 
another country, and they see their one path in the creation of 
factions a la Komintern and in a schizmatic perspective. This 
path will obviously lead nowhere, if not to the discredit of the 
Fourth."
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1938 in journals in Europe and America. 246 In 'dredging up' 
this ignominious chapter in Bolshevik history. Serge had not 
changed his position of siding with the party, but wanted the 
Party to understand how they came to be in the position of 
executing workers. The libertarians and anarchists in Europe 
were quick to point to the similarities between the Moscow 
Trials and the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion. While the 
anarchists and POUMistas were being betrayed by the Communists 
in Spain, the Kronstadt debate served as a foil for the larger 
question of whether Stalinism was the natural outgrowth of 
Leninism, or a deviation from it.
Serge did not share this view, nor was it his purpose in
intervening in the debate about Kronstadt. Trotsky saw Serge's 
intervention as a way of "manufactur[ing] a sort of synthesis of 
anarchism, POUMism and Marxism",247 which was not far from the 
truth. Nonetheless Serge was more than that, and at the same 
time that he argued with Trotsky over the importance of a 
reappraisal of what went wrong at Kronstadt and how it could 
have been avoided, he defended the Party against Anton Ciliga in
the same pages of the New International. To Trotsky Serge
maintained it was a lie that the Kronstadters wanted
246The following articles comprised the main part of the 
debate: LDT: "On Makhno and Kronstadt (July 6, 1937), VS:
"Fiction and Fact, Kronstadt," (La Revolution Proletarienne, 
Sept. 10, 1937), VS, "Kronstadt 1921, Against Sectarianism,
Bolshevism and Anarchism," (La Rev Prol, no. 257, Oct. 25, 
1937), LDT: "Hue and Cry Over Kronstadt" Jan. 15, 19 38-'(The New 
International. April 1938), VS, "Once More: Kronstadt" April 28, 
1938, (The New International, July 1938),,LDT: "Again on the
Kronstadt Repression" July 6, 1938, VS, "A Letter and Some
Notes," October 31, 1938, VS "More on the Suppression of
Kronstadt", July 6, 1938 (The New International, August 1938).
247LDT, "Hue and Cry Over Kronstadt," Jan. 15, 1938,
published in the April 1938 issue of The New International.
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privileges248: they wanted to end War Communism, restore soviet 
democracy and restore trade, which is what the NEP set out to 
do. Serge insisted it was not only healthy to look back at what 
happened, and how it could have been avoided, but that this was 
essential to draw the lessons. Trotsky agreed that it was 
"necessary to learn and think" but that advice was yery easy to 
give after the event.249 For his part, Trotsky revealed that he 
did not personally "participate in the suppression of the 
rebellion nor in the repressions following the suppression." 
However, as a member of the government Trotsky "considered the 
quelling of the rebellion necessary and therefore [I] bear
250responsibility for the suppression."
Trotsky aimed his fire at the 'moralists,' like Souvarine 
and Ciliga, who were interested in the question of LDT's 
personal responsibility. Serge also entered the fray, in order 
to defend the ideals of October from those, like Ciliga, who 
"judged [the revolution] in the light of Stalinism alone" and 
who directed personal attacks "against Trotsky out of bad faith, 
ignorance and sectarian spirit."251 Serge took on Anton 
Ciliga's ahistorical critique, stating,
248Trotsky had said that "The Kronstadters had demanded 
privileges" and Serge countered that he had been in Petrograd 
with Zinoviev at the time and followed events at close hand. The 
country was starving and the Kronstadters demanded 'freely 
elected soviets' and the abolition of the militias' barricades 
(zagraditelnye otriady) which stopped the population from 
looking for food on their own in the countryside. Moreover, 
Serge insisted, both the uprisings and the repression could have 
been avoided had the Central Committee listened to the 
Kronstadters grievances. Victor Serge, "Les Ecrits et Les Faits; 
Kronstadt," La Revolution proletarienne. (Paris) No. 254, Sept. 
10, 1937.
249LDT, "Hue and Cry Over Kronstadt," Jan. 15, 1938, The New 
International. April 1938.
250LDT, Ibid.
251VS, "A Letter and Some Notes," The New International, 
February 1939, p. 53.
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"What greater injustice can be imagined towards the 
Russian revolution than to judge it in the light of 
Stalinism alone? ... It is often said that 'the germ 
of all Stalinism was in Bolshevism at its beginning.'
Well, I have no objection. Only, Bolshevism also 
contained many other germs, a mass of other germs and 
those who lived through the enthusiasm of the first 
years of the first victorious socialist revolution 
ought not to forget it. To judge the living man by 
the death germs which the autopsy reveals in a corpse 
—  and which he may have carried in him since his
birth —  is that very sensible?
.. A little direct contact with the people was enough 
to get an idea of the drama which, in the revolution, 
separated the communist party (and with it the dust of 
the other revolutionary groups) from the masses. At 
no time did the revolutionary workers form more than 
a trifling percentage of the masses themselves. In 
1920-21, all that was energetic, militant, ever-so- 
little socialistic in the labor population and among 
the advanced elements of the countryside had already 
been drained by the communist party, which did not, 
for four years of civil war, stop its constant
mobilization of the willing —  down to the most
vacillating....... Eloquence of chronology: it is the
non-party workers of this epoch, joining the party to 
the number of 2,000,000 in 1924, upon the death of 
Lenin, who assure the victory of its bureaucracy. I 
assure you, Ciliga/ that these people never thought of 
the Third International. Many of the insurgents of 
Kronstadt did think of it; but they constituted an 
undeniable elite and, duped by their own passion, they 
opened in spite of themselves the doors to a frightful 
counter-revolution. The firmness of the Bolshevik 
party, on the other hand, sick as it was, delayed 
Thermidor by five to ten years."252
Clearly Serge and Trotsky had much in common in these thoughts.
It was not Serge who dredged up the debate in light of the
Spanish Civil War and a need to link the Stalinist weeds with
the Leninist germs, but Trotsky himself, in the Dewey Commission
on the Moscow Trials, when he was defending his record against
the calumny of the whole weight of the Soviet state. Serge took
the opportunity to raise some issues he thought worthy of
252Victor Serge, "Reply to Ciliga," The New International. 
February 1939.
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reflection, which had an educational value for the left in the 
West.
Trotsky's tone, in all of his replies, was one of
exasperation. He seemed most angry by the debates Serge raised.
When Serge published in Partisan Review an article entitled
"Marxism in Our Time"253 Trotsky replied without any evidence
of having read Serge's piece. Trotsky's disagreements with Serge
here turn into simple ad hominem attack:
"the ranks of the disillusioned include not only 
Stalinists but also the temporary fellow travelers of 
Bolshevism. Victor Serge —  to cite an instance —  
has recently announced that Bolshevism is passing 
through a crisis which presages in turn the 'crisis of 
Marxism.' In his theoretical innocence, Serge imagines 
himself the first to have made this discovery. Yet, in 
every epoch of reaction, scores and hundreds of 
unstable revolutionists have risen to announce the 
'crisis of Marxism' —  the final, the crucial, the 
mortal crisis.
That the old Bolshevik Party has spent itself, has 
degenerated and perished —  that much is beyond 
controversy. ... this does not at all invalidate 
Marxism, which is the algebra of revolution. That 
Victor Serge himself is passing through a 'crisis', 
i.e. has become hopelessly confused like thousands of 
other intellectuals —  is clear enough. But Victor
254Serge in crisis is not the crisis of Marxism."
In a fragment found among Trotsky's papers in Mexico, 
written sometime in 1939, he reached, perhaps, the peak of his 
animosity:
"Victor Serge claims that his enunciations, 
statements, and corrections, always revolving around 
his own personality, must without exception be printed 
by the workers' publications. Why? On what basis?
What does Victor Serge represent today in the workers' 
movement? An ulcer of his own doubts, of his own 
confusion and nothing more. ...What do people of the 
Victor Serge type represent? Our conclusion- is
253VS, "Marxism in Our Time," Partisan Review, Vol. V, No. 3, 
August-Sept. 1939, pp. 26-32.
254LDT, "Intellectual Ex-Radicals and World Reaction," Feb. 
17, 1939, published in Writings (1938-1939), Pathfinder Press, 
pp. 194-196.
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simple: these verbose, coquettish moralists, capable
of bringing only trouble and decay, must be kept out 
of the revolutionary organization, even by cannonfire 
if necessary."
Clearly with this fragment Trotsky overstepped the bounds
from viciousness to deadliness. It was as if all his
frustrations at being physically prevented from playing a
leading role in the struggle in the USSR and Europe were vented
in his literary tantrums against comrades like Serge. His own
son, Lev Lvovich Sedov, a frequent subject of Trotsky's anger,
recognized the deleterious effects of this kind of outburst:
"I think that all Dad's deficiencies have not 
diminished as he grew older, but under the influence 
of his isolation, very difficult, unprecedentedly 
difficult, gotten worse. His lack of tolerance, hot 
temper, inconsistency, even rudeness, his desire to 
humiliate, offend and even destroy have increased. It 
is not 'personal,' it is a method and hardly good in 
organization of work."
The rupture between Serge and Trotsky was never really 
completed, and had the character of a quarrel with room for 
conciliation. Even as Trotsky spewed out the worst venom, some 
of which is quoted above, he always left open the door for 
cooperation, provided of course, that Serge work within the FI. 
For Serge's part, the pain of Trotsky's invective was great, but 
did not deflect from Serge's essential appreciation of Trotsky's
255LDT, Writings. Supplement (1934-1940), p. 872.
256Lev Lyovich Sedov to his mother, Natalia Sedova, 16 April 
1936. Having vented his own frustration at his-*- father' s 
inconsistent meddling with the French Trotskyists, Sedov never 
sent this letter, and remained publicly his father's most ardent 
supporter. The letter was found in the Boris Nicolaevsky 
Collection at Stanford's Hoover Institution, series 231. It was 
also cited by Dale Reed and Michael Jakobson in "Trotsky Papers 
at the Hoover Institution: One Chapter of an Archival Mystery 
Story," The American Historical Review, Volume 92, Number 2, 
April 1987, p. 366.
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"greatness" whose "traits were those of several generations,
257developed to a very high degree of individual perfection."
In an essay Serge wrote to the memory of LDT, he described 
Trotsky as
"a doer, but one who brought to everything he did a 
lyrical touch.
.. .His absolute conviction that he knew the truth made 
him impervious to argument toward the end and 
detracted from his scientific spirit. He was 
authoritarian, because in our time of barbaric 
struggles thought turned into action must of necessity 
become authoritarian. When power was within his reach 
in 1924 and 1925, he refused to seize it because he 
felt that a socialist regime could not be run by 
decree.
...The end of his life was played out in loneliness.
He often paced up and down in his study in Coyoacan 
talking to himself. ... he would engage in discussions 
with Kamenev who had been shot long before; he was 
often heard addressing him by name. Although he was 
still at the height of his intellectual powers, what 
he wrote towards the end did not approach his earlier 
work in quality. People often forget that
intelligence does not exist in a vacuum. What would 
Beethoven have been had he been exiled among the deaf?
A man's intelligence needs to breathe. The 'Old Man's 
intellectual greatness was a product of his 
generation's. He needed direct contact with men of 
the same spiritual stamp as himself, men who could 
understand his unspoken thoughts and could argue on 
his level. He needed a Bukharin, a Pyatakov, a 
Preobrazhensky, a Rakovsky and an Ivan Smirnov; he 
needed Lenin to be fully himself. Even among us, who 
were younger but included such fine men as Eltsin, 
Solntsev, Yakovin, Dingaelstadt and Pankratov...he 
could find no equal; they lacked the advantage of his 
ten unique years of experience and thought." 58
All the more tragic, then, that Serge and Trotsky were not able
to work together in those dark years, that Serge's generous,
comradely attitude to Trotsky was not reciprocated.
257VS, "The Old Man," August 1, 1942, written in Mexico, "to 
the memory of Leon Davidovich Trotsky" and published in Victor 
Serge and Natalia Sedova Trotsky, The Life and Death of Leon 
Trotsky. Basic Books, 1975, p. 4.
258Serge and Sedova, Ibid. pp. 2-5.
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Worse, for Serge, was the destructive behavior of the
Trotskyists. It is clear that Serge did not think Trotsky a
Trotskyist in this sense. Trotsky's inflexibility could be
understood, wrote Serge, because he was "the last survivor of a
generation of giants." For the present generation and the
future, however, Serge was convinced that
"Socialism too had to renew itself in the world of 
today, and that this must take place through the 
jettisoning of the authoritarian, intolerant tradition 
of turn-of-the-century Russian Marxism. I recalled, 
for use against Trotsky himself, a sentence of 
astounding vision which he had written in 1914 I 
think: 'Bolshevism may very well be an excellent
instrument for the conquest of power, but after that 
it will reveal its counter-revolutionary aspects.'
... Our Oppositional movement in Russia had not been 
Trotskyist, since >we had no intention of attaching it 
to a personality, rebels as we ourselves were against 
the cult of the Leader. We regarded the Old Man only 
as one of our greatest comrades, an elder member of 
the family over whose ideas we argued freely. ...
I came to the conclusion that our Opposition had 
simultaneously contained two opposing lines of 
significance. For the great majority .. it meant 
resistance to totalitarianism in the name of . the 
democratic ideals expressed at the beginning of the 
Revolution; for a number of our Old Bolshevik leaders 
it meant, on the contrary, the defence of doctrinal 
orthodoxy which, while not excluding a certain 
tendency towards democracy, was authoritarian through 
and through. These two mingled strains had, between 
1923 and 1928 surrounded Trotsky's vigorous 
personality with a tremendous aura. If, in his exile 
from the USSR, he had made himself the ideologist of 
a renewed Socialism, critical in outlook and fearing 
diversity less than dogmatism, perhaps he would have 
attained a new greatness. But he was the prisoner of 
his own orthodoxy, the more so since his lapses into 
unorthodoxy were being denounced as treason. He saw 
his role as that of one carrying into the world at 
large a movement which was not only Russian^-but 
extinct in Russia itself, killed twice over, both by 
the bullets of its executioners and by changes in 
human mentality.1,259
259Serge, Memoirs. pp. 348-350. These thoughts were echoed 
in a -letter Serge wrote to Trotsky on May 27, 1936. In
discussing the strands of thought in the Left Opposition, Serge 
quoted Eltsin who admitted that the 'GPU created any unity we 
have.'
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Chapter Fives Section II
FROM PARIS TO MARSEILLES, MARSEILLES TO MEXICO: THE LONG, LAST 
JOURNEY FROM NIGHTMARE TO REFUGE
II. 5.13 "When Paris Ends, the World Ends..."
This chapter in Serge's life is very well documented. He 
wrote about it in his Memoirs, carried on a voluminous 
correspondence with Dwight and Nancy Macdonald in New York in 
search of material assistance and a visa for himself, his 
family, and other refugees in dire circumstances, and the 
experience is memorialized in the books of MaryJayne Gold, 
Varian Fry and Daniel Benedite, all of whom were with Serge in 
Marseilles in Villa Air-Bel. Nancy Macdonald also wrote of her 
experience with her 'first refugee', Victor Serge, in her 
account of the committee to rescue Spanish exiles.
Serge fled Paris in June of 1940 just as the Nazis entered 
the city gates. The war was on, but Serge commented that the 
French bourgeoisie was less than enthusiastic about fighting the 
fascists, who they preferred to the Popular Front of Leon Blum.1 
Thus, the 'phony war' which was barely fought, ending in 
France's surrender and division between occupied France, and the 
collaborationist, Vichy regime in the unoccupied South.2 As the 
German Army advanced, the roads to the South filled with the 
refugees not only from the occupied sector, but also from 
[defeated] Republican Spain, and Nazi Germany.
Europe's difficult situation only magnified Serge's own 
already precarious political and personal predicament. Serge's
Memoirs, p. 352.
2The first year of WWII was called the 'phony war' because 
it was uneventful and led to France's rapid capitulation. 
MaryJayne Gold described it as "rather a bore . .. [because] 
nothing much happened on the military fronts and there was 
nothing much to do in the rear." MaryJayne Gold, Crossroads 
Marseilles 1940. p. viii. Jean Malaquais wrote Serge that the 
troops at the front were utterly passive, talking only of women 
and booze. (Memoirs, p. 354)
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second edition of L'An I was postponed and the publicity for his 
just published Portrait de Stalin was canceled. He now lived 
with Laurette Sejourne,3 Vlady and Jeanine. He watched the 
bombs, knew it was time to leave, and yet clung to Paris, vainly 
hoping the situation would turn, in a sort of denial of the 
truth. Indeed, Serge commented: "When Paris ends the, world ends; 
useless to see the truth, how could one bear to acknowledge 
it?"4 He certainly wasn't alone in this, and many waited longer 
before taking to the South. In Serge's case one reason was his 
material situation; he simply never had the money to plot his 
future. That he waited until the last possible moment to escape 
also conforms to his character and his past —  he had to be 
there, to witness the cataclysms, to participate. In the 
Memoirs Serge wrote that he was writing some pages of a novel, 
not out of a love for literature, but because "this age must be 
witnessed."5
II. 5.14 The Sense of History
Serge's escape during the fall of France is charted in his 
novel The Long Dusk. There are glimpses of his thinking in 
several passages, sardonic reflections on the role of 
intelligence in a Europe taken over by barbaric 
totalitarianisms, the one fascist, the other Stalinist. His 
characters Tullio Gaetani and Dr. Ardatov (an older and more 
weary incarnation of Serge) reflect on their situation, and
3Liuba Russakova's (Serge's second wife) mental illness 
finally got the best of her and Serge had to leave her behind in 
a sanatorium in the South of France, where she remained until 
her death in 1985. He met Laurette, a French actress who had 
worked in Italy, in Paris. Laurette was described by-MaryJayne 
Gold as a "very young-looking thirty-year-old" who resembled a 
"Luini Madonna." Gold, p. 245. Laurette Sejourne married Don 
A. Orfila after Serge's death and resides with him today in 




Gaetani remembers a simpler time, when the antimonies were 
clearer:
"Against us, reaction, and we stood for progress, 
liberty, the republic, socialism. ... do you remember 
the radical magazines with a picture on the cover of 
an athlete breaking his chains, and behind him the sun 
rising with straight lines for rays ... representing 
the dawning day....We wrote good books, we created 
ideological fireworks on mountains of statistics, 
observations, scientific findings— and we did not 
suspect that we were passing through the magic gates 
of hell. Until history descended on us with rains of 
shrapnel, with dictatorships, propaganda, castor oil, 
socialist inquisitions, liberating revolutions 
transformed into tyrannies, abject tyrannies affirming 
by decree the genius of rational organization, an 
anti-socialist national socialism, a Bolshevism that 
exterminated the Bolsheviks. I understand that people 
should lose their heads and come to believe in chaos, 
in the perverse nature of man. I say: complexity, 
maelstrom, and man is in it, weak with his weak little 
mind, a prisoner of the machines he has built, crushed 
by the facility of destroying and being destroyed: 
thirty years of work are needed to make a man and a 
millionth of a second to destroy a hundred or more of 
them, without seeing them, by opening a valve in the 
belly of a bomber. It takes centuries and generations 
to build a cathedral and a single bomb pulverizes it 
by mistake in thirty seconds. Don't you regret the 
good old days, Simon?"
Serge (here Ardatov) wants to respond with Spinoza's
statement on the function of intelligence, not to deplore but to
understand. He comments instead, that this would only be true
if we were disembodied minds or we understood intelligence. But
Ardatov does respond:
...."Perhaps it's no more difficult to invent a human 
order, though it's more difficult to bring it about.
We were not insane. I agree that we lacked a sense of 
complexity, that we borrowed an infantile determinism 
from mechanics and a blind optimism from — the 
prosperous bourgeoisie. Our apparent error was to be 
neither devious nor skeptical. We anticipated too 
much, we thought in terms of diagrams, and our 
diagrams were muddled by the daubs and splotches of 
reality. From the point of view of Sirius, we were 
right and the events were wrong. Our mistakes were 
honorable. And even from a point of view less absurdly 
exalted, we were not so wrong. There is more
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falsification of ideas now than real confusion, and it 
is our own discoveries that are falsified. I feel 
humiliated only for the people who despair because we 
have been defeated. What is more natural and 
inevitable than to be beaten, to fail a hundred times, 
a thousand times, before succeeding? How many times 
does a child fall before he learns to walk? How many 
unknown navigators were lost at sea before a Columbus, 
guided by a magnificent error, could discover new 
continents? He followed an immense and correct 
intuition, he groped his way, he was right. If his 
nerves had weakened like those of his crew, twelve 
hours or twenty minutes before the discovery, he would 
have sailed back over the pitiful safe route of true 
defeat and oblivion. Others would have succeeded at 
a later date, can we doubt it? —  The main thing is to 
have strong nerves, everything depends on that. And 
lucidity. "
The Nazis invaded Paris on June 10, and Serge left that day
with his son Vlady, Laurette Sejourne, and a Spaniard, Narciso
Molins7. Their experience is paralleled in the fictional escape
of the Russian revolutionary refugee Dr. Simon Ardatov, the
German revolutionary socialist [refugee] Hilda, the Spanish
Civil War refugee Jose Ortiga and the slightly deranged deserter
Laurent Justinien in Serge's novel Les Derniers Temps.. Serge,
his family and Narciso left on foot, until "a providential taxi"
appeared and took them through the Fountainebleau woods,
underneath a barrage of shells.
With Europe collapsing behind them, Serge felt a certain
relief: he wrote of his "sense of release bordering ... on
• 8gaiety." Serge's isolation and historical marginality could be 
[ just might be] swept away with this new cataclysm. His journey
6Serge, The Long Dusk, pp. 317-318.
7 ^
Narciso, mentioned by first name only in the Memoirs, is 
described by Danny Benedite (Serge's comrade in Marseilles) as 
an ex-member of the Executive Committee of the POUM, and a 
friend of Vlady's. Daniel Benedite, La Filiere Marseillaise: Un 
chemin vers la Liberte sous 1'occupation. Editions Clancier 




through Vichy France, Marseilles and on to the 'New World' was 
solitary, in the sense that he was alone in the world with his 
sense of history and his revolutionary past, alone a vanquished 
refugee of the revolutionary generation, cast adrift in a Europe 
where the Gestapo and the GPU hunted him, and the Social 
Democrats glanced askance.
The crew of four were in need of sanctuary and Serge 
remembered his "Socialist" friends who had visited him in Paris 
and offered to reciprocate should the situation in Paris get too 
'disagreeable.' However, as Serge blithely noted, Laurette was 
"hounded, 'ever so politely,' out of a chateau" of a well-to-do 
anarchist on a day of torrential rain9 and when the group 
entered an abandoned farm in the woods owned by a Socialist 
journalist10 friend, he begged them to be off, for surely the 
Nazis would be right behind them. This so-called socialist 
journalist friend, Serge related in his Memoirs, had been 
converted to collaboration with the fascists. Still seeking 
sanctuary, Serge tried the house of a pacifist author who 
promised him refuge, only to find "the door ... shut and well- 
guarded ."11
The situation was appalling in a moral sense, since some of 
those who closed their doors were once refugees themselves. 
Some of the Spanish Civil War refugees had even become bandits. 
The concern for personal survival, material comfort and money 
was, to Serge, another aspect of the defeat.12 Serge noted that
9 Memoirs. p. 359.
10In an article which appeared in 1942 in Partisan Review, 
entitled "On The Eve," which is an earlier fragment of the 
Memoirs, Serge spoke of this friend "who had been a^socialist 
journalist the day before yesterday,.. . now in favor of a strong 
military government." PR, Vol. 9, #1, Jan-Feb 1942, p. 23.
11Memoirs, p. 359.
12 This sentiment is developed in the article "On the Eve" 
a fragment of the Memoirs translated by Jean Connolly in
(continued...)
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with the far left remained the task of survival; the survival of
thought, and the survival of solidarity.
Even worse than the defeat, was the knowledge that what was
left of the left was shrinking:
" I realized suddenly that we political refugees, we 
hunted revolutionists, were doubly, triply, beaten at 
the moment, for many of us were no longer 'of us,' 
having been defeated and demoralized in the depths of 
our souls. We had begun to fight among ourselves for 
a place on the last boat. The extremity of our defeat 
was this sauve qui peut. The end of solidarity means 
the finish of socialism and the workers' movement."
Yet even as some of the left jealously guarded for
themselves the last few ways out of the nightmare, there were
others who offered their last morsel to share. It is this
complex vision of defeat and yet survival of solidarity that
Serge evokes in some of his finest writings, both in the
Memoirs, the novel The Long Dusk (TLD), and later in Les Annees
Sans Pardon. It is the knowledge that the immediate defeat is
not a final one, that the knowledge —  the "superabundance of
consciousness and will" —  is what is essential. Serge chose to
describe this as 'the sense of history.'
The sense of history is vital if the world is to be
transformed and it is that very sense, that political-historical
consciousness, that threatened the survival of those who held
it. The revolutionary generation faced defeat on three fronts:
mind, spirit, body. The political defeat was accompanied by a
moral defeat, and a physical one, either by physical
elimination, or the deprivation of a means of livelihood to
sustain physical existence. Serge's novel TLD reflects this
giant struggle: not simply the defeat inflicted by the twin
totalitarianisms on a collective scale, but the physical, moral
12(. . .continued)
Partisan Review. Jan-Feb 1942. When the Memoirs were finally 
published in France in 1951 and translated into English in 1963, 
this fragment was changed. Gone was the longer reflection on 
the 'triple' defeat, the demoralization, and at the same time, 
the confident hope of being "on the eve", pp. 23-33.
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and political toll it exacted on Serge's individual characters, 
who dare to try to maintain their sense of history and their 
human dignity.
As in Serge's novels, so in his life. Now on the run,
Serge's precarious financial situation suddenly became more
acute. The pressure to survive intact, to write, and simply to
eat and to provide is magnified. Serge noticed, in TLD, that
there are those who participate in history, think and take
risks, while "people who have nothing to do surround themselves
with lots of comfort. They take care of themselves."13 Those
who think, unfortunately, cannot sustain their bodies simply by
thought, nor even by writing or participation in history.
Ardatov echoes these sentiments:
"a good deal of physical weakness can be overcome by 
clear thinking, by the will to hold firm, by the sense 
of history that will bring us revenge, by stubbornness 
in clinging to one's opinions— yet there are some 
weaknesses that cannot be overcome. Perhaps the 
hardest struggle is that between the mind and the 
(undernourished) flesh which nourishes the mind, 
exalts it above the flesh and sometimes suddenly 
debases it."14
In the Memoirs, Serge comments on the sense of history, 
which is also the title of an article he wrote for La Wallonie, 
(7 aout 1937) and an entry in his Carnets (5 Jan. 1944). Indeed 
this 'sense' is part of what sets this generation of vanquished 
revolutionaries apart, and prevents them from dissolving into 
ordinary life. It is not just that this rapidly depleting 
generation ".. have caught a glimpse of man resolving his own 
history:"15 the old world is disintegrating and new barbarisms 
arise amid a terrible apathy and resignation. Well then, perhaps
Victor Serge, The Long Dusk. The Dial Press, New York, 
1946, p. 356. Translated from the French original Les Dernier 
Temps by Ralph Manheim.
14Serge, The Long Dusk, pp. 61-62.
15Memoirs, 366-367.
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at least this dreadful destruction will seed a renewal —  this
is what Serge insinuates:
"Now it is all over: the rotten tooth has been pulled 
out, the leap into the unknown has been made. It will 
be black and terrible, but those who survive will see 
a new world born. There are very few people who have 
this new sense which modern man is so painfully 
developing: the sense of history. "16
Serge returned again and again to this theme. He said he learned
from the Russian intelligentsia that the "only meaning of life
lies in the conscious participation in the making of history. "17
The old Russian revolutionary exiles who Serge grew up with also
taught him to "have faith in mankind and to wait steadfastly for
the necessary cataclysms."18 This patience and sense of history
became a kind of leitmotif running through all his writing, and
thinking. It reflected the maturity of his thought, his personal
testament, but included simultaneously a measure of despair over
his intellectual and political isolation, and his general
optimism on the human condition on its rocky road to a
collective, socialist, democratic future. Serge's 'sense of
history' became a kind of dialectical expression of the
historical crossroads of humanity at the near half-point of the
twentieth century. In the novel on the fall of France the twin
dangers of fascism and Stalinism have the left cornered,
pondering their historic and yet personal significance:
" We are grains of sand in the dune. Sometimes we 
have a glimmer of consciousness, which is essential 
but which may well be inefficacious. The dune has 
curves in its surface, caused by the wind. The 
consciousness of the thinking grains of sand can do 
nothing to change them...... we must foresee, that it
lsIbid. . pp. 357-358.
17Ibid., p. 374. Recall also Serge's earlier description of
the sense of history, which could also be described as a clear 
political consciousness, during the age of revolution, in the 
now far-off twenties: "All we lived for was activity integrated 
into history; we were interchangeable....Memoirs, p. 177.
leIbid. . p. 358.
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[the world] is moving toward the object of our hopes, 
passing over our bodies and our skulls on the way. 
Neither revolutionary rhetoric nor the spirit of 
sacrifice can compensate for our impotence. The 
Spanish Revolution was lost in advance... the Popular 
Front betrayed itself in advance, the European 
democracies, tender mother of fascism, were defeated 
in advance by the totalitarian machines; and these 
last are equally defeated, defeated by the defeated 
and by the industrial machines of America and Russia, 
which in spite of themselves will take over the 
acquisitions of the Nazis, adapting them to the 
mentality of the Anglo-Saxon democracy and to the 
spirit, as yet unforeseeable, of an immense revolution 
seething with contradiction.
In all this, the conscious grains are precious; let 
us not underestimate ourselves. What counts is always 
the rise or fall of man. This may be pride, but it 
sustains us, provided of course, that it be a pride 
without self-complacency and without concern for
appearances. A number of precious grains will be 
crushed or inexplicably buried. However, a century 
will not pass before Europe, Euramerica, Eurasia see 
the birth of a rational, balanced, intelligent 
organization capable of re-conceiving history and
guiding it, and at last attacking seriously the
problems of the structure of matter-enercjy and its 
galaxies. Human destiny will brighten— u l
Significantly, the novel is not only about the fall of
France and symbolically the defeat of the struggles ushered in
by the October Revolution and the fate of the 'shipwrecked'
generations it is also about the birth of the resistance,
portrayed in the final chapter. The sense of history is not
simply the knowledge that the old generation carries with them,
it is also the will to hang on, to struggle, to be the link
between the defeated past and the expectant future.
The mature Serge returned to the theme of the sense of
history in his notebooks or Carnets, in January of 1944, where
he mused that "Men would need a sense of history comparable to
19Serge, The Long Dusk, pp. 72-73.
421
20the sense of direction of migratory birds." Serge wrote that 
the 'enormous spiritual magnetism of Marx's work" is explicable 
by this 'revelation of historical sense." In this later work, 
Serge defined the sense of history as "the consciousness of 
participation in the collective destiny, in the constant 
development of mankind; it involves knowledge, tradition, choice 
and hence, conviction, it commands a duty —  ... we must live 
(act) according to this sudden awareness."21
Those who carry this historical consciousness become 
dangerous men, wrote Serge, and thus the sense of history 
carries a psychological burdens the conflict between instinct 
and reason/understanding can give rise to panic. This happened 
in the Moscow trials. Serge had developed his understanding of 
Freud and psychological studies in these later years in Mexico 
(when he was writing the Carnets) which is reflected in this 
essay. Consciousness comes into conflict with a sense of fear or 
primordial anguish, which then expresses the failure of the 
sense of history. Serge used Trotsky as an example of an 
individual endowed with this sense, whose personal courage 
allowed him to overcome not only fear, but to continue fighting, 
unfortunately "with arms which had become inadequate." Trotsky, 
wrote Serge, was characteristic of a "man who endeavors to be 
integrated to history in order to live and whose spirit is 
constantly subordinated to the sense of history. He expresses 
this well in the last pages of Mv Life.1,22
20 •Victor Serge, Carnets, Actes Sud, Paris, 1985, p. 53. In 
the original the phrase is "Les Hommes auraient besoin d'un sens 
de l'histoire comparable au sens de 1' orientation des oiseaux 
migrateurs."
21Ibid.
22Ibid. Serge was right that Trotsky carried this 
'historical sense,' as did Serge and other 'genuine' Marxists, 
who could "look with clear eyes on the worst tragedies, and even 
in the midst of the greatest defeats he feels himself enlarged 
by his ability to understand, his will to act and to resist..."
(continued...)
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In an essay on "Marxism in Our Time," published in Dwight 
Macdonald's Partisan Review in 1938, an essay that became a bone 
of contention in the difficult relationship between Serge and 
Trotsky,23 Serge wrote of Marxism's many contributions, and 
noted:
"Marxism, finally, gives us what I call the 
'historical sense'" it makes us conscious that we live 
in a world which is in process of changing; it 
enlightens us as to our possible function— and our 
limitations— in this continual struggle and creation; 
it teaches us to integrate ourselves, with all our 
will, all our talents, to bring about those historical 
processes that are, as the case may be, necessary, 
inevitable, or desirable. And it is thus that it 
allows us to confer on our isolated lives a high 
significance, by tying them, through a consciousness 
which heightens and enriches the spiritual life, to 
that life— collective, innumerable, and permanent— of 
which history is only the record." 4
II. 5.15 The Macdonalds, and Marseilles: A shipwrecked
continent with too few lifebelts, and too many castaways
Serge came into contact with Dwight Macdonald through the 
American left literary journal Partisan Review, which Macdonald 
edited and to which Serge contributed. Serge's contributions to 
PR span the years 1938-1947. PR paid Serge for his articles,
22 (...continued)
(Serge, Partisan Review. Vol V, No. 3, 1938, p. 27.) There is a 
certain irony in Serge's exemplifying Trotsky as the consciously 
awakened historical instrument because in his dispute with 
Trotsky over Kronstadt, Serge was pleading that Trotsky use his 
historical sense.
23Trotsky was venomous in his critique of Serge and his 
'petty-bourgeois intellectual' crises. Serge was the 'moralist' 
Trotsky referred to in his "On Moralists and Sycophants" 
(Souvarine the sycophant in question). Leaving aside the obvious 
slander (Serge was hardly petty-bourgeois in classical Marxist 
categories) the language Trotsky employed was unfortunate at 
best: even the lyricism with which Serge wrote became an object 
of derision. See especially Chap. V, Section I, fn 215 above.
24Victor Serge, "Marxism in Our Time," Partisan Review, Vol 
V, No. 3, August-September 1938, p. 27.
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alleviating somewhat his difficult financial circumstances. In 
November 1939, Dwight Macdonald sent Serge a check for $38 and 
remarked: "In these tragic times, I often think of you and
wonder about your life in France. You can be sure you still 
have many friends (unknown to you) and admirers in this
25country." From Fenlac in the Dordogne, Serge remembered this,
and wrote to the Macdonalds for help:
By some luck I managed to flee Paris at the very last 
minute. We have been traveling in freight trains, 
spending nights in the fields. ...in the Loire country 
we were so tired that we lay down behind some stones 
and slept through an entire bombardment. Nowhere, in 
this completely chaotic world, were we able to find 
any asylum. Finally the roads were barred and we were 
stranded in the small village in the south from which 
I am writing you. I do not think I will be able to 
remain here since I know no one and have neither roof 
nor money nor chance of earning anything.
Of all I once owned— clothes, books, writings-— I 
was able to save only what my friends and I could 
carry away on our backs in knapsacks. It is very 
little, but fortunately includes the manuscripts which 
I have already begun. This letter is a sort of S.O.S. 
which I hope that you will also communicate to my 
known and unknown friends in America. I have no money 
for stamps; I will be able to send off perhaps one or 
two letters, but that is all. I must ask you to 
immediately undertake some action of material aid for 
me. I have scarcely a hundred francs left: we are
eating only one meal a day and it is a very poor one 
at that. I don't at all know how we are going to hold 
out. "26
The Macdonalds answered this appeal by setting up the 
Partisan Review Fund for European Writers and Artists. This was 
the beginning of Nancy Macdonald's lifelong commitment to the 
"real heroes and heroines of modern times, who have been victims
25Dwight MacDonald to Victor Serge, Nov. 14, 1939, MacDonald 
Papers, Yale University.
26Victor Serge to Nancy and Dwight MacDonald, published in 
Nancy MacDonald, Homage to the Spanish Exiles. Insight Books, 
New York, 1987, p. 55.
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of both Communist and Fascist totalitarianism. "27 Victor Serge 
was the first refugee she helped, and by 1953 she set up Spanish 
Refugee Aid, a committee that raised and distributed money among 
13,000 refugees, mainly political refugees of the Spanish Civil 
War.
On July 20, 1940, Nancy Macdonald first wrote the American 
Consul in Marseilles to invite Serge and his family to come to 
the United States, and to live with the Macdonalds in New
2fl
York. From 1940 well into 1942, the Macdonalds were Serge's 
lifeline. They corresponded regularly, sent him money, and 
interceded on his behalf with the State Department in the 
attempt to get Serge first an American visa, and then simply an 
American transit visa after his Mexican visa was obtained 
through the efforts of Julian Gorkin. After Serge and Vlady left 
France in March 1941, the Macdonalds continued to help Serge 
financially, and continued their efforts on behalf of Laurette 
Sejourne and Jeanine Kibalchich, until they were also able to 
leave France to join Serge in Mexico, in March 1942. The 
extensive correspondence, collected at Yale University library, 
measures some five inches in thickness, and is a testament to 
political and human solidarity. In the Memoirs Serge said a 
letter he had received from Dwight Macdonald, who Serge had 
never met, seemed "to clasp my hands in the dark, I can hardly 
believe it. So then, let us hold on."29
Holding on was the main task. This was Serge's fourth 
exile, and seventh flight in twenty years. Serge and his 
entourage successfully navigated the congested roads to 
Marseilles, only to find they were too late. There were no more 
lifeboats out. Marseilles was teeming with refugees of all
27Nancy MacDonald, op. cit. p. 15.
28Nancy Macdonald to American Consul, July 20 , 1940,
MacDonald Papers, Yale Collection.
29 •Memoirs, p. 360.
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beleaguered Europe, representing most social classes. There was 
a surfeit of talent and brains, all at the "limit of their 
nervous resources." The Jews suffered their own particular hell. 
They all lived, trying to maintain a shred of human dignity, in 
a "twilight zone of illegality,"30 hunted, harassed and ignored. 
Being a man of the far left, Serge was shunned and excluded, 
marginalized and exposed. He commented:
"In drawing up visa-lists, both in America and here, 
the leading figures of the old exiled parties were, it 
seems, determined to exclude the militants of the far 
Left...everybody is making their escape through the 
political family-network: groupings are of use now 
only for that purpose. So much the worse for the man 
of no Party who has dared to think only in terms of 
Socialism in all its vastness! All of my party, all of 
it, has been shot or murdered^ and so I am alone, a 
curiously disturbing figure."3
And to the Macdonalds on August 14, 1940, Serge added:
"Here is what I must ask of my known and unknown 
friends in America in order to survive. At present, 
it is impossible for me to find here work or help (and 
I am a little handicapped by my 49 years). Therefore 
the necessity for material aid. The best thing might 
be for me to collaborate with some one or use some 
unpublished works which would seem to be of interest 
to various publics. ...help is needed urgently. I 
understand that there are certain organizations which 
help political refugees, only I am outside the old 
well known groups and they jealously guard for their 
own people their connections and resources. Being 
alone and an independent, I have not benefitted by any 
of these supports and I am not on the lists of the old 
Russian socialists which have been, I know it, drawn
30MaryJayne Gold, Crossroads Marseilles 1940. p. 169.
31Ibid.. p. 361. The visa lists drawn up in France that 
Serge refers to were not the visa lists of Varian Fry's ERC, but 
of Frank Bohn who was a right wing socialist and the AFL 
representative in Marseilles. He worked with the ERC, was in 
fact Fry's first contact, and Fry took over and greatly expanded 
the work after Bohn returned to the US. See Serge's letters of 
August 19, August 30. September 7 and October 8, 1940 to the 
MacDonalds (Yale Collection), Fry's Surrender on Demand, pp. 7- 
12, 51-59, 93.
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up in America, for help and visas (they include only 
Mensheviks, social-revolutionaries and Jews), for me 
there will have to be a separate personal appeal."
And on August 22s
..."the situation becomes more and more 
difficult...almost untenable: no place of refuge, no 
resources, no help and difficulties of every kind. I 
must hold out and again I will make every effort to 
hold out."32
Serge also contacted the Mexican Embassy in search of a Mexican
visa, and Jewish organizations for help for himself and his
comrades and friends.33
Serge was left to fend for himself in the summer months of
1940, trying to find refuge in Marseilles, dashing off letters
to America and beyond. In TLD, Serge described the left, far
left and intellectuals
who would have remained famous if only they had had an 
orchestra, a hospital, a magazine or a party to 
direct. But having only their brains overloaded with 
memories and superfluous knowledge, they were less 
competent at living than the pimps and Sudanese 
longshoremen, the pretty streetwalkers, the unemployed 
seaman, the'Balkan racketeers..."
In the Memoirs, Serge described the exiles in Marseilles as
"a beggar's alley gathering the remnants of 
revolutions, democracies, and crushed intellects. 
...Those with the most scars take the shock best.
These are the young revolutionary workers or semi-
These letters to "Cher Amis" —  the MacDonalds, gave 
Serge's address as care of Madame Sosnovski, 123 rue Horace 
Bertin, Marseille.
33FBI file on Victor Kibaltchiche alias Victor Serge, Item
2-293 dated January 5, 1940 and Item 2-259, August 13, 1940. 
Here the FBI has obviously made a mistake on dates, since both 
items are datelined Marseilles, but in January 1940 Serge was 
still in Paris. It is possible he sought a Mexican visa in 
Paris in January, though there is no evidence for it.
34Serge, The Long Dusk, p. 307.
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intellectuals who have passed through countless 
prisons and concentration camps...."
Serge was a professional at being a refugee on the run: it 
was his main life experience. Others were far less suited; 
indeed, one need only read MaryJayne Gold's portrait of Franz 
Werfel and his wife, Alma,36 to see how. The Werfels, talented 
and refined, old and used to comfort, were physically ill- 
prepared for flight and horrified by the discomfort of retreat. 
Serge, on the other hand, had spent so much of his life without 
security, that he learned to become indifferent to the creature 
comforts provided by material goods.37
While Serge was in Marseilles, Trotsky was murdered in 
Mexico, on Aug. 20, 1940. Serge recalled in the Memoirs seeing 
the news and feeling that this was an appropriate time for the 
Old Man to go, "the blackest hour for the working classes: just
38as their keenest hour saw his highest ascendancy." To Fritz
Brupbacher, Serge wrote on August 23:
"the thought of the tragic event in Mexico City and of 
that great mind which has just been extinguished, 
horribly... When I think of the man's high-minded 
intelligence, of the extraordinary rectitude of his 
soul, of his rich vitality, all our discords vanish, 
nothing remains of the quarrels over ideas that 
divided us, I am stunned, devastated, .... Trotsky's 
disappearance leaves me in a singularly perilous 
position since now I am alone, the last free witness - 
- more or less —  of a whole era of the Russian 
revolution —  and the last representative of the men
35Memoirs, p. 362.
36Alma had been married to three of Germany's most gifted 
men: Gustav Mahler, the composer; Walter Gropius, founder of the
Bauhaus school of architecture, and Franz Werfel, novelist and 
playwright. Gold, p. 180-181. Notwithstanding Gold's 
observation, it should be noted that Mahler was Austrian, not 
German.
37Fry, pp. 5-6 and 168-71; Gold 178-199; and Serge 371-2.
38Serge, Memoirs. p. 365.
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who, beginning in 1923-1926, defended its essence
against Stalin. "39
Serge wrote to the Macdonalds on August 22 of having received 
the terrible news from Mexico, and asked for information about 
the assassin, and again on August 30, discreetly asking them if 
they had any news of "L'affaire de Mexico". In another letter 
on 26 August, Serge connected the Reiss murder, the first 
attentat on Trotsky and the final act. Serge asked for a photo 
of the assassin, and also asked the Macdonalds to express to 
Natalia "toute 1'affection ...au'elle inspire a quelques mis 
dispereses mais fiales despit des divergences de vues." Serge 
also mentioned how badly affected Vlady had been by the 
assassination, and told the Macdonalds that he thought Krivitsky 
could be very useful in helping them sort out the affair because 
of his 'experience and intuition."40 It also appears that the 
Macdonalds tried to help save Trotsky as soon as they heard he 
had been mortally wounded. They made arrangements to send a 
fine "brain specialist" to Mexico City, but it was "too late." 
Trotsky died within 24 hours.41
The death of Trotsky, followed a few months later by the 
death of Krivitsky in suspicious circumstances, suddenly made 
Serge's situation42 even more dangerous, as he intimated in his 
letter to Brupbacher (above). MaryJayne Gold noted that no one 
talked anymore of Serge's paranoia. In fact, Serge was on the
39Serge to Brupbacher, Brupbacher papers, Zurich. Cited in 
unpublished mss "Victor Serge and Leon Trotsky: Relations 1936- 
1940," by Richard Greeman, p. 37.
40VS to the MacDonalds, 26, Aug. 1940, MacDonald Papers, 
Yale University.
41Nancy Rodman MacDonald to Victor Serge, Sept. 30, 1940. 
This letter was written in a cryptic style, but apparently did 
not reach Serge, at least this copy. (The letter was sent in 
duplicate to Marseilles and Lisbon.) It was returned to the 
MacDonalds from Lisbon in December of 1940.
42Serge, along with Natalia Sedova, were the only Russian 
Left Oppositionists still alive outside the USSR.
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GPU's hit list, as we noted earlier. Zborowski aka Etienne, 
Stalin's trusted agent in the Left Opposition circle in Paris, 
operated in the larger NKVD French network headed by Sergei 
Efron and his wife, the Russian poet Marina Tsvetayeva. Efron 
coordinated plans to 'hit' Henrik Sneevliet and Victor Serge, 
but were unable to accomplish their task.43
The need to get out of Europe was ever more urgent and 
Serge wrote the Macdonald's that he received a letter from 
Julian Gomez Gorkin who said he could obtain a Mexican visa for 
Serge, (Aug. 26) but Serge preferred to go to the US. Serge was 
also adamant that he would not go unless Vlady also got a visa 
since Vlady had no passport. After the death of the Old Man, 
Serge continued,
"Je me sens —  par simple logique— sensiblement plus 
menace qu'aiparavant; c'est une raison pour hater le 
depart, c'est une raison aussi pour eviter les 
aventures (depart en mauvaises conditions), c'est une 
raison de preferer les EU au Mexique —  si l'on a le 
choix. "44
II. 5.16 The Emergency Rescue Committee
That summer a group of American citizens who were shocked 
to learn that a clause in the armistice signed with Germany 
following the June invasion of France provided for the 
"surrender on demand" of refugees. France had always been a 
haven for exiles, whose lives were now threatened. They put 
together the Emergency Rescue Committee [ERC], whose "sole 
purpose was to bring the political and intellectual refugees out 
of France before the Gestapo and the Ovra and the Seguridad got
See, inter alia, Victor Alba and Stephen Schwartz, Spanish 
Marxism versus Soviet Communism: A History of the POUM,
Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1988. pp. 220-221.
44Serge to MacDonalds, Oct 7, 1940 (MacDonald papers, Yale 
University).
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them. "45 The committee drafted Varian Fry, a Harvard graduate 
who had been shocked by what he saw in Germany in 1935, to move 
to Marseilles to get them out.
Fry linked up with Danny Benedite, his British wife Theo, 
and Jean Gemahling in Marseilles. Benedite was a left wing 
Socialist who had met Serge in 1936, while working in the Police 
Prefecture, and had helped Serge get a French residence 
permit.46 In 1940, he and his comrade-in-arms Jean Gemahling 
were demobilized from the British division of the Allies and 
sent to unoccupied France. There they began to work in the 
French office of the Emergency Rescue Committee [ERC], known as 
Centre Americain de Secours [CAS]. Their work essentially 
constituted the humble beginnings of the maquis, or 
Resistance.47 A family friend of the Benedites, MaryJayne Gold, 
an American heiress living in Europe since 1929, became involved 
in the work of the committee, and quietly financed much of the 
operations.48
45The secret police of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and 
Francoist Spain. See Surrender on Demand, Varian Fry, Random 
House, New York, 1945, pp. ix-x.
46Daniel Benedite, typescript, pp. 1-2. [Obtained through
Richard Greeman]
47Indeed, in a letter Serge wrote to Danny Benedite from 
Mexico on 22 June 1946, Serge commented, "Ce fut un beau 
commencement! Ce fut en verite la toute premiere Resistance, 
bien avant que le mot n'ait apparu." ["It was a beautiful 
beginning! It was in truth the very first Resistance, well 
before the word had appeared."] Victor Serge to Danny Benedite, 
22 June 1946, published in Carnets, pp. 157-163.
48Serge's novel of the fall of France is drawn from the 
people and experiences in Marseilles. Danny and Theo Benedite's 
experiences in the Resistance are represented in the final 
chapter of The Long Dusk, and both Varian Fry and MaryJayne make 
an appearance on page 250, where Serge describes the work of 
Jacob Kaaden and the 'aid committee." Kaaden was in the business 
of obtaining visas and met 'a blonde young de Gaullist' who was 
negotiating to buy a boat to get refugees out.
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From August 1940 until September 1941 when Fry had to leave 
France against his will, the ERC/CAS was in the business of 
rescuing, under the nose of the Gestapo, hundreds of anti-Nazi 
refugees by legal and illegal means, the endangered species of 
talent and intellect, Jewish and non-Jewish, political or 
otherwise. The work of the committee continued until June 1942, 
and dealt with 2000 cases, some 4000 endangered human beings. 
The rescued included artists, writers, publishers, editors, 
scientists, philosophers and political militants. Victor Serge 
was one of them.
Serge had written in his Memoirs that "if it had not been 
for Varian Fry's American Relief Committee, a goodly number of 
refugees would have had no reasonable recourse open to them but
49to jump into the sea." As it turned out, some did commit 
suicide, including Walter Benjamin, and possibly Rudolf 
Hilferding, who was a client of the Committee. The Committee 
had secured Hilferding and Rudolf Breitscheid visas [that most 
impossible and precious commodity] and places on a boat, but 
they were arrested on their way out, turned over to Vichy 
officials and then to the Nazis. Hilferding was found hanging 
from a hook in the Sante prison the day he was to have been 
turned over to the Germans. The Nazis killed Breitscheid in 
1944.50 The anti-Nazi lawyer Alfred Apfel who had worked on 
Hilferding and Breitsheid's cases himself came to Fry's office 
the day they heard that Breitscheid and Hilferding had been 
arrested. Fry warned Apfel to be careful himself, at which 
point Apfel was stricken by a fatal heart attack.51 Gold 
related that Fry felt responsible and had nightmares for weeks.
49Serge, Memoirs, p. 362.
50For the accounts of their fate, see MaryJayne Gold, pp. 
302-305, Serge Memoirs p. 364, and Fry, pp. 170-178.
51Fry p. 176-177, Serge p. 365, Gold, p. 305.
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II. 5.17 Villa AirBel —  Chateau Espere-Visa
In the Indian summer of October 1940, Mary-Jayne Gold found 
a Villa just outside Marseilles as a place of refuge from the 
overwhelming pressure of the Committee's work. It was originally 
intended to be a home for Mary-Jayne and the Benedites, Danny, 
Theo and their son Pierre. Varian Fry, however, ,also needed 
respite from the tremendous pressure, and Jean Gemahling as 
well. Villa Air-Bel, as it was known, was outside of Marseilles 
but on the tramline. It was huge and yet "dirt cheap,"52 a 
marvelous early 19th Century bourgeois eighteen room estate with 
three floors, a beautifully decorated and intelligently stocked 
library, grounds with a garden, a cow for milk, in sum, an 
"ideal country estate," ready, in Mary-Jayne's words, for a 
large "Victorian family" to move right in. A 'large political 
family' was about to.
Like most of the other refugees in Marseilles, Serge had 
been living in one hotel after another.53 When Danny Benedite 
invited Serge to join them at Air-Bel, Serge replied:
"J'accepte avec joie, d'autant plus que mes logeurs 
commencent a me trouver encombrant —  et peu 
remunerateur. Mais vous savez, Danny, que je ne suis 
pas seul; il y a aussi ma compagne, Laurette Sejourne, 
et mon fils Vlady"...
— "Pas le moindre probleme....
— "Savez-vous qu'Andre Breton est a Marseille, lui 
aussi tres precairement installe? II passe pour etre 
un homme difficile mais je peux vous garantir qu' il 
est charmant et d'une frequentation reellement 
enrichisante. Pourriez-vous l'heberger? Mais il n'est 
pas seul, lui non plus, il a sa femme et sa fille avec 
lui." 54
52Mary Jayne Gold, op. cit. . p. 242.
53Benedite, p. 54.
54Benedite, p. 58. Translation: "I accept with joy,
especially as my landlord is beginning to find my presence 
bothersome and unrewarding. But you know, Danny, I'm not alone: 
there are also my companion, Laurette Sejourne, and my son, 
Vlady." "No problem. Even with other co-workers from the
(continued...)
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This concern for the fate of other refugees peppers all of 
Serge's correspondence in the period. He was preoccupied with 
the intolerable situation for the Spanish refugees, and wrote 
the Macdonalds that something must be done for the POUMistas 
Juan Andrade55, Wilebaldo Solano56, and Narciso Molins, who were 
in danger. Serge was particularly concerned for the safety of 
Elsa Reiss, widow of Ignace Reiss who was murdered by the GPU in 
Switzerland in 1938.57
Villa Air-Bel became a "wonderful haven58" for those 
waiting for visas. Mary-Jayne Gold, the Benedites, Jean 
Gemahling, and Varian Fry from the ERC (as well as Miriam
54(.. .continued)
American committee, there will be extra room." "Did you know 
that Andre Breton is here? He has a reputation for being 
difficult, but I assure you he's a charming man whose company is 
truly enriching. Could you put him up?..But he's not alone 
either. He has his wife and his little daughter with him."
55Serge wrote Nancy MacDonald that Andrade was suffering 
with tuberculosis in the prison of Montauban in Vichy-ruled 
France. Serge fictionalized Andrade's predicament in TLD. See 
correspondence, Oct. 7 1940, and Nancy MacDonald^ op. cit, p. 
45.
56Poumista who had visited Serge in Paris in 1937.
57MacDonald-Serge Correspondence, Yale University: Serge to 
MacDonald, 30 Aug. 1940; Nancy MacDonald to Serge, Sept. 9, 1940 
and Oct. 30, 1940. When Serge first wrote to the MacDonalds 
nothing had yet been done about Elsa Reiss-Poretsky, but by 
Oct.7, 1940, Serge was able to write to the Macdonalds that Elsa 
was in Lisbon, on her way to the US. The Mensheviks had been 
active helping her, though without much success. Serge 
continued,
"mais elle n'en attendait pas de resultat favorable, 
soit qu'elle fut encline a tout voir en noir, soit 
qu'elle connut l'egoisme de clan des hommes qui-lui 
avaient promis de s'occuper d'elle. Elle est tres 
amere, lasse de tout, fatiguee des petites miseres 
morales qui ne nous ont pas ete epargnees. Elle 
pourrait revivre et faire preuve d'intelligence et de 
courage si au contact de camarades moins uses, elle 
reprenait espoir." Serge to MacDonalds Oct. 7, 1940.
58Varian Fry, op.cit.,pp.113-122.
434
Davenport, Msr. Maurice59 and Gussie) were joined in the villa 
by Andre Breton (dean of Surrealism) and his vivacious wife 
Jacqueline and their young child, Aube, and Victor Serge, his 
companion Laurette Sejourne, and Serge's 20 year old son Vlady, 
who stayed there much of the time. Serge's young daughter 
Jeanine was already ensconced with friends in Pontarlier (near 
the Swiss border),60 and Serge was not to see her for nearly two 
years.
The Villa AirBel was renamed Chateau Esperevisa by Serge,
"for that was the precious commodity in which the Secours
Americain dealt and for which so many hoped and waited."61 They
stayed five months, in a pleasant atmosphere of camaraderie,
work, political discussions and surrealist games —  which
brought the famous French surrealists of the Parisian "Deux
Magots" crowd to Chateau Espervisa on Sunday afternoons —  as
well as police surveillance, food and fuel rationing.
Three of the residents of Villa Air-Bel have memorialized
the experience, and their various descriptions of Serge are
worth noting. Varian Fry, who published Surrender on Demand in
1945, and an entirely rewritten version entitled Assignment
Rescue in 1968, described Serge as
"a dyspeptic but keen-minded old Bolshevik... During 
his long career, he had evolved from an extreme 
revolutionary to a moderate democrat. At the house he 
talked for hours about his experiences in Russian 
prisons, recalled conversations with Trotsky, or 
discussed the ramifications and inter-relations of the 
European secret police, a subject on which he had a
5 "Maurice" was the name adopted by the young Rumanian 
doctor Marcel Verzeanu. He was brought on staff at- the ERC 
because so many of "our intellectual customers were having 
nervous breakdowns" that Fry thought it wise to have a doctor on 
staff to treat them. Fry, op. cit., p. 103.




vast store of knowledge. Listening to him was like 
reading a Russian novel...."
Mary Jayne Gold wrote "When Danny brought Victor Serge to 
the chateau I was thrilled to meet a real Marxist— after all 
that talk."63 In an interview with John Eden in July 1989, Mary 
Jayne recalled "it was quite exciting to hear Victor speak about 
his life in Russia." He had "the manners of a prince," he 
"walked and moved like a gentleman" and "yet he had been a 
communist, a revolutionary since birth..." In her memoir/ Mary­
Jayne wrote that both Breton and Serge "had almost courtly old- 
school manners/ so that when I asked Danny how it happened that 
our two revolutionaries were so ancien regime, he simply replied 
that they liked ladies of goodwill."64 She remembered how 
considerate he was and was particularly impressed with what he 
said on a number of occasions when asked if he were Jewish: with 
"his innate sense of delicacy and comprehension," he would say, 
"It happens that I am not."65 As to Serge's physical 
appearance, Mary-Jayne wrote
"He was about fifty years old, with finely drawn 
features surmounted by a bristling crew cut.*He wore 
a dark gray flannel jacket, loosely fitting, which 
buttoned, Russian fashion, up close to the chin. When 
Victor told us his stories in the evening as we all 
huddled around the porcelain stove in the library, his 
face took on another expression because he spoke of a 
time when the future direction of the revolution was 
being played out. On such occasions he held us all in 
respectful silence."66
62The quote is a composite from the two editions of Fry: 
Surrender on Demand, p. 115, and Assignment: Rescue, p. 120.
"Gold, p. 247.
64Gold, p. 248.




Mary-Jayne was surprised to meet Serge's companion Laurette
Sejourne, after Serge had told her he was expecting someone
"quelqu'une qui m'est tres chere." Mary-Jayne told John Eden
that she anticipated "some comrade or somesuch, and this
beautiful little women arrives" who looked like a "Luini
Madonna." Laurette was 20 years younger than Serge, and very
beautiful. Fry described her in contrast to Jacqueline Bretons
"Laurette Sejouren [sic], Victor Serge's friend, was 
a woman as unlike Jacqueline [Breton] as Jacqueline 
was unlike everybody else. She was dark and quiet and 
very reserved. Although she generally stayed in her 
room during meals, professing not to be interested in 
food, the servants reported a large consumption of 
leftovers between meals."67
Jacqueline Breton was described as blond, vivacious, sexy and 
outgoing, while Laurette was reserved and quiet. Still, Mary­
Jayne recalled problems between Serge and Laurette, who was much 
younger and flirtatious, and thought that Serge was jealous. 
They often stayed in their room for dinner.
Danny Benedite recalled that even with the tension that 
existed at Air-Bel, due to their dangerous situation and their 
internal personal and political conflicts, the atmosphere was 
relaxing. He and Serge explored the gardens, counting 45 
different trees and bushes, Andre Breton collected insects, 
which he sometimes used in his games, and Varian Fry observed 
the birds. They all used the library. Everyone spent time in 
their respective rooms working. Serge was writing The Case of 
Comrade Tulaev , Breton was writing Fata Morgana. Vlady spent 
much of his time sketching on the terrace. At night they 
gathered to listen to Serge or Breton read the pages they had 
written, to have political discussions or to play games. Both 
Serge and Breton circulated their books, which were" read by 
all.68
67Fry, p. 121.
68Daniel Benedite, op. cit, pp. 116-128.
437
When the food situation became worse in December and meals 
were particularly sparse, Serge would recite his various prison 
adventures. They had political discussions all the time. Jean 
Gemahling was the only Gaullist, and the rest were leftists, 
with the two Americans learning. Mary-Jayne Gold remembers it
69was Vlady who first aroused her curiosity about Marxism. Danny 
recalled Serge and Vlady arguing over the character of the Vichy 
regime, which Vlady insisted was 'simply fascist.' Serge 
corrected him, saying that
"II n'y a aucun des elements ... positifs (j'hesite 
a employer le mot) du fascisme. C'est un melange de 
tendances monarchistes, derides et militaristes,
1'expression d'une societe a bout de souffle qui se 
dissout dans la onte et le masochisme . "70
Serge had a major political influence on Danny Benedite, who
described him:
"Victor. . .dans sa cinquantieme annee, est le doyen 
affectueusement repecte. II a les traits fins, les 
cheveux gris et flous plantes haut sur le front, des 
lunettes a monture d'acier, la voix douce et des 
gestes mesures. Son aspect physique, ses maniers 
distinguees sont d'un clergyman anglo-saxon de bonne 
race et je n'ai jamais ete tente de voir en cet ancien 
compagnon de Lenine "une vieille demoiselle a 
principes", comme le decrira plus tard Claude Levi- 
Strauss. . .. Pour quelques-uns d'entre nous, il incarne 
la Revolution et ses prestiges, pour les autres il 
personnifie un socialisme humaniste farouchement 
oppose a celui que le stalinisme a compromis, perverti 
et devoye. Je connaissais Victor depuis quatre ans, 
alors qu'il venait d'arriver a Paris, dernier 
oppositionnel libere d'URSS par une campagne 
internationale de protestation avant que ne s'ouvre le 
premier proces de Moscou.....Serge se trouvait pris
Vlady was a passionate and fanatical Marxist, Gold wrote,
but he was adept in the ways of survival as well (remember he 
had been with Serge in Orenburg.) When food became quite
scarce, Vlady collected dried fruits and nuts and made them into 
rolls and sold. Mary-Jayne wrote: our Marxist theoretician was 
openly engaged in a small private enterprise. In a period of 
near famine his fruit rolls stand out in my memory as a 
gastronomic delight." Gold, pp. 308-309.
70Benedite, p. 128.
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dans les feux croises des gens de droite du fait de 
ses antecedents revolutionnaires et des communistes 
pour lesquels il etait un abominable 'trotskysto-
fasciste'. Cet homme, constamment calomnie, souvent 
menace, qui montrait dans les epreuves une etonnante 
egalite d'humeur et accueillait avec une grande
dignite les injures dont on l'abreuvait, etait devenu 
l'un de mes meilleurs amis."
72Benedite wrote that Serge and Breton were the stars at 
Air-Bel, and though they were both of the far left, "more or 
less Trotskyists" according to Mary-Jayne Gold, there were
tensions between them. Danny Benedite was less enthused with
Breton as he didn't think much of the surrealist movement, but 
Serge had recommended Breton be with them, and that was enough. 
Danny wrote: "Serge etait notre conscience, Breton sera notre 
animateur. "73
On Sundays the Air-Bel was transformed with the arrival of 
Breton's surrealist friends. The Parisian cafes seemed to be
71Benedite, p. 116-117. Translation: "in his fiftieth year, 
[he] was the affectionately respected elder statesman. He had 
finely-chiseled features, soft grey hair growing out of a high 
forehead, steel-framed glasses, a soft voice and measured 
gestures. His physical appearance and his distinguished manners 
were those of a well-bred Anglo-Saxon clergyman, but I have 
never been tempted to see in this former comrade of Lenin 'a 
scrupulous old maid' as Claude Levi-Strauss later described him.
... For some of us, this man [who summed up all the tendencies 
of the turn-of-the century workers' movement,] incarnated the 
Revolution and its prestige; for others he personified a 
humanist socialism fiercely opposed to the socialism that Stalin 
had compromised, perverted and depraved. I met Victor four years 
ago, when he arrived in Paris, the last oppositionist let out of 
the USSR after an international campaign of protest before the 
first Moscow trial... Serge was caught in the crossfire between 
the men of the right who made use of his revolutionary 
antecedents and the communists for whom he was an abominable 
'trotsko-fascist.' This man, constantly slandered, often 
threatened, revealed an astonishing even-temperedness in these 
trials and accepted the insults that were hurled at him with 
great dignity, had become one of my best friends."
72Daniel Benedite, op. cit.. p. 116
73Benedite, p. 118.
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reconstituted at the Chateau. The visitors included Oscar 
Dominguez, Herold Blumer, Victor Brauner, Wifredo Lam, Max 
Ernst, Frederic Delanglade, Georges Dumas, Boris Voline (the 
Russian anarchist), Pierre Herbart, Andre Gide, Jean Malaquais, 
and others. The Chateau became well known for the surrealist 
games they played. The games had a history in surrealist 
circles, as a technique to "reach the inner and lost realities 
and to liberate the mind from the bonds of occidental logic. 
The games also achieved that curious juxtaposition of 
incongruities in which the surrealists detected profound and
unexpected meanings."74 In Air-Bel, the games were mainly a
distraction from trouble and danger. Serge joined in, but 
evidently didn't think much of this side of Breton. According to 
Mary-Jayne:
" although Breton and Serge had publicly supported
each other politically there was often considerable
tension between them. Both were revolutionaries, but 
Victor had lived through the revolution in the streets 
of Moscow and Leningrad, not Paris. From a literary 
point of view they were incompatible. Victor wrote in 
a sensitive, realistic style that to Andre was 
meaningless, and he was intolerant of what he 
considered to be Andre's flirtation with the Beyond.
.. .Victor Serge was the only one of the boarders to 
whom this present adventure was a way of life... .To me 
his books are much more moving and poignant than those 
of Solzhenitsyn because Victor Serge had been with 
them. He was of them.
Victor had somehow managed to live through what he 
hoped would change life on this planet. Since his 
early days he had seen his friends and comrades 
executed or assassinated or diplomatically commit 
suicide. Perhaps he had reason to be irritable and 
dyspeptic at times. Those who disliked him called him 
paranoid. After Trotsky's assassination there was 
less talk of paranoia.
One day when he and Laurette and I were crossing 
over the port . . . halfway over he glanced back 
furtively once or twice. Then he turned to me and said 
apologetically, 'You will have to excuse me, I have 
been followed so often... .It's an old Bolshevik habit, 
a habit one does not lose easily"... .at the cafe he
74Gold, p. 251. Fry also described the games, 115-116.
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chose the last table and sat with his back to the
protecting wall."
Even at Air-Bel, suspicions arose amid the terrible 
atmosphere of an "expiring bourgeois world." Rumors were rife, 
and one day Miriam told Mary-Jayne that a prominent Menshevik, 
also a client of the Committee, "has told me that Victor Serge 
is a Stalinist agent. You will have to tell Varian. " Mary-Jayne 
wrote that neither of them believed the rumor, but "we had both 
learned recently from Serge himself that Stalinists were capable 
of anything and that in a revolutionary situation only the cause 
mattered." Mary-Jayne told Varian about the rumor, and he said, 
with a guffaw, "My God, how these Russians intrigue I"76 With 
Trotsky murdered and Krivitsky's suspicious demise, Mary Jayne 
Gold wrote that no one talked anymore of Serge's paranoia.
The heightened GPU work outside the Soviet Union began to 
threaten Serge vitally. Varian Fry's relationship with the 
French authorities and the American Embassy become strained as 
the French Communist Party took advantage of "French 
government's inherent fear of revolutionaries" and mounted a 
campaign of slander, accusing Fry of Trotskyism. Serge's 
presence at Air-Bel finally compromised the work of the 
committee, as Varian Fry and the ERC were being labeled 
Trotskyist. MaryJayne Gold admits "they thought of themselves 
as Trotskyists" but this label was a liability in an agency 
dealing with the State Department. Fry eventually had to ask 
Serge to leave the villa. Serge scarcely mentioned this in his 
Memoirs, but Mary-Jayne was quick to point out the evil 
Stalinist hand behind this ugly slander. Mary-Jayne's gangster 
boyfriend, who hated all the intellectuals at the villa except
75Gold, pp. 253-255.
7 6Gold, pp. 246-247. Although Gold never names the 
prominent Menshevik, it could have been Boris Nikolaevsky, who 
had been with Serge in Paris, where doubts about him also 
surfaced from Elsa Reiss Poretsky, and Lola Estrine Dallin, a 
close associate of Nikolaevsky.
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Serge, was devastated. He said, ""I'm just as good as any of 
your friends, but next to a guy like Serge I'm a shit. Just a 
shit."77
Serge was shattered that he had to leave, and though his 
Mexican visa had just come through thanks to Julian Gorkin's 
work in Mexico and the Macdonalds in New York, no visa was yet 
obtained for Vlady or Laurette and Jeanine, nor was it clear if
*78he could travel through Spain, Portugal, and Cuba. Serge wrote
to the Macdonalds on Jan. 5, 1941 from a hotel in Marseilles:
"Notez notre nouvelle adresse. Sur le plan personnel, 
tout s'est beaucoup et facheusement complique pour 
moi. Nous avions loue avec de bons amis, parmi 
lesquels Andre, une villa abandonnee aux environs de 
la ville;des amis qui se trouvent etre les 
collaborateurs de Mr. F. y habitent avec nous, mais on 
a mene toute une intrigue pour nous obliger a nous 
separer, sous le pretexte que les collaborateurs de 
l'Em. Rescue Comm, pourraient etre compromis par leurs 
relations etroites avec moil L'enorme en tout ceci, 
c'est qu'en depit de la clarte des choses et de la 
profonde estime qui nous reunit tous, cela ait reussi, 
par suite de 1' atmosphere. Je me retrouve done devant 
le probleme du logement et i est lie a beaucoup 
d'autres. Vous suivez sans doute mieux que nous les 
evenements qui compliquent encore les problemes 
personnels. Mais a cet egard, je ne suis pas 
pessimiste du tout."79
77Serge had told Killer of his exploits and prison sentence 
with the Bonnot gang, which endeared him to Killer for all time. 
Serge told MaryJayne he liked Killer because "he reminds me of 
myself when I was young." Gold, p. 286. Killer later become the 
model for Serge's character Laurent Justinien in his novel The 
Long Dusk.
78Nancy MacDonald to Laurette Sejourne, Dec. 6, 1940, and 
throughout Dec. 1940. (MacDonald Papers, Yale University.)
79Serge to MacDonalds, 5 Jan. 1941. Trans: "Note our new
address. On the personal side, everything has become 
distressingly much more complicated for me. We had rented with 
some good friends, among them Andre, an abandoned villa in the 
outskirts of town; of the friends living there with us were the 
collaborators of Mr. F, but a whole plot has been woven in order
(continued...)
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Despite the extremely difficult new circumstances, including a 
particularly severe winter amid food and fuel shortages on top 
of a lack of funds, Serge did not allow pessimism to overtake 
him. Mary-Jayne informed Miriam Davenport of Serge and 
Sejourne's departure in a cryptic letter dated Jan. 30, 1941, 
stating "There was a terrific Committee crisis at the villa last 
week. Laurette, Victor and Vladi had to leave as they were 
considered not tout a fait, au fait, Social Standing you 
know. "80
Prior to Serge's 'expulsion' from the Chateau, one incident 
at Air-Bel is worth relating. The police arrived at the Villa 
at the time of the Marechal Petain's visit to Marseilles, with 
search warrants. They confiscated Serge's pearl-handled 
revolver —  "a delicate instrument but efficient enough to 
pierce Victor's brain if the OGPU got too close,"81 and his 
typewriter and one of his books, which Serge said they would now 
use to "try and match the letters of my machine with the 
Stalinist tracts I am supposed to be writing."82 Benedite wrote 
that the police were aggressive and arrogant and had information 
about all of the inhabitants. To Serge, they turned and 
addressed him as Mssr. Serge, or "would you prefer Mr.
79(.. .continued)
to force us to separate, on the pretext that the co-workers of 
the Emergency Rescue Committee could be compromised by their 
close relations with me! The enormity in all of this, is that 
despite the clarity of the scheme and the profound esteem that 
unites us all, it worked —  as a result of the atmosphere. I am 
once again faced with the housing problem, and it is tied to 
many others... You follow without doubt better than us the 
events that complicate again our personal problems. But in this 





83Kibaltchiche? It is your real name, no?" Having searched the 
villa, the police arrested the lot of them. In fact the police 
had asked the AirBel occupants to come to the police station, as 
a formality. Serge advised his cohabitants that the police 
always say that. His experiences taught him that a few hours 
could last days, weeks or even years. Fry said, "good, at least 
you are always the optimist!1,84 They were first interrogated, 
then interned on board the SS Sinaia, along with some 600 other 
unfortunate souls suspected of possibly causing a disturbance 
during the Marechal's visit. Some 20,000 were arrested for the 
four day duration of Marechal Petain's visit to Marseilles. It 
was December 1940.85
The men were taken to the hold, the women given 3rd class 
cabins. MaryJayne was given a cabin with Laurette and Serge, 
who "on account of age and a heart condition, was accorded this 
special privilege." Mary-Jayne related that Serge thought they 
were doing very well, but nonetheless instructed them on how to 
be prepared. He took out his handkerchief and showed them how to 
fold it and place it under the chin so that the skin never 
touched the dirty wool of the blankets handed out. 
"Furthermore" went on the old professional, "it is wise to bring 
something to read. Takes your mind off your troubles. He pulled 
out a volume from his pocket. 'Merde. It's my own. Here, Mary
Jayne. You can have it. ' It was Les hommes dans la Prison.
86'Re-merde, alors' she said. Thanks." Varian Fry ended up
83Benedite, p. 143.
84Fry's account is in his book, pp. 136-149.
85Benedite, pp. 145-147.
86Mary Jayne Gold, 273-276. Serge also helped MaryJayne cope 
with the "evil-looking" food they received aboard, which she had 
trouble eating: Serge insisted "that in prison one must eat 
anything and everything one can get down, and moreover one must 
hold it down. 'You must keep up your strength. You never know 
how long you will be held.'
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with the book in his pocket, with a dedication from Serge "In 
memory of our common captivity on the Sinaia, and in complete 
sympathy."87.
A few days before Serge and Vlady and the Bretons finally
boarded the "Capitaine Paul Lemerle" for Mexico, Fry informed
them that Andre Malraux was in Marseilles and asked if Malraux
could join them for dinner. Benedite recalled that Serge
answered: "Pourquoi pas? J'aimerais assez lui dire ce que je
88pense de sa collusion avec les staliniens en Espagne." In any 
case Serge, Fry and the Benedites dined with Malraux on March 
19, 1941 at "Le Dantesque" restaurant in Marseilles. Benedite 
related that at the meal Malraux listened attentively to Serge's 
reproaches and agreed that "beaucoup d'erreurs ont ete commises
89lors de la repression de Mai 1937 en Catalogne.
On 25 March 1941, Serge finally left Europe aboard a ship 
that he described to Danny as "une boite de sardines sur 
laquelle on aurait colle un megot!" (Imagine a tin of sardines
90with a cigarette butt pasted on!) On board with Serge were 
the Bretons, Claude Levi-Strauss, and the painter Wilfredo Lam.
II. 5.18 From Marseilles to Martinique to Mexico: The visa 
hunt, the FBI and Serge
Serge was a difficult case, because his involvement in the
Comintern and his membership in the CPSU meant he would never
get past the State Departments' application of the reactionary
87Fry, p. 146.
88Benedite, p. 214.
89Benedite, ibid. This was the last time Serge saw Malraux, 
and it was not a pleasant evening. In 1947, Serge turned to 
Malraux for help in leaving Mexico, and Malraux published part 
of Serge's letter to him to make it appear Serge had become a 
Gaullist. Perhaps he was getting back at Serge for this evening 
of reproaches?
90Benedite, p . 191.
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Smith Act, preventing his entrance, even as a stopping off point 
in the USA.
Although the picture painted by Fry, Gold and Serge of the 
Rescue Committee is one of their doing everything possible —  
Serge commented they were "overwhelmed by work and the appeals 
from concentration-camps, and in constant peril themselves. As 
it was, however, this was a shipwreck with too many 
castaways."91 A different picture emerges from the Macdonald 
papers. Dwight and Nancy Macdonald worked incessantly and 
tirelessly on behalf of Serge and his family. They report less 
than cordial reception from the American office of the Rescue 
Committee, made up of democrats and liberals more inclined to 
save their own than a well known former Bolshevik such as Serge. 
While it is clear from the various sources that Varian Fry's 
group in Marseilles was doing everything humanly possible, the 
New York committee dragged their heels in tandem with the State 
Department. The Macdonald's were outraged by this and dashed
92off letters to Frida Kirchway, editor of The Nation, Eugene 
Lyons, editor of The American Mercury and anyone else they could 
pressure to help. On Sept 24, 1940, Dwight Macdonald received 
a letter from the ERC in New York, saying they could no longer 
do anything on the case of "Vladimir Kibaltschiche (Victor 
Serge)" [sic] because of "Serge's previous Communist
91Serge, Memoirs, p. 364.
92On September 12, 1940, Dwight MacDonald wrote to Frida 
Kirchway complaining about the New York ERC's "scandalous 
laxness" in dealing with Serge's "life and death" need for a 
visa, and suggested that perhaps the ERC was negligent because 
Serge was both "a left wing anti-fascist and anti-Stalinist." 
On September 18, 1940, Kirchway replied that the ERC was
overworked, but was doing everything it could. She indicated 
that politics "had nothing to do with the delay" in the ERC 
handling of the Serge case, but that Serge may be refused a US 
visa because he "a Communist," even if "an anti-Stalinist 
Communist." MacDonald Papers, Yale Collection.
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93 iaffiliations." Macdonald resubmitted the case and got letters 
of support from John Dewey, Eugene Lyons, Sidney Hook, Margaret 
Marshall, (literary editor of The Nation) Meyer Schapiro, Rev. 
Frederick Reustle, Max Eastman,94 and James Farrell. Macdonald 
insisted that Serge's anti-totalitarian views and writings, his 
years in Stalin's gulag and his great danger in France should be
95sufficient reason to give him immediate entry into the US. 
The rest of the Macdonald correspondence is filled with more of 
the same: urgent cables to Serge, checks sent, letters lost, 
bureaucratic barriers, endless paper trails.
The desperate need for immediate action was frustrated by 
the sluggish pace of bureaucratic committees, whether they 
belonged to the State or the 'resistance.'96 Serge's case could
93Mildred Adams, Executive SEcretary of New York Emergency 
Rescue Committee, to Dwight MacDonald, Sept 24, 1940. Yale
Collection.
94There is a separate correspondence between Serge and 
Eastman, which found its way into the FBI files, released to 
this author. The letter from Serge to Eastman, dateline 
Marseilles, August 14, 1940, appeals to Eastman for material 
help and help with a visa for Serge and Vlady. Serge stated that 
he was "one of the last refugees of the Russian Revolution" and 
expressed the conviction that "a better time is coming after the 
dark period we are in." Item 2-257, declassified Victor 
Kibaltchiche alias Victor Serge memorandum for Mr. Foxworth, 
signed P.J. Wacks, Washington DC, Sept. 23, 1941.
95MacDonald to Mr. Warren, Sept 30, 1940, Yale Collection.
96For example, the ERC in New York was provided with the 
necessary affidavits and papers by the MacDonalds, yet these 
documents needed to pass through various internal committees and 
subsequent delays before being passed on to the Solicitor 
General's office in an official visa request. Dwight MacDonald, 
in frustration, bypassed the committee and went to a lawyer who 
wrote the Solicitor General directly. See letters of September 
and October 1940 in Yale collection of MacDonald paper. In 1941 
the MacDonald's refugee committee merged with the International 
Rescue Assoc. (IRA), which focused exclusively on left wing 
refugees, while the Emergency Rescue Committee focused more on 
intellectuals and artists.
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only be considered when committees met, which was not every day, 
though he was daily in danger. Once the Mexican visa was 
finally procured, it came in the wrong name, made out to the 
pseudonym 'Serge,' not 'Kibalchich' (a problem for Serge's son 
Vlady Kibalchich),97 and listed Serge's nationality as "Spanish" 
rather than "Russian." Worse, the visa could expire before it 
made it back and forth across the Atlantic to be corrected. In 
the meantime, the Macdonalds paid for Serge's passage from 
Lisbon, which meant Serge had to get to Portugal through Spain. 
This required an exit permit from France and Portuguese and 
Spanish transit visas. The problem was that the Franco
98government would not recognize Mexican documents. The paper 
chase became a maze of labyrinthine proportions, yet the 
Macdonald correspondence demonstrates their dogged persistence
99in getting through the tangled document web. In the end, a 
transit visa was granted, two weeks after Serge managed to board 
the Paul Lemerle for Mexico.
97Vlady did not get a visa with Serge right away. Serge 
wrote the MacDonalds in a letter of 16 Sept 1940, that if Vlady 
couldn't accompany him, even though the situation was extremely 
dangerous, he would not go. Serge explained that Vlady at 20 was 
at a dangerous age to be in Europe, because of the war. On the 
other hand, Jeanine, who was nearly six, was safe in a house in 
Pontarlier and could come later, but "she is the only joy of my 
iife" and Serge hadn't seen her in a year. Serge implored the 
MacDonalds to get a visa for Laurette, who could bring Jeanine 
with her. MacDonald Papers, Yale. See also, Jeanine Kibalchich, 
"Victor Serge, Mi Padre," Unpublished testimonial, Oct. 1990.
98This is all documented in the MacDonald collection of 
papers at Yale, and fairly faithfully summarized in Serge's FBI 
file.
99Dwight Macdonald wrote to Serge on June 2, 1941 that Serge 
he could only get a US transit visa if he agreed to testify 
before the Dies Committee. The Dies Committee preceded the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), which made an 
investigation in 1940 of Communist activity following the 
Stalin-Hitler pact. In order to get Serge to consider 
testifying, MacDonald mentioned that the Old Man was willing to 
testify. (Trotsky had considered testifying to clear his name 
from the Stalinist slander.)
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The visa application process, in the meantime, made Victor 
Serge known to American intelligence services. While they were 
doing the step-by-step delay dance, the FBI was investigating 
Serge. From 1987 to 1989, Serge's FBI file was slowly released 
to me after two years of persistent correspondence with the FOIA 
Appeals Office.100 The FBI file indicated that the US Army, 
Navy, CIA, FBI, State Department, and Justice Department had all 
been spying on Serge. It appears that all the correspondence 
between Serge and the Macdonalds was photographed by the FBI, 
all the names mentioned investigated, no matter if the 
correspondence was sent through the mail, clipper, or American 
Express or telephone, rendering all of the Macdonald's efforts 
and Aesopian language fruitless. All of the correspondence
100The following is the record of the replies I received from 
the various offices of American Intelligence: 1. Letter from
Dept of State, Visa Services, 9.25.89; 2. Diplomatic Security 
Service of Dept of State, 4.10.89; declassified document 65- 
54550-16, reporting agent Walter S. Pedigo, investigating in 
Mexico City from April to May 1954 [listing Serge — dead 7 
years— as a famous painter living in Mexico]; 3. From Dept of 
Army, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, 4.16.88; 4. 
doct #100-236386-3, from HQ Southern Defense Command, Fort Sam 
Houston, 1 Feb 44. Includes subversive annex on magazine 
Politics 'a trotskyite organ' mentioning Serge's Mexican group, 
dated 6-13 Dec. 1946. 5. From the same again, 4 Feb. 1944, names 
and addresses of Serge and all his associates in Mexico with 
short bios, plus information on Dwight MacDonald; 6. 24 May 
1988, from Defense Intelligence Agency, reporting investigation 
in Mexico City of 26 March 1946: 7. June 4, 1987, from Defense 
Intelligence Agency; 8. 10 June 1987, from US Dept of Justice 
Ap 24, 1987 from FBI; 9. Apr 22, 1987, from US Army Intelligence 
and Security Command; 10. Mar 2, 1987, from Office of Legal 
Policy, FBI; 11. 6 Jan 1987, from Dept of Justice, FBI; 12. 20 
Nov. 1986, from New York FBI; 13. 17 Nov 1986, from New York 
FBI; 14. 25 Nov. 1986, from Washington FBI, Dept of Justice;
15. April 29, 1987, from Dept of Navy, Naval Intelligence
Command, declassified documents Op-16-f-7, A8-5/QQ/EJ3, Serial 
No. 0871716, covering reports from August and Sept 1941, Naval 
Attache in Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, "political 
forces, foreign penetration", see report from Intelligence 
Report 63215 24 Jan 1946, Mexico on Mundo, Serge, Movimiento 
socialismo y libertad.
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between the Macdonalds, Serge and official agencies in France 
were similarly photographed by American Intelligence.101
Ironically, once the Macdonald's succeeded in getting Serge 
a temporary transit visa, his belongings were marked USA. The 
Immigration confiscated Serge's two suitcases, from the SS 
Boringen, and the FBI assigned special agents to photograph the 
contents and translators to translate the documents "which were 
written in foreign languages."102 The documents were then 
summarized for the attention of J. Edgar Hoover.
While Dwight and Nancy Macdonald were furiously active on 
Serge's behalf in New York and the FBI was similarly active 
paying translators to make Serge's words readable to 
intelligence agents, [in order to discover legal grounds to deny 
Serge a simple transit visa through the US], Serge and Vlady 
sailed out of the nightmare, to a new world and an uncertain 
future. Although Serge had spent months waiting to leave, he did 
so reluctantly, "parting only to return." He described the Paul 
Lemerle as a cargo boat converted "into an ersatz concentration-
103camp of the sea". Of the 300 on board, 40 were refugees,
including Serge and Vlady, Andre Breton and family, Claude Levi-
Strauss, and others. They held meetings on board, and shared
their thought and insights. It was also a time of reevaluation,
being "on the eve" of a new world and new possibilities. Serge
wrote that he was able to faintly grasp the essential, that
"We have not lost after all, that we have lost only 
for the moment. In the struggles of society we 
contributed a superabundance of consciousness and 
will, which greatly exceeded the forces at our 
command. All of us have behind us a certain number of 
mistakes and failings, for creative thought of any 
kind can proceed only with hesitating, stumbling
101 For example, see Item 2-344, letter to Minister of Public 
Health from Minister of Interior of French Republic dated Feb. 
1937.
102See FOIA FBI file on Victor Serge, p. 16.
103Serge, Memoirs, p. 366.
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steps. . . .Having made this qualification, in accordance 
with which each must search his heart...."
Vlady remembered reading Bukharin and Preobrazhensky's ABC of
Communism on deck, when Serge approached somewhat angrily: Serge
grabbed the book, and said, "This is not the time for this" and
tossed the book into the sea. He added, "You should be studying
105a Spanish primer, that's what's important now."
They docked first in Martinique, where Vlady recalled Vichy 
officials making the rounds, asking which passengers were 
Jewish. When a Nazified Vichy official asked Serge [if he were 
Jewish], he replied "I do not have that honor."106 In a letter 
to Mary Jayne Gold, Serge described Martinique as French in form 
only, but more like 'una specie de Gestapo." There they were 
jailed, robbed and threatened (to be shipped to the Sahara, 
among other things). Their conditions of incarceration were 
primitive: no running water, having to pay 25f per day for food 
that was "indescribably filthy.107"
The boat sailed from Martinique to Ciudad Trujillo, the 
capital of the Dominican Republic, where they stayed for weeks, 
detained" in a concentration camp at Fort of France. It was here 
in Ciudad Trujillo that Serge was visited by the United States
Naval Attache, John A. Butler, Captain of the US Marine Corps,
who filed a confidential Intelligence Report on August 14,
1081941. The report is short (3 pages), a summary of the
104t , . ,Ibid.
105Interview with Vlady, January 1986, Mexico City.
106Interview with Vlady, January 1986, Mexico City.
107Serge to Mary-Jayne Gold, Ciudad Trujillo, 1 August 1941, 
8pp., Serge Archive, Mexico City.
108 •Obtained by the author from the Department of the Navy, 
Naval Intelligence Command on April 29, 1987, as the result of 
a Freedom of Information Act request to the FBI. The file 
contained Intelligence Reports from agents in Chile, Colombia, 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and the 'Fifteenth Naval
(continued...)
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discussion that contains the kinds of political inaccuracies 
that someone unfamiliar with the revolutionary movement would 
make. Vlady remembered Serge's reaction after the agent left —  
he laughed at the kinds of questions the agent asked Serge.
109Vlady was not present for the interview. In Butler's report, 
we read that Serge was a member of the "Red General Staff" 
(Vlady confirmed that Serge had the rank of General in his 
Soviet Passport), that Serge was a "Social Democrat" who stated 
that "Trotsky's party disappeared with Trotsky's death." Serge 
is also reported to have said that Stalin's government would be 
replaced by a Popular Front government, that the "Red General 
staff emphasized bacterial warfare" and "built more submarines 
than publicly admitted." The agent remarked that Serge was "a 
brilliant, well-trained observer, whose first thoughts are 
against Stalin, although he is for democracies." Serge is 
reported to have named Lucien Vogel as a "Communist agent in the 
U.S." Vogel, according to the report, was one of the Communist 
agents who were active in the Popular Front, who subsequently 
escaped to the United States at the time of the German 
invasion.110 Serge also told the agent that "Without doubt 
Krivitsky was killed by the OGPU," and that Alexander Barmine 
and Boris Nicolaevsky could both advise on Russian questions.111 
Finally agent Butler admitted that Serge was waiting in the
108(. . .continued)
District." The document was declassified, but marked 
'confidential." serial No. 0871716, Document #100-36676-5, dated 
Sept. 30, 1941.
109interview with Vlady Kibalchich, Mexico City, May 1987.
110Confidential Intelligence Report, Naval Intelligence, 
Serial R-194-41, Ciudad Trujillo, August 14, 1941, 3 pp.
111This is not the indiscretion it appears to be, as both 
Barmine and Nicolaevsky had already themselves been contacted by 
American intelligence. Barmine went on to work for the CIA (as 
an advisor on Soviet affairs), after he served in the American 
army in World War II, and Nicolaevsky accompanied American 
Intelligence to Germany in 1945 to retrieve his stolen archive.
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Dominican Republic for a transit visa through Cuba enroute to 
Mexico.
In Ciudad Trujillo, Serge set to work in the tropical August 
sun, and wrote Hitler contra Stalin in four weeks for a Mexican 
public, and complained he couldn't sleep for worry about what 
nightmare was sweeping over Russia. The book's subtitle was HLa 
Fase decisiva de la guerra mundial" and was Serge's first book 
written in the Americas, dedicated to the combatants and 
builders of the Mexican Revolution. It also caused the ruin of 
the small publishing house, Ediciones Quetzal, for publishing 
this uncompromising anti-Stalinist and anti-capitalist analysis 
of the Second World War.
Serge wrote to Mary-Jayne Gold from Ciudad Trujillo on 1 
August 1941, after finally receiving a letter from her, breaking 
months of isolation with his European friends. His situation was 
still 'complicated and dangerous:' his travel visa had expired, 
and he had no documents to go to Mexico. The State Department 
"les ha clavado un punal en la espalda a todas las emigraciones 
anti-fascistas" which meant that only the pro-fascists with 
their dollars could travel to Latin America. Serge wrote that 
the committees were sleeping, satisfied with their work. His 
American visa was granted twice and taken away 20 times.
Serge told Mary Jayne that since the occupation of Bulgaria 
he had believed the war would turn into a Nazi-Russian conflict, 
but not as soon as it happened. This showed to Serge that the 
Nazis couldn't afford to wait (not even for the winter to pass) 
to 'flatten' Russia. Serge knew that the Russians would defeat 
the Nazis, "the Russians still have energy in reserve" but what 
began to worry Serge even more was the 'reactionary spirit' of 
the Americans and their allies who "seemed to be more'afraid of 
a new Europe than a Nazi Europe." He noted this after listening 
to Hoover's speech following the Nazi invasion of Russia. He 
also wrote that he thought the Russians could not last very long 
due to the misery of the country and state of transport, but he 
believed that this situation would produce a great change in the
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internal situation, which would make possible a war of 
resistance almost without limit. He also thought that the 
Stalinists were using their freed up credits to spread their 
influence "much in the style of the Popular Front." This letter 
to MaryJayne, and another sent two days later to Dwight 
Macdonald summarized Serge's thoughts on the imminent Russo- 
German conflict.
As to his survival in Ciudad Trujillo, Serge wrote that he 
and Vlady adapted themselves to life around the hot sun: work 
from dawn to 1pm, Serge writing, and Vlady drawing 
"spectacularly." Serge told MaryJayne that his "typewriter 
doesn't rest" in the tropical heat —  because he worked without 
stop, passing sleepless nights of anxious preoccupation for 
Laurette, Jeanine, and his comrades left behind. Serge was also 
made uncomfortable by his state of total dependence on his New 
York friends (the Macdonalds) for survival. Serge confided to 
MaryJayne that he hated life without Laurette, and complained 
that the Mexican comrades didn't seem to pay attention to how 
important it was to have a couple together, that the single life 
was not for him. Serge had even suggested at one point to Nancy 
Macdonald that if the visas for Laurette and Jeanine did not 
come together, that Laurette should come first, then Jeanine 
with Laurette's son Rene.
II. 5.19 From Mexico, Whither the USSR, the World?
In the introduction to the first section of chapter five 
infra, I outlined Serge's Mexican activities and contacts. This
112Serge to Nancy and Dwight MacDonald, June 7, 1941. Nancy 
MacDonald replied on the 12th June 1941 that the visas for 
Laurette, Jeanine and Rene had come through. Laurette's son 
Rene, in fact, never made the journey, as the war made it too 
dangerous for Laurette to go collect him in Italy. He was left 
in Italy, and raised there by his grandmother. He finally came 
to Mexico as an adult, full of hostility for his mother for 
having 'abandoned him.' Interview with Jeanine Kibalchich, 
Mexico, Sept. 1990.
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is a rich chapter in Serge's life and thoughts Serge wrote in 
profusion, considered new ideas and new directions, became 
involved in "Socialism and Liberty," which first published 
Analysis. and then Mundo. The group was an entirely 
heterogeneous collection of exiles from Russia, France, Spain 
and Germany, each bringing their own experiences, traditions and 
defeats. Serge and Vlady became political antagonists in this 
group, which later split due to internal divisions.113 Serge 
was continually persecuted by the GPU, through its Mexican 
agents, who had the ignominious dishonor of having been involved 
in the assassination of Leon Trotsky just a year before.
The persecution grew from vicious slander into a physical 
threat to Serge's life, which has been documented in the FBI 
files, here described in footnotes 21 and 22 of Chapter Five, - 
section one. After Serge, Gorkin and the others were physically 
attacked by Communist thugs and GPU agents, Serge, Pivert, 
Gorkin and Regler wrote a book to publicize their situation and 
protect themselves. What is remarkable in this booklet, La GPU 
Prepara Un Nuevo Crimen. apart from the appended letters of 
solidarity which were signed by hundreds of North American and 
British intellectuals, including MPs and the Governor of the 
State of California,114 is the short replies each of the
113According to Vlady, his rebellion was as much the immature 
rebellion of a son trying to carve his own path against the 
wisdom and experience of his father. (Interview, August 1990) 
The other divisive element in the exile group was Jean 
Malaquais, the French novelist, who incorporated this experience 
into his novel World Without Visa (Doubleday & Co.) New York, 
1948.
114 The last section of the book was filled with.documents 
demonstrating the solidarity of individuals and organizations 
expressed with these exiled revolutionaries. The American 
progressive press, including The Nation. Partisan Review, The 
Militant. The New Leader, and The Call all came to their 
support. Norman Thomas dedicated his half hour radio program to 
them, the Israeli newspapers of New York assumed their defense, 
as did many other newspapers and magazines, including The New
(continued...)
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slandered wrote to refute the calumnious charge of being Fifth 
Columnists. In the initial statement, they answered the charges 
that they were "Trotskyites." The statement declared that while 
they admired the great revolutionary115 they never belonged to 
the Trotskyist movement, except Serge who had belonged to the 
Soviet Left Opposition, had translated Trqtsky, and 
energetically defended the Old Man in the Moscow Trials. They 
wrote that they had each separated from Trotsky over questions 
of philosophy, history, and organization.
While Gorkin and Pivert sought to refute the charges that 
they were Trotskyites, Serge chose instead to stress his life of 
obstinate resistance to lies, falsehoods and despotism, from 
Petrograd to Orenburg to Rheims to Mexico and the terrible 
consequences he suffered in the form of years of captivity. He 
ended by declaring:
"I will continue in the service of mankind, liberty, 
and the Russian Revolution which still beats once more 
for the liberty of the world. I hope with firmness 
that it will be renewed, liberated from 
totalitarianism, and with the right to a great 
future. "116
Serge's statement was quite different than Gorkin's, Pivert's, 
and Regler's, all of whom responded to the outrageous charges 
against them by denying their links with Trotskyism. Serge, on
114(. . .continued)
York Times. Only the Daily Worker and New Masses, both 
Communist organs, attacked them. Hundreds of prominent American 
intellectuals addressed a letter to President Avila Camacho 
which was included in La GPU prepara un nuevo crimen! (pp» 54- 
57). Apart from the Governor of the state of California's 
signature on the appeal, from Great Britain came another appeal, 
signed by three Labour Ministers, three Independent Ministers, 
and many well known writers, trade unionists, and the leadership 
of the ILP.
115Serge, Gorkin, Pivert and Regler, La GPU prepara un nuevo 
crimen!. Serie "Documentos," Edicion de "Analysis" (Revista de 
Hechos e Ideas), Mexico DF, 1942, p. 16.
116Ibid., p. 21.
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the other hand simply recounted his life of fidelity to 
revolutionary truth and wisdom, and to the hope of the future.
A full account of Serge's activities and writings from 
Mexico would require another dissertation. To conclude this 
study of Serge's activities and reflections drawn from his 
Soviet experience, I would like only to offer a select panorama 
of his last published and unpublished essays, written from his 
final exile, where Serge was poor, isolated, and "indescribably 
lonely."117
In an entry in his personal diary, Serge lamented his 
political and literary isolation, writing "for the drawer at 
over fifty," and realizing that the present dark world situation 
might outlast his lifetime. He noted that in "this free land of 
America" he was writing as the Russians did around 1930, and 
that he had "reached the stage of asking myself if my name alone 
will be an obstacle to publication." While his novels and 
Memoirs did not see publication before his death (except The 
Long Dusk, published in Canada in 1946), Serge did publish much 
of his journalism in small reviews in the US and France. Yet 
there are many worthwhile pieces left in Serge's archive in 
Mexico, which were never published.
In the United States Serge was read and promoted by Dwight 
Macdonald and his journal, Politics, as well as Partisan Review, 
and by Daniel Bell and David Dallin at the New Leader, where 
Serge was the Mexican correspondent. He was also listed as an 
international contributor to Modern Review, a Menshevik-oriented 
journal largely financed by the International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union. His articles also appeared in the New 
International. all the more so after its takeover by Max 
Schachtman's Workers Party in the 1940 split in th^"American 
Section of the Fourth International. The New International
117Serge to Marcel Martinet, no date, Mexico archive.
118Serge, Carnets, "Difficulty in Writing, Russian Writers, 
10 Sept 1944, p. 134.
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printed excerpts of Serge's Memoirs, Year One, and seven
119excerpts from his diary, or Vieux Carnets. Serge was also
was published in Socialist Call, Horizons. Espana Libre (New
York), and in Mexico in Analysis. Mundo, Rumbo, La Nacion,
Excelsior, El Informador, and others. In Cuba, Serge was the
120subject of a long article in Bohemia. Serge also carried on 
a rich correspondence with Sidney Hook, Dwight and Nancy 
Macdonald, William Phillips, and others, including George 
Orwell, who tried to get Serge's Memoirs published with Seeker 
and Warburg.121
The themes Serge wrote about were varied, expressing his 
analysis of the current situation, his new found interests in 
psychology and anthropology, and his concern for the possibility 
of genuine socialist struggles. These interests reflected the 
world situation, and the relationships Serge formed in Mexico, 
from his wife's passionate embrace of early Mexican culture, to 
his friendship with the German psychologist Herbert Lenhof, to 
the discussions in the continuing group of European 
revolutionary exiles.
The Mexican group Socialismo y Libertad wrote another book 
together, which was the product of their discussions on the 
nature of the present period. The book was written throughout 
1942 and 1943, and published in January 1944 as Los Problemas
119These were the only extracts ever published in English, 
until 1980-81, when the Scottish journal of International 
Literature, Arts and Affairs, Cencrastus published another 
eleven extracts, translated by John Manson.
120Bohemia. La Habana, Septiembre 7 de 1941, ano 33, Vol. 33, 
Num. 36, written by Gilberto Gonzalez y Contreras.
121Serge was so poor that he had only one copy of the 
Memoirs, which he was naturally reluctant to trust to the 
overseas post. Much of his correspondence with Orwell deals 
with how Serge could safely get his copy to Orwell. See George 
Orwell to Dwight MacDonald, London 4.4.45. Dwight Macdonald was 
similarly attempting to find an American publisher for the 
Memoirs. This did not happen until Oxford University Press 
published Peter Sedgwick's translation in 1963.
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Del Socialismo En Nuestro Tiempo, by Serge, Gorkin, Pivert, and 
122Paul Chevalier . Serge's contribution was called "Guerra de 
Transformacion Social"123 (War of Social Transformation) and it 
outlined Serge's position on the character of World War II, 
which he saw as fundamentally different from World War One. 
Serge's conception of the global conflict was that it was a war 
taking place in a transitional epoch, and would usher in new 
social formations which would be characterized by a tendency 
toward totalitarian collectivist command economies.
In Nazi Germany, Serge described the existence of a duality 
of power between the capitalist class and the Nazi bureaucracy. 
Citing Hilferding's 1910 work on the relationship between 
economic and political power and Franz Neumann's study of Nazi 
Germany as 'totalitarian monopoly capitalism' Serge wrote that 
he thought James Burnham's and Dwight Macdonald's newer and more 
expressive formulation of 'bureaucratic collectivism' better 
described this social formation. To emphasize his point, Serge 
quoted something Trotsky wrote in 1939, a year before his death:
"El regimen sovietico, el fascismo, el nazismo, el 
New * Deal, tienen innegablemente rasgos comunes, 
determinados, en ultima instancia, por las tendencias 
colectivistas de la economia moderna... A consecuencia 
de la postracion de la clase obrera, esas tendencias 
revisten la forma del colectivismo burocratico. . . "124
122Los Problemas del Socialismo en Nuestro Tiempo. Ediciones 
Ibero Americanas, Mexico 1944.
123 •Victor Serge, "Guerra de Transformacion Social" in Los 
Problemas del Socialismo en Nuestro Tiempo. pp. 11-41*,..-
124 •Victor Serge, "Guerra de Transformacion Social" in Los 
Problemas del Socialismo en Nuestro Tiempo. pp. 19-20. 
Translation: "The Soviet regime, fascism, Nazism, and the New 
Deal undeniably share common traits determined in the last 
instance by the collectivist tendencies of the modern economy... 
As the consequence of the exhaustion of the working class, these 
tendencies take on the form of bureaucratic collectivism... "
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Serge wrote widely on this issue: the same ideas and even the 
same citations permeate his unpublished essays, his review 
articles and his diary entries, which will be summarized below.
The Mexican political group enlarged their contacts and 
continued their discussions of the character of the world 
throughout 1944. They tried to hammer out a new manifesto, which 
Serge thought both inappropriate and imperious. In his diary 
entry of 13 September 1944, Serge severely criticized the 
document, which he indicated was formulated by Marceau Pivert, 
Enrique Gironella and W.S. Serge tended to question every 
thesis put forward by these independent socialists, which he
125considered nothing but "old stock phrases." His frustration 
was evident, as Serge was grappling with uncertainties while 
they were repeating old formulae.
The Trotskyists in their various organizations, following 
the Old Man's theoretical lead, had forecast that Stalin would 
not survive WWII, that the war would give way to a new 
revolutionary upsurge. In reality, Stalin defeated Hitler and at 
home embarked on a new enslavement of returning soldiers, and a 
vast, forced reconstruction program. In Western Europe, the 
revolutionary upsurge failed to materialize and radicals were 
successfully 'contained. ' The new conjuncture did not conform to 
their preconceptions, nor to Trotsky's predictions. With 
Trotsky's death, the Trotskyists were bereft of his 
authoritative theoretical preeminence. As Serge had said, the 
Trotskyists found it difficult to think outside Trotsky's head, 
valiant though they might be as militants. Many activists of the 
prewar generation left politics after the war, discouraged by 
political differences, or failed realizations. The main issues 
tended to be the class nature of the USSR, and the roTe of the 
working class in the West.
125Serge, "Ideological Discussions," 13 Sept. 1944, Carnets, 
pp. 135-139.
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The other left organizations, the anti-Stalinists Serge had 
wanted to group together in International Committees, suffered 
similarly. Serge's group in Mexico, Socialismo y Libertad, was 
not immune to the fate of other left groups, was internally 
divided, and isolated from real political struggles. In fact 
much of what Serge wrote about the Fourth International, 
discussed in the previous chapter, turned out to be equally true 
in the other non-Stalinist groups of the left, the syndicalists, 
libertarian socialists, left Mensheviks, and Trotskyoids. 
Political militants in the forties worked under extreme 
pressure, not simply because of the war, but because their 
predictions about the Soviet Union did not come to pass. 
Stalinism survived, and Nazism and Francoism inflicted horrible 
defeats on the working class. Working alone, Serge grappled 
with these questions in a creative political way.
II. 5.20 Stalinism, the emergence of the technocracy and 
"totalitarian collectivism."
Serge's writings in this last period revealed his fresh 
thinking, and active, agile mind. He went wrong, mistaking 
tendencies for trajectories, but nonetheless went farther than 
Trotsky had, without abandoning socialism as had so many whose 
'god had failed' them. For those socialists who had not 
abandoned Marxism, Serge bemoaned that fact that they seemed to 
still see the world in traditional, if not routine terms, as if 
it were 1917 or even 1871.126
Serge thought the struggle was no longer simply between 
capitalism or socialism, that new obstacles were produced by 
Stalinism, now a factor in the world. In response to reading an
127ILP bulletin from England, Serge wrote in his diary that




there are no longer two adversaries facing each other, that of 
revolution and reaction. Now there are three: conservatism, 
socialism and Stalinist totalitarianism, engaged in mortal 
struggle.128 He continued, in a thought that is every bit as 
meaningful in the 1990s as in 1944: "I'm inclined to think that 
the fate of Europe will not be decided until Stalinist 
totalitarianism is restricted or destroyed by the new conflicts
129which of necessity it brings forth."
The existence of Stalinism colored all current struggles, 
exerting a negative influence, for example, on the colonial 
struggle, which Serge insisted could not be mistaken for 
socialist struggle, simply anti-imperialist and Stalinized. This 
was an unpopular view on the left, one which Laurette Sejourne 
made sure to point out to me.130 She said Serge did not support 
the independence of India, nor did he support Ho Chi Minh. In 
Partisan Review. La Wallonie. and La Revolution proletarienne 
Serge wrote that the struggle for socialism still resided in 
Europe, that national liberation struggles would lead to an 
extension of Soviet totalitarianism, which was ultimately anti­
socialist and anti-human.
Having said that, Serge wrote in a later diary entry that
Hilferding saw better than Trotsky the present conflict from the
point of view of the incredible power of the totalitarian state:
"This power is so great that the USSR is in a position 
to dominate, channel, crush the revolutionary 
movements of Western Europe, Asia and to a certain 
extent Latin America. She can nip in the bud the ones 
that would embarrass her and support, promote, arm 
effectively the others. LT's proposition [that the 
salvation of the Russian revolution would come from 
the revolutionary transformations in Western Europe, 
the contagiousness of which the totalitarian Russian
128_, . .Ibid.
129Ibid., p. 170.
130Interview with Laurette Sejourne, Sept. 6, 1990, Mexico
City.
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apparatus wouldn't be able to resist] could only come 
true if the Russian totalitarian state were to weaken,
131spent from inside by extraordinary efforts."
In the same vein, Serge criticized Dwight Macdonald's 
ingenuousness in the American magazine Politics for seeing the
132possibility of reforming the Communist Parties. Serge
thought that Macdonald lived in too free a country to 
understand! Serge wrote that the new type of leader that would 
emerge was the type of Mao and Tito, "cynical and convinced, who 
will be 'revolutionary' or counter-revolutionary —  or both at 
the same time —  according to the orders they receive and 
capable of a turn-about from one day to the next."133 In fact, 
Serge wrote that when Mao Tse-Tung was in Moscow in 1926-27, he 
"sympathized deeply with the Opposition, but he ended up by 
adopting the cynically pragmatic formulas Who can give us arms 
and money?"134
Yet while Serge was quite clear on the nature of the 
Communist Parties, he did not have a viable organizational 
strategy. In a conversation with Narciso Molins, Serge said the 
worst thing a genuine socialist left could do, would be to 
remain a tiny sect. Far better, wrote Serge, to enter the old 
Socialist parties, where democratic practices would allow the 
possibility of influence. Molins was skeptical of the "old 
opportunists" who "would calmly let us be murdered by the
135Stalinists..." Serge acknowledged this, but had no other
131Carnets, p. 181.
132 "Stalinism and the Resistance —  A Letter from Victor 
Serge," Politics, Feb. 1945, pp. 61-62. In this letter Serge 
tried to alert the American left to the totalitarian nature of 
the Communist Parties, which would brook no dissidence.
133Carnets, p. 171.
134Serge, Politics. Feb. 1945, p. 62.
135Carnets, p. 171.
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prescription. Yet in 1947, Serge would write in Partisan 
Review that
"the old reformism is no less outmoded than 
insurrection. Socialist action is by definition, 
neither exceptionally timid nor exceptionally violent, 
but it seems that is has to be both transformer and 
liberator, or else disintegrate."136
In this same article. Serge stressed that Stalinism and Social
Democracy were inching toward each other, and that the blindness
of the social democrats towards "this darkest of despotisms" was
unforgivable ("they have not seen the Kazakhs die of famine").
In an evident clarity of purpose that Serge did not demonstrate
in the above quoted conversation with Narciso Molins, Serge
stated "if socialism ... does not proclaim itself as the party
of human dignity, obviously it will only be crushed between the
reactionaries and the totalitarians," this last even more cruel
because of its "unimaginable inner weakness."137 Now more than
ever, Serge told his public in America through the journal
Politics, we must reconstruct "a conscious and energetic
socialist movement that will not allow itself to be manipulated
by the CP."138
The new levels of barbarity that Stalin demonstrated were 
outdone by Hitler with the extermination of the Jews. Serge was 
horrified by the Nazi inhumanity, and believed this made the 
character of the war more than simply an imperialist war, that 
the anti-semitisra unleashed by the war brought to it a 
particular character. Serge wrote in his diary on 12 Nov. 1944 
that this unspeakable horror, the annihilation of the Jews, with
136Serge, "The Socialist Imperative," in Partisan Review 
discussion, "The Future of Socialisms V," Sept-Oct. 1947, Vol. 
XIV, No. 5, p. 515.
137Serge, PR, Sept-Oct. 1947, p. 516.
138Serge, Politics, (Feb. 1945), p. 62. This journal of 
politics and popular culture was edited by Dwight MacDonald 
after he left Partisan Review on his journey from Trotskyism to 
anarchism. The journal lasted from 1944-1949.
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little fight even from Jews abroad was too difficult to 
comprehend. Serge declared "I am lost" when trying to understand 
—  the Nazis have reversed the trend of human evolution 
(proceeding from animality to humanism) and were now destroying 
the attainments of thousands of years of history. It is no 
wonder that in a conversation with an unnamed Polish socialist 
in December 1944, Serge agreed that "since dignity and hope 
alone remain to be saved, we are advocates of absolute 
uncompromisingness."139
Serge's uncompromisingness, his intransigence and his 
commitment to socialist democracy was demonstrated in the 
numerous essays he left unpublished in Mexico. Contemplating the 
scenarios for the future and seeing hope for vast socialist 
movements in Europe to take advantage of Stalinist exhaustion, 
Serge wrote:
"Socialism has only been able to grow within bourgeois 
democracy (of which it was to a large extent the 
creator.) If by unawareness, lack of educated, 
energetic leaders, various corruptibilities, it is 
taken in tow by 'revolutionary' Stalinism 
(revolutionary, insofar as the planned economy still 
is in comparison with traditional capitalism —  and 
it's a slight extent, considering the evolution of the 
whole of capitalism towards planning —  control —  
collectivisation), it abdicates and succumbs, 
inevitably crushed and disgraced. Its only chance of 
life and victory is in intransigence vis-a-vis 
Stalinist totalitarianism, by the upholding of beliefs 
in democracy and humanism (excluding controlled 
thought) and vis-a-vis capitalist conservatism, in the 
fight for the restoration of the traditional 
democratic liberties, become revolutionary."140
This passage contains the germs of what preoccupied Serge for 
the short remainder of his life. He was able to detect the 
germ, to continue the metaphor, but not able to ^ *see what 
organism would grow from it. He also exhibited a mixture of
139Serge, Carnets, 10 Dec. 1944, p. 177.
14°Ibid.. p. 182.
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confusion and clarity over the question of planning. The 
confusion was both semantic and substantial. The term he used 
most often was the 'economie dirigee' which I prefer to 
translate as the command economy, the directed or controlled 
economy, or what is sometimes called bureaucratic 
administration. Serge described the features of a
bureaucratically administered command economy, but sometimes 
used it interchangeably with the phrase 'planned economy.' 
Serge did distinguish what he finally called "Stalinist 
planning" from the Marxist conception of planning,141 but in his 
discussion of totalitarian planning, which he saw in the 
controlled economy of fascism and the Western war plan, —  what 
Serge's generation often called 'war-time socialism' —  there is 
real confusion between the simple allocation of resources, even 
done by capitalist firms, and the Marxist conception of 
planning, which is the conscious regulation of the economy by 
the freely associated producers. Marxist planning, unlike 
administration or bourgeois planning, is not a technical, but a 
social relation.
In the end, Serge left hundreds of essays, all of which 
should be published. Without trying to examine them all, it can 
be said that his thoughts expressed throughout were broadly 
similar:142 the USSR was neither capitalist nor socialist,143 
operated out of fear of independent thought and was in permanent 
conflict with its own people, with a mighty totalitarian state 
machine directed against them, that the new world order was one 
which would change the social structure of the world. Again, 
Serge was particularly perceptive in noting the postwar
141Serge, unpublished typescript, no date, no title, Serge 
Archives, Mexico.
142In fact, Serge was often repetitive, using the same 
examples, and the same phrases.
143Serge, "Necesidad de una renovacion del Socialismo," 
Mundo, June 1945, p. 18.
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nationalizations as accommodations to the actuality of the 
socialist revolution and its consequences, however degraded. 
Serge was able to see the collectivization, or perhaps the 
increasing socialization of production and thought it would give 
rise to new structures, but that the concentrated control of 
production carried with it the danger of totalitarianism. At the 
same time, Serge noted that the poverty of traditional socialism 
coincided with the immense revolutionary crisis of the modern
144
world that forcefully puts socialism on the order of the day.
Thus Serge's thinking about the character of the world 
during and immediately after the war is intimately connected to 
his analysis of the character of Stalinism. In an essay "L'URSS 
A-T-Elle Un Regime Socialiste? "145 Serge stated that few 
socialist theorists had the time to develop their theoretical 
glimpses into the future, and were "unable to see beyond the 
limited horizons of the concrete present," and the glimpses were 
never developed or integrated into the living philosophy of the 
socialist movement.
In this essay Serge came very close to adopting a 
bureaucratic collectivist analysis of the USSR, a 'third 
solution' which was neither capitalist nor socialist but was 
defined by "bureaucratic planning based on the obliteration, 
degradation or abolition of private property." Serge was 
influenced by Franz Neumann's Behemoth,146 which defined the 
social structure of Nazi Germany, and was struck its 
similarities with Stalinism. Other writers as well, such as 
James Burnham, Dwight Macdonald and Sidney Hook, reached the
144Serge, "Necesidad de una renovacion del Socialismo," 
Mundo, Libert ad y Socialismo, Mexico, June 1945 (but written in 
April 1943.)
145Dated 1946, Serge archive, Mexico. Published in Masses, 
Paris, 1947.
146Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National 
Socialism 1933-1944, Oxford University Press, 1942, 1944.
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conclusion that the totalitarian states bore great resemblance. 
Trotsky, following Marx, also wrote (in Aug. 1939) of the 
collectivist tendencies of the modern economy.
Serge took the intuitive glimpse of Trotsky further, and 
showed how although Nazism was based on capital and supported by 
capital, the source of privileges in Nazi society depended more 
on cooperation in the political regime than ownership of the 
means of production or wealth.147 Serge wrote this essay at 
the end of the war, and thus did not see the short lived 
character of the Nazi regime, which served its purpose of 
crushing the working class so that capital could go its way 
unmolested by the threat of socialism. Nonetheless Serge was 
struggling here to define the future, which he thought, based on 
the tendencies of the modern economy, would lead to a limitation 
of laissez-faire through controls that would in practice abolish 
the free market. The new economic collectivism that he had 
thought synonymous with socialism as a youth now represented a 
new and terrible form of exploitation. This collectivism had 
none of the goals of socialism, of "the realization of a 
rational economy and the liberation of mankind, the realization 
of a human destiny that achieves a new dignity,"148 but this 
collectivism actually worsened the human condition and was, 
therefore, anti-socialist.
Serge then examined the Soviet Union in light of this new 
world form. While recognizing new distinct social categories in 
the USSR, Serge did not want to enter into the discussion of 
whether they should be called "classes, castes, social layers or
147 "**Serge, "L'URSS A-T-Elle Un Regime Socialiste?" 6 pp., 
Mexico 1946, Serge Archive, Mexico, p. 2. In fact, Serge went 
way out on a limb in July 1943, in a letter sent to the editor 
of Mundo, rhetorically titled "Es Capitalista la Economia Nazi?" 
a question he danced around without directly answering. Serge to 
Camarade directeur de Mundo, July 1943, Serge Archive, Mexico.
148—. . , _Ibid., p. 3.
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something else."149 This distinguishes him from both orthodox 
Trotskyist analysis, and the new class analysts of the state 
capitalist or bureaucratic collectivist tendencies. Serge 
examined instead, what he called the 'facts' of Soviet social 
structure, in which as much as 15% of the population comprised 
a penal workforce, enslaved and superexploited, and constantly 
renewed, (the "special reserve of labor"), 7% of the Soviet 
social hierarchy corresponded to the privileged layers, and the
150remaining 78% were exploited, impoverished workers.
Soviet totalitarianism, according to Serge, was established 
in 1936-38 through a bloody counterrevolution. The experience
of Stalinism proved that the abolition of private property,
collectivization and 'planning' could lead to a powerful, 
terrorist economic machinery and the most inhumane anti­
socialism. In an unpublished fragment Serge left behind in 
Mexico, he characterized the USSR as a 'bureaucratic
totalitarian state' and reaffirming the program of the Left 
Opposition, Serge insisted that had 'democratic planning' as 
opposed to 'Stalinist planning' been in place, industrialization 
would have "been slower but less exhausting and more
fertile."151
While "L'Urss A-T-Elle Un Regime Socialiste?" shows
extraordinary insight, it attempts a theorization of the new 
social structures without a political economy. The similarities 
between Stalinism and Nazism were striking, but so were the 
differences: Stalinism abolished the market, Nazism was a
politically controlled market capitalist society, short-lived 
and with the purpose of defeating the challenge of the working 
class.
149 . ,Ibid.
150 . . .Ibid., p. 4.
151Serge, Unpublished typescript, no date, no title, Serge 
archives, Mexico. (This fragment appears to have been written 
just after the war.)
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In a longer unpublished essay, "Economie Dirigee et
152Democratie" Serge again characterized the Soviet totalitarian 
state as one under siege, with a directed (or command) economy, 
rationing, state control over labor, a monopoly of power, 
thought control, and terror. Serge traced the administration of 
the economy to the "war time socialism" introduced in the 
capitalist economies during WWI, refined in the Soviet state 
with a one-party system, which Serge wrote, was no longer a 
political party, but a bureaucratic-military apparatus.153 While 
in the Soviet case the aim was socialism and the fascist one 
anti-socialist, Serge wrote they both accomplished 
"collectivization and planification of production within a 
national framework... which is autarchic."154
Unlike the earlier essay mentioned above, Serge does not 
here miss the essential difference between Stalinism and Nazism, 
which in the former rested on the annihilation of the old 
privileged classes, the collectivization of production and a new 
governing class of 'parvenus' from the working class, that rules 
in contradiction with itself because it must preserve the 
psychological tradition of socialism. In the case of the Nazis, 
the role of capital is central in creating and supporting the 
regime and results in an ongoing duality of power between the 
trusts and the party bureaucracy. This makes the Nazi regime 
less homogeneous, according to Serge.
Serge thought that the social transformations of Europe in 
the coming postwar world would include federations like the 
United States rather than traditional 19th century nation 
states; that the reconstruction would require planification 
continent-wide. Serge's ideas of the new Europe, which would be
152Serge, "Economie dirigee et Democratie," 36 pp (single­
spaced), no date, unpublished, Serge archive, Mexico.
153Serge, "Economie Dirigee..." p. 4.
154t , . ,Ibid.
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totalitarian and fascistic are fairly far from the marks he 
wrote that paper money would disappear both in reality and as a 
symbol, class struggle would still be determinant, but with a 
new factor, that of the state with its organized and planned 
monopoly capital, capable of response. He saw this new society 
as anti-democratic and neo-fascistic. Again Serge, was wrong, 
but with more than a measure of insight in his visions postwar 
social democratic regimes used nationalizations to strengthen 
capitalist rule, while the new Europe of 1992 at least posits a 
U.S. type economic federation.
As for the USSR, Serge described its continued anti­
socialist course, without even conceding a minimum of democratic 
reform. Brute force and the "complete absence of ideology ... 
translates simply as fear of thought and ideas."155 Under these 
conditions. Serge wrote that neither Soviets nor Bolsheviks nor 
Bolshevik Parties could reemerge. He continued:
"The Soviet experience shows us [in the implementation 
of the five year plans] what horrible waste, what 
involuntary sabotage and what unnamed sufferings the 
totalitarian regime imposed on the people in their own
•• 156 iname."
What Serge turned to here and in three other unpublished 
essays was the increased importance and thus privilege of the 
administrators and functionaries and technicians in the 
controlled economies. Examining the nature of 'collectivisation 
planifiee' Serge worried that the creation of a technocracy that 
runs the planning commissions will become the real governing 
power and replace the state. The problem for the working class 
would then become how to control the technocrats. Serge is here 
the precursor of the kind of thinking exemplified by the East 
Europeans Georgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, who identified the 
class power of the intelligentsia, whose teleological knowledge
155Ibid. . p. 12n.
156Ibid., p. 15.
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of production put them in a position of power in Soviet-type 
societies.157
Serge wrote that this form of economic organization created 
a passive obedience, horror of initiative and responsibility, 
individual massive resistance, involuntary sabotage, and 
enormous waste. The directed economy substitutes a minimum of 
economic liberty for the economic liberty of insecurity, but 
freedom from unemployment is not a real liberation unless 
accompanied by freedom of opinion. "If instead of fearing 
unemployment and hunger one has now to fear repression for one's 
thoughts, then a new captivity has emerged, maybe heavier and 
more regressive than the old."158
Serge wrote in an earlier article published in Partisan 
Review called "What is Fascism" that he found broad agreement 
with James Burnham on the role of the managers,159 that
"The next European revolution will be fought on the 
terrain of planned economy —  no longer for or against 
strangled capitalism . . . but over the question of 
management —  for whom? To whose benefit? ... The 
category of managers will tend to crystallize into a 
class and to monopolize power."
Thus, Serge thought that Burnham's theory was not incompatible
with Marxism and
"Capitalist economy is going under, yielding to new 
types of transitional planned economies: capitalism is 
so hopeless that we see the counter-revolutions it 
incited now forced to strangle their begetter, as in
157See Konrad and Szelenyi, 1974, The Intelligentsia on the 
Road to Class Power.
158Serge, "Economie Dirigee" pp. 21-22.
159Though the first pages of this essay are a ^ sustained 
attack on Burnham's abandonment of the Marxist method, his 
vulgar Marxism, and his facile equation of Bolshevism and 
Stalinism. His critique of Burnham's politics continued in 
another unpublished essay in the Mexico Archives called "Lenin's 
Heir?" and in a letter to Sidney Hook in 1943.
16°Victor Serge, "What Is Fascism?" Partisan Review. Vol. 
VIII, No. 5, Sept-Oct. 1941, p. 420.
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Germany and Italy and tomorrow elsewhere perhaps under 
other forms. But this does not do away with the 
problem of socialism. It remains in the very heart of 
the planned economies, because of the clash of 
interests (material and immaterial) between the rulers 
and the masses. Nor should we neglect the factors of 
psychology and tradition. From this standpoint, the 
struggle bears quite different aspects, according to 
whether the new managerial class is the product of an 
anti-working class and anti-Marxist counterrevolution, 
respectful (in theory) of private property, wedded to 
the principles of authority and hierarchy, as is the 
case in Germany and Italy —  or whether it is a class 
of usurpers who still invoke an ideology and tradition 
conflicting with its usurpation and standing for the 
democracy of work and the complete liberation of man.
I emphasize this in order to emphasize that even from 
the viewpoint of the 'managerial revolution' deep 
antagonisms exist between Nazism and Stalinism. In 
every case, finally, when confronted with a planned 
economy, we should pose the question: 'Planned by
whom? Planned for whom; Planned for what end? It is 
on this front that socialists will fight in the 
future, side by side with the masses." 1
Though Serge was sometimes ambiguous in his use of the term 
'planned economy,' the above passage makes it clear that he did 
not consider it genuine (Marxist) planning, but for ^ant of a 
better word, often settled on 'planning.' Yet the question he 
asked, "planning for whom, by whom?" demonstrated that for Serge 
the essential issue was that of democratic self organization 
versus totalitarian control.
As for the role of the technocrats or managers, Serge was 
not the first to draw attention to the growth of this group. He 
noticed that this stratum ran across social formations and 
concluded, at least partially, that there was a form of 
convergence, or that one social formation would result. This did 
not turn out to be the case. Both Burnham and Serge perceived 
that the world was in transition from capitalism and that the 
transition had transitional forms. Serge also pointed out the
161Ibid. ■ pp. 420-421.
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role that the first socialist revolution played in influencing 
this transition.
Serge's observation that managers gradually play a greater
role in capitalist production was also picked up by Marx, who
162spoke of "the joint stock firm making the capitalist otiose." 
Serge went too far, however, as the managers have not taken over 
capitalism, nor have they usurped power in the USSR. The 
assumption of control to whatever degree by the bureaucracy in 
the USSR is not the same thing as occurs in capitalism or in 
Nazi Germany. Serge was suggesting that the managers would 
expropriate power from the capitalists and in the USSR, would 
act as controllers. In the USSR, however, the technocrats or 
administrators have not usurped capitalists, but rather cannot 
become capitalists because of the resistance of the working 
class, in whose name they rule, and hence must instead be the 
administrators of production. If they were to become 'genuine 
capitalists' they would not need to hide their 'illegitimate' 
privileges.
Serge saw that the first socialist revolution influenced 
the modern development of the world, both capitalist and non­
capitalist. In the absence of workers democracy in the Soviet 
Union, administrators take the deliberate decisions that direct 
the economy, while in the advanced capitalist world the 
administrator-managers also increase their controlling role in 
production. If one looks at the immediate postwar world as the 
beginning of a standoff between capitalism and socialism, that 
is between capitalists and workers, a lacuna leading somewhere 
as yet undetermined —  then Serge's essays from this period 
appear all the more farsighted, even though he could not see how 
it would end. Rather than seeing the increasing role of: managers 
and controllers of production as a product of the failure of
162Thanks to Hillel Ticktin for this observation, HHT to SW, 
12 May 1990.
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socialism, he saw these managerial forms as steps on a necessary 
ladder.
While Serge could note the tendencies, his analysis was 
perhaps too sociological, without enough political economy. The 
world was not going collectivist, fascism remained capitalist 
though in a desperate form, and postwar capitalism remained 
capitalism, though it also adopted new forms.163 The managers 
have proved to be more pro-capitalist than collectivist, even 
though they assume a more important role in production than 
before. In the Soviet Union they play a dominant role, for a 
different reasons in capitalism it is the influence of 
socialism, while in the Soviet Union, it is because of the 
aborted revolution, or the failure of socialism. Serge died 
just as the Cold War was beginning, and so was not able to see 
the actual contours of the postwar world.
Nonetheless, as in so much of Serge's work, there is a 
fundamentally correct perception which is very suggestive, 
without being sufficiently penetrative. These insights also 
show Serge to be miles ahead of his cohorts, a thinker of the 
present time grappling with real problems instead of old 
postulates.164
Serge was certain socialism would ultimately win, and that 
it would come first to Europe, because Stalinism was inherently 
a weak system, even though he considered it more powerful and 
more dangerous than capitalism. Stalinism became more and more
163Serge, on the other hand, wrote the editors of PR that it 
was wrong to call fascism a 'new order' since there was "nothing 
new in despotism... Nazism brings an order new only in relation 
to capitalism, made up of old things that we hate, a really 
phenomenal retrogression, war being the oldest thing in the 
world." PR, Sept-Oct. 1941, p. 422.
164In this sense Serge went farther than Trotsky, who was 
clearly capable and should have begun to consider these 
problems, but was still too wedded to defending the nationalized 
property forms in the Soviet Union to actually analyze the 
content of these property forms.
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dangerous because of its weakness and, Serge wrote, because of 
the resistance of the working class, which would ultimately have 
the last word.
In an undated and unpublished essay from Mexico, Serge 
explored the lacuna mentioned above, in which the class struggle 
continues amidst a decomposing capitalism —  because of the 
influence of the Russian revolution, —  all the while making an 
enormous effort to break the resistance of the working class. 
This essay repeats many of the tendencies Serge discussed 
elsewhere, but succinctly. He saw the defeats of the working 
class in Germany and Spain as a sign of the decline of the 
working class, because of Stalinism and unemployment due to the 
rationalization of production. Serge wrote that the war was 
ultimately between totalitarian collectivism and the possibility 
of historically conscious collectivism. If the former wins then 
its the end of socialism for a whole era, —  but Serge did not 
think it would win.165
In this unpublished essay Serge again wrote of the tendency 
in modern capitalism toward a planned collectivization which 
marked the end of 'liberal' free-market capitalism. The 
collectivization of production would come into conflict with the 
privileges of the owning minorities, and would give rise to new 
privileged minorities —  the administrators and technicians —  
who the big capitalists would seek to integrate. In the new 
collectivism, the planning commissions would wield enormous 
power, like the old capitalist/financial oligarchies of earlier 
capitalism. There would also be enormous tension in the 
'directed economy' between the privileged minorities who would 
resort to totalitarian methods to repress the masses, and the 
need for freedom for scientific investigation —  essential for 
technical progress, —  and efficient functioning factories
165This is a loose summary of Serge's unpublished typescript, 
no date, no title, 2 pp., found in the Mexico archive. Many of 
the same points were raised in Serge's letter to Dwight 
MacDonald of 10 Sept 1943.
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needing freedom of criticism for the workers, and freedom of 
initiative. Thus Serge saw industrial democracy as
indispensable to the collectivization of production. Finally, 
Serge asserted that the class struggle will continue and 
socialism will be the natural and perfect culmination of these 
collectivist societies.
These last essays written from Serge's lonely Mexican exile 
show how much the Soviet Union continued to occupy center stage 
in Serge's thinking, and how deeply affected he was by the 
turbulent events in Europe before and during the World War. His 
essays were often perceptive but insufficiently rigorous, 
sometimes demonstrating more impressionistic conjecture than a 
thoroughgoing political economy. He was haunted by the twin 
fears of the spread of totalitarian collectivism and the 
possibility of a new war, which he thought Stalin was preparing, 
and worried that Stalin might use nuclear weapons. This 
preoccupation weighed heavily upon Serge who thought the Soviet 
Union was inherently unstable and weak, with Stalin ruling 
through brute force alone. He came to believe that change had to 
come from within, but this was near impossible to accomplish.
In 1945 Serge wrote an article in English, which stated 
that the democratic aspirations of the Soviet workers must be 
encouraged from the outside. He even laid out a program for the 
'Great Soviet reform' which he saw as the only guarantee against 
a new war. This article is uncharacteristic for Serge, because 
it is both vague and contradictory, positing a democracy that 
could be confused with bourgeois democracy.166 Serge was 
troubled by his vision of totalitarian collectivisms strangling 
human rights on a world scale and understood that only class 
struggle and mass action could counteract this perspective, the 
very actions most difficult to undertake in a totalitarian 
society. Like so much of Serge's work, this essay suffers from
166Unpublished Mss, "On the Russian Problem" 1945, 8pp, Serge 
Archives, Mexico.
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impressionistic speculation even though it is aiming in the 
right direction.
Serge struggled with these questions as a Marxist with the 
experience of Stalinism foremost in his mind, and having just 
gone through fascism. The mature Serge was no less Marxist for 
going beyond the orthodoxies, nor had he reverted to anarchism, 
moralism, centrism or Menshevism. He was constantly developing, 
incorporating new ideas: in 1943, he wrote to Dwight Macdonald 
that modern psychology must be integrated with Marxism, which 
would be enriched by this body of knowledge. After all, he told
167Macdonald, "Man is a conscious animal!" In May 1947, Serge
168published an article "Socialism and Psychology" in which he 
argued forcefully that "to meet the exigencies of our day, 
socialism must enrich itself with the newly-acquired knowledge
169of the motivating factors determining human conduct."
Serge, then, was engaged in a renewal of Marxist thought, 
in which no shibboleth was too sacred to leave unscrutinized. 
Even the revolution of 1917, which Serge defended just as he 
defended its early years, the time of Lenin, was worthy of new 
reflection. Serge wrote that 30 years later one couldn't expect 
1917 to repeat itself in a transformed global situation with new 
actors on the scene. There was still much to learn from the 
experience of the first proletarian revolution, but surely one 
essential lesson was that new revolutions must be "socialist —  
in the humanist sense of the word —  and more precisely, 
socializing, through democratic, libertarian means."170 Another 
important lesson regarded organization, which Serge recognized
167Serge to MacDonald, Mexico, Sept. 7, 1943. ^MacDonald
Papers, Yale University Library).
168Serge, "Socialism and Psychology," in Modern Review, vol. 
1, No. 3, May 1947, pp. 194-202.
169Ibid., p. 195.
170Serge, "Trente Ans Apres La Revolution Russe," p. 32.
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as necessary, though he cautioned against "centralization, 
discipline, [and] guided ideology."
Finally, Serge, ever the optimist in spite of the darkness, 
reminded his readers that even though the first socialist 
revolution led to the "concentration camp universe" of 
Stalinism, its "high degree of development attained by state- 
controlled production" along with the advent of capitalist 
nationalizations in Europe would again creative imperatives that 
would "combine with the desire for social justice and a new 
found freedom to once again place the economy at the service of
171the community. "
Serge drew on the essential humanism of Marxism and its 
scientific spirit of open inquiry, while attacking those like
• 172Sidney Hook and James Burnham, who separated the class 
struggle from socialism, and saw Stalinism as the same as 
Bolshevism, Stalinist planning as Marxist planning. Serge was 
full of hope for the future, despite living through terrible 
defeats, and persecution so severe that he acknowledged that 
"critical intelligence" itself was dangerous173 to survival. 
Foreseeing totalitarian collectivist societies that were 
fundamentally anti-democratic and anti-socialist, Serge affirmed 
that the citizens of these states would "soon demand control 
over the elaboration and application of plans, choosing of 
managers and leaders, and the liberties which this control 
requires. "174
II. 5.21 Conclusion
171Serge, "TAALRR," pp. 33-34.
172Serge to Sidney Hook, "Marxism et Democratie," July 10,
1943.
173serge, Memoirs, p. 376.
174Typescript, no title, no date, Serge Archives, 2 pp.
479
Victor Serge's political trajectory, his writings and his 
life experience were unique in the revolutionary movement. His 
revolutionary integrity and dedication to humanity were not 
negotiable, were in fact beyond compromise. In an obituary for 
Serge that appeared in the January 1948 edition of Modern 
Review, the editors proclaimed "his chef d'oeuvre was his own
175life." In a New Left Review article, Nicholas Krasso wrote 
that Serge's life was most remarkable as a "corrective" to
176Stalinism. Serge was an intransigent socialist who believed 
at the same time that intransigence was necessary and dangerous: 
he was a Leninist whose support of the Russian revolution and 
its ideals was unwavering, and who, while contributing to 
Menshevik journals, nonetheless took them to task for 
identifying Leninism with Stalinism: and at the same time, Serge 
criticized certain of Lenin's practices for leaving the door 
open for a Stalin. Serge was a Trotskyist who was spurned by the 
Trotskyists, who called him a centrist for his nonconformist 
views. Serge differed from the Trotskyists because he held that 
the revolution began to degenerate with the establishment of the 
Cheka and the death penalty, and slid down the road to 
Totalitarianism as early as 1921, with Kronstadt and NEP. He 
even dared to suggest that the Marxist project, as interpreted 
by too many "Marxists" was totalitarian,177 though the 
aspiration and struggle for social justice was profoundly 
democratic.
Serge angered all his political associates by publishing 
wherever he could: Trotsky was enraged to see his articles in La 
Revolution proletarienne. which he considered a journal of
175"In Memorium: Victor Serge," Modern Review Vol II, No. 1, 
January 1948, pp. 6-7.
176Nicholas Krasso, "Revolutionary Romanticism," New Left 
Review, No. 21, Sept-Oct. 1963, pp. 107-111.
177"A Definition of Socialism," Unpublished manuscript, no 
date, Serge Archive, Mexico.
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'petty bourgeois syndicalists' and Dwight Macdonald and others 
worried about Serge's association with the Menshevik New Leader 
in New York. In the former case Serge disagreed with Trotsky and 
published with the sole aim of gaining as wide an audience as he 
could, and with the latter, Serge was also trying to make a 
living and hence published where he could, with pay.. Macdonald, 
who befriended and supported and published Serge, worried that 
Serge was becoming a professional anti-Stalinist like the others 
around the New Leader, such as Max Eastman, and Sidney Hook. 
Alan Wald reiterates this point in his article "Victor Serge and 
the New York Anti-Stalinist Left, 1937-47 ”178, where he is 
certain that Serge was on the same path as these ex-Marxists.
Serge confounded his comrades by his associations, but 
this had always been true, from the earliest days when he 
associated in the USSR with the theosophists, the Bolsheviks and 
the anarchists, in France with the revolutionary syndicalists 
and French socialists and Trotskyists, with the POUM in Spain 
and the Fourth Internationalists in Belgium and France. It was 
no different in Mexico, where Serge took up with psychologists, 
revolutionists, syndicalists and social democrats. Serge was in 
sum, always a maverick. He was universally denounced and 
maligned, by the right (as a unrepentant Marxist revolutionary) 
by the Stalinists (who called him a fascist-Trotskyite Fifth 
Columnist) by the Trotskyists (who called him a centrist or a 
petty-bourgeois intellectual moralist). The Social Democrats 
considered him an ex-Marxist, and the various anti-Stalinists in 
the left, when they weren't attacking him, were claiming him as 
their own.
Throughout this study we have tried to show where Serge 
stood, and what his ideas were in relation to the 'course of 
Soviet historical and political development. It is because his 
writings are so varied in his final years, and so suggestive —
178Forthcoming, in a special issue of Critique devoted to 
Victor Serge.
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often taking ambiguous directions —  that he could easily be 
claimed or disowned by any of the anti-Stalinist tendencies. 
What distinguishes his writing, apart from its poetic 
expressiveness, is that it is rich, varied and questioning.
Even in defeat, Serge sought to reaffirm his Marxism, 
noting that we socialists
"should not be too discouraged if we see clearly why 
and how we have been beaten. After all, we are used 
to it, we know that we must be the defeated for a long 
time in order no longer to be so one day. And we 
have, in spite of everything, enough victories behind 
us to keep us going, provided we don't renounce the 
compass Marx has left to us."179
Serge was unable to satisfactorily resolve the lives of his 
characters in The Long Dusk180 and so considered the work 
inferior. I think rather that history offered no resolution, but 
this novel, like Serge's work in general was one of great 
insight and evocation, and also of hope, not naive hope, but of 
a far more profound hope based on a deep understanding of human 
history and social processes, and this hope that Serge's work 
expresses was a victory in itself.
Serge's ideas consigned him to a life of poverty and
obscurity: his rejection of both the Soviet state and the
capitalist West assured his marginality. He paid dearly: he has 
been ignored or poorly understood, his books have disappeared, 
been confiscated, or remain unpublished even though they 
establish him as a man of the contemporary world, whose ideas 
are increasingly relevant.
Victor Serge is more than an historical figure, whose 
writings are a neglected addition to a chapter of the twentieth 
century. Although his role in shaping events was not as decisive 
as that played by revolutionary leaders whose theories and
179Serge, "What is Fascism?" PR, Vol. VII, No. 5, Sept-Oct.
1941.
180Diary entry for 4 December 1944, "On the Ending of the 
Novel," Carnets, p. 173.
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actions made them towering figures, Serge's perception and 
description of these events casts a light on the actions and 
ideas of both leaders and masses which not only illuminates the 
past but reflects on today's world as well. The aim of this 
study is to let more people see that brilliant light.
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Bilan de la reaction stalinienne
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Economie dirigee et democratie
Proposiciones Del Independent Labour Party (I.L.P.) de 
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Nuevo Movimiento Socialista Internacional, Problemas 
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L'avenir du Socialisme
Alice et Otto Ruhle sont morts
Modigliani, notice necrologique
Peuples et regimes
Que deviennent les refugies italiens en URSS?
Sur le conflit russo-polonais et le regime de l'URSS 
Que la guerre economique commenca ave le nazisme 
Es capitalista la economia nazi?
L'Assassinat de Trotsky. Dossier sur Jacson - Mor^ard 
Calomnie (1936-1937)
Theses sur la revolution russe (1937)
Puissance et limites du Marxisme (fev. 1938 and Oct. 41) 
Bessarabie et Dobroudja (9 mai 40)
Serge to Nancy and Dwight MacDonald, June 7, 1941 
Pour la democratie Sovietique, 14 Sept 41 
La guerre et la democratie sovietique, Mexico, 7 Dec. 41 
Avenir de l'URSS, Dec. 41
Mexico, enero de 1942: A los Ciudadanos, Presidente de los
Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Presidente de la Camara de 
diputados, Secretario de Gobernacion" signed Serge, 
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Bilan provisoire de la campagne de Russie, Feb. 5, 42, 
(Pour Bohemia)
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"traditionnelle" devant la guerre (mai 42)
"La guerre et la pensee" 4 aout 42
Lettre a Maurice Wullens sur 1'antisemitism et quelques 
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L 'Extermination des Juifs de Varsovie (28 Jan 43)
La Question Juive, reponse a la revue "Babel" 12 Oct
"Marxism et Democratie," letter from Serge to Sidney Hook, 
May 1943
La Fondation de la Illeme Internationale, Fin mai 43
L'Organisation du Komintern, fin mai 43
Sur le probleme des Partis, Juin 43
L'Internationalisme socialiste est-il-fini? (juin 43)
Le Socialisme et l'avenir de l'europe, juillet 43
Letter to Harold Laski, 6 aug. 43 (sur la collaboration de 
socialism europeene avec l'URSS)
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Socialisme et questions coloniales, Nov. 43
Reponse au questionnaire de 1'ILP concernant un nouveau 
mouvement Socialiste International, Mexico, 6 Dec. 43
Determinisme de la Politique de l'URSS (1943?)
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Sur Malaquaise (Journal de Guerre) published in Hiio 
Prodigq, Mexico, Marzo 44)
Sur Jean Malaquaise (journal de guerre) (published in 
Politics, NY, April 44)
Deuil a Mexico (sur la mort de Fritz Fraenckel) 26 june 44 
(sent to Levitas at New Leader. NY)
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Les enigmes staliniennes, Mexico 6.IX.44
Manoeuvres dans le Komintern (10.4.44)
La Pologne et l'avenir de l'Eruope (Nov. 1944)
Vers un renouvellement du socialisme? Mexico, Jan. 1945
Le temps du courage intellectuel, Mexico, Jan. 45, (Para 
"BABEL," Santiago de Chile)
L'Economie Planifiee et la Liberte de la Presse, 20.2.45,
New Leader. NY
Problemes du socialisme (fev. 45)
"Lenin's Heir?" fin mai 45
Two letters to S. Levitas of the New York New Leader. 7
June 1945 and 18 June 1945, both letters in English,
warning about Manouilski, Due los and others who may be 
agents in the USA.
"Necessity of Free Information and discussion for the
European Trade-union and Socialist Movements" (in 
English, 2 June 45)
Les oppositions en URSS, Mexico Juillet 45
"On the Russian Problem" Oct. 1945, 12pp (in English)
"Le dernier livre de Trotsky: Staline," 1946
L 'alternative: Democratie russe (mars 46, for The Call. NY)
Existentialisme? April 1946, (For "Death", NY, handwritten 
note says "publie" NY 1946)
Planification et Liberte, Mexico, 1946
'El Ciudano Vichinsky" (in Spanish), 1947, 3pp
L'Appareil Central du Komintern (published in Plain Talk), 
NY Feb. 47)
Crimes sur crimes, Mexico, mai 47
La Substance Du Komintern (with cover letter to S.M. 
Levitas of the New Leader. NY, Mexico, Oct. 24, 47.
L'URSS a-t-elle un regime socialiste (published in Masses 
1947 and Accion Sociale 1947)
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Les causes de 1'imperialisme sovietique (Nov. 47) (for 
Revista de las Americas)
Trente ans apres la Revolution russe (Nov. 1947, published 
in RP, Nov. 47)
I. Journalism (Cited by Periodical)
This is not a complete list of Serge's journalism
l'Anarchie. 1909-1912
"Les anarchistes et la transformation sociale" 252, (3 
Fev 1909)
"Sur la violence" 297, (15 Dec. 1910)
"Les Bandits" 352, (4 January 1912)
Bulletin Communiste. 1921-24
(Organe du Parti Communiste (S.F.I.C.) Hebdomadaire.
"Les Anarchistes en Russie," 1921, p. 57.
"La Revolution d'octobre a Moscou," no. 36-37, 1921,
p. 612.
"Lettre de Russie," 1921, p. 723.
"Revolution-Legende et Revolution-Realite," 1921, 
p. 755.
"Les Tendances nouvelles de l'Anarchisme russe," no. 
1921, p.808.
"Les Methodes et les Procedes de la police Russe," no. 
1921, p. 829.
"La Confession de Bakounine," 1921, p. 941
"Raymond Lefebvre," no. 14, 1921, p. 223.
"Lichtenstadt (Mazine)," no. 42, 1921, p. 702.
"Notes d'Allemagne" R. Albert, no. 41, 11 Oct. 1923, 
pp. 625-631.
"Notes d'Allemagne" R. Albert, no. 42, 18 Oct. 1923, 
pp. 650-652.
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"Notes d'Allemagne," R. Albert, no. 43, 25 Oct 1923, 
pp. 779-780.
"Notes d'Allemagne: R. Albert, no. 45, 8 Nov. 1923,
pp. 808-810.
"Notes d'Allemagne," R. Albert, no. 46, 15 Nov 1923, 
pp. 823-830.
"Notes d"Allemagne" par R. Albert, no. 47, 22 Nov
1923, pp. 853-855.
Biulleten oppozitsii, 1936— 39
"Pis'mo Viktora Serzha Andre Zhidu," No. 50, May 1936.
(VS letter to LDT reproduced in a report on Political 
Persecution in the USSR, signed "LT") No. 51, 
July-Aug. 1936.
Clarte, 1922-27 Directeur Henri Barbusse
"Les Classes moyennes dans la Revolution russe," Clarte,
1922.
"Les Ecrivains russes et la revolution," Clarte, 1922.
"La Nouvel ecrivain et la Nouvelle litterature," Clarte,
1923.
"Boris Pilniak", Vol. 1923, Clarte, no. 36, 1923.
"La Semaine" de I. Lebedinsky", no. 56, 1924.
"Vsevolod Ivanov," No. 74, 1925.
"La Litterature epique de la Revolution: N. Tikhonov et
Serafimovitch," Clarte, Vol. 1925, pp. 389-391.
"Devant la revolution allemande: Les Riches contre la
nation," R. Albert, Clarte, No. 46,"Nov. 1, 
1923, p. 428.
"Au seuil d'une Revolution: la 'retraite d'October' en
Allemagne." Berlin, Janvier 1924. R. Albert (a 
suivre) Clarte. no. 52, 1 Fev. 1924. pp. 66-68.
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"Au Seuil d'Une Revolution: Le P.C. Allemand se critique
lui- meme." R. Albert, Clarte. no 53, 15 Feb.
1924, pp. 96-98.
"Notations d'Espagne." Clarte, no. 55, 1924, p. 140.
"Chroniques de la Vie Intellectuelle en Russie: Vsevolod 
Ivanov." Clarte, no. 56, 1924, p. 151.
"Lenine 1917." Clarte, no. 58, 1924, p. 203.
"Lenine 1917." Clarte, no. 59, 1924, p. 223.
"Lenine 1917." Clarte. no. 60, 1924, p. 249.
"Lenine 1917." Clarte, no. 61, 1924, p. 285.
"Un incident (lettre a 'Nakanounie7)."Clarte, no. 59,
1924, p. 241.
"Chroniques de la Vie Intellectuelle en Russie: Valere 
Brioussov." Clarte, no. 67, 1924, p. 473.
"Chroniques de la Vie Intellectuelle en Russie: 
Mayakovsky." Clarte, no. 69, 1924, p. 504.
"Une fiere equipe.". Clarte, no. 70, 1925, p. 8.
"Une litterature proletarienne est-elle possible? " Clarte, 
no. 72, 1925, p. 121.
"Un portrait de Lenine par Trotski." Clarte, no. 75, 1925, 
p. 255.
"La litterature epique de la Revolution." Clarte, no. 79,
1925, p. 389.
"La verite sur l7attentat de Sarajevo. La complicite de 
l7Etat-Major russe. "Clarte. no. 74, 1925, p. 205.
Parijanine, "La ville en danger, de Victor Serge," (Book 
Review) Clarte. no. 70, 1925, p. 24.
"Les jeunes ecrivains russes de la Revolution" entre e 
passe et 17avenir. "Clarte, no. 2, 1926-27, p. 50.
"Les nouveaux aspects du probleme de la guerre," Clarte, 
no. 3, 1926-27, p. 67.
"Au lendemain de 17Insurrection d7octobre." Clarte. no. 4, 
1926-1927, p. 115.
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"La Mariage en U.R.S.S." Clarte. no. 6, 1926-1927, p. 175.
"Le Bolchevisme et 1'Asie." Clarte, no. 7, 1926-1927, p. 
195.
"Une "Le Bolshevisme et l'Asie" Clarte, New Series, No. 7, 
15 Mar. 1927, p. 195-199;
"Grande Experience oubliee: La Commune finlandaise de
1918," Clarte. no. 8, 1926-1927, p. 237-241.
"La lutte des classes dans la Revolution chinoise (I)."
Clarte, New Series, No. 9, 15 mai 1927, p. 259- 
266.
"La lutte des classes dans la Revolution chinoise (II)."
No. 11, Clarte, no. 11, 15 juillet 1927, pp. 323- 
329.
"La lutte des classes dans la Revolution chinoise 
(III), "Clarte. No. 12, 15 aout 1927, pp. 356- 
362.
"La lutte des classes dans la Revolution chinoise (IV)," 
Clarte. No. 13, 15 sept. 1927, pp. 382-392.
"La lutte des classes dans la Revolution chinoise (V)," 
Clarte. No. 14, 15 oct. 1927, pp. 406-412.
"Vers 17Industrialisation (I)."Clarte, no. 15, 1927, p. 
436.
"Vers 17Industrialisation (Part II)."Clarte, No. 16, 29 
Nov. 1927, p.486.
"Canton," appeared in La lutte des classes. Num. 1, fev- 
mars 1928. (last of the series on the Chinese 
Revolution)
La Correspondence Internationale. 1921-25
"Le Bilan d7une annee" 1922 par R. Albert, pp. 1-2 No. 1, 
3 Jan. 1923.
"L7Anniversaire du 15 Janvier: Karl Liebknecht et Rosa 
Luxembourg," par R. Albert (Berlin), no. 3, 10 
Jan 1923 pp. 1-3.
"Nouvelles d7Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 12, 9 fev
1923, p. 75.
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"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 61, 31 Juillet 
1923, pp. 456-7.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 63, 7 Aout 1923, 
pp.471-2
"La Greve Generale en Allemagne: Notes d'Allemagne," par 
R. Albert, no. 64, 15 Aout 1923, pp. 477-9.
"Notes d'Allemagne: La grande coalition a 1'oeuvre," par R.
Albert (Berlin), No. 70, 5 Sept 1923, pp. 523-28.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 71, 8 Sept 1923, p. 
535.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 72, 11 Sept 1923, 
pp. 542-33.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 73, 14 Sept 1923, 
pp. 551-2.
"La Dictature militaire en Espagne: La causes du
mouvement," R. Albert no. 74, 18 Sept 1923, pp.
557-8.
"Notes d'Allemagne: Vers la guerre civile," par R. Albert,
no. 77, 28 Sept 1923, pp 581-2.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 78, 2 Oct. 1923, pp
591- 2.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert (Berlin), no. 79, 5 Oct. 
1923, pp. 599-600.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, No. 82, 16 Oct 1923, 
pp. 623-624.
"Notes d'Allemagne; Vers une Commune allemande" par R. 
Albert, No. 83, 19 Oct 1923, pp. 630-631.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 84, 25 Oct. 1923, 
pp. 639-641.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 85, 26 Oct. 1923, 
pp. 649-651.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 86, 30 Oct 1923, 
pp. 656-658.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 87, 2 Nov., 1923, 
pp. 662-664.
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"Notes d'Allemagne" par R. Albert (Berlin), no. 89, 9 Nov. 
1923, pp. 679-681.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert (Berlin), no. 90, 13 Nov 
1923, pp. 689-692.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert, no. 91, 17 Nov. 23, pp. 
696-697.
"Notes d'Allemagne," par R. Albert (Berlin), no. 92, 20 
Nov. 1923, pp. 705-6.
The Communist
"Five Years Struggle" Vol. 4, May-Oct 1923, London, pp. 
162- 164.
The Communist International
"Frame of mind of the French Proletariat," No. 1, May 
1919.
"Letter from France," No. 2, June 1919.
Le Crapouillot, 1938
"La Pensee anarchiste," numero special, Jan. 1938, 2-13.
L'Emancipation Pavsanne
"Staline contre les paysans," 3 Fev. 1940, pp. 1-8. 
l'En Dehors
"A propos de Romain Rolland," 15 fevrier 1934.
Esprit, 1936-39
"Lettres a Magdeleine Paz et a Andre Gide," 45 juin 1936.
"Meditation sur 1'Anarchie," 55, March, 1937.
"Litvinov," 81, juin 1939.
La Fleche. 1936-7
"Tenebres," 31, 19 Sept. 1936.
"Un appel de Victor Serge a Romain Rolland," 52. 6 fev.
1937.
"Analyse d'un crime," 78, 7 aout 1937.
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El Hiio Prodiqo (Revista Literaria)
"El Mensaje del Escritor," Vol. VI, Num. 21, Die. 1944.
Horizon (A Review of Literature and Art)
"Letter from Mexico," Vol. XV, No. 85, Jan. 1947., pp. 63- 
72.
L'Humanite, 1924-27
"La vie intellectuelle en URSS: Un nouveau livre de Maxime 
Gorki," 5 aout 1926.
"Litterature proletariennes La Vie intellectuelle en URSS," 
26 Sept. 1926.
"Litterature proletarienne: Iouri Libedinsky," 17 oct.
1926.
"Ecrivains proletariens: A. Serafimovitch," 11 Dec. 1926.
"Ecrivains proletariens: Les memorialistes de la
revolution," 19 Dec. 1926.
"Les Idees de Boris Pilniak," 25 Mai 1927.
Les Humbles, 1936-39
"Lettres a Maurice Wullens," 21, no. 5, Mai 1936, and no. 
8, aout 1936.
"Lettres a Henri Barbusse," 22, nos. 8-9, aout-sept 1937.
"Deux recontres," 24, nos. 8-12 (aout-dec. 1939) (Published 
in English as "Twice Met" in International Socialism, 
20, Spring, 1965.
Inprekorr. Vienna
R. Albert, 26 Feb. 1925
R. Albert, 12 Mar. 1925
International Presse-Korrespondenz.
R. Albert, Vol. I, October-December 1921, Nos. 1-20. 
R. Albert, No. 103, June 21, 1923, p. 869.
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International Press Correspondence (Inprecorr) (English 
edition)
"The Causes of the Russian Famine."Vol. I, No. 3, p. 26, 
1921.
"The Reality of the Famine." Vol. I, No. 6, p. 51, Nov. 8,
1921.
"To the Rescue: For the Right of Political Asylum," R. 
Albert, Vol. I, No. 6, Nov. 8, 1921, p. 45
"The Downfall of the Russian 'Whites,'" R. Albert, Vol.
1, No. 10, 22 Nov. 1921, p. 82.
"Intellectual Life in Russia," (Kiev), Vol. 2, No. 68, 12 
Aug. 1922.
"The Nobel Case," (Kiev), Vol. 2, No. 69, 15 Aug. 1922.
"From Havre to Kattovitz and Vienna," (Moscow), R. Albert, 
Vol.2, No. 75, 1 Sept. 1922.
"Five Years... (Kiev, 20 Oct. 1922), Vol. 2, No. 96, 7 Nov.
1922.
"The Worst Counter-Revolution," Vol. II, No. 108, Dec.
1922.
"To the Rescue of the Spaniards," R. Albert, Vol. II, No.
2, 1922, p. 16.
"The Social Democrats and Reparations," R. albert, Vol. 3, 
No. 33 [15], 19 April 1923.
"From Gallifet to Mussolini," R. albert, Vol. 3, No. 34 
[16], 26 April 1923.
"War: a conversation with a Pacifist," R. Albert, Vol. 3, 
No. 36 [18], 9 may 1923.
"French Imperialism in Poland," Vol. 3, no. 41 [23], 7 June
1923.
"The Military Dictatorship in Spain," R. Albert, Vol. 3, 
no. 62 [40] 27 Sept. 1923.
"The New Fiume Crisis," R.A., Vol. 3, No. 64 [41], 4 Oct.
1923.
"The Museum of the Revolution in Petrograd," Vol. 3, No. 
54, [32], 2 aug. 1923.
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"Lenin and Imperialism," (Kieff), Vol. 3, No. 60 [38], 13 
Sept. 1923.
"The Bloodiest of all Democracies," R. Albert, Vol. 4,
No.2, 10 Jan. 1924.
"The Third International," R. Albert, Vol. 4, No. 15, 28 
Feb. 1924.
"May 1st, 1924" (Paris), R. Albert, Vol. 4, No. 26, 24
April 1924.
"After the French Elections," R. Albert, Vol. 4, No. 30, 
May 1924.
"Anatole France," Vol. 4, No. 73, 16 Oct. 1924.
"Five Months of the government of the Left Block in 
France," R. Albert, Vol. 4, No. 77, 6 nov.
1924.
"The Ebert Slander Case," R. Albert, Vol. 4, No. 86, 18
Dec. 1924.
"The Events in Spain," R. Albert, Vol. 4, No. 90, 31 Dec.
1924.
"The Police Provocations in Poland," 1925, No. 64, p. 919.
"The Asassination of Todor Panitza in Vienna," R. Albert,
1925, No. 43, p. 554.
"Friedrich Ebert," R. Albert, 12 March 1925, No. 19, p.271.
"The German Tcheka," R. Albert, No. 17, 26 Feb. 1925, p. 
230.
Modern Review
"Socialism and Psychology," Vol. 1, No. 3, May 1947, pp. 
194- 202.
"In Memorium: Victor Serge," (the Editors), Vol II, No. 1, 
January 1948, pp. 6-7.
Mundo. Libertad v Socialismo
"A Donde Va Stalin?" Mexico, Oct-Nov. 1943, pp. 14-15.
"Necesidad de una renovacion del Socialismo," Mexico, June 
1943, pp. 18-19.
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"Socialismo y Psicologia," #16, Santiago de Chile, Abril- 
Mayo 1948, pp. 10-14.
"La Tragedia de los Escritores Sovieticos," #17, Santiago 
de Chile, agosto-sept. 1948, pp. 8-12.
"Los Alemanes," #18, Santiago de Chile, feb-marzo 1949, pp. 
10-13.
New Essays
"Escape From Freedom, by Erich Fromm," reviewed by Serge, 
Vol. VI, no.3, Spring 1943
The New International (1938-39, 1942, 1949-1951)
"Once More: Kronstadt," July 1938, pp. 211-212.
"A Letter and Some Notes," Feb. 1939, pp. 53-54.
"Again, Riazanov and Sneevliet," Sept. 1942, p. 255.
Excerpts from Serge's Year One printed in the following:
"The October Insurrection," 14, No. 3, March 1948, pp. 
83-90.
"The Counter-Revolutionary Socialists," 14, No. 4, 
April 1948, pp/ 123-126.
"The First Flames of Civil War," 14, no. 5, July 1948, 
pp. 155-58.
"The Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly," 14, no. 
6, August 1948, pp. 187-190.
"Summary of First Months," 14, no. 7, September 1948,
pp. 220-221.
"The Dispute Over Brest-Litovsk," 14, No. 8, Oct.
1948, pp. 252-255.
"The Revolution in Finland," 14, No. 9, Nov. 1948, pp. 
282-286.
"Left Communism and Inner-Party Conflict," 15, No. 1, 
Jan. 1949, pp. 30-33.
"The Suppression of the Anarchists," 15, No. 2, Feb.
1949, pp. 60-62.
"Life and Culture in 1918," July 1949, pp. 157-159.
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Excerpts from Serge's Pages of a Diary printed in the 
following:
"Andre Gide, Arrests at Leningrad (Vera, Esther),
Disappearance of Andres Nin, Krivitsky," 15, No. 
10, Sept. 1949, pp. 214-18.
"Reiss, Krivitsky, Bastich, Others, Agabekov, Rossi, 
Anton Ciliga, The Klement Affair, Krivitsky, 
Brandler, Dzerzhinsky, Stalin, Semyonov)" 16, No.
1-2, Jan-Feb. 1950, pp. 51-7.
"The Case of Doriot, Alexis Tolstoy, Nicola Bombacci," 
16, No. 3-4, March-April 1950, pp. 115-121.
"The tragedy of Romain Rolland, Erongaricuaro, 
Justification of Duplicity," 16, no. 5-6, May- 
June 1950, pp. 177-179.
"Fedin and Gorky" 16, No. 7-8, July-Aug. 1950, pp. 
249- 251.
"The Tomb of Coyoacan, Jacson, The Assassin," 16, No. 
9-10, Sept.-Oct. 1950, pp. 309-13.
"Koka, Kravchenko," 16, No. 11-12, Nov.-Dec. 1950, 
pp. 368-371.
New Leader 1942-1947, (Serge was their Mexican Correspondent)
"Letter from Victor Serge," Feb. 7, 1942, p. 1.
"Gorkin stabbed as Mexican CP Wrecks Erlich, Tresca 
Meeting," April 17, 1943, p. 1.
"Letter from Victor Serge," May 1, 1943, p. 1 and 7.
"The Trotsky Murder —  GPU Fails to Save Jacson from 
20-year Term," May 8, 1943, p. 4.
"Another Chapter in the Mystery of Mornard —  
Trotsky's Murderer," Nov. 20, 1943, p. 2.
"Spanish Liberation Junta in Action," Feb.^12, 1944, 
p. 5.
"Stalin's Plan for Germany," March 11, 1944, p. 9. 
"The Spanish Junta," April 8, 1944, p. 5.
"Men in Exile," May 13, 1944, No. 20, p. 7.
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"Spain at the Crossroads," June 10, 1944, p. 6.
"The Fate of Italian Refugees in the USSR," Aug. 19,
1944, p. 9.
"In Defense of Andre Gide," Vol. XXVII, No. 49, Dec. 
2, 1944, pp. 12-13.
"Who Will Succeed Franco," an Interview with Indalecio 
Prieto, Dec. 16, 1944, p. 6.
"The Death of Oumansky," Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, Feb. 10,
1945, p.4.
"Spanish Communist Maneuvers," Vol. XXVIII, No. 7, 
Feb. 17, 1945, p. 7.
"Stalin's Drang Nach Osten" (Mongolia as base of 
Russian operations in Asia), written with Robert 
T. Oliver, Vol. XXVIII, No. 33, August 18, 1945,
p. 6.
"The Spanish Government in Exile," Vol. XXXVIII, No. 
37, Sept. 15, 1945, p. 3.
"Toledano, CTAL and WFTU," Vol. XXVIII, No. 46, Nov. 
17, 1945.
"Plebiscite for Spain?" Vol. XXVIII, No. 51, Dec. 22, 
1945, Section 1, p. 8.
"A Note on Lombardo Toledano," Vol. XXIX, No. 45, Nov. 
9, 1946, p. 5.
"Trotsky's Murderer," Vol. XXX, No. 14, April 5, 1947, 
p. 5.
"Ukrainian Writers in DP Camps," Vol. XXX, No. 17, 
April 26, 1947.
"The NKVD in Mexico," Vol. XXX, No. 28, July 12, 1947,
p. 2.
"Toledano's New Party, " Vol. XXX, No. 44^ Nov. 1, 
1947, p. 1.
"Death of Victor Serge," (the Editors), Vol. XXX, No. 
47, 22 Nov. 1947.
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Partisan Review 1938-1947
"Marxism in Our Time," Vol. V, no. 3, Aug-Sept 1938.
"Note on Kronstadt- letter," Vol. VI, No.2, Winter 1939.
"What Is Fascism?" Vol. VIII, No. 5, Sept-Oct. 1941, p. 
420.
"French Writers, Summer 1941," Vol. VIII, no. 5, Sept-Oct. 
1941.
"On the Eve," Vol. IX, No.l, Jan-Feb. 1942.
"In Memory: L.D. Trotsky," Vol. IX, No. 5, 1942.
"French Expectations," vol. XII, No. 2, Spring 1945.
"The Socialist Imperative," discussion, "The Future of 
Socialism: V," Vol. XIV, No. 5, Sept-Oct. 1947.
Politics (1944-1947)
Note on Mundo, Vol. 1, No. 3, march 1944
Review .of Malaquais' War Diary. Vol. 1, No. 3, March 1944.
"The Revolution at Dead-End," Vol. 1, No. 5, June 1944.
"The End of Europe," Vol. 1, No. 7, Aug. 1944
"Stalinism and the Resistance: a Letter," Vol. 2, no. 2, 
Feb. 1945.
"Vignettes of NEP," vol. 2, No. 6, June 1945.
"Letter from Victor Serge," Vol. 2, No. 6, June 1945.
"The Responsibility of Peoples," Vol. 2, No. 8, Aug. 1945.
"War Communism," Vol. 2, No. 3, March 1945.
"Kronstadt," vol. 2, no. 4, april 1945.
"In Memory: Boris Voline," Vol. 3, No. 2, Feb. 1946.
"Soviet Culture: Mandelstam," Vol. 3, No. 11, Dec. 1946.
"The Communists and Viet Nam,' Vol. 4, No 2, March-April 
1947.
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La Revolution proletarienne, 1928-47
"La Profession de foi de Victor Serge," 22, 3 Nov. 1928.
"Lettre de Victor Serge au Comite Central Executif des 
Soviets," 153, 10 juin, 1933.
"Lettre a Ses Amis, Bruxelles, Mai 1926," 156, 25 juillet 
1933.
"La correspondance de Victor Serge," 158, 28, Aout 1933.
"Quatre d'entre toutes" (poem), 1935, p. 11-12.
"Lettre a La Revolution proletarienne." 221, 25 avril 1936.
"Lettres a Magdeleine Paz et Andre Gide," 224, 10 juin
1936.
"La Verite Sur L'U.R.S.S.," Deux Lettres de Victor Serge, 
(These two letters to Magdeleine Paz datelined 
Brussels, May 1936, were also published in 16 
Fusilles, Ou va la Revolucion Russe?. pp. 51-58.)
"Ce qu'est devenue la Revolution Russe," 228, 10 Aout,
1936.
"Le cauchemar stalinien," 229, 25 Aout, 1936.
"Autour d'un crime," 230, 10 Sept. 1936.
"Suite du cauchemar," 232, 10 oct. 1936.
"Pas de temoins!" 233, 25 Oct. 1936.
"L'execution," 235, 25 Nov. 1936.
"Crimes en Russie, intrigues en Espagne," 236, 10 Dec.
1936.
"1'intrigue stalinienne en Espagne," 238, 10 Jan 1937.
"Insuite a grande tirage," 240, 10 fev. 1937. —
"La fin de Yagoda," 244, 10 avril 1937.
"La Fin des ecrivains thermidoriens," 246, 10 mai 1937.
"Victoir et defaite a Barcelone," 247, 25 mai, 1937.
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"La crise du regime stalinen," & "Gamarnik," 249, 25 juin,
1937.
"Adieu a Andres Nin," "Bezymenski," 253, 25 Aout 1937.
"Les ecrits et les faits," "Cronstadt," Cauchemar en URSS," 
"Execution de Mdivani, suicide de Lioubtchenko," "Ce 
que Staline veut detruire," 254, 10 Sept. 1937.
"Les ecrits et les faits," 255, 25 Sept. 1937.
"Les ecrits et les faits," "Barbarie" "Karakhane"
"L'Isolateur de Yaroslavl," 256, 10 Oct. 1937.
"Les ecrits et les faits," "Cronstadt 1921," "Contre 
1'esprit de secte," "Bolchevisme et Anarchisme," 257, 
25 oct. 1937.
"Le Stalinisme est-il une necesite historique?" " Antonov- 
Ovseenko," 258, 10 nov. 1937.
"Boukharine execute?" 259 25 Nov. 1937.
"Erwin Wolf," 260, 10 Dec. 1937.
"Leon Sedov," 265, 25 Fev. 1938.
"Le troisieme proces de Moscou, I," 266, 10 Mars 1938.
i
"Le troisieme proces de Moscou, II," 267, 25 mars 1938.
"Le troisieme proces de Moscou, III," 269, 25 Avril 1938.
"Nouvelles d'URSS," "Le Birobidian, republique juive," 276, 
10 Aout, 1938.
"Sur Cronstadt 1921 et quelques autres sujets," 277, 25 
Aout 1938.
"Les idees et les faits," "Cronstadt 1921," Defense de 
Trotski" "reponse a Trotski," No. 281, 25 oct. 1938.
"Trente ans apres la revolution russe," 309, nov. 1947.
RP Articles about Serge:
"Souscription pour Victor Serge," no. 122-2, 1933.
"Lettres," 11-155, 1933.
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